Presentation on theme: "JLOTS 2014 After Action Review April 2014"— Presentation transcript:
1 JLOTS 2014 After Action Review 041330 April 2014
2 J1 Predeployment PAX Travel Arrangements. The process for securing commercial transportation for ADVON and TORCH was not put out in advance (were making DTS arrangements two weeks prior to departure. There was no advance schedule for Military transportation to the port of debarkation (Transportation schedule put out the night before).Recommend putting out the process for commercial transportation procurement far enough in advance to ensure that flights are not overbooked. Ensure that Military transportation to the port of debarkation is put out in advance so personnel can plan accordingly.
3 J1 TORCH Receiving of equipment containers. Upon arrival of containers there was no specific coordination for equipment to offload containers (no forklift to remove inserts from container).Recommend specific time and location for the support personnel to stage for the unloading of equipment.
4 J1 RSOI Issue/Topic: Accurate PAX count from subordinate units Discussion: Ensuring adequate communication with PAX count is drilled down prior to the exercise. Inadequate numbers affects the RSOI mission.Recommendation: PAX count requirement/manifest format provided in OPORD
5 J2 Execution Issue: Physical Access Security Discussion: Frequent Visitors in the JOC either not wearing badges or never having been issued a badge. Multiple accesses to the JOC. Overall lack of physical assess security.Recommendation: Maintain one entrance to the JOC and additional personnel for the J2 dedicated to maintaining a desk in the JOC for verification and enforcement of security access.Issue: Badge ReciprocityDiscussion: The ambiguity regarding security badges with the 593RD ESC.Recommendation: 7TH TBX / 593RD ESC / TF-11 personnel all issue 1 badge, no need for access to JOC/TOC/593rd ESC JOC to be differentiated, badge has unit identification on it but same format for all, ensure sign in with the desk at the front of each operations center.
6 J3 Pre-deployment Issue: Operations Order Process Discussion: JLOTS14 Operations Order was ineffective. It was published too late, not following basic joint troop leading procedures. Subordinate TF units therefore lacked documented guidance in specific keys areas.Recommendation: Lead organization should publish and staff an effective operations order (in joint format) according to a feasible planning timeline ensuring obtuse acronyms which are service specific are not utilized.Issue: Communication regarding cargo and personnel movement dataDiscussion: Information flow in the planning phase of a Joint Exercise is challenging. Multiple organizations from various sister services are dispersed across a vast geographic expanse. Some members of our team missed movement hard times. The unit leadership simply did not understand (or overlooked) the departure times were listed in Zulu rather than local times.Recommendation: Ensure TF units are fully aware of movement order specifics. Also, obtain unit leadership contact information and confirm receipt and understanding of deployment information.
7 J3 Execution Issue: In Transit Visibility Operations Discussion: A crucial component of JLOTS operations is in transit visibility (ITV) and potentially in total asset visibility (TAV). Automated cargo documentation data was not provided to the JTF-7 Battle Watch Captains. This resulted in conflicting daily cargo throughput totals.Recommendation: Ensure automated cargo documentation capabilities are fully functional at the tactical level.Issue: Unit Evaluation and ValidationDiscussion: Every unit is aware of their respective training objectives. Doctrinal publications provide specific information regarding units’ evaluation during training events. JLOTS14 was an excellent venue to obtain an update training rating on key operational task to assess readiness.Recommendation: Units must lean forward to ensure the proper procedures and hierarchy (usually two command echelons above evaluated unit) are coordinated to leverage formalized training ratings.
8 Maritime Ops ARRLeader to leader discussion between AC and RC commandsCommand engagement prior to vessels departing will identify issues with crew, vessels and provide a complete understanding of mission1)visit with crew rep and asses vessels that will be in play with command.2) commands involved with weekly DCO chatsContact local pilots with regards to location, hazards and recommendationsLocal pilot would have identified concerns about anchoring in channel, winterization of vessel systems, concerns with preforming operation in the area and potential recommendation to operate in alternate locationCall local SME(pilot) as soon as location is picked.Personnel not working in MTOE slot during operationSM not working in MTOE slot in their MOS. Although it was manageable for 12 hour ops, will not work for 24 and SM is not receiving the training for JLOTS S TOEContinue multi-compo training with AC/RC watercraftCrew are working and performing excellently. Certain processes are different and the more frequently we train together the better we will get .Conduct mini-lots at home station to iron out crew continuity and vessel familiarity.Arrive in JLOTS with pubs , charts, plotting tools and vessel briefing boardsNeed to bring in all charts for surrounding area, all pubs and gear for plottingBuild a tool box to deployReporting processWhen vessels depart home station, who do when they report to. When does OPCON/TACON transfer to JTF.HMOD arrive prior to departure, conduct pre-sails inspections and transfer is completeCatastrophic maintenance proceduresWhat and how will vessels receive catastrophic support in the event of issue while in transit or on site
9 Maritime Ops ARRVessels need to feed the “2” with sea and weather limitations in planning and during operationsThe J2 has been tracking weather and building synopsis, vessels need to use them and feed limitationsJ2 train with fleet weather center and be in contact with OTSRThe need for a 881 or 88L40 and 882 or 88N40 in the JOCThe need for complete and competent team to answer and asses situations shop in the JOCAssign a rep from each section to set up shop in the JOCLate identification of SPOEAgencies were aware of SPOE in January but did not communicate to all participating units to allow for proper planning and stagingCommunication lines need to be developed and usedExtreme tidal range caused embarrassing issuesWith 25-35’ tidal range embarking and disembarking crew, pax, and DV’s was a challenge and vessels were not prepared to reactFind unique characteristics of pier and vessels and determine if a contracted gangway is needed.Who makes the decision for upload/offload location and responsibility for JLOTS equipmentEarly decision with SDDC to ID specialized equipment, lift requirements and responsibilitiesIdentify who will assume what risk for liftsAC/RC need to order and maintain lashing and lifting gear for all ST’sNot all ST’s have required equipment for lifting and lashing on the LMSR
10 J4 PredeploymentIssue/Topic: Initial Planning Process did not generate adequate information for resourcing purposes.Discussion: Supporting units were reluctant to commit scarce resources without official orders or tasking, while a lack of concrete information up front delayed the formulation of these orders/tasking.Recommendation: Establish specific requirements during initial planning phase.Issue/Topic: Units did not submit itineraries in a timely manner.Discussion: Units did not comply with the suspense date for submitting itineraries, which induced significant confusion into the efforts to plan logistical support for the APOD to JBER timeframe.Recommendation: Apply Command emphasis and visibility to hold units accountable for suspense date requirements.
