1. Military intervention, foreign aid, and sanctions
Tools of Statecraft
Military intervention, foreign aid, and sanctions

2. I. Military Intervention
Predicting intervention
Escalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflict
Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention
Alliance Portfolios predict side choice

3. What is an alliance portfolio?
All of the allies of a state
Similar portfolios generally reduce conflict / increase cooperation
Better predictor than dyadic alliance!

4. I. Military Intervention
Predicting intervention
Escalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflict
Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention
Alliance portfolios predict side choice
More likely when existing parity between combatants

5. Balances of Power: Disparity and Parity

6. I. Military Intervention
Predicting intervention
Escalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflict
Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention
Alliance portfolios predict side choice
More likely when existing parity between combatants
Great powers intervene much more frequently!

7. 2. Predicting War Initiation
What factors increase the probability of war?

8. a. Contiguity and Proximity
Contiguity: Sharing common border
MID = Use, threat, or display of force short of war

9. Proximity: Loss of Strength Gradient
Wealthy/Advanced State
Poor State
Resources that can be applied to a conflict decay at distance
Shift in gradient due to technology or development

10. b. Different Regime Types
Regime Country A
Regime Country B
Probability of War
Democracy
Lowest
Autocracy
Highest
Middle
State level finding that magnifies dyadic effects:
Democracies more stable than autocracies, which in turn are more stable than intermediate regimes

11. c. Issue Type: Territory

12. d. Power Parity: A “Balance of Power” Produces War, Not Peace!
Disparity = Low Risk
Parity = High Risk

13. War initiators since 1980 United States (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq)
Iraq (1981 and 1990 attacks on Iran and Kuwait)
Israel (1982 and 2006 invasions of Lebanon)
Argentina (1982 occupation of Falklands)
Armenia (1991 war with Azerbaijan, depending on definition)
China (1987 attack on Vietnam)
Ecuador (1995 war with Peru)
Eritrea (1998 war with Ethiopia)
Georgia (2008 war with Russia)
Pakistan (1999 Kargil War with India)
Rwanda and perhaps Uganda (1998 war with the DRC)
(Note: War is defined as minimum 1000 battle-deaths/year)

14. B. When does intervention work?
Who wins interstate wars?
Who started it? Initiators win most wars quickly, but tend to lose long wars.
Bigger economy usually wins (GDP outperforms military predictors)
Bigger military also helps – parity makes victory less likely for both sides (stalemate)

15. Parity Leads to Long Wars, Makes Stalemate More Likely
Source = Slantchev, AJPS, Oct 2004

16. 2. Intervention in Civil Wars
No Pro-Rebel Intervention
Pro-Rebel Intervention
No Pro-Government Intervention
119
(60.41%) 24
(12.18%)
Pro-Government Intervention 29
(14.72%) 25
(12.69%)

17. 2. Intervention in Civil Wars
Does intervention lead to compromise?

18. 2. Intervention in Civil Wars
Probability of Compromise,
Intervention for government
No intervention

19. 2. Intervention in Civil Wars
Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes
Does intervention prolong wars?

20. 2. Intervention in Civil Wars
Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes
Does intervention prolong wars? Yes
Is intervention getting more common?

21. Intervention Over Time
Number of Civil Wars 22 28 16 23 21 39 43
Intervention
Frequency
36%
25%
31%
35%
24%
49%
51%

22. 2. Intervention in Civil Wars
Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes
Does intervention prolong wars? Yes
Is intervention getting more common? Yes
The intervenor’s dilemma: Saving lives vs. Justice
Want to end the war quickly? Help the strong crush the weak
Want to find a compromise? Write off another 10,000 people

23. II. Sanctions and Pressure
Predicting Sanctions
US Sanctions: Best single predictor is target’s relationship with US
Domestic factors, target characteristics almost irrelevant
Interesting: Belligerence towards US after threat reduces chance that US imposes sanctions

