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Defence Research and Development Canada Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada Canada CRTI 07-0103RD: Full Scale RDD Experiments and Models.

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Presentation on theme: "Defence Research and Development Canada Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada Canada CRTI 07-0103RD: Full Scale RDD Experiments and Models."— Presentation transcript:

1 Defence Research and Development Canada Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada Canada CRTI RD: Full Scale RDD Experiments and Models Dr. Lorne Erhardt Group Leader, Radiological Analysis and Defence Defence R&D Canada – Ottawa Public Security S&T Summer Symposium 16 June 2009

2 Defence R&D Canada R & D pour la défense Canada Presentation Outline Radiological Terrorism RDD Hazard Overview –What are the major hazards? RDD Experimental Work –What do we need to study, why and what were doing. –Full-Scale RDD Experiments and Models Conclusion

3 Defence Research and Development Canada Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada Canada Introduction: Radiological Terrorism

4 Defence R&D Canada R & D pour la défense Canada What is Radiological Terrorism? Radiological terrorism is the use of radioactive material to cause harm Harm could be a lot of things: –Death –Acute effects: Radiation sickness –Chronic effects: Increased cancer risk –Economic effects: Contamination –Psychological effects The amount and type of harm that a radiological weapon can inflict depends greatly on the design of the weapon

5 Defence R&D Canada R & D pour la défense Canada Types of Radiological Weapons For a radioactive source to be dangerous, it must be put into a configuration that allows people to be exposed to it (accidentally or maliciously) There are two main types of radiological weapons: –Radiological Exposure Devices Source deployed in order to irradiate people; Simplest form of radiological attack –Radiological Dispersal Devices Radioactive sources dispersed by explosive or non- explosive means

6 Defence Research and Development Canada Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada Canada RDD Experimental Work: Objectives and Relevance

7 Defence R&D Canada R & D pour la défense Canada Why are we studying RDD effects? Effectiveness of radiological dispersal devices subject to debate –" Dirty Bombs" Much More Likely to Create Fear than Cause Cancer American Institute of Physics, –Radiological attacks constitute a credible threat Federation of American Scientists, Strategies to protect first responders, the public and critical infrastructure against RDDs must be made in the planning stage, not in the early period just after an attack. The development of guidelines for first responders dealing with radiological terrorism incidents requires experimentally verified data on the effects of RDDs.

8 Defence R&D Canada R & D pour la défense Canada What do we need to determine? For atmospheric dispersion (and other hazard assessment) codes we need the Source Term –Particle size distribution and spatial distribution We must understand: –Mechanism for material break-up Melting, vaporization, solid fracture –Energetic mechanisms for spatial distribution Buoyant rise, fragment throw –Modifications to source term Agglomeration, shock sintering, secondary aerosolization Many time and distance scales involved This all depends greatly on the design of the device

9 Defence R&D Canada R & D pour la défense Canada Pre-detonation –External hazard, maybe some contamination Detonation gives: –Small particles respirable < 10 µm Inhalation hazard, cloudshine –Medium/large particles 10 – 500 µm Contamination/groundshine downwind –Fragments > 500 µm Shrapnel/groundshine near blast Longer term hazards –Resuspension, ingestion, skin/wound contamination Need to understand all aspects to quantify hazard Understanding RDD Hazards

10 Defence R&D Canada R & D pour la défense Canada Solid fracture (along grain boundaries) Solid fracture (energy limitedspall) > 100 m Solid fracture (across grain Boundaries) Comminution peak Phase change (liquid) Phase change (vapor) Solid fracture (along grain boundaries) Stress Particle Size Solid fracture (energy limitedspall) Solid fracture (across grain Boundaries) Comminution peak Phase change (liquid) Phase change (vapor) Slide courtesy Sandia Labs Final size distribution can be a combination of several of these Peaks and can be modified by combustion and agglomeration Different stress induced mechanisms result in different initial particle size peaks

11 Defence R&D Canada R & D pour la défense Canada Desired Source-Term Modelling Capability Desired Capability: –Given a suspect package, take a radiograph Also, dose rate measurement and isotope ID –Quickly (5 min) model the device to determine potential inhalation and ground-shine hazards –Make a determination on disruption and mitigation techniques (and associated consequences) Modelling an RDD is difficult, examples: –Disc of ceramic with disc of explosives Uncertainty in downwind hazard –Local contamination hazard from ballistic fraction

12 Defence R&D Canada R & D pour la défense Canada High Speed Video: February 2007, Valcartier

13 Defence R&D Canada R & D pour la défense Canada Regular Speed Video: February 2007, Valcartier

14 Defence R&D Canada R & D pour la défense Canada High Speed Video: February 2007, Valcartier

15 Defence R&D Canada R & D pour la défense Canada Regular Speed Video: February 2007, Valcartier

16 Defence R&D Canada R & D pour la défense Canada Video: Sandia Laboratories

17 Defence Research and Development Canada Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada Canada RDD Experimental Work: Progress, Results and Impact

18 Defence R&D Canada R & D pour la défense Canada Full-Scale RDD Experiments and Models New CRTI Project is a follow-on from CRTI RD Experimental Characterization of Risk for RDDs Most ambitious RDD modelling and experimental program to date –Will provide a unique dataset Indoor and outdoor explosive tests with coordinated source-term modelling program Federal Government Partners: –DRDC Ottawa – RAD/FFSE –DRDC Suffield – CTTC –DRDC Valcartier – EM –Health Canada –Natural Resources Canada –Environment Canada Academic Partners: –Royal Military College –Acadia University Industry Partner: –International Safety Research International Participants: –UK Atomic Weapons Establishment –US Sandia National Laboratories –New England Complex Systems Institute

19 Defence R&D Canada R & D pour la défense Canada Indoor Explosive Dispersal Experiments (Valcartier) –Explosive dispersal indoors, non radioactive –Aerosol collection to determine airborne hazard RDD Modelling Program (Ottawa) –Comprehensive look at existing relevant models Different models for various time and distance scales Create tool kit and best practices for combining models –Agent-based modelling approach to cross scales Outdoor Explosive Dispersal Experiments (Suffield) –Two series of tests in 2011, each three weeks Full-Scale RDD Experiments and Models

20 Defence R&D Canada R & D pour la défense Canada Recent Progress CAN/UK/US RDD modelling workshop held in November 2008 in Albuquerque NM –Input from a variety of subject matter experts –Defined best approaches for both the modelling and experimental programs Modelling effort has focused on evaluation of existing relevant codes, moving on to best practices for integration –Modelling of experimental configuration is just beginning (Canada and UK) Experimental parameters defined after last workshop –Safety of experiments is first priority, but must maintain relevance to the RDD problem –Indoor source term experiments to focus on modelling gaps and to test the defined outdoor experiments

21 Defence R&D Canada R & D pour la défense Canada Conclusions Radiological terrorism involves getting a radioactive substance into a configuration where it can cause harm RDDs produce different particle sizes leading to different hazards To fully characterize the hazard you need to determine the Source Term –This is difficult due to the great dependence on: Device design Material properties CRTI RD: Full Scale RDD Experiments and Models is addressing these issues –Extensive experimental program is designed to fill gaps in and validate the modelling effort –International collaboration including UK and US participants –Will result in an ability to quickly evaluate emerging threats Already has resulted in increased understanding of relevant issues

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