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Public Affair IW-220 College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education.

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1 Public Affair IW-220 College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education

2 AFDD 2-5.4 the way we think about and use public information in a military operation... “the public information battlespace”

3 contents global information environment information as an instrument of national power informational flexible deterrent options virtual force projection case study - Haiti using themes & messages combating enemy PSYOP case study - Kosovo review

4 global information environment …technology & competition has changed the world !

5 global information environment media are virtually everywhere - and have the technology to broadcast information in real-time media will find people to talk to them -- if they don’t get info from us, they’ll get it from a less knowledgeable source, or from the enemy can’t hide major troop movements appearance of withholding/manipulating information can impair mission media attention and questions on an issue bring enormous pressure on political decision makers to act quickly...

6 the “CNN effect” a reality of the global information environment The speed of communications & commercial pressures to be first with a news story brings a sense of immediacy to journalism today. In essence, the CNN effect occurs when media attention and questions on an issue bring enormous pressure on political decision makers to act quickly without full knowledge of the situation. William J. Perry Former SECDEF given this, what advantages are there to dealing with the media ?

7 national support - funding - recruiting - national will - morale enemy decision making - show of force - resolve - sending clear messages how can this power of information and communications be effectively used by the NCA ?

8 information as an instrument of national power …every bit as powerful as diplomatic, economic, military instruments… combine them for an irresistible synergy

9 national will, or public support for the operation = strategic center of gravity information is crucial to the formulation of national will -- PA ops tells the story enemy will attempt to sway public opinion PA ops counters these threats by: 1. gaining and analyzing information about the environment 2. provide timely and accurate information 3. defending against enemy propaganda, threats or attack it’s important to create an effective synergy of PA ops within IO information as an instrument of national power


11 AF performs strategic, operational, and tactical PA ops utilizing deployable and reach-back capabilities in support of the JFC campaign plans contain PA ops -- commanders must build in PA ops considerations in the campaign plan right from the beginning PA ops actions and capabilities must be integrated within normal campaign planning and execution -- annex F and PA guidance should contain the commanders intent for PA ops, not just specific PA actions PA ops must be coordinated and de-conflicted with other IO activities -- this is done in the JFC IO cell these capabilities give the commander some real options... AFDD 2-5.4 considerations

12 informational flexible deterrent options …options other than “bombs on target”

13 “attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.” -- Sun Tzu, 4th Century B.C. how can we do this? informational FDOs

14 PA ops can be key to “driving a crisis back to peace” - Lt. Gen. Ron Keys, EUCOM J-3 heightening public awareness and gaining and maintaining their support promoting national (and coalition) policies, aims and objectives for the operation combating enemy dis-information keeping the operation in the news PA ops must be carefully orchestrated PDD - 68 helps informational FDOs

15 presidential decision directive PDD - 68 helps the U.S. government speak with: one voice one intent to the international audience goal: “...more deliberate and well-developed international public information strategy in promoting our values and interests.” integrates public affairs activities of government departments into overall strategy through interagency core group (ICG) PDD - 68 can create a powerful strategic synergy for the operational commander informational FDOs

16 interagency core group -- ICG assistant secretary-level reps from State, Defense, JCS, US AID, NIC, NSC, and other offices or agencies as situation requires ICG will establish sub-groups on regional, functional, and transnational issues as appropriate ICG chaired by Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs the ICG can coordinate powerful resources for the commander’s FDOs and if needed, help create a ‘virtual force projection’ informational FDOs

17 virtual force projection … combine military hardware with public information to “project force”

18 PA ops can effect a virtual force projection visible activity visible resolve visible enthusiasm professional images clear, unmistakable messages & images send the enemy clear and unmistakable messages and images -- goal can be to intimidate the enemy through public information flowing through the news media virtual force projection

19 resolving a crisis case study Haiti resolving a crisis case study Haiti

20 case study: Haiti 1994 UN authorized the use of force to remove the military dictatorship in Haiti asked US to restore the lawfully elected government goal: generate public support for actions goal: show US resolve, intent to uphold UN resolution goal: show US willingness to resolve the conflict without military force, although force was authorized

21 Haiti results Haiti dictators recognized international and US resolve -- saw and heard leaders express support and determination to restore elected government recognized willingness to use military force -- saw preparations, heard from military leaders and service members who believed in and supported the operation saw mobilization on TV -- watched forces load and depart quickly struck a deal to restore the elected government