11 J4 Predeployment Issue/Topic: Bus contract was not flexible. Discussion: Bus contract was very specific with respect to where the buses could go. Emergent requests for additional bus tasking required changes/additions to the contract, which in some cases was complicated to coordinate on short notice.Recommendation: Add verbiage into the bus contract that more easily enables alternate routes to be turned on.Issue/Topic: Drivers not licensed for certain support vehicles.Discussion: There was confusion regarding what vehicles would ultimately be available/utilized during the exercise. Some units arrived licensed to drive vehicles different than those on site.Recommendation: Identify and publicize equipment to be used early, provide all components with sufficient notification to secure the proper licenses (listed on a 348).
12 J4 Predeployment Issue/Topic: DV Helmets and Life Vests. Discussion: There were not helmets and life vests packed to support the DVs.Recommendation: Ensure DV required materials are determined, purchased and brought with us prior to deployment.
13 J4 RSOIIssue/Topic: Movement Control Team (MCT) was not part of the Torch.Discussion: MCT did not come as part of RSOI team, forcing the creation of a makeshift group to monitor and marshal personnel from the APOD to JBER.Recommendation: Have MCT be part of the RSOI team, and spearhead the personnel and equipment reception.Issue/Topic: Properly qualified/ranked people in place for RSOI.Discussion: Units need to ensure they put people in the ADVON that can execute the specific missions assigned. Make sure people are of appropriate rate/rank, and sufficiently licensed to provide vehicle support amid LSA set up, fuel and MHE stand-up.Recommendation: Validate roster, check individuals’ licenses.
14 J4 RSOI Issue/Topic: Not enough available transportation for ADVON. Discussion: ADVON arrived on 18 Mar, amid arrival of other unit personnel. There was not sufficient rental cars across this group, and bus service did not start until 25 Mar.Recommendation: Pre-request bus from installation or authorize additional rental cars for ADVON until bus service startsIssue/Topic: Housing Plan.Discussion: Some people were confused if they should have been in lodging or in the LSA areas.Recommendation: Better publicize this plan to ensure all personnel understand it.
15 J4 Execution Issue/Topic: Vessel Maintenance. Discussion: When a vessel experienced a maintenance fault, acquiring necessary class IX repair parts was difficult.Recommendation: Vessels should deploy to the exercise with a full vessel On Board Spare Parts List (OBSL). Vessels should ID components not listed that are likely to fail – i.e. seals in silty water.Issue/Topic: Administration & Logistics Operations Center (ALOC) and the Joint Lighterage Command Center (JLCC) comms.Discussion: Comms between the ALOC and JLCC weren’t consistent. JLCC didn’t have a dedicated hard line or , and ALOC didn’t have a radio system. It was difficult to coordinate between the JLCC and ALOC to get required vessel statistics and reports from higher.Recommendation: Include JLCC in the exercise telephone and/or network footprint, or procure the ALOC a VHF radio.
16 J4 Execution Issue/Topic: Copy/Printing Service. Discussion: Required specialized printing services including foam board and lamination work was significant, and quickly surpassed the $2500 three bid threshold. This increased the difficulty of contract execution.Recommendation: Either a larger specialized local printing contract should be put in place ahead of time (including capacity for foam board & laminate), or plotter printing capability should be brought along.
18 J6 Pre-deployment ISSUE: Command Post locations DISCUSSION: The PoA municipal facility was not reconnoitered until the final day of the week-long final planning conference. Furthermore, limited personnel from the coordinating staff actually got to step foot inside the facility & to inspect it for critical supporting infrastructure like power grid, lighting, HVAC, and storage. Key staff assessments were not able to be completed in order to validate this Course of Action as either Suitable, Feasible, Acceptable, or Complete. This caused a ripple effect in the planning process with respect to JOC/ALOC design, network planning, and space allocation. Upon arrival, the situation deteriorated into a “land grab” where respective operational space was claimed by multiple organizations. Had there been a well coordinated meeting between the echelons of command, we could have deployed with a competent & confident plan of action for limited space at both locations (PoA, Hangar 5). Having a pre-planned, faces-to-spaces allocation diagram (i.e. a blue print) helps the S6 team forecast network support requirements (like how many linear feet of cable is needed to wire the command posts, etc) and accelerates network installation & connection times.RECOMMENDATION: Recon and select the best location(s) to establish Command Post operations prior to the Final Planning Conference so the space allocation & layouts can be completed before deployment; inject Command Post design & planning into the post FPC conference actions.