25. II. Sanctions and Pressure
Predicting Sanctions
US Sanctions: Best single predictor is target’s relationship with US
Domestic factors, target characteristics almost irrelevant
Interesting: Belligerence towards US after threat reduces chance that US imposes sanctions
General: Asymmetric dependence
If I depend on you, I am unlikely to sanction you
If you depend on me, I am more likely to sanction you
Problem: Measuring dependence is hard

26. Example: US-South Africa
1984: Asymmetric Interdependence? US = 15% of S.A. trade, but S.A. = only 1% of US trade
Issue: Apartheid
US backs South Africa, vetoes UN resolutions for sanctions
US imposes minor sanctions only (to forestall larger ones)
Question: Why not sanction?

27. Example: US-South Africa
Answer: Minerals
USSR was obviously unreliable for strategic minerals

28. Example: US-South Africa
US needed imports of critical minerals:

29. F-100 Engine Use of Imported Metals (F-15 and F-16 aircraft – key to air defense in 1980s)
Titanium
5,366 lbs
77%
(Australia, South Africa)
Cobalt
910 lbs
73%
(Norway, Finland)
Tantalum
3 lbs
80%
(China)
Columbium
171 lbs
100%
(Brazil)
Aluminum
720 lbs
100%
(Australia)
Chromium
1,656 lbs
80%
(South Africa)
Nickel
5,024 lbs
63%
(Canada)
(Note: Metals indicated are used in more than one place in engine) 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21

30. Example: US-South Africa
Best case: end trade = price increases
Worst case: end trade = inferior hardware

31. Example: US-South Africa Did South Africa’s Minerals Make It Secure?
No: Fear of resource conflict  nuclear proliferation
1957: US provides nuclear reactors, enriched uranium
1970s: Insecurity in southern Africa = security-based rationale for atomic bomb (South Africa fears Soviet influence)
: US cuts off nuclear cooperation over NPT dispute; UK terminates bilateral defense treaty over apartheid
“laager mentality:” Fear of Soviet invasion, need to force Western defense, conventional arms embargoes, isolation  proliferation
: US-Soviet pressure fails to prevent probable nuclear test (possibly joint Israeli-South African test)
1980s: Six atomic bombs constructed
1990: White government dismantles arsenal before majority rule

32. B. Do sanctions work?
The basic problem: The “best” sanctions are never imposed
Keys to success
Sanction must be large % of target’s GDP
Sanction must not harm sender (very much)
Problem: Trade is mutually beneficial. Cutoff will always harm sender
Success usually takes less than 5 years

33. III. Foreign Aid Predicting foreign aid
In general (who gets the most aid?)
Free market countries (especially during Cold War)
Post-Colonial states (especially during decolonization)
Poverty and Debt
Specific relationships
US: Egypt, Israel, Iraq (since 2003)
Japan: “Friends of Japan” – similar UN voting and trade
Western Europe: Former colonies
Source = Alesina and Weder

34. B. US Gives Low % of GDP for development…

35. …but still manages to be the largest donor

36. 1. Recent International Affairs spending (aid and diplomacy): Surprising stability

37. 2. Long-Term Decline in Foreign Aid

38. 3. Top Three Recipients of US Aid: FY 2001 – FY 2009 (And 2010 Request)
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
1st
Israel
Iraq
2nd
Egypt
Afgh
3rd
Jord
Pak
Israel and Egypt were the top two from 1979 to 2002 and in the top five ever since 9/11 (along with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – countries where US forces have been fighting). Why?

39. C. Does foreign aid work?
Aid and corruption: No overall correlation, positive or negative
More corrupt countries tend to attract US aid
Less corrupt countries tend to attract aid from Australia and Scandinavia
Aid and growth
“Good policies:” Aid may have positive effect
“Bad policies:” Aid has no effect
Problem: Hard to establish effect of aid on growth. Why?
Source = Alesina and Weder 2002