Dr. William J Davis, Jr. USACGSC

Dr. William J Davis, Jr. USACGSC
JCOL Dr. William J Davis, Jr. USACGSC

Joint Course on Logistics
Introduction Organizational Structure for Joint Planning Joint Strategic Planning Systems Contingency Planning Crisis Planning

Course Objective The objective is to give an overview
of the joint operation planning process for both contingency and crisis action planning. The Course Objectives are achieved at two levels. One is the JPOC and the other is the Flag and General Officer Seminar (FGOS). THE FGOS is a more concise presentation that takes approximately 2.0 hours. It is normally provided to O-6s and above when JPOCs are conducted for the Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders (time permitting).

Vocabulary PPBE JSCP CAP Strategic Concept M-day JFAST C-day JPEC
UTC JPEC Strategic Concept LAD We will familiarize you with the multitude of terms associated with joint planning and execution. We hope you will get an appreciate for staff responsibilities for developing and maintaining contingency plans and the complexities associated with developing deployment databases (TPFDDs) so that we can ultimately execute operations. FACULTY NOTE: Again point out the glossary and definitions in the back of JFSC Pub 1 and perhaps discuss a few of the more important terms on this slide. JOPES UIC PPBE QDR TPFDD TUCHA M-day JSCP JFAST

What is JOPES? Develop and Execute War Plans
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is a combination of joint policies and procedures, supported by IT, designed to provide joint commanders and planners with a capability to plan and conduct joint military operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). (DOD) A continuously Evolving system that is being developed through the integration and enhancement of earlier planning and execution systems: Joint Operation Planning System and Joint Deployment System. It provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and theater-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. The system is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations. See also joint operation planning. (JP 1-02) JOPES VOLs

(PLANNING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES)
Three Volumes of JOPES CJCSM A CJCSM B CJCSM C JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) VOLUME I JOPES VOLUME II JOPES VOLUME III (CRISIS ACTION TIME PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT DATA DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT EXECUTION) PLANNING FORMATS (PLANNING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES) This is the current status of the JOPES manuals as of 25 Oct 06 Vol I (29 Sep 06) (CJCSM A). Volume II (28 Feb 06) (CJCSM B) Change from previous Vol II was annex on Strategic Communications VOL III (22 Mar 04) (CJCSM C) All pubs can now be located on DTIC website: 29 Sep 2006 28 February 2006 22 March 2004

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
Contingency Planning Strategic Guidance Concept Development Plan Development Plan Assessment JSCP OPLAN CONPLANs SCP Commander’s Strategic Concept - JOPES is designed as a flow matrixed process to help joint commanders and planners develop and execute war plans - It is a system of joint policies, processes, procedures and supported by IT Crisis Action Planning Execution Situational Awareness OPORD Planning Crisis No Plan Campaign Plan OPORDs

Joint Planning Goal The primary goal of planning is not the
development of elaborate plans that inevitably must be changed; a more enduring goal is the development of planners who can cope with the inevitable change. After DS/DS the Army sent the Joint Staff J7 a message suggesting that less emphasis be place upon deliberate planning and more on time sensitive planning. BrigGen William's, USMC, Deputy J7 hosted a planning process review working group and the comment was the bottom line. Planners must be current and familiar with the process, procedures and plans as the time to spin up during a crisis is critical. A common base-line of understanding enhances our ability to quickly respond to a crisis. How successful have we been at accomplishing this?

06 Feb 2006 JFSC / JCWS Taken from FC Draft JP 5-0 (29 Dec 05).
Military planning integrates military actions with those of other instruments of national power and our multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve a specified end state. Military planning consists of joint strategic planning with its three subsets: security cooperation planning, joint operation planning, and force planning (Figure I-1). JCWS JPP will focus on the process used by military planners during Joint Operation Planning: the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). 06 Feb 2006 JFSC / JCWS

Op Art / Op Design Must use Op Art and Op Design throughout the planning process Op Art Application of creative imagination to design strategies, campaigns and operations Elements of Op Design Now includes end state, objectives, effects, and lines of operation Systems Approach Addition to traditional JIPB Phasing Element of “Arranging Ops” Although JOPP provides a logical process to frame the planning effort, it is only the creative minds of the commander and staff that will make the plan successful 06 Feb 2006 JFSC / JCWS

Relationship of Shaping Ops
As you can see shaping requires all instruments of power (EBAO) and is done continuously at the strategic (global) and operational (theater) level. 06 Feb 2006 JFSC / JCWS

Restoration (DoD Support TBD)
HA/DR Phasing Current Situation Disaster Phase 0 Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV Phase V Immediate Response First 72 hours Initial Response Restoration (DoD Support TBD) Preparation Relief Stabilization Recovery This is an overview of the phasing for It’s a modified version of the standard Joint Staff 6-phase construct which was developed and implemented during GTM relief efforts in Oct 05. The following slides show the details of each phase. (Shape) (Deter) (Seize Initiative) (Dominate) (Stabilize) (Enable Civil Auth) Continuous SA & preparedness TSC activities to enhance PN disaster preparedness and response capabilities Immediate lifesaving when: directed by SECDEF, or directed by CDR for immediate lifesaving with forces in place (72 hr limit) Assess affected areas for relief ops Support OFDA to: Mitigate near-term human suffering Provide water, food, shelter, sanitation, medicine, etc. Assess affected areas for restoration ops Support OFDA to: Restore key infrastructure (roads, power, communications, etc.) Set conditions for transition to civil authorities If no legitimate, functioning civil gov’t, perform limited local governance Provide basic services to people Set conditions for transition to civil authorities Support civil gov’t Civil authorities assume responsibilities (with assistance as req’d from OFDA, NGOs, IOs, etc.) Military forces redeploy Phase 0 activities resume Phases May Overlap

Introduction Organizational Structure for Joint Planning Joint Strategic Planning Systems Contingency Planning Crisis Action Planning

Elements of the Department of Defense
Office of the Secretary of Defense DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES DEFENSE AGENCIES Faculty Note: JFSC Pub 1 Page 1-8 has the wiring diagram for DoD Organization as of Jun This is a good place to ask students if they can name Defense Agencies (14) and DoD Field Activities (7). Defense Agencies (14) DOD Field Activities (7) Defense Security Cooperation Agency Washington Headquarters Services Defense Contract Audit Agency Office of Economic Adjustment Defense Logistics Agency TRICARE Management Activity Defense Information Systems Agency Dept. of Defense Education Activity Defense Threat Reduction Agency Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Pentagon Force Protection Agency Persons Office Defense Intelligence Agency Department of Defense Human Resources Activity Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency American Forces Information Service Defense Legal Services Agency Missile Defense Agency Defense Commissary Agency Defense Finance and Accounting Service Defense Security Service Defense Contract Agency Defense Geospatial-Intelligence Agency* National Security Agency/Central Security Service* *Reports directly to Secretary of Defense JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MILITARY SERVICES JOINT STAFF MILITARY DEPARTMENTS COMBATANT COMMANDS * * * *