19 J6 Pre-deploymentISSUE: Identification, manifesting, and deployment of section equipmentDISCUSSION: S6 section identified a potential power generation shortfall for our Battle Command Common Server (BCCS) stack at the PoA facility (see site recon comment above). Due to the lack of proper site reconnaissance, we were unable to confirm through the Port Authority, of the power voltage/amperage system already installed in the warehouse facility required to support the operation of our BCCS stack. As a result, we requested support from HHC, TBX to deploy at least a separate 10Kw trailer mounted tactical generator set in support of our power supply uncertainty. HHC identified and manifested the S6’s own Trailer Mounted Shelter System (TMSS) Medium package (18Kw) as a solution to the problem, without ever notifying us as the section equipment owner/operator. On the designated equipment upload date, our TMSS-Med package was removed from the STB motorpool [where it was staged to participate in the TENTEX as directed by the Deputy Commander] without our notification. Upon further investigation, we discovered our TMSS-Med package being uploaded to the line-haul before we (as the section hand receipt holders) had a chance to properly download & store the non-deployable equipment (i.e. Drash Tent) that was not necessary for this mission. To compound the problem, we had some Component of End Item (COEI) shortages on this newly acquired asset which made the power distribution system NMC; the very reason that we needed a system to deploy in the first place.RECOMMENDATION: finalize deployable equipment requirements at least 90-days in advance (or at least following the FPC). If assets are not available at the section or unit level, resource these requirements through the exercise’s host units. If equipment is identified to deploy on a mission – NOTIFY the section that is sub-hand receipted for it in advance (even if it is to support the section’s own mission). Do not remove other section’s hand receipted equipment from the unit motorpool without notifying the section hand receipt holder – period.
20 J6 Pre-deploymentISSUE: Communications mission requirements not clearly identified by staff and external unitsDISCUSSION: Some communications requirements were not identified by the staff and external units before deployment to JBER. As a result, the J6 staff was challenged to provide some requested services. This also caused a delay in the J6 ADVON’s operations during setup. The ADVON was not given all requirements prior to deployment and had to be in complete react mode.RECOMMENDATION: Communications mission requirements must be clearly expressed by a NLT date. This will allow the J6 staff to properly plan and provide these requirements. If requirements are not feasible, the customer organization can be notified in time for them to adjust their planning.
21 J6 Pre-deployment ISSUE: Communications requirements clearly outlined. DISCUSSION: Upon execution in Anchorage the network administrators were tasked with providing SIPR services to the users as the primary resource during the exercise when actually NIPR was the primary. SIPR was not truly utilized for the execution of the exercise, only for training and demonstration purposes. Global Broadcasting System (GBS) was not identified as a requirement, but the Commander wanted live television (one of the GBS’s capabilities) in the JOC for situational awareness. When the system went down hard for maintenance during the train-up STAFFEX, we could have brought the issue to the CMD’s attention in order to influence an outcome (GBS support is extremely limited below DIV level). Tactical VTC was not identified as a requirement during the planning process, but was requested during the exercise. A local exchange deployed in a server environment would have provided the staff and outlying sites an internal “deployed” & collaborative system for coordination purposes without relying on the internet and civilian addresses for official purposes. The minimal bandwidth made it difficult to upload large files on APAN website and hindered collaborative efforts. File storage was dependent on a web application APAN rather than a local file store which enables users to easily save, recover, and collaborate easily.RECOMMENDATION: Identify which network will be the primary path early enough to plan accordingly. Also identify the requirements for the Commander and staff so that the network operators can prepare accordingly. Communications working group in planning conferences needs to include personnel from ALL participating units so that all requirements can be outlined so that a complete and comprehensive communications plan can be executed.
22 J6 RSOIISSUE: Download and delivery of unit equipment for exercise purposesDISCUSSION: 7th TBX did not have a dedicated MHE asset on-hand that our own unit personnel could sign for and operate when/where necessary upon arrival for download operations. Instead, Air Force MHE assets were coordinated for & available on an as-needed basis, but often times were not available during hours when equipment needed to be downloaded and transferred to CP locations. Additionally, much of the equipment was not combat loaded for tactical deployment, meaning the S6 commo gear was positioned in the 20ft container between the DFAC gear which ended up NOT being downloaded from the CONEX. Lastly, the S6 was forced to transport our commo package to PoA from the Kenai dining facility location via our x1 non tactical vehicle, resulting in seven trips to/from in order to get the entire package on site at PoA by 24-March.RECOMMENDATION: request dedicated MHE assets from the local installation that unit operators can sign for & operate as needed, when needed. Ensure equipment containers are delivered to the right locations when/where needed. Provide better ground transportation plan for equipment from container locations to exercise destinations. Combat load gear for deployment or select a consolidated location where container inserts can be downloaded and accessed by each section throughout the exercise.
23 J6 RSOI ISSUE: Equipment delivery at the port of anchorage DISCUSSION: A/51st Signal Battalion equipment arrived at PoA via commercial barge; as a result, their exercise equipment & containers could not stay on the PoA commercial side of the facility until the main body of personnel & equipment arrived to sign for/open up storage space on the port facility. Instead, their equipment had to be transferred via flatbed truck to the Hangar 5 location where it took x2 days to coordinate for download (x3 Tricons; 1 TEU)RECOMMENDATION: know the delivery procedures upon arrival at the SPOD; pre-coordinate necessary assets to get equipment from point A to B, back to point A.
24 J6 RSOI ISSUE: PAX flow & reception of personnel DISCUSSION: 7th TBX did not have the capacity to pick up large groups (more than 8 PAX) of individuals coming in on the same flight with a single transport until the MB arrived on the 24/25th. Instead, the reception team had to coordinate w/ each staff section’s authorize GOV driver to utilize their sections’ transport for PAX pick up. This detracted from the equipment download and transfer mission, given that a consolidated equipment vehicle was hard to come by. The priority for said asset was to establish life support areas, given the unanticipated amount of non-serviceable cots.RECOMMENDATION: have TORCH/ADVON party reception team coordinate & sign for a medium capacity troop transport vehicle that can be dedicated for PAX pick up from airport upon arrival, prior to the start of contracted bus service for the exercise.
