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Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May 2005 1 ‘Oh what a tangled web’: EBO in Theory and Practice Rob Grossman-Vermaas EBO Concept Lead Centre for Operational.

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Presentation on theme: "Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May 2005 1 ‘Oh what a tangled web’: EBO in Theory and Practice Rob Grossman-Vermaas EBO Concept Lead Centre for Operational."— Presentation transcript:

1 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May ‘Oh what a tangled web’: EBO in Theory and Practice Rob Grossman-Vermaas EBO Concept Lead Centre for Operational Research and Analysis DDA/CFEC ISMOR, UK, Aug 05 UNCLASSIFIED

2 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May Life is really simple… but we insist on making it complicated - Confucius

3 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May Outline 1.EBO concept development 2.EBO experimentation 3.EBO in practice 4.Observations and Conclusions The reported results, their interpretation, and any opinions expressed therein, remain those of the authors and do not represent, or otherwise reflect, any official opinion or position of DND or the Government of Canada. UNCLASSIFIED

4 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May The Six Flavours of EBO… 1. ‘EBO’ is a planning methodology that links strategy to operations… 2. ‘EBO’ is efficient ‘targeting’ and ‘shock and awe’… 3. EBO consider the application of all available sources of power… 4. EBO involve rapid, decisive operations and rapid dominance… 5. EBO require ‘knowledge’ principles for analysis and support… 6. EBO benefit from Systems of Systems analysis…

5 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May The Six Fallacies and Flaws of EBO… 1. The Air Force invented it… 2. EBO is too connected to strategy, or, not connected enough to strategy… 3. EBO derives from a position of strength, therefore, close combat is always wrong… 4. Relies on ‘ch’i’ rather than ‘cheng’ – extraordinary vs. ordinary; direct vs. indirect 5. We can predict cause and effect… 6. EBO is ‘old wine in new bottles’

6 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May There is an accepted understanding of EBO The Seventh Fallacy or Flaw of EBO?

7 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May An ‘Effect’ Clear statement for each Effect (written and understood): Identifies who or what is to be ‘influenced’, ‘affected’ Suggests ‘nested’ or ‘environmental’ Effects Suggests the desired environmental state as a consequence of an action(s) - measures Is descriptively written (how and why) Includes a timeframe (days, weeks, months) Is assignable, measurable, achievable UNCLASSIFIED

8 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May EBO : Conceptual Requirements EBO incorporates: Complexity and cause and effect Systemic knowledge: environment dependencies/links/weaknesses Multiple levels of conflict Planning (EBP) process and capable organization Cognition and decision making in ‘real time’ – tools, models, assessment Adaptive environment (fluidity of system) Risk analysis, MOE/MOP and metrics over time and space Synchronization of actions aligned to capabilities over time and space Non-military and military planning and assessment construct Knowledge

9 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May Assessment of the System(s) Economic Social and Cultural Military Physical Scientific and Technical Political Legal, Ethical and Moral Vulnerabilities Strengths Weaknesses Relationships Dependencies System Understanding Nat’l and Int’l Intelligence OGDs Private Industry Defence Academia IGOs, NGOs nodes + dependencies

10 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May A Complex Effects-based Environment

11 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May EBO: the inter-agency perspective Cultural, social, economic, dependency, humanitarian, developmental issues critical to Effects-based concept Complex conflict environments favour ad hoc inter-agency command arrangements Inter-agency coordination group should not formalize its organization, processes, roles Consideration of development of inter-agency protocol or best practices HQ consider including liaisons to NGOs, IGOs and vice versa (PACOM) – Inter-agency support is an integral ingredient for a functional Effects-based concept Relationships? Authority? Strategic vs. operational vs. tactical Coordination? Direction? Advice?