Standard Military Org Chart

Organization For National Security
NSC President Vice President Vice President National Security Advisor NSC Advisors Secretary Of Defense Secretary Of State Secretary of Energy DA DON DAF Chairman JCS Secretary NAVY JCS Vice Chairman Secretary ARMY Secretary Air Force CSA CNO CMC CSAF Joint Staff USA USN USMC USAF Faculty Note: CJCS transmits the President and/or the Secretary or Defense’s orders to the Combatant Commanders as directed by the President and coordinates all communications in matters of joint interests addressed to the combatant commanders by other authority. In January, The SecDef directed the term NCA be eliminated from all terminology. But, you will see that I added the NSC to this slide. The NSC is shown how it is today, IAW President Bush’s National Security Council. You can see the 4 statutory members, and the two added in by NSPD-1. Establishment of the National Security Council The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL Stat. 496; U.S.C. 402), amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.). Later in 1949, as part of the Reorganization Plan, the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President. Membership of the National Security Council The National Security Council is chaired by the President. Its regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) are the Vice President, the Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy (2007), Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, representative of the US to the UN, White House COS, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of National Intelligence is the statutory intelligence advisor. The Chief of Staff to the President, Counsel to the President, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting. On International Economic matters, Secretary of Commerce, US Trade Representative, Asst to President on Economic Policy, and the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers. When Homeland Security and Counter-Terrorism related issues are on the agenda, the NSC’s regular attendees will include the Asst to the President for Homeland Security and Counter Terrorism. When Science and Technology related issues are on the agenda, the NSC’s regular attendees will include the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, and other senior officials, shall be invited to attend meetings of the NSC as appropriate. PPD1: 13 February 09 National Security Council's Function The National Security Council is the President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. Since its inception under President Truman, the function of the Council has been to advise and assist the President on national security and foreign policies. The Council also serves as the President's principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies. X Specified Command Unified Command Commander Functional Component Command Commander Joint Task Force Commander Sub- Unified Command Commander Service Component Command Operational Responsibilities Support Responsibilities Combatant Command Directive Authority Operations Planning Strategic Direction Military Advice Organize Train Equip Maintain Assign Support

Strategy Resources Contingency Plans
We are now going to move into the PPBE system. This is from CJCSI The PPBE. (a) Each Military Department, Defense agency, and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) are in the best position to determine its requirements for equipment and personnel needed to comply with the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG). Management of resources is considered an internal matter in consonance with the statutory responsibility of each Military Department to organize, train, equip, and administer its own forces. The CJCS normally will not address matters of internal organization that are the primary responsibility of the Services, but this in no way abrogates statutory responsibility of the CJCS to review major personnel, material, and logistics requirements of the Armed Services in relation to strategic and operational plans. (b) Goldwater-Nichols legislation was the impetus for strengthening joint military participation in the management of DOD resources. Currently codified in Title 10 US Code, Armed Forces it provides the CJCS, Combatant Commanders, and the Joint Staff a greater voice in planning, programming, and budgeting. (c) As principal military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense, the CJCS has statutory responsibility to assist the President and SECDEF in providing for strategic planning and direction, and to provide SECDEF advice on requirements, programs, and budget priorities identified by the Combatant Commanders. CJCS mechanisms to satisfy statutory responsibilities include the JSPS, FCB Process, JCB, and JROC which are discussed under separate instructions. Title 10 significantly strengthens the role of CJCS, Combatant Commander, and Joint Staff participation in the decision making process for allocation of resources. Title 10 USC. requires the CJCS to provide strategic direction and prepare strategic plans for the Armed Forces. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the formal means by which CJCS, in consultation with the JCS and Combatant Commanders, discharges responsibility to give strategic plans and direction to the Armed Forces. The JSPS provides for a continuous study of the strategic environment. The principal mechanism for this study is the Joint Strategy Review. Strategic direction is provided through the Chairman’s Guidance (CG), Joint Vision 20XX (JVXX), and the NMS. The CG provides a common set of assumptions, priorities, intent, and critical planning factors required in the development of future strategies and plans. The Joint Vision document is a long-range vision that provides a common focal point for future planning and recommends concepts for operating within the projected security environment. Prepared in consultation with the Combatant Commanders and the JCS, the NMS conveys CJCS advice on strategic direction for the Armed Forces. The JPD supports the NMS by providing CJCS planning and broad level programming advice on military capabilities to the SECDEF early in the planning phase as the process of developing the SPG and JPG begins. The Directorate for Plans and Policy J-5 is the OPR for JSPS. Joint policy, guidance, responsibilities and functions of the JSPS are discussed in CJCSI Contingency Plans

JSPS and Related Systems
Strategic Direction Programming Advice Assessment Plans JSPS JSPS Point out the different systems Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA): Basis for the JSR with input due 30 Sep each year from Joint Staff, Service, and combatant command assessments. Service and Combatant Commanders integrated response of capability to execute Title 10 /UCP responsibilities Security Environment assessment of the global environment for threat and opportunity Current Operations and Health of the Force Near-Term Military Risk Assessment Near-Term Risk Drivers and Mitigation Implications for the Future Force JSR Feeders: Joint Intelligence Estimate (JIE) J2 consolidated near-term inputs in a global view crossed walked with indications and warnings with most likely and most dangerous. Joint Strategic Assessment (JSA) A key point that can be illustrated upfront is civilian control of all of these processes. Highlight the documents in yellow. NSS National Security Strategy (Presidential product, shown in yellow) Joint Programming Guidance (JPG) (SecDef products, shown in yellow) Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) (SecDef product shown in yellow) Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (SecDef product shown in yellow) JSPS JSPS SMEAC Situation Mission Execution Admin C2 The Gouge

JSPS and Related Systems
NSS Strategic Direction Programming Advice Assessment Plans QDR CRA JSR NDS JSPS NMS GEF JSPS JSCP JOPES/ APEX PLANs CPA FCB JROC Point out the different systems Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA): Basis for the JSR with input due 30 Sep each year from Joint Staff, Service, and combatant command assessments. Service and Combatant Commanders integrated response of capability to execute Title 10 /UCP responsibilities Security Environment assessment of the global environment for threat and opportunity Current Operations and Health of the Force Near-Term Military Risk Assessment Near-Term Risk Drivers and Mitigation Implications for the Future Force JSR Feeders: Joint Intelligence Estimate (JIE) J2 consolidated near-term inputs in a global view crossed walked with indications and warnings with most likely and most dangerous. Joint Strategic Assessment (JSA) A key point that can be illustrated upfront is civilian control of all of these processes. Highlight the documents in yellow. NSS National Security Strategy (Presidential product, shown in yellow) Joint Programming Guidance (JPG) (SecDef products, shown in yellow) Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) (SecDef product shown in yellow) Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (SecDef product shown in yellow) CPR JSPS PPBE JPG JSPS IPL JFRR SROC CRS JCCA JTS POMs

Guidance to Combatant Commanders
Joint Pub 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States UCP Unified Command Plan (FOUO) Combatant Commander Command Relationships Faculty Note: This slide can either set up the slides following or can be used by itself with the remaining slides hidden. It is a matter of comfort with the topic.

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Strategy Resources Contingency Plans NSS QDR CRA JSR NDS NMS FCB CPR
JROC JPG The real focus of this lesson is how strategy and resources work together, hopefully in concert to support contingency planning. Likewise, how do we ensure that the plans we develop support our strategy. We’ll examine the overall process to see how they all work together. CPA JFRR GEF JSCP Contingency Plans

Secretary of Defense Initiatives
Realign five (5) Phases of Deliberate Planning into four (4) Functions of Contingency Planning Redefined six (6) Phases of Crisis Action Planning into three (3) Functions. Sec Def Rumsfeld directed JCS to move the planning process away from the two (2) year development process that satisfied a deliberate Cold War planning requirement to a more responsive system that reflected the rapidly changing scope of the 21st century environment. This does not mean that all aspect of the old process were done away with, rather it allowed for use of more capable communications and planning tools to rapidly develop new strategic guidance, review assumptions, courses of action, plan development, plan review and supporting plans through an Contingency Planning Process. Contingency Planning was intended to be proactive in developing military options during times of emerging threats. Crisis Action Planning (CAP) was rewritten to also allow for more effective use of communications and planning tools. The three functions of CAP did not change the civil-military dialogue process but it reflected the change in response time necessary to develop courses of action to support deterrence, engagement, seize the initiative, and if necessary, decisive combat and transition as reflected in the four functions of military operations.