25 J6 RSOI ISSUE: LSA information dissemination DISCUSSION: When the Torch and ADVON arrived, some information was not put out to the entire group after arrival. Some members did not find out information about LSA activities until the Main Body arrived. Morning and evening huddle times/locations were all over the place; often times, sections were not represented because they were out making their individual missions happen when/where the meeting times/locations changed.RECOMMENDATION: The Mayor Cell should establish a set time to give all information and safety briefs after PAX arrival. This will ensure all personnel will receive information on all LSA activities. This will need to be a coordinated effort between the Mayor Cell and the S-1 section.
26 J6 RSOIISSUE: Pre-planned assignment of designated sleeping areas in life support areasDISCUSSION: Based on an inconsistent exercise participant list from all joint staff sections, it was a challenge for the Reception Team and the Mayor’s Cell to plan & execute the bunk assignment plan for units as their personnel arrived to the exercise. Torch/advanced party personnel were often required to relocate living areas after being on the ground for 24-48hrs to maintain unit integrity as the inaccurate number of PAX arrived for each unit.RECOMMENDATION: Establish a hard-line reporting requirement for all exercise participants to adhere to when declaring PAX participant numbers. Report non-compliant units/organizations to the JTF commander as a CCIR.
27 J6 Execution ISSUE: JLOTS Staff Sync DISCUSSION: The Staff Sync meeting was a very effective and important meeting for daily operations. This allowed all staff sections to know what was going on to their left and right. It also allowed for quicker resolutions to some issues by fostering collective problem solving and decision making.RECOMMENDATION: Continue to hold Staff Sync meetings in the morning, but consider the already compressed timeline constraint of the breakfast meal.
28 J6 ExecutionISSUE: Common Operational Picture in the Joint Operations CenterDISCUSSION: The purpose of the COP in the JOC is to provide an informational depiction of the battle space/area of operation. BLUF is that the Operations Section must dictate what information is presented in JOC in which format. The JLOTS COP seemed to have little relevancy to the JOC staff. It was not informational and at any given time if anyone stood in the JOC and paid attention to the screens, they would gain little to no situational awareness of current or future operations. There are multiple systems in the JOC that were either underutilized or not utilized at all. The Command Post of the Future (CPOF) terminals were reported in the daily J6 status report but were not utilized at all for this exercise. The Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3) had outdated software and was not able to provide a real-time live feed until maintenance was conducted. The Harbormaster Command and Control Center (HCCC) HTSP Camera and Radar feed were ran into the JOC for a COP sporadically between DV visits; however the HCCC feed is not ideal for multiple reasons. The first reason is because of pulling the feed to be used strictly for VIP visits, which doesn’t support operations whatsoever. A second reason the HCCC feed is not ideal to be used as a COP in the JOC because that is not what the system is designed for. It is designed to enable command and control for the Joint Lighterage Control Center (JLCC) and/or harbormaster unit. If/when the JOC is not co-located with the HCCC, the detachment is not equipped to broadcast that information to other locations. The purpose of this feed is to enable the JLCC/harbormaster to C2 the lighterage in the harbor.RECOMMENDATION: A COMMEX (communications exercise), CPEX (command post exercise) and other events are beneficial to ensuring the proper software is loaded on systems, and would hopefully reduce the reliance on field service representatives (FSR) in exercise operations. These evolutions also ensure the gear is in proper working condition. The COP depicts what the Commander and staff needs to know. If VIPs need to see the capabilities, they can come through our Operations Centers rather than dedicating systems on stage for them.
29 J6 ExecutionISSUE: Joint planning and execution vs. individual unit planning and execution during DSCA and JLOTS operations.DISCUSSION: It seemed difficult for many people to step out of the mindset of their individual unit and to operate as a joint staff. The majority of the products for the exercise seemed to serve as a showcase for individual units rather than the Lines of Operation the Joint Logistics Over the Shore Commander is responsible for: LOTS operations, marshalling, LSA, maritime and shore-based security, medical. Understandably many individuals/units are inexperienced in JLOTS operations. However, the lack of education is inexcusable. For a Defense Support of Civil Authority (DSCA) event, there are legal parameters for the DoD. Some tasks from HQs were not within the legal parameters of a DSCA evolution.Per the JMD, most staff sections have billets from each service and every one of these planners needs to be included in EACH planning conference/session so that everyone knows the plan and can provide the joint perspective.RECOMMENDATION: During planning conferences ensure the working groups consist of all participating units, thus making them inherently joint. Units conduct DSCA and JLOTS training so that they know what the requirements/limitations are, as well as what the JLOTS Commander is responsible for according to doctrine/law.
30 J6 Execution ISSUE: Network administrators for the JOC. DISCUSSION: The network administrators for the network in the JOC were supportive and responsive to any troubleshooting required. The NIPR communications infrastructure was stable and responsive.RECOMMENDATION: Encourage growth and development of junior enlisted soldiers by developing a plan to run a NIPR intranet with exchange, active directory services, and local file storage. Having the ability to run an exchange server provides the joint command the ability to exchange information locally without having to rely on an already strained tactical internet connection. Primary information exchange should not rely on internet access; it should be available in the Local Area Network (LAN) environment so when/if network services go down, LAN services are still available. This creates a crutch for the command and is counterproductive.
31 J6 Execution ISSUE: Help Desk DISCUSSION: There wasn’t allocated space within the JOC to establish a helpdesk, let alone procedures for the staff to follow for troubleshooting assistance. Network administrators were essentially out of a job once the network was established (on NIPR) and the staff was working in the JOC. When troubleshooting was needed, the J6 actual typically provided the personal assistance to the customer on the JOC floor.RECOMMENDATION: Allocate enough space in the planning process & set up a helpdesk with established procedures. That is the responsibility of the network administrators. This keeps them proficient in their specific skill sets and provides a 24hr support to the staff rather than a single point of contact.