12 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May UNITS OPCDR CC FCDR OPS TACT STRAT COALITION D/MNIG MNIG NATIONS AGENCIES & GOs UNITS ACTORS HEADS of MISSION STAFF CTFHQ COS STAFF Dep./CMNIG co-ordination authority IOs & NGOs STAFF Nations reps National links ACTORS EMBASSIES & HoMs MNIG board co-ordination authority

13 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May EBO MOE/MOP Analysis

14 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May Experimentation: MNE 4 (20 Feb-17 Mar 06) Aim: To explore concepts and supporting tools for Effects Based Operations (Knowledge, Planning, Execution, Assessment) within a coalition environment involving Stability Operations with increasing levels of violence in order to assist the development of future processes, organizations and technologies at the Coalition Task Force (CTF) level of command

15 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May Multinational Experiment 4 Multinational Experiment 4 Multinational (MN) Effects Based Operations Multinational Interagency Group Knowledge Management MN Effects Based Operations Concept of Operations Effects Based Tools Knowledge Base Development Effects-based Plan Tools Implementing Procedures Concept of Operations National Political-Military Plan Combined Task Force Political-Military Plan Combined Task Force Strategic Guidance Multinational Information Sharing Technical Demo Combined Task Force Intelligence Plan Information Operations Strategic Context Combined Task Force Information Operations Plan Intelligence Concept of Operations Implementing Procedures Implementing Procedures Concept of Operations Concept of Operations Concept of Operations Implementing Procedures Other Participants Intelligence Tiger Team Lead Effects Based Execution Tiger Team Lead Organization Analysis Lead

16 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May Knowledge Base (Development) Effects-Based Planning Effects-Based Execution Effects-Based Assessment Effects-Based Planning Effects-Based Execution time Effects-Based Assessment Relationships among the Four Components of EBO for MNE 4 T=0 T=1

17 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May

18 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May EBO in practice (CJTF 180) Joint Effects Coordination Board (JECB) - synchronization of lethal and non-lethal effects - ‘targeting’ board (J2/J3) - Intelligence, Info Ops, Mil Ops provide assessments - quantitative and qualitative Joint Effects Working Group (JEWG) - weekly staff coordination - JEWG briefs JECB - Based on Commander’s Intent - Develops supporting effects Targeting Battle Rhythm - OPORD establishes 3 week battle rhythm resulting in weekly FRAGOs - Changes are incorporated into decision making process = Results in production of (refined) Commander’s desired Effects

19 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May EBO in Practice: (Operation Iraqi Freedom) Finding: ‘Based on initial understanding of the enemy, integrated kinetic and non-kinetic actions and multiple, high-tempo lines of operation were unleashed to achieve enemy disintegration and regime collapse; when execution exceeded capacity to understand change, operations reverted from an effects to attrition focus’. Desired Effects Out- comes Objectives TasksAssess Actions Most Mature, Routine Maturing Least Mature Least Enabled Why it happened: –Difficulty gaining knowledge to identify appropriate effects, desired actions, & cascading or 2d & 3d order effects. –Limited collection on non-kinetic actions, notably IO –Over focused on measures of performance, rather than measures of effectiveness and merit –Insufficient interagency, joint and Service integration hindered execution / support of effects-based action What should be done: –Enhance C2 and C2I technology, procedures, & organizations to deal with war’s new character/conduct –Create routine joint and function integration via training & organization; extend jointness to the lowest levels possible –Inculcate EBO via world-class experiment & training venues Source: US Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned

20 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May EBO in Practice (NATO ISAF) ISAF ‘targeting’ and assessment cycles - NO defined methodology PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) ESC Working Group (Indicators and MOEs) MOEs on Security, Governance and Development

21 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May EBO in Practice vs. Theory Little integration between CJ2, CJ3/7, CJ5, CJ9 Task over process vs. process-driven Sporadic inter-agency coordination Immature analysis techniques Confusion over MOE and MOP Military vs. non-military planning and assessment constructs

22 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May Observations and Conclusions Prescription vs. guidance Operational ‘redux’ (levels are archaic) Knowledge and technology Culture ‘Inter-agency’ includes the military Doctrine vs. concepts Don’t break what isn’t broken Complexity + complicatedness = confusion…

23 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May Questions?