GEF Purpose – Consolidate Guidance
Consolidating five separate documents forces holistic thinking about previously stove-piped planning Contingency Planning Guidance Security Cooperation Nuclear Weapons Global Posture Force Mgmt Purpose: A single strategic guidance document that directs planning for foreseeable, near-term (FY 08-10) operational activities Consolidates and streamlines 5 guidance initiatives into a single document. Built concurrently with the Chairman’s planning guidance (JSCP) and with input from State Establishes strong and clear linkages from strategy to operations/activities by providing strategic context for planning Guides development and integration of campaign, campaign support, and contingency plans Integrates operational planning, force management, resources, and posture guidance Previously GEF 1. Planning system largely centered around Contingency planning done within broader context of individual scenarios/contingencies strategy and related campaign plan(s) 2. Primarily focused on COCOMs DOD enterprise-wide guidance 3. Predominant focus on combat operations Increased focus on security cooperation, other shaping activities, and stability operations Planning relatively unconstrained by resource Resource constraints explicitly recognized and addressed considerations COCOM assessments narrowly focused on theater Assessments tied to achievement of campaign plans’ strategic security cooperation plan end states Guidance for Employment of the Force Built together by Task Force Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

Global Force Management
Force Apportionment Guidance for Contingency Planning (GFM Implementation Guidance: GFMIG) 3 Bins Force Allocation Guidance [to the Global Force Management Board (GFMB)] for operations and shaping activities 5 Tiers of Priorities Managing the force structure. 4 June 08 GFMIG Section 2 “Forces For” Section 4 Apportionment

New Apportionment Construct
JSCP 06 JSCP 08 Plans Force Bins Plans Force Bins HD NORTHCOM/ ELEMNORAD/PACOM HD NORTHCOM / PACOM USELEMNORAD/SOUTHCOM Homeland Defense - HD Homeland Defense - HD XXXXXXXX Campaign 1 Forces not available for planning Current Operations XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX Not a bad time to review the old construct of and compare it to how the QDR looked at the 4 critical challenges for force development as discussed in Lesson 3. XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX Campaign 2 XXXXXXXXX Forces available for planning XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX NDS required the ability to conduct 2 overlapping campaigns XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX Proposed construct accounts for employed forces Establishes a more realistic start point for planning Not intended to be the equivalent of contingency sourcing Improves CCDR’s ability to assess military risk to execute a plan

“Arranging Operations – Phasing”
Design Element: “Arranging Operations – Phasing” Arranging operations is a broad term that includes more that phasing. This slide depicts a notional operation plan’s phases. There are a lot of joint concepts associated with arranging operations. Chapter IV of Joint Publication 5-0 includes a number of these concepts to include having appropriate force flow (with an effective TPFDD), sustainment, phasing and transitions, branches and sequels, and operational pauses. The focus in this class is on phasing and transitions, but all of the other concepts are equally as important. Two of the key concepts for arranging operations are phasing and transitions. What is the purpose for phasing in operational design? What does the joint phasing construct look like? What are the notional operation plan phases in a campaign? From Joint Publication 5-0: Phasing is a way to view and conduct a complex joint operation in manageable parts. The main purpose of phasing is to integrate and synchronize related activities, thereby enhancing flexibility and unity of effort during execution. Reaching the end state often requires arranging a major operation or campaign in several phases. Consequently, operational design provides for related phases implemented over time. Phases in an OPLAN are sequential, but during execution there will often be some simultaneous and overlapping execution of the activities within the phases. In a campaign, each phase can represent a single major operation, while in a major operation a phase normally consists of several subordinate operations or a series of related activities. As a general rule, the phasing of the campaign or operation should be conceived in event-driven rather than time-driven terms. However, resource availability depends in large part on time-constrained activities and factors — such as sustainment or deployment rates — rather than the events associated with the operation. The challenge for planners, then, is to reconcile the reality of time-oriented deployment of forces and sustainment with the event driven phasing of operations. Before we move on from the operational design element of arranging operations we must briefly discuss two key terms related to this element, branch and sequel. 31 JP 5-0, p. IV-34 (26 Dec 2006)

Relationship of Planning Efforts
Theater Campaign Plan DOD Global Campaign Plan DOD Global Campaign Plan DOD Global Campaign Plan Campaign(s) Subordinate Campaign Plans XXX YYY ZZZ Indicates a supporting campaign plan synchronized with a Global Campaign Plan Here again, the campaign plan developer will not be the only one responsible for executing a plan. The hierarchical nature dictates that these plans will transcend regional and functional areas of responsibility. Indicates campaign or contingency plans nested under a Theater Campaign Plan Contingency Plans XXX YYY ZZZ #### #### Contingency plans to subordinate campaign plans are not stand alone plans, but are branches to the subordinate campaign plans.

The Never-ending Theater Campaign Plan (TCP)
TCP (security cooperation/Phase 0) Contingency as a branch plan from the TCP Once the contingency is over, the end state is back to day-to-day military activities (phase 0, which is the theater campaign plan) The end-state that doesn’t end (NSS objectives and interests)

Security Cooperation/Shaping Activities
The COCOM campaign plan is the mechanism for organizing, integrating and prioritizing security cooperation activities Global Core Partners Global End State(s) COCOM Regional or Functional End State(s) Critical Partnerships Key Supporting Partnerships Countries of Concern When one looks at phasing of an operation, this clearly indicates how the Phase 0 requirements influence where exercises etc will take place. National and Multinational Influence Security Cooperation Focus Areas Defense Exports and International Collaboration Security Sector Reform Intelligence and Information Sharing Inter- operability Operational Capacity and Capability Operational Access and Global Freedom of Action Assurance and Regional Confidence Building Security Cooperation Activities/Tools

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Campaign Planning Efforts
Global/Functional Campaigns Global War on Terror Homeland Defense Defense Support of Civil Authorities Global Pandemic Influenza Combating WMD Strategic Deterrence & Global Strike Cyberspace Space Regional Campaigns USAFRICOM USCENTCOM USEUCOM USNORTHCOM USPACOM USSOUTHCOM This represents the areas that will be divided between the Combatant Commanders for planning. In the case of Functional Plans they will impact Regional responsibilities as supporting commanders.