32 J7 Phase 1: Pre-deployment Issue: Travel arrangements for non-DoD personnelDiscussion: There was significant difficulty in utilizing TRANSCOM accounting string for non-DoD personnel. As a rule, USCG personnel do not utilize DTS. This created some administrative challenges for both DoD and USCG staffs.Recommendation: In the early planning stages of JLOTS, DoD and USCG should work together to create DTS accounts for USCG personnel participating in JLOTS. With these accounts, USCG members and their parent commands will be able to book and bill travel arrangements much more easily.Issue: USCG Unit FootprintDiscussion: Size of Force Protection element changed multiple times. Unit was asked to provide an estimate of its manning requirements based on mission assignment. That was provided and agreed upon; however, several times over the course of planning, the unit was told that its manning level needed to be reduced. (Mission requirements did not change.) As late as several weeks prior to execution, additional requirements were added (i.e. addition of requirement for bus riders, request to lengthen duration of participation – starting on 20th vice 25th, etc.). Since the vast majority of the USCG personnel are Reservists, these last-minute changes present significant logistical challenges (employer notification, pay and allowances, etc.).Recommendation: Be cautious of mission creep. Anticipate requirements outside of the actual exercise (i.e. start-to-finish timeline, bus riders, etc.), and staff accordingly.
33 J7Phase 5: ExecutionIssue: Incorporate USCG Sector into IPDS operationDiscussion: Conducting JLOTS in a U.S. port poses some unique challenges and opportunities. One opportunity involves coordination with US Coast Guard Sector pollution prevention personnel. The US Coast Guard Sector is responsible for inspection of petroleum/chemical distribution systems in the port of Anchorage. As such, the Sector has a vested interest in how the IPDS is set up & monitored, and what mitigation actions are taken to address potential spills.Recommendation: For a domestic mission, JLOTS command should consider incorporating USCG into IPDS setup and operation.Issue: Ability to split forces into multiple locationsDiscussion: During execution, the JLOTS staff was tasked with developing COAs to push aid forward to another location in addition to the Anchorage operation. As currently constructed, the Force Protection element does not have sufficient personnel, equipment, or C4IT capabilities to conduct multi-site operations.Recommendation: JLOTS command should be aware of the FP element’s capabilities and limitations. If it is anticipated that multiple locations in need of FP assets might be in play, a larger FP package (or multiple FP elements) should be considered.Issue: FP element became entwined in DV operationsDiscussion: Throughout the exercise, security forces were consistently involved in the identification of DVs, and the subsequent notification to (and escort to) the JOC. The FP element did not anticipate this requirement when building its manning document, and was therefore not manned with the appropriate number of personnel to provide escorts to/from the JOC.Recommendation: FP element must coordinate with PA/JVB to de-conflict mission assignments. If FP personnel are expected to conduct DV escort (or otherwise devote resources to DV activities), tasking should be given and manning levels should be adjusted accordingly.
34 TF 11 Predeployment Issue: Late publication of OPORD Discussion: The OPORD was issued very late. There were "Drafts" that were issued, but never an official order until right before execution. Even the last one still had taskings from the base "draft" that changed numerous times during planning sessions, but were never removed from the order. Additionally, the E-Date for execution of the task org was vague (O/A 18 March) and led to confusion on when TF 11 assumed OPCON.Recommendation: Issue the OPORD at the MPC and then FRAGO off of that.Issue: Units did not bring supplies required for their operations.Discussion: TF11 S4 purchased several items locally that were known operational requirements and should have been shipped from home station or planned as local purchases prior to BOG. Examples include: lifejackets, hard hats, engineer tape, extension cords, yaktrax, etc.Recommendation: Identify requirements prior to deployment. Better PCC/PCIs. Units bring their own GPCs.
35 TF 11 Predeployment Issue/Topic: Orders Brief Discussion: The order was never issued via an orders brief to subordinate units with the follow on back-brief. This led to some confusion about responsibilities causing some to not be on the same frequency. ROC drills and weekly DCO chats were conducted, but did not effectively replace the an orders brief.Recommendation: The order should be issued and briefed at the MPC. Usually those at the MPC are commanders/staff personnel, not necessarily the executer(s). The order should be briefed so that ALL commands are tracking the same requirements, followed by a commanders back-brief where units personally acknowledge their task and responsibilities to the JLOTS commander. This is the only way to make sure that everyone has a shared understanding of the mission and requirements.Issue/Topic: No Annex R issuedDiscussion: Reporting requirements were not clearly defined and created confusion, especially prior to Arrival in Anchorage.Recommendation: Issue an Annex R that clearly defines all the reporting requirements for subordinates.
36 TF 11 PredeploymentIssue/Topic: Sleeping areas (Shift workers and sleep apnea)Discussion: Sleeping areas were designated for day and night shift personnel; however, some personnel remained in the day shift area even after their leadership placed them on night shift. Hangar 5 had an area set-up for personnel diagnosed with sleep apnea, but the gym did not.Recommendation: Identify personnel that will be on day vs. night shift ahead of time so they can sleep in the correct sleeping area. Identify those with sleep apnea prior to deployment and segregate.Issue/Topic: Reporting/JPERSTATDiscussion: The original start date to report JPERSTAT was incorrect in the OPORD.Recommendation: Identify the start date for JPERSTAT turn-in ahead of time.
