1. T HE VULNERABILITY OF OIL AND GAS INSTALLATIONS AND PIPELINES TO EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI E RNESTO S ALZANO I NSTITUTE OF RESEARCH ON COMBUSTION – I TALIAN NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL U NIVERSITY OF NAPLES « FEDERICO II» Towards disaster resilience: reducing risks from technological accidents triggered by natural hazards (Natech)" PUBLIC FORUM EVENT Tohoku University Sendai, Japan, 16 March 2015

2. Introduction The vulnerability of oil and gas installations and pipelines to earthquake and tsunami –16 March 2015 - Sendai (J) Very populated area around volcano (>3.5 millions) Twin town: Kagoshima Naples, Italy 2

3. Andy Warhol, Vesuvio (1985) Eruption 1872 Eruption 1906 Eruption 1944 Introduction Mt. Vesuvius is still active 34 y 38 y 41 y The vulnerability of oil and gas installations and pipelines to earthquake and tsunami –16 March 2015 - Sendai (J) 3

4. Introduction Pompei eruption 79 AD, Italy The vulnerability of oil and gas installations and pipelines to earthquake and tsunami –16 March 2015 - Sendai (J) 4

5. Na-Tech Tsunami Tsunami in Sicily (1908) The 1908 Messina earthquake and tsunami took about 123,000 lives, in Sicily and Calabria, southern Italy. …The gazometer was destroyed, with a dramatic fire fed by furious wind... [ Cds 29/12/1908 ] The vulnerability of oil and gas installations and pipelines to earthquake and tsunami –16 March 2015 - Sendai (J) 5

6. Introduction Mt.Etna Mt.Volcano, Stromboli Mt.Vesuvius Last strong earthquake in Naples area November 23, 1980 - Magnitude 6.89 Mw 2,914 killed, 10,000 injured 300,000 homeless - cost $ 52bn Napoli and South of Italy are one of the most hazardous area in the world in terms of Natural Events The vulnerability of oil and gas installations and pipelines to earthquake and tsunami –16 March 2015 - Sendai (J) 6

7. Natural disaster (earthquake, tsunami) Na-Tech Safety barriers Emergency response Mitigation systems Early Warning Multiple events with release of content and loss of control Unavailability of utilities ( electric power, cooling water ) Unavailability of safety barriers ( firefighting, catch basin ) Overloading of internal & public emergency services NA-TECH disaster fire, explosion, air pollution, enviromental consequences Koaceli earthquake (1999) – Tupra Refinery Chinese earthquakes (2008) – Shifang (ammonia) Katrina and Rita Hurricanes (2005) – Offshores and Coastal area Sendai earthquake and tsunami (2011): Cascading Effect The vulnerability of oil and gas installations and pipelines to earthquake and tsunami –16 March 2015 - Sendai (J) 7

8. Earthquake/Tsnuami Japan (2011): Ichihara – Cosmo Oil facility Emergency response in Ichihara was still able to cope with industrial accident despite earthquake and tsunami hence avoiding further consequences in the industrial area Na-Tech Multiple events, Cascading Effects The vulnerability of oil and gas installations and pipelines to earthquake and tsunami –16 March 2015 - Sendai (J) 8

9. Earthquake/Tsnuami Japan (2011) Sendai Nippon Refinery Na-Tech Overloading of emergency system, early warning Employees on roof after tsunami warning Tsunami early warning The vulnerability of oil and gas installations and pipelines to earthquake and tsunami –16 March 2015 - Sendai (J) 9

10. Na-Tech risks  Sound approaches to Na-Tech risk assessment is still missing in the current industrial practice even if they are now included in the European “Seveso” Directive NaTech may be 2 order of magnitude higher 10 -3 /N 2 (The Netherlands) Campedel M., Cozzani, Garcia-Agreda, Salzano, Extending the Quantitative Assessment of Industrial Risks to Earthquake Effects, Risk Analysis, 28, 1231-1246 (2008). The vulnerability of oil and gas installations and pipelines to earthquake and tsunami –16 March 2015 - Sendai (J) 10