JOPES Functions and Joint Planning
Threat Identification & Assessment Strategy Determination COA Development Detailed Planning Implementation Contingency Planning III Plan Development JSPS IPR C IPR F II Concept Development During the next series of slides and throughout the remainder of the Joint Planning Orientation Course we will continue to describe and explain these elements of Contingency and crisis action planning beginning with Strategic Guidance and its elements. IV Plan Assessment IPR A I Strategic Guidance IPR R JSCP Warning Order Planning Order Crisis Action Planning Execute Order Situation Awareness Planning Execution Alert Order

Initiation Strategic Guidance Concept Development Plan Development
The JOPP (formerly known as MDMP). These are the “Enduring Elements of Planning” and the focus of JCWS instruction. Again - these are common to both Contingency and CAP, as well as to joint organizations who may not have associated JOPES products. It is more important to know and understand the basic process, rather than the specific JOPES products. Therefore we have based JCWS JPP on this slide. This is our JPP foundation slide. For reference the “planning functions” are placed next to the appropriate JOPP steps. The blue arrow on the right side shows where this class is in the JOPP. Note: JOPP may change to a different name when the 5-0 is finalized. Concept Development Plan Development

JOPP Generic Receive and analyze required tasks.
Review and refine adversary situation Develop and compare alternative courses of action. Select the best course of action. Submit and gain concept approval. Prepare a plan based on approved concept. Complete the planning document. The JOPP restated in a slightly different format. This is the generic process. JOPES will specify the different process and products for the JPEC to use during Contingency and CAP. 06 Feb 2006 JFSC / JCWS

JOPP Step 1: Initiation CJCSM 3122 (JOPES) specifies JPEC
Milestones, deliverables and interaction points Differences between Contingency and CAP Contingency Initiation CPG / SGS / JSCP Commander’s Guidance Formation of planning team (JPG, OPG, etc) CAP Initiation Warning Ord / Planning Ord / Alert Ord This is where we are today. At JCWS we use a simulated JSCP (JFSC Pub 5). In this class we will give handouts that details commander’s guidance, other guidance and planning aides, form the JPG, and give a planning timeline. 06 Feb 2006 JFSC / JCWS

JOPP Step 2 (FC Draft JP 5-0 Jan ’06)
JOPP Step 2. JIPB may be done prior to, or in conjunction with, mission analysis. It is the J-2’s responsibility to develop the JIPB, however the planning staff must continue to work with the J-2 throughout the planning process to refine the JIPB as required for the specific end state, mission, and plan being developed.

JTF Commander's Orientation
PACOM Commander's Intent Purpose: Provide immediate life sustaining support to the GOB, reduce further loss of life, mitigate human suffering. Key Tasks: Designate COMMARFORPAC as CDR-JTF Preposition Relief Supplies and Equipment in anticipation of support request. BPT to conduct operations as part of a multi-national relief effort or in support of a third country BPT establish a joint logistics hub in the vicinity of Burma Conduct FHA in support of OFDA Transition FHA functions to other agencies as soon as practical Redeploy/Reposition forces upon completion of the mission or as directed. Endstate: Demand for Emergency Relief decreased to the point where GOB and the humanitarian community can meet relief requirements and begin recovery operations without U.S. Military Assistance. Human suffering is alleviated. U.S. Forces are safely redeployed.

JTF Specified Tasks (1/3)
(1) BPT PROVIDE DISASTER RELIEF SUPPORT IN COORDINATION WITH USAID/OFDA. (2) PROVIDE JTF-CDR'S ESTIMATE WITH COURSES OF ACTION AND RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION TO USPACOM J3 NLT ZMAY08. (3) DEVELOP SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND CONDUCT ASSESSMENTS IN SUPPORT OF FHA RELIEF OPERATIONS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE. (4) BPT PROVIDE MOBILITY ASSETS IN SUPPORT OF RELIEF EFFORTS AS REQUIRED. (5) BPT DELIVER FOOD, WATER, EMERGENCY MEDICAL SUPPORT, MEDICINE AND OTHER RELIEF SUPPLIES AS REQUIRED. (6) BPT PROVIDE LIMITED TRANSPORTATION OF DISPLACED PERSONS TO DESIGNATED AREAS FROM LOCATIONS INACCESSIBLE TO HN TRANSPORTATION ASSETS.

JTF Implied Tasks (1/1) Establish FCE in Rangoon
Establish HN / JTF coordination element in Rangoon Establish LNOs with MPAT for coordination/deconfliction with International Aid agencies. BPT Establish FOB or FARPs in Thailand/Burma as required. Establish Air C2 concept to deconflict JTF tactical and operational air with HN and Non-DOD aviation Seek clearance to fly non-DOD personnel and supplies

Assumptions (1/2) SECDEF WILL DIRECT USPACOM TO ASSIST WITH DISASTER RELIEF IN BURMA. USPACOM FORCES WILL EXECUTE OPERATIONS AS A PART OF A MULTI-NATIONAL RELIEF EFFORT OR IN SUPPORT OF THE EFFORTS OF A THIRD COUNTRY. BURMA WILL REQUEST U.S. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. BURMA WILL PROVIDE FORCE PROTECTION FOR US FORCES IF ALLOWED IN THE COUNTRY. GOB WILL DIRECT OVERALL RELIEF EFFORT. GROUND TRANSPORTATION NETWORK IN THE AFFECTED AREAS OF BURMA IS SERIOUSLY DEGRADED OR UNUSABLE.

Proposed Mission Statement
CDRUSSOUTHCOM conducts PHASE II (RELIEF) ISO the USAMB/Country Team in coordination with MINUSTAH/ NGOs/OGA/USAID IOT mitigate near term human suffering and accelerate recovery in Haiti. BPT transition to PHASE III (RESTORATION).

Proposed JTF Mission O/O, JTF conducts Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and Disaster Relief (DR) Operations IVO Central Burma to support International relief efforts IOT reduce further loss of life and mitigate human suffering.

JOPP Step 3 JOPP Step 3

COA Balanced Response OPS LOG
Deploy HMM-262 det/ HMM-265 CH-53 det/ HM-14 det to Utaphao Deploy HMM-265 aboard 31st MEU/ ESX ARG in MODLOC vic Gulf of Martaban Establish FOB in Mae Sot, TH Establish FARP at Rangoon Intl, MY OPS and LOG nodes JTF HQ/1st MAW Khorat, TH 3rd MEB proposed FARP Rangoon Mae Sot FOB Intermediate Logistics Staging Base Main relief aid distribution point Rapidly establish initial relief capability Build to maximum capacity as resources and authorities allow. Conduct assessments Deploy FCE to Burma Project aid relief fwd from Utaphao via KC/C-130s and Mai Sot to Rangoon when authorized 1 2 5 2 4 3 3 4 FRDP FOB 3 MFP OPS LOG 1 1 2 2 3 MEB 3 1 4 FOB 4 5 C2 Links FRDP Forward Refuel/Distribution Pt

JOPP Step 4

JOPP Step 5

JOPP Step 2

JOPP Step 7 Note: CONOPS development is shown as the first step of Plan Development. It most probably will become the final step of Concept Development. But the process will remain the same.

Plan Development PURPOSE:
STEP 1 FORCE JOPES VOLUME II CJCSM B 28 February 2006 PLANNING FORMATS STEP 2 SUPPORT PURPOSE: To identify all forces needed to accomplish the Concept of Operations. Build the force list. STEP 3 CHEMICAL NUCLEAR STEP 4 TRANSPORTATION STEP 5 NEO FORCE PLANNING a. Introduction. The purpose of force planning is to identify all forces needed to accomplish the concept of operations and phase them into the theater of operations. Force planning is based on CJCS, Service, and USSOCOM (for special operations) guidance and doctrine. It consists of force requirement determination, force list development and refinement in light of force availability, and force shortfall identification and resolution. Force planning is ultimately the responsibility of the supported commander, but the components do most of the work. (1) The original task-assigning instrument, the JSCP or other such directive, identifies major combat forces. Tasks assigned in the UCP and JP 1 generally use inplace forces already under the combatant command, however with global force management this has become more complicated. Forces apportioned for use in making plans will be those projected to be available during the JSCP period at the level of mobilization specified for planning. SecDef or CJCS approval is required when CCDR initiated plans cannot be supported with apportioned resources. The strategic concept must clearly identify the principal combat forces required by the proposed concept of operations. (2) A total force list includes much more than just major combat troops. Combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces, as well as smaller units of combat forces, are essential to the success of any military operation. The most up-to-date guidance on combat and support capabilities and methods of employment is available in Service planning documents and directly from Service headquarters commands. STEP 6 SHORTFALL IDENTIFICATION STEP 7 TRANSPORTATION FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS STEP 8 TPFDD REFINEMENT STEP 9 DOCUMENTATION STEP 10 PLAN REVIEW