24 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May Effects Based Operations ‘Operations designed to influence the long- or short-term state of a system through the achievement of desired physical or psychological effects. Operational effects are sought to achieve directed policy aims using the integrated application of all applicable instruments of hard and/or soft power. Desired effects, and the actions required to achieve them, are concurrently and adaptively planned, executed, assessed (and potentially altered) within a complex and adaptive system’ CA working definition

25 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May st Century Conflict: Towards an Effects-based Policy? 1945 to to to ? Linear System Limited Dimensions Sequential operations Reacting to Threats Attritional Forces Focus on Attack and Defence Single service focus Civilian vs Military Mass/Directed weapons Asymmetric System Increasing Dimensions Rapid reaction operations Coping with Threats Response Forces Focus on Outcomes/Exits Joint/Coalition Focus OOTW and Civ-Mil Ops Small/Light Weapons Complex Adaptive System Unlimited Dimensions Complex operations Mitigating Threats Agile Forces Focus on Effects ‘Collaborative’ Focus Inter-Agency Direction Advanced Technology and WME Source: Robert Vermaas, Future Perfect: Effects Based Operations, Complexity and the Human Environment (Operational Research Note, Department of National Defence Canada, Ottawa, CA, 2004)

26 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May EBO Relationships (UK JDCC) AA A EEE E AA A A EE E E A A A A A Strategic Level Operational Level Tactical Level AAA A EE E Obj EEE A A A A EE AsAs E A EE Strategic Aim A A

27 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May Hierarchy of Effects Physical Systemic PsychologicalUncertaintyScale Low Medium High Small Medium Large

28 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May Example of Operational Objective: Establish freedom of movement in Qandahar region R1R1 A1A1 N1N1 E1E1 N2N2 E2E2 N3N3 E3E3 Example of Effect¹: ISAF Force (R 1 ) patrols (A 1 ) ensure freedom of movement of relief convoys (E 1 ) along Supply Route (N 1 ) Example of Undesired Effect 2, but Warlords ambush (A’ 1 ) open routes (N 2 ) resulting in civilian casualties (E 2 ) and animosity, leading to negative press coverage (E 3 ) in international news media (N 3 ). dT A’ 1 UNCLASSIFIED

29 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May CA EBO Experimentation EBO (CA and multinational) a.C2 and inter-agency perspective (Strategic and Operational) b.Systems and Network Analysis concept and technologies as enabler to EBO EBO Concept Development for Experimentation (DDA/CFEC) vs EBO Concept Development thru Experimentation (USJFCOM; CFEC) Feasibility Exploration vs. ‘Jumping on the Band Wagon’ UNCLASSIFIED

30 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May Canadian EBO concept Campaign Plan Support optimization of existing CA/NATO operational planning process in light of emerging CA effects-based approach Provide functional solutions (based on experimentation) to support optimized CA planning processes at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and modified CA command organizations (methodologies - analysis; risk; modelling;) Influence and learn from development of US/NATO multinational EBO processes, C2 organizations and technologies (inter-agency perspective; hard/soft power; long-term effects) Inform development of subsequent campaign plans to address later horizons (where should CF/DND focus in 2020?) Inform development of CF/DND doctrine based on concept development and experimentation of EBO

31 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May CA EBO Initiatives National Security Policy, Integrated 3D security approach (Defence, Diplomacy, Development) CDS Vision – ‘integrating effects’ Multinational concept and policy statements (US; UK) Integrated Operating Concept (IOC), EBO as an Integrating Concept - DDA/ACD lead development of concept Joint Force Development and Joint Vision, Employment of Effects-based approach Experimentation and Integration – CFEC - MNE series CF/DND; FAC; CIDA; academia

32 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May Effects Analysis by MOE

33 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May Weighting of Multi-dimensional EBO MOE

34 Unclassified USJFCOM/J9/JPP/MNE 17 May EBO in practice (CJTF 180) Main ‘combat’ objective: ‘Deny terrorist operatives sanctuary and eliminate all foreign-sponsored Taliban, Al Qaeda and Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin anti-Coalition forces’ (measurable) Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180) employed a method for synchronizing joint fires and effects Model for military and non-military integration throughout CENTCOM – Joint Fires Element Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) – with NGOs


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