11. Seismic Risk Assessment Propagation (Geophysics ) Site Effects (Geotechnical Engineering) Structural response (Structural/Seismic Engineering) Geological Characterisation Structural Failure Loss of control  RETURN-TO-SERVICE (Serviceability Limit State)  RECONSTRUCTION AND REPAIRING (Structural Limit State)  BUSINESS INTERRUPTION  UPGRADING OF EXISTING STRUCTURES  NEW DESIGN Fault Multisciplinary Simplification is needed Natural Hazard Structural Vulnerabiltiy The vulnerability of oil and gas installations and pipelines to earthquake and tsunami –16 March 2015 - Sendai (J) 11

12. Seismic Risk Assessment Limit State = Damage State (DS) Performance levels based on structural damage and/or component malfunctioning DS1 - absence of structual damage DS2 - slight damages to structures DS3 - moderate structual damages DS4 - extensive damage to structures DS5 - total collapse of structure Ultimate Limit State as defined by HAZUS No reference to hazmat losses, risk assessment, public safety, land use planning… Structural vulnerability Fragility curves Damage State Probability for the given earthquake intensity The vulnerability of oil and gas installations and pipelines to earthquake and tsunami –16 March 2015 - Sendai (J) 12

13. Seismic Risk Assessment Overturning, Sliding and Pipe detaching, Elephant Foot Buckling Structural vulnerability The vulnerability of oil and gas installations and pipelines to earthquake and tsunami –16 March 2015 - Sendai (J) 13

14. Seismic Risk Assessment Uplift Tohoku (Japan) 2011 Structural vulnerability Uplift Kashima Port, Ibaraki, Japan Severe liquefaction Sloshing The vulnerability of oil and gas installations and pipelines to earthquake and tsunami –16 March 2015 - Sendai (J) 14

15. Seismic Risk Assessment Structural vulnerability The vulnerability of oil and gas installations and pipelines to earthquake and tsunami –16 March 2015 - Sendai (J) 15

16. Structural Vulnerability Quantitative Risk Assessment Disaster Management, including shelter localisation Land Use Planning Emergency and Civil Protection Plans Hazard Structural damage of industrial equipment containing large amount of hazardous materials Release (Loss of Content) Industrial Accidental Scenarios Natural event Earthquake Tsunami Cascading effects Na-Tech Risk Assessment The vulnerability of oil and gas installations and pipelines to earthquake and tsunami –16 March 2015 - Sendai (J) 16

17. Risk State (RS) performance levels based on release of content (consequences) Damage State (DS): performance levels based on structural damage and/or component malfunctioning DS1 - absence of structual damage DS2 - slight damages to structures DS3 - moderate structual damages DS4 - Extensive damage to structures DS5 - total collapse of structure HAZUS RS1 - Shell damage with negligible loss of containment ( Φ < Φcrit = 10 mm) RS2 - Considerable loss of content ( total release in 10 minutes) RS3 - Total (instantaneous) loss of content (complete inventory) Main scope: evaluation of post-event economical losses (reconstruction, repair, upgrading) Ultimate Limit State Na-Tech Risk Assessment The vulnerability of oil and gas installations and pipelines to earthquake and tsunami –16 March 2015 - Sendai (J) 17

18. Observational fragilities – Full, anchored steel atmospheric tank RS1 effective loss of content RS2 total loss of content Salzano et al., Seismic risk of atmospheric storage tanks in the frame work of quantitative risk analysis, J Loss Prev in the Proc Ind, 16, 403-409, 2003 Na-Tech Risk Assessment The vulnerability of oil and gas installations and pipelines to earthquake and tsunami –16 March 2015 - Sendai (J) 18

19.  Natural-Technological Risks weights as “pure” industrial Risks  Simplified tools for Na-Tech ( fragility, probit coefficient, threshold values) are needed for emergency plans, shelter localisation, land use planning, QRA, mitigation, prevention  Changing the perspective: future development should be addressed by modify limit state concept from structural Damage State to Risk state related to loss of containment (and loss of control)  Dynamic system for emergency response is essential (time delay) Conclusions Thank you for your attention! Questions and comments are welcome salzano@irc.cnr.it The vulnerability of oil and gas installations and pipelines to earthquake and tsunami –16 March 2015 - Sendai (J) 19