Combatant Commander’s
The Movement of Forces Mobilization Station Home Intermediate Location Origin Port of Embarkation term: date: ORIG RLD POE ALD ILOC - The importance of this chart is not to talk transportation specifically. Need to backward plan from the Combatant Commander Required Date (CRD) which is specified by the Combatant Commander for arrival of forces or cargo at destination. What this allows us to do is identify the types of support and forces which will be necessary to support the deployment. (APE units, terminal transfer, truck and POL, etc) visualize the movement of forces through possibly eight points to their destination - Preparation time for loading units and transit times between points are all considered in the deployment planning process -- Required Delivery Date (RDD) is based on the concept of operations -- Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RJSOI) represents the total requirement from a unit marrying up with pre-positioned materiel to a subordinate unit joining with its parent organization. -- At the Port of Debarkation two dates are considered, the Earliest Arrival Date (EAD) that a unit/shipment can be accepted at its POD from strategic list, and the Latest Arrival Date (LAD) that a unit/shipment can arrive at POD and still move to its destination by RDD (close the force) -- Strategic Staging from POE to POD is deployment planning -- Intermediate Location may be necessary for training or staging -- Available To Load Date (ALD) -a unit is available to move from its Port of Embarkation (POE); often same as origin and is the place that strategic movement begins -- Origin is where a unit is located. Active-duty is usually home station, and reserve is mobilization station. The unit assembly station is normally the origin. -- Ready To Load Date (RLD) - a unit is ready to move from its origin. Employment Strategic Staging Reception Staging Onward Movement Port of Debarkation Integration POD DEST PREPO RDD/CRD EAD LAD Earliest, Latest Arrival Date Required Delivery Date Combatant Commander’s Required Date

I knew I should have stayed awake during the JPOC when Sledge talked about TPFDDs!!

Reference Times for Planning
EMPLOYMENT D-day (H-hour) Military Operation Begins (specific hour operation begins) THEATER DEPLOYMENT C-day (L-hour) (N-day) Deployment Operation Begins (specific hour deployment begins) (Day unit notified, e.g., AMC mission support) POD STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT POE NATIONAL MOBILIZATION Force Mobilization Begins (SECDEF announcement to mobilize reserve forces) M-day (F-hour) ORIG A F S C JP666c 5D#3-g

Plan Development PURPOSE: Identify the quantities of
STEP 1 FORCE JOPES VOLUME II CJCSM B 28 February 2006 PLANNING FORMATS STEP 2 SUPPORT PURPOSE: Identify the quantities of supplies, equipment and replacement personnel to sustain the force. STEP 3 CHEMICAL NUCLEAR STEP 4 TRANSPORTATION STEP 5 NEO This slide shows the steps for Plan development. It is intended that you will just show this as a place holder to focus students on where this step is in the process. SUPPORT PLANNING The purpose of support planning is to identify the quantities of supplies, equipment, and replacement personnel required to sustain the forces identified in Step 1, and phase their movement into the theater to support the concept of operations. Support planning determines the quantities of supply by broad category and converts them into weights and volumes that can be compared to lift capability. Thus, they become calculations of phased movements that become deployment movement requirements. The intent is not to identify the detailed levels of particular supplies, but to identify and phase into the theater the gross quantities of needed sustainment. These quantities are based on the number and types of C, CS, and CSS units to be employed in the operation. Support planning is completed when all significant supply, equipment, and personnel requirements have been determined, consolidated by the supported commander, and then entered into the TPFDD file for the plan. (1) Sustainment capability is a function of U.S. logistics capability, inter- Service and inter-allied support, Service guidance, theater guidance, and the resulting time-phasing. Appropriate combat support agencies and the General Services Administration (GSA) give the Services planning information concerning the origin and availability of non-Service-controlled materiel. (2) The actual support calculation uses consumption rates developed and maintained by the Services under their responsibility to supply, equip, and maintain their forces assigned to combatant commanders. This calculation is generally made by the component commanders, who refer to Service and USSOCOM planning guidelines STEP 6 SHORTFALL IDENTIFICATION STEP 7 TRANSPORTATION FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS STEP 8 TPFDD REFINEMENT STEP 9 DOCUMENTATION STEP 10 PLAN REVIEW

Support Planning Additional considerations Must be added separately
Supply Buildup Unit-Related Non-Unit-Related T U C H A Additional accompanying supplies Sustaining supplies PWRS Resupply LAD +5 +10 +30 +60 Pipeline opens Additional considerations EPW Civil Affairs Special Materials CESP Medical Must be added separately A F S C JP160c D#5-g

Plan Development PURPOSE: Solve the complex strategic movement
STEP 1 FORCE JOPES VOLUME II CJCSM B 28 February 2006 PLANNING FORMATS STEP 2 SUPPORT STEP 3 CHEMICAL NUCLEAR STEP 4 TRANSPORTATION STEP 5 NEO This slide shows the steps for Plan development. It is intended that you will Just show this as a place holder to focus students on where this step is in the process. Focus here is that we have now returned from the efforts of the component staffs to the staff of the Unified commander. It’s their job to put the TPFDD together. Chemical/Nuclear Planning. Time-phased chemical/nuclear requirements will be developed as force records in a stand-alone PID. The supported commander does transportation planning. These steps outline the procedures to solve the complex strategic movement problems. The task is to simulate the strategic movement of requirements generated by the component planners during force planning and support planning steps using organic lift and apportioned common-user strategic transportation resources. The goal in transportation planning is to produce a feasible strategic transportation movement to support the Commander’s plan, a very difficult and complex thing to do. It is an iterative process: if the simulation of movement indicates that the forces and nonunit supplies cannot be moved in time, planners identify the problems, evaluate their impact on the overall plan, incorporate solutions, and simulate the strategic move again. In order to insure all lift requirements are identified NEO Planning is conducted. This will be the only time during this lesson in which NEO is discussed so spend a few moments detailing what NEO planning is intended to do and how it might impact programmed force flow. The supported command develops time-phased noncombatant evacuation requirements in coordination with the Department of State and USTRANSCOM. This requirement is entered into the deployment TPFDD, or into the retrograde TPFDD if a separate TPFDD for retrograde has been developed. STEP 6 SHORTFALL IDENTIFICATION PURPOSE: Solve the complex strategic movement by simulating the movement of forces, planning for NEO requirements, and support to identify shortfalls and analyze alternatives. STEP 7 TRANSPORTATION FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS STEP 8 TPFDD REFINEMENT STEP 9 DOCUMENTATION STEP 10 PLAN REVIEW

The Strategic Transportation Challenge
Identify the Total Transportation Requirements... Describe Them in Logistical Terms... Simulate the Strategic Move... Short Tons Square Feet Using Common-User Lift Movement Criteria Logistic estimates and strategic transportation is probably the most crucial problem for the logistician -- Are the COAs logistically supportable? -- Can the forces identified be deployed using the strategic transportation assets apportioned? -- Can the forces be sustained? All of these things must be considered in the estimate process by logisticians Cubic Feet Passengers A F S C JP675C 7D# g