37 TF 11 Predeployment Issue: FPC attendance and ROC Drill Discussion: Not all lead unit executers did not attend the FPC. This is where confirmation is done that all planned actions are on glidepath. Additionally, the ROC drill was not conducted down to the detail it should have been. There was a lot of big hand waving that everything was going to happen. The ROC drill also covered both operations and sustainment.Recommendation: Lead unit executers (CO CDRs, vessel masters etc…) should attend the FPC. The ROC drill should be split into two separate events an operations ROC drill (CAR) abd a sustainment one (CoS).Issue: Transportation (flights)Discussion: The method to move the unit from Indiana changed multiple times over the coarse of a few months. Original method of a charter flight, to flying commercial, lead to an intense last minute push to get all Soldiers scheduled for flights for mission. Higher requested a full manifest of all Soldiers participating and stated flights would be scheduled for the unit. Less than two weeks from movement, higher concluded they were unable to schedule flights for reserve units leading to a swift employment of battle drill #2.Recommendation: Ensure all flights are properly scheduled 30+ day prior to movement and identify road blocks that may result in negative reports of an essential task.
38 TF 11 PredeploymentIssue: Operational equipment borrowed from tenant units rather than shipped from home station.Discussion: Drawing operational equipment from tenant units was a painstaking process involving five companies with different SOPs and levels of readiness. Equipment requirements were communicated NLT mid-January (8 weeks prior) and equipment owners complained of last-minute notification. Some vehicles were exceedingly difficult to acquire (HMMWVs, LMTVs) and other requirements were not met at all (10K forklift) due to issues with equipment readiness, lateral transfer disposition instructions, etc. Failing to meet certain requirements significantly degraded operations capabilities; i.e. no organic assets to move TRICONS required civilian contract support.Recommendation: Ship operational equipment requirements from home station. Financial implications should be carefully balanced against training value of real-world equipment deployment and operational capability at destination.
39 TF 11 Predeployment Issue: MTS Discussion: MTS's needed updates and reimaging for AlaskaRecommendation: PMCS equipment and coordinate with FSR's before field opsIssue: CPOFDiscussion: CPOF systems were unable to connect to the network due to lack of updates and out of date computer imageRecommendation: Coordinate with FSR to ensure proper install of updates needed to operate
40 TF 11 RSOI Issue/Topic: In/Out Processing/JPERSTAT Discussion: Everyone was supposed to in-process and “swipe” their CAC. This did not happen all the time due to several reasons. Units submitted JPERSTAT reports daily and J1. However, it took quite a few days to get an accurate personnel count.Recommendation: Develop the systems prior to deployment and rehearse with subordinates prior.
41 TF 11 Execution Issue: DV day Discussion: Not often are Soldiers of a PP/TO able to be involved in an operation that would have the amount of exposure and attract the number of DVs that this mission has done. This reinforced the importance for Soldiers to know each part of the complex IPDS operation and caused them to dig deeper into the minute details of the operation in response to multiple questions posed from DVs. All Soldiers involved in this operation were cross trained on all parts of the IPDS and gained an extensive amount of understanding of the system.Recommendation: Continue to schedule and include the IPDS portion on the agenda of DV agenda.Issue/Topic: PERSTAT vs Task OrgDiscussion: Multiple times throughout the exercise we were instructed to account for units with whom we had no command relationship.Recommendation: Stick to the task org and make changes as needed and doctrinal in nature
42 TF 11 Execution Issue: Tracking Cargo from MSC to CSA . Discussion: At no point during the exercise was a manifest published that showed what cargo (by TCN) was being pushed that day. Ideally in the morning their should be a projection of what actual cargo will move that day.Recommendation: Put an LNO onto the MSC vessel to track and relay pertinent data back to the shore IOT build, at a minimum, a daily projection.Issue: Units at the PortDiscussion: From a tactical perspective, having all commanders and staff in one central location is not optimal. If something were to happen during a real world emergency, too many key leaders risk death or injury. Additionally, there is no exercising C2. if someone needs something they walk downstairs and get the info. we have systems in place that need to be exercised. Finally, with everyone at the port there is too much confusion on who is reporting to whom. if a BDE element needs information they go directly to that unit.Recommendation: Try to simulate a more realistic scenario by not having all units at the port and force the use of military communications equipment for reporting.
43 TF 11 ExecutionIssue: No laundry collection or distribution point at gym.Discussion: JTF is split between two LSAs and there is only one laundry point located at Hangar Five. Transportation to Hangar Five is a unit responsibility and impacts focus on mission.Recommendation: All LSAs should have locations where laundry can be secured until it is turned into the laundry facility and/or collected by unit laundry reps.Issue: Ship Manifest .Discussion: The ship manifest, in regards to the training set, was not produced and distributed in a timely fashion. We knew that the humanitarian aid in the containers would be notional but we need that notional information to adequately plan the container staging area. being that this was a FEMA based mission we needed to know this in terms of the FEMA classes of supply. The manifest that was given to us was not broken down into FEMA classes of supply and did not accurately reflect the cargo. There were over a dozen container that were downloaded from the vessels which were not on the manifest at all. this created frustrated cargo that was not intended to be.Recommendation: Prior to the shipment of containers create an accurate list of the containers and their contents so that subordinate units are able to plan supply and distribution centers. Distribute this list to the subordinate units in a timely fashion.