22 “The objective is to ensure military operations are put in the proper context for the American public and audiences around the world.” Lt. Gen. Hugh Shelton commander, Haiti operation

23 using themes & messages

24 never just “answer” a question ! respond to the question ANSWER + MESSAGE = RESPONSE

25 themes overarching reasons for the campaign messages your main points - build them in advance hooking message up front you lead bridging don’t wait for “right” Q move beyond the question to the message flagging foot stompers - tell ‘em what’s important voice inflection, hand gestures, body language using themes & messages

26 combating enemy PSYOP what PSYOPS techniques will the enemy use against us in the “public information battlespace ?”

27 propaganda “propaganda for and against war, often originating from senders halfway across the world, sometimes masking the real source, will be cleverly infiltrated into the news exactly as entertainment is infiltrated into it today.” Alvin and Heidi Toffler War and Anti-War, 1993

28 enemy propaganda techniques - atrocity - hyperbolic inflation - dehumanization & demonization - polarization - divine sanction - metapropaganda - transfer - bandwagon - unwarranted extrapolations propaganda

29 anticipate & identify propaganda techniques being used -- intel & PA = IO synergy build PA Ops plan to counter the techniques base plans on absolute credibility and ground truth absolute credibility is the “gold standard” to counter the enemy’s propaganda -- credibility built up over years & decades -- vanishes overnight combating enemy propaganda

30 Kosovo case study: combating enemy propaganda

31 “for leaders, winning the media campaign is just as important as winning the military campaign - the two are inseparable - can’t win one without the other.” Dr. Jamie Shea NATO Spokesman

32 why plan for and try to win the “media campaign ?”

33 because... keeps public opinion behind the operation convinces your adversary that you are not going to give up sends a message to the enemy leadership sends a message to the victims to hold on and stay the course how well did we do it in Kosovo ?

34 Admiral Ellis’ views... “not a shining moment for the U.S. or NATO” the enemy was better at this than we were… and far more nimble the enemy deliberately and criminally killed innocents by the thousands…but no one saw it we accidentally killed innocents sometimes by the dozens…and the world watched on the evening news we were continuously reacting, investigating and trying to answer “how could this happen?” Milosevic had informational “interior lines” “a much underutilized instrument of national and alliance power… ignore it at your peril”

35 why did we fail, if we failed ?

36 “It is quite simple -- no pictures, no news.” Dr. Jamie Shea a simplistic analysis or a profound insight ?

37 obstacles - press coverage in the information age international press: primarily interested in the instantaneous image -- becomes reality of the day believes objectivity requires a “pro-con” debate constructs the story from the picture, rather than other way around how do we deal with this new environment ?

38 Shea’s solutions get out “ahead” of events - (recognize public information as a “battlespace”) - gain, maintain the initiative! give ‘em pictures ! dedicate resources to do this use government & military leaders rather than “spokesmen” to take the case to the public stress theme repeatedly that we are morally right develop & use messages over and over again - across entire spectrum

39 saturate the airwaves with your themes, your leaders, your messages, your images don’t expect perfection cold war paradigm is N/A to most of today’s missions - so “weigh & challenge” classification mobilize PA ops early smooth, fast operational information flow between Joint Task Force and PA critical Shea’s solutions

40 intel needs to provide more unclassified info - and provide it faster - will help us “get out front” PA needs to better understand enemy’s propaganda plan - and “get out front” of the enemy’s efforts plan to work the “public information battlespace,” include PA ops in exercises and wargames and expand media training for leaders Shea’s solutions

41 “…what information was released was managed, massaged, and manipulated by NATO and the Pentagon -- with an eye to filling up air time with the alliance’s message of the day, rather than filling in the blanks for the thirsty media and the uninformed public.” James Kitfield National Journal

42 press views of PA ops managed, massaged, manipulated ground vs. air war - media accessibility possible backlash if not careful

43 implications for the future images are stronger than words must better understand and get ahead of enemy propaganda must be able to anticipate and get bad news out first - before the enemy puts his “spin” on it must be able to better understand the “media” increasing use of internet by friend and foe are changing the dynamics of news reporting must be able to carefully coordinate and orchestrate PA ops across oceans and time zones be careful, open and up-front with all this -- the press are not dummies and will not “be used !”

44 summary

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