Mobility Tradeoffs – Goal: Optimize Capability
Concrete Air:$129M Sea:$5.5M HDR Air:$17.6M Sea:$360K 1 LMSR = 420 C-17s There are definitely warfighting and economic advantages of using sealift when possible and freeing-up our airlift assets for the missions necessitating the speed of airlift. Sealift has been demonstrated as cost effective and can meet the warfighters needs with earlier identification of lift requirements. Early collaborative planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM helped develop a good plan to rely on sealift vice reacting with airlift. Also helped with diplomatic clearances for access to other countries. An LMSR can move the equivalent of 420 C-17 loads. The real bonus is the next morning when another LMSR arrives with another 420 C-17 loads, and in the afternoon, an FSS arrives with 229 C-17 loads. At OEF inception, the target planning numbers of 65% LMSR stow factor and 35 STON C-17 load yielded a ratio of 1 LMSR = 302 C-17’s. Actual reported numbers from OEF/OIF showed a 65% LMSR stow factor and a 28.8 STON C-17 load to yield a ratio of 1 LMSR = 420 C-17’s. This is not a pitch for sealift over airlift; it’s to emphasize the necessity for collaborative planning to move things most effectively for all users including deployment and sustainment ops…it’s really about war fighting distribution. (Constrained airlift capacity vs. nearly limitless sealift capacity equalizes time factor…2-3 days by aircraft or 3-4 weeks by ship (with many more days for 420 airlift loads)) Cost Bombs Air:$235M Sea:$10.7M D-50 D-10 RDD D-60 D-30 D-40 D-20 But We Typically Operate Here! We Want to Be Here… Time? 3-4 Weeks (ship) vs. 2-3 Days (aircraft) Time Constrained Resources… Premium on Right Asset, Right Mission!

Worldwide Pre-positioned Assets
Norway USMC USN USAF Luxembourg USAF South Korea USN USA USAF Germany USAF GAO Report 2005: Notes updated 20 Jun 02: This chart provides a global laydown of some of the strategic and critical pieces of our prepositioned stocks are located. The locations of the PREPO ships change from time to time, but the general strategic positioning as depicted on this chart is relatively accurate. Army - APS-2 – prepo ashore Army War Reserve Operational Projects (AWROP), and Bde and Bn sized prepo equip sets (AWRPS) of materiel. 2 armor heavy -- 2 armor bns and 1 mech inf bn – bde (2X1 BDE) sets in 4 storage sites in the BENELUX (Central Region); 1 2X2 BDE set stored at Livorno, Italy (Southern Region); and 1 field arty bn stored in Norway (Northern Region).-APS-3– 2x2 BDE set prepo afloat in the PACOM/CENTCOM AOR. Currently, APS-3 consists of 15 ships with 4 capabilities. (1) an armored bde unit equip set with 15 days critical supplies; (2) theater opening CS/CSS equip sets; (3) a contingency corps’ first 30 days critical sustainment stocks; and (4) port opening equip and water craft. Army will field a 2nd bde set afloat (1X1 BDE), referred to as the 8th BDE, starting in April FY02 - APS-4 – set of AWRS stocks, AWROP, and 2X1 Brigade sized equip set (AWRPS) of materiel, and War Reserve Stocks for Allies - Korea (WRSA-K), in the PACOM AOR. WRSA-K is a US owned, ROK intended stockpile APS-5 – Kuwait and Qatar, (SWA). Kuwait: 2X1 Armor Bde Set with CS/CSS support, and selected equip that supports a portion of the Div Base (FA, ADA, Aviation, Signal, Engineer, MP, and Chemical units). Qatar: 2X1 BDE Set, and the remainder of the Div Base requirement; and sustainment stocks.- Force Provider is a contingency capability set of equipment designed to enable rear area rest and relaxation support to a bn sized element (550 personnel) of a combat bde. The Army plans to buy 36 sets of this modularly designed containerized equipment. Current status: nineteen on hand. Air Force - Harvest Falcon – modular sets configured to three particular functional capabilities – housekeeping or billeting, flight-line ops spt, and industrial ops. Designed to house an AEF/fighter wing of 1100 personnel at a remote and austere airfield having only a runway and a water source. Harvest Falcon designed to spt AF personnel in bare base in SWA. Represents a total of 55,000 personnel at 15 austere AEF locations. 50 housekeeping sets authorized with 47 on hand. 40 flight-line sets authorized with 33 on hand. 15 of 15 industrial ops sets on hand.-Harvest Eagle – modular sets primarily for billeting 550 (some divided to facilitate 275 personnel). 8 in PACOM, 4 in EUCOM, and 8 (of 12 authorized) retained in CONUS depot (ACC assets). 24 sets auth/20 on hand.- Afloat Prepositioned Munitions - 3 MSC ships of which 2 normally operate in the vic of Diego Garcia and 1 in the Med. AF is reviewing the locations. Ships contain a mix of approx 15% PM with various types of non-guided air munitions accounting for the remaining 85%. Marine Corps: strategic positioned equip and War Reserve assets include the MPF 15 MPS arrayed into 3 MPSRON. Each MPSRON spts a bde sized MAGTF; in stream or pier-side offload; 30 days of sustainment for the TF. ACE each MPSRON includes fixed and rotary wing assets, which arrive separately in the Fly-In-Echelon (FIE)(are not prepositioned). Prepo materiel in Europe with the Marine Corps Pre-positioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N), a bde-sized MAGTF including sustainment. The Geopositioning Program in Norway has evolved into a relevant spt option with the Out-of-Area policy of NALMEB Equipment and Supplies (E/S). MARFOR and Norway allow the use of the NALMEB E/S for exercise and ops use. 2 ships added under the MPF Enhancement program. FY02, 1 more ship to MPSRON 3 making it 16 ships. These ships owned by DoD, vice long term lease of the original 13 ships. Program represents additional capability for: 500 bed fleet hospital, Expeditionary Air Field, Naval Mobile Construction Bn assets. Navy: 2 MSC hospital ships in a Reduced Operating Status (ROS), a containerized 500 bed deployable Combat Zone Fleet Hospital positioned afloat. 9 other 500 bed hospitals prepositioned Norway, Guam, other sites. Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) 3 prepositioned fuel tankers carrying JP-5 fuel. 2 ships outfitted with an Offshore Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS). OPDS provides discharge thru undersea pipeline system while the tanker remains up to 4 miles off-shore. DESC control of 5 other commercial contract tankers for general product movements. Vessels generally posit to support: Europe (1); US Gulf (1); Western Pacific (1); and the US West Coast (2). DESC uses spot market chartering for short notice and opportunity fuel requirements. Italy USA Kuwait USA USAF Japan USN USAF Bahrain USN USAF Mediterranean USMC USN USAF Qatar USAF Oman USAF Guam USAF Guam/Saipan USMC USN USA USAF Diego Garcia USMC USN USA USAF Ashore Afloat

Shortfall Resolution Refine priorities
Adjust origin to POE to POD routing and timing Change lift modes Link forces to pre-positioned resources Enhance preparedness with base development Seek additional assets Conclude contractual agreements or inter-Service support agreements Arrange for HNS where feasible Employ combination of above Redefine concept of operations

Plan Review Group Combatant Commands Services National Guard Bureau
Joint Staff directorate Defense agencies CJCS action. The Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (DJ-7) is responsible for managing the process of developing operational plans outside of a crisis action environment. SMEs are consulted as required. Reviews are processed under the provisions of CJCSI D. The process from start to finish should be nine months for plan approval with a nine month IPR-R review cycle in case after approval unless significant triggers alter the plan requiring a earlier review. Review Pages A-5 through A-11 of CJCSI D CJCSI D identifies the JPEC membership as the combatant commands, the Services, the National Guard Bureau, all Joint Staff directorates (including OCJCS Legal Counsel, Public Affairs, and National Guard and Reserve Affairs), and the following DOD agencies: (a) Defense Intelligence Agency (b) Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) (c) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) (d) National Security Agency (NSA)/Central Security Service (e) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (f) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) (g) Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)

What is a crisis? A F S C IP255 5D23-g

I hope my SATs are high enough for the Naval Academy
They have to take me…my Dad’s an admiral!!