44 TF 11 Execution Issue: Use of Own Equipment . Discussion: Upon arrival in country it is unrealistic for a relief force to draw equipment from a unit in the disaster area. A unit's Soldiers are familiar with their home station equipment and its operation. Drawing equipment that requires additional training consumes time and resources. Soldiers would not deploy to a relief effort without being qualified to operate the equipment. Unit's have all the equipment to execute their missions at home station and should be afforded the opportunity to test their equipment in a deployment scenario like this. Money was a constraint for the exercise.Recommendation: Train like we fight and bring our home station equipment to operate our mission. Some units were able to accomplish this and that should be the standard that we strive for.Issue: DFAC schedule .Discussion: The DFAC schedule did not coincide with operations in the evening. Units conducting operations until 1900 have multiple reset and closeout tasks to perform prior to release. Combined with personnel shortages, this causes an inability to meet the pre-planned meal times.Recommendation: Plan meal hours to support mission requirements
45 TF 11 Execution Issue: Cold Weather Gear . Discussion: 92F Fuelers were always required for this operation. However the extreme cold weather gear they required was not resourced until mid-way through the exercise.Recommendation: Ensure that the issued cold weather equipment includes MOS and theater specific gear.Issue: Bus route .Discussion: The bus route initially did not include all work areas (EX: The Container Staging area).Recommendation: Plan routes that enable Soldiers to travel between all major work locations, housing and DFAC prior to execution.Issue: Joint Operations / teamworkDiscussion: All units were highly professional and there were no issues integrating active duty, reserve, Army, Navy, and USCG elements into operations.Recommendation: Continue to build inter-service and inter-element relationships.
46 TF 11 Execution Issue: Branch Missions Discussion: Incorporation of branch missions provided excellent training opportunities and real world problem solving. Units built teamwork and cohesion during operations.Recommendation: Units must plan to support missions that will push aid to alternate off-site locations.Issue: Customs and courtesiesDiscussion: Guidance of salute/no salute zones were conflicting. Multiple moving pieces pier side. Soldiers need to remain focused on avoiding accidents (crushed, knocked off pier, etc) and not focused on which JOC personnel are walking through AO in order to salute.Recommendation: establish clearly defined salute and no salute zones. For example-pier side of building no salute, all other areas are salute zones.Issue: equipment/equipment supportDiscussion: A reserve support channel was not identified during initial planning.Recommendation: have reserve support channels in place prior to the start of the operational phase of the mission such as G6 SASMO
47 TF 11 ExecutionIssue: not authorized to transport complete CMF "containerized maintenance facility"Discussion: having the complete CMF would increase the ability of 175th to fully support the vesselsRecommendation: have authorization to transport entire CMF for any mission it is requested forIssue: DV Support/ TeamDiscussion: DVs need to be on a manifest so that HMOD could have the accurate personnel information required by the vessels for tours. Also DVs need to be supplied with safety equipment prior to vessel tours, not take away from HMOD safety equipmentRecommendation: A DV support team should be established by higher echelon for support DVs for vessel tours.Issue: LMSRDiscussion: LMSR only provided enough personnel to provide throughput from 0700 to 1900 daily.Recommendation: LMSR needs to bring additional personnel to provide additional throughput and respond to an emergency offload.
48 TF 11 Execution Issue: COMSEC Discussion: TACLANE tamper keys need to be issued to someone prior to missionRecommendation: Revision of SOP needs to be completed for COMSEC of HCCC equipmentIssue: Network SupportDiscussion: Excellent support from JNN team on supporting and maintaining the networkRecommendation: Continue to coordinate with the communication support unitsIssue: FSRDiscussion: Outstanding training provided by various FSR's on the equipmentRecommendation: Maintain relationships with the FSR's
49 TF 11 Execution Issue: Product Receive/ Issue Discussion: No product was available for issue. Three COAs were submitted during MPC and FPC. Each COA came back with with a negative result in action.Recommendation: If the Navy cannot bring OPDS for JLOTS, possible coordination with another organization to bring a vessel that can hold 300k+ gallons of potable water. Possible use of a water purification unit to be able to supply needed product. End result, if commercial cannot support, it may be feasible to have a unit available to provide asset support.Issue: TrainingDiscussion: Given the availability of IPDS systems and cost, not often is a PP/TO unit able to coordinate the deployment of this system and able to design and setup during an Annual Training. This provided excellent training for the Unit that would not other wise be available if not participating in an operation like JLOTS.Recommendation: Continue to include the IPDS in JLOTS operations.
50 IPDS Pre-deploymentIssue: Lack of communication, planning and coordination with sister unit's battle CPTsDiscussion: The unit tasked to support the WETOPS portion of JLOTS need to communicate more with the BDE Petroleum Tech as well as the BDE. There were issues with travel and gear due to this disconnect of information.Recommendation: Incorporate the subordinate unit into more meetings and planning conference to better assist the higher command. Also ensure the subordinate unit meets all established deadlines.
51 IPDS Pre-deploymentIssue: The IPDS needs to receive its mission prior to deployment.Discussion: In order for a PPTO to operate effectively in this type of mission a mission requirement must first be established. The IPDS can be configured in multiple ways to facilitate the mission. In order to determine the amount of pipeline, pumping stations, personnel, and tank farm assemblies to deploy you must first conduct a assessment. Once this is done we would be able to better fulfill the requirement and give estimated days of completion of the pipeline.Recommendation: Have a scenario based mission prior to the deployment of the IPDS unit. For example if we were giving the power station scenario prior to deploying we would have been able to better execute the mission and the requirement.
52 IPDS ExecutionIssue: The flow of information from the company to the BDE.Discussion: The 373rd were not properly embedded into TF 11.Recommendation: Establish a petroleum cell within the TF to help track petroleum and IPDS construction.Issue: (PRO) The Joint Ops between the services.Discussion: This operation allowed for the 417th to implement the IPDS as well as talk to sister services in regards to how they tie into the operation.Recommendation: Continue to conduct Joint Operations as well as include the OPDS and Marine petroleum support.