What is a crisis? “An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.” JP 1-02 Highlight that a nation will consider any action that threatens its vital interests as a requirement to respond automatically and consider which element of DIME is appropriate to use for its Grand Strategy. However, quite often less than vital interests will direct action when some might not consider it important.

State / Energy Department
The Players White House Situation Room Government Agencies State / Energy Department OSD Defense Agencies DISA DTRA DLA NGA CJCS JCS Jt Staff Services Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps Coast Guard NGB Intelligence Agencies During Contingency planning JPEC participates, therefore when a crisis occurs, the actions that take place during peacetime have to be employed more rapidly. That is why it is incumbent upon all of us to understand the process and how we participate in it and what each of us brings to the fight. DNI DIA CIA NSA NMCC Combatant Commands Central Command Joint Forces Command European Command Special Operations Command Northern Command Strategic Command Pacific Command Transportation Command Southern Command

CAP Process Allows Rapid exchange of pertinent information
Analysis of situations affecting possible COAs Development of feasible COAs Decisionmaking process to select best COAs Coordination of plans and orders to implement decisions made CAP does not provide the answers, you do. CAP like Contingency Planning is the Joint methodology to insure the best options are provided to our civilian leadership.

Political-Military Actions and the “Interagency”
Policy “War is a continuation of Policy by other means” On War Carl Von Clausewitz. Thus all actions conducted to achieve military objectives are completed to achieve political objectives. In the context of DIME therefore, coordination/interagency is a critical element of civil military relations during PEACE and WAR. This is where we originally started to talk about PDD-56. Well, PDD-56 has been rescinded by President Bush. However, he signed NSPD-1 and that allows for interagency involvement, similar to the PDD from President Clinton. In the notes pages for the next few slides I will include info from NSPD-1. National Security Presidential Directives shall replace both Presidential Decision Directives and Presidential Review Directives as an instrument for communicating presidential decisions about the national security policies of the United States. National security includes the defense of the United States of America, protection of our constitutional system of government, and the advancement of United States interests around the globe. National security also depends on America's opportunity to prosper in the world economy. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, established the National Security Council to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. That remains its purpose. The NSC shall advise and assist me in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States -- domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economics (in conjunction with the National Economic Council (NEC)). The National Security Council system is a process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies. Military Operations

Importance Sensible and realistic policy-making creates opportunities for progress Interagency planning can make or break an operation Failure to integrate civil dimension… Undermines unity of effort Pressures military to do more Lengthens the duration of commitments Early involvement in planning accelerates contributions of civilian agencies Multi-dimensional Tasks Diplomatic collaboration Cease-fire / Disengagement / Stabilization Prisoner exchange Weapons control / Demobilization Demining Humanitarian relief Refugee / Displaced person return Elections / Democratization War crimes tribunal Police and criminal justice Civil and social order Economic restoration

Deciding to Intervene How did we get where we are? Mission/Objective
Alternative means to achieve objective Tolerance for what level of violence? Support for use of force Financial and logistical Exit strategy Definition of victory In consideration of the political dimension of the potential intervention, the decision makers provide alternatives and rationale for the use of force through the principals committee: The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) will continue to be the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security, as it has since The NSC/PC regular attendees are the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff to the President, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (who shall serve as chair). The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall attend where issues pertaining to their responsibilities and expertise are to be discussed. The NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) will also continue to serve as the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/DC can prescribe and review the work of the NSC interagency groups discussed later in this directive. The NSC/DC shall also help ensure that issues being brought before the NSC/PC or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision. Management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government shall usually be accomplished by the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day-to-day for a for interagency coordination of national security policy. They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President.

Crisis Action Planning Process
Major Crisis US Government (OSD, JS, COCOMs, Interagency) Monitor the situation Identify that an event has occurred Recognize that the event is a problem or potential problem Report the event Assess the event Combatant Command CoCom HQ Pres SecDef CJCS In CAP, situation monitoring encompasses five related activities — monitoring the global situation; identifying that an event has occurred; recognizing that the event is a problem or a potential problem; reporting the event; and assessing the event. An event is an occurrence assessed as out of the ordinary and viewed as potentially having an adverse impact on US national interests and national security. The recognition of the event as a problem or potential problem follows from the observation.

Major Crisis Situation Awareness Commander’s Assessment Information on situation Action being taken within ROE Forces available Timeframe for commitment of forces Major constraints or restraints for employment of forces COAs under consideration Combatant Command CoCom HQ Pres SecDef CJCS Regardless of the source, the initial report of the event should be as timely and accurate as the unfolding situation permits. The military focal point for receiving and providing information crucial to national security is the NMCC. The NMCC and the CCDRs share data collection activities and products through a collaborative environment. The NMCC monitors the global situation, requests reports from the CCDRs, evaluates the supported commander’s actions being taken under the ROE, and coordinates additional intelligence gathering, if necessary. The Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CCDRs, advises the President and Secretary as the situation develops. The CCDR’s Assessment provides the President, Secretary, and Chairman with a personal assessment of actions being considered or actions already taken. The assessment normally includes amplifying information regarding the situation, actions being taken, forces available, expected time for earliest commitment of forces, and major operational limitations on the employment of forces. If the time sensitivity of the situation is such that normal CAP procedures cannot be followed, the CCDR’s assessment may also include a COA recommendation. The assessment then serves as the commander’s estimate normally prepared during COA development. For this reason, the supported commander’s initial assessment can have great influence. Lack of time may make the supported commander’s assessment the only alternative considered by the President, Secretary, and Chairman when making the decision to develop military options to resolve a situation. The President and Secretary can either continue monitoring the situation, return to the pre-crisis situation without further planning action, or initiate more detailed planning. Their decision to develop military options for their consideration and possible use provides strategic guidance for joint operation planning and may include specific guidance on COAs to be developed. Regardless of which decision the President or Secretary makes, the Chairman expeditiously transmits it in an appropriate order to the supported commander and other JPEC members.

Major Crisis Situation Awareness CCDR’s Assessment Combatant Command CoCom HQ Pres SecDef CJCS Warning Order Issued by CJCS Contains Mission Statement -- Objectives -- Constraints/ Restraints -- Tentative Forces Available -- Command Relationships Requests Cdr’s Estimate -- Develop COAs When the President, Secretary, or Chairman decides to develop military options, the Chairman issues a planning directive to the JPEC initiating the development of COAs and requesting that the supported commander submit a commander’s estimate of the situation with a recommended COA to resolve the situation. Normally, the directive will be a WARNORD, but a PLANORD or ALERTORD may be used if the nature and timing of the crisis warrant accelerated planning. In a quickly evolving crisis, the initial WARNORD may be communicated vocally with a follow-on record copy to ensure that the JPEC is kept informed. If the directive contains force deployment preparation or deployment orders, Secretary approval is required. The WARNORD describes the situation, establishes command relationships, and identifies the mission and any planning constraints. It may identify forces and strategic mobility resources, or it may request that the supported commander develop these factors. It may establish tentative dates and times to commence mobilization, deployment or employment; or it may solicit the recommendations of the supported commander regarding these dates and times. If the President, Secretary, or Chairman directs development of a specific COA, the WARNORD will describe the COA and request the supported commander’s assessment.

Major Crisis Situation Awareness CCDR’s Assessment Warning Order Combatant Command CoCom HQ Pres SecDef CJCS In response to the WARNORD, the supported commander, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting commanders and the rest of the JPEC, reviews existing joint plans for applicability and develops, analyzes, and compares COAs. Based on the supported commander’s guidance, supporting commanders begin their planning activities. Although an existing plan almost never align with an emerging crisis, it can be used to facilitate rapid COA development. An existing OPLAN can be modified to fit the specific situation. An existing CONPLAN can be fully developed beyond the stage of an approved CONOPS. The TPFDDs related to specific OPLANs are stored in the JOPES database and available to the JPEC for review. Course of Action (COA) Planning Review Existing Plans for Applicability Develop COAs Analyze COAs Compare COAs

Major Crisis Situation Awareness CCDR’s Assessment Warning Order Combatant Command CoCom HQ Pres SecDef CJCS COA Planning When a supported commander develops courses of action and prepares a plan or order per JOPES in response to a CJCS WARNORD, the commander submits an estimate that analyzes various COAs that may be used to accomplish the assigned mission, and recommends the best COA. Although the estimate prepared at the supported commander’s level may be detailed, the version submitted to the Chairman typically will be abbreviated and contain only the information for the President, Secretary, and Chairman to make relevant decisions. Supporting commanders typically do not submit estimates to the Chairman, but may be requested to do so by the supported commander. Commander’s Estimate Mission Situation and COAs Analysis of opposing COAs Comparison of own COAs Recommended COA

Major Crisis Situation Awareness CCDR’s Assessment Combatant Command CoCom HQ Warning Order Pres SecDef CJCS COA Planning Cdr’s Estimate The Chairman, in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CCDRs, reviews and evaluates the supported commander’s estimate and provides recommendations and advice to the President and Secretary for COA selection. The supported commander’s COAs may be refined or revised, or new COAs may have to be developed in light of a changing situation. The President or Secretary selects a COA and directs that detailed planning be initiated. On receiving the decision of the President or Secretary, the Chairman issues an ALERTORD to the JPEC to announce the decision. The Secretary approves the ALERTORD. The order is a record communication that the President or Secretary has approved the detailed development of a military plan to help resolve the crisis. The contents of an alert order may vary, and sections may be deleted if the information has already been published, but it should always describe the selected COA in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander, in collaboration with other members of the JPEC, to conduct the detailed planning required to deploy, employ, and sustain forces. However, the ALERTORD does not authorize execution of the approved COA. Issuance of either the PLANORD or the ALERTORD marks the beginning of plan development. Alert Order President’s decision on COA Contains -- Situation -- Tasks -- Allocation of Major Forces -- Allocation of Strategic Lift -- Target Date for Execution Requests Operation Order (OPORD)

Major Crisis Situation Awareness CCDR’s Assessment Combatant Command CoCom HQ Pres SecDef CJCS or … Planning Order Issued by CJCS when detailed planning is desired immediately -- Before President approves a COA Contains -- Mission -- Objectives -- Forces Available -- Command Relationships Directs Execution Planning In some cases, the Chairman will issue a PLANORD to initiate detailed planning before the President or Secretary formally select a COA. Used in this manner, a PLANORD expedites plan development and provides flexibility in responding to fast-breaking events as the crisis develops. It may be issued orally, by GCCS message, or by formal message traffic to the supported commander with copies to members of the JPEC. The PLANORD may be the first record communication between the Chairman and the JPEC on the crisis. In this situation, vital planning information would be exchanged immediately. However, it is desirable to use this message merely to update strategic guidance that has been given earlier. The contents of the PLANORD will vary depending on the situation. JOPES Vol I outlines an example of a PLANOR. SecDef approval is required if the PLANORD directs the deployment of forces or increases force readiness. Issuance of either the PLANORD or the ALERTORD marks the beginning of plan development.

Major Crisis Situation Awareness CCDR’s Assessment Warning Order Combatant Command CoCom HQ Pres SecDef CJCS Cdr’s Estimate COA Planning Issuance of either the PLANORD or the ALERTORD marks the beginning of plan development. The supported commander develops the OPORD and supporting TPFDD using an approved COA. Understandably, the speed of completion is greatly affected by the amount of prior planning and the planning time available. The supported commander and subordinate and supporting commanders identify actual forces, sustainment, and mobility resources and describe the CONOPS in OPORD format. They update and adjust planning accomplished during COA development for any new force and sustainment requirements and source forces and lift resources. All members of the JPEC identify and resolve shortfalls and limitations. In CAP, force planning focuses on the actual units designated to participate in the planned operation and their readiness for deployment. The supported commander identifies force requirements as operational capabilities in the form of force packages to facilitate sourcing by the Services and other force providers. A force package is a list (group of force capabilities) of the various forces (force requirements) that the supported commander requires to conduct the operation described in the CONOPS. The supported commander describes required force requirements in the form of broad capability descriptions (not unit type codes). The supported commander submits the required force packages through the Joint Staff to the force providers for sourcing. The force providers 23 review the readiness and deployability posture of their available units before deciding which units to allocate to the supported commander’s force requirements. The Services and their component commands also determine mobilization requirements and plan for the provision of non-unit sustainment. Transportation Planning. In CAP, practical considerations require that transportation planning concentrate on the first seven days of air movement and the first 30 days of surface movement. Major changes to deployment plans with effective dates more than about seven days or so in the future will have very little impact on the scheduling process; however, changes with effective dates of seven days or less may adversely affect the timely development of the airlift flow schedule. Adding requirements within those management windows may cause delays in other scheduled movements. USTRANSCOM recommends transportation feasibility aligned to the JFC requirements. The supported commander makes the final decision, balancing mission needs with risks. Alert Order Planning Order Plan Development Update/Adjust Selected COA -- Identify and Source Forces -- Identify Sustainment/Mobility Resources -- Resolve Shortfalls and Limitations Can also be Directed in Planning Order Develop OPORD

Major Crisis Situation Awareness CCDR’s Assessment CCDR’s Assessment CCDR’s Assessment CCDR’s Assessment Warning Order Combatant Command CoCom HQ Pres SecDef CJCS COA Planning COA Planning COA Planning COA Planning Cdr’s Estimate The supported CCDR submits the completed OPORD for approval to the Secretary or President via the Chairman. After an OPORD is approved, the President or Secretary may make the decision to begin deployment in anticipation of executing the operation or as a show of resolve, execute the operation, place planning on hold, or cancel planning pending resolution by some other means. Detailed planning may transition to execution as directed or become realigned with continuous situation monitoring, which may prompt planning product adjustments and/or updates. Alert Order Planning Order Plan Development Operation Order (OPORD) Situation Mission Execution Admin & Logistics C2

Major Crisis Situation Awareness CCDR’s Assessment Warning Order Combatant Command CoCom HQ Pres SecDef CJCS COA Planning Cdr’s Estimate Execution. The operational activity starts when the deployment or execution order is issued. This component is comprised of deployment and employment sub-components. Deployment