53 JRSOI Pre-deploymentISSUE: The JRSOI cell was selected from multiple units under the 7th TBX to include the 385th Trans Company to conduct the JRSOI mission and Life Support mission three weeks prior to deployment.DISCUSSION: The JRSOI and Life Support mission was tasked to the ESC post the Final Planning Conference. Three weeks prior to execution, the ESC requested JTF-7 to execute the JRSOI and life support mission. Team was selected from various units to create the RSOI/ Mayor Cell to ensure mission success for RSOI and Life Sustaining Operations.RECOMMENDATION: Per Joint Publication pg. II-1, the Geographic combatant commander’s (GCCs) staff is responsible for the JRSOI mission. Per Joint Publication pg. II-5, the Navy is responsible to provide base camp support and other common-service assets, as required. Recommend that mission requirement not be combined; to be identified at the Concept Development Conference and the capability tasked appropriately under JTIMS.
54 JRSOI Pre-deploymentISSUE: JLOTS units not providing unit manifest and gender count in a timely manner.DISCUSSION: Prior to deployment, units did not submit their unit manifest and gender count in a timely manner to plan accordingly to facilitate a synchronized reception and housing plan. Incompliance at the pre-deployment phase, caused the JRSOI /Mayor Cell team to consolidate inaccurate information.RECOMMENDATION: Recommend the GCC Staff sets a NLT Date for submissions of unit manifests to synchronize JRSOI and Life support requirements.
55 JRSOI ExecutionISSUE: JLOTS units providing inaccurate manifest and gender countDISCUSSION: Consolidated manifest and gender count were inaccurate which caused the JRSOI/Mayor Cell team to react to unit ground transportation and living arrangement requirements. JRSOI/Mayor Cell operated for approximately 19 hours multiple days to meet mission requirement.RECOMMENDATION: Recommend the GCC Staff sets a NLT Date for submissions of unit manifests and gender count to synchronize JRSOI and Life support requirements.
56 JRSOI ExecutionISSUE: 593rd ESC tasked a team to conduct JRSOI operations as our Higher HQs. They were unprepared and did not provide guidance.DISCUSSION: Our Higher HQ, 593rd ESC JRSOI Cell provided no guidance or support to execute JRSOI operations. They failed to provide a CONOP and were not prepared for the mission. The 593rd ESC JRSOI Cell had no equipment or supplies to execute their mission. The team did not conduct a local purchase to procure supplies internally in order to meet their mission requirements. The team did not pre-coordinate requirements prior to arrival to Alaska and demanded support.RECOMMENDATION: Higher HQ JRSOI Cell provide clear guidance on mission requirements and actively participate in the JRSOI operation.
57 Mayor Cell Pre-deployment ISSUE: Mayor Cell OIC and NCOIC were notified of their position less than a month before arriving to JBER Alaska.DISCUSSION:JLOTS is planned a year in advance. The NCOIC and OIC were not a part of the planning phase. This limited our input for the operation of the Mayor Cell.RECOMMENDATION:Identify Mayor Cell NCOIC/OIC within a reasonable time and allow them time to plan and imbued themselves with operations.
58 Mayor Cell TORCHISSUE: Not all participating units provided gender counts or actual numbers.DISCUSSION: Mayor Cell was unable to forecast gender number which caused a lot of issues regarding LSA bedding.RECOMMENDATION: Task Force should enforce that units provide gender count ahead of time.
59 Mayor Cell TORCHISSUE: participating units did not provide know night shift count.DISCUSSION: Mayor Cell was unable to secure bedding area for night shift personnel due to overflow of different night shift crews.RECOMMENDATION: Provide all personnel numbers requiring special bedding needs to include sleep apnea.
60 Mayor Cell TORCH ISSUE: Shortage of Cots. Some co were unserviceable. DISCUSSION: Units shipped cots with mold, only one pole, & a few cots had large holes in them. S4 borrowed Cots from the SSARECOMMENDATION: Units should thoroughly inspect their Cots before shipping them.
61 Mayor Cell ExecutionISSUE: Unit flight itineraries were not provided in a timely manner.DISCUSSION: Transportation was unable to be allocated given short suspense therefore reaction was difficult and flights were unpredictable.RECOMMENDATION: Provide flight itinerary prior to operations to alleviate transportation confusion.
62 Mayor Cell ExecutionISSUE: Command and Control from unit leaders were not effectiveDISCUSSION: Welcome packets were given, rules and guidelines were brief and posted throughout both LSA’s and Some of our guests refused to obey the rules.RECOMMENDATION: Max participation from all Unit leaders to enforce the policies.
63 Safety Execution ISSUE: Taglines DISCUSSION: When lowering containers with taglines practices are different Army/Navy. Army drops taglines to lower vessel with container. Navy it is optional to control from LMSR to LCUs.RECOMMENDATION Some soldierly concerns about this method of control. Recommend dropping taglines to the lower vessels to give them more control and speed of where the container goes in place.ISSUE: Coordination with Port of Alaska/Areas of OperationsDISCUSSION: Some contractors working in the area of operations sped in the pier area past soldiers and claimed that there needed to be a understanding between us and their company.Marshalling Yard, same case. Told one thing but told to do other by Port of Alaska. I.e. speed, location and reflective material requirements.RECOMMENDATION: Recommend safety requirement expectations be asked on recons. This is also a learning lesson for me as well to ask, ask, ask.
64 Safety Execution ISSUE: Pier, Heaving Lines and Mooring Lines DISCUSSION: When soldiers on the pier are standing ready to receive the Heaving lines to pull in the mooring lines they need to untie the heaving line to throw it to the vessel once the mooring line is secure. Many times the Soldiers needed to lean over the pier or lay down to untie the line.RECOMMENDATION: It is common practice that causeway personnel lean over causeway systems to release anchor points. A soldier in back holds the soldier’s life jacket while he is leaning over the edge. I would recommend using this method on the piers as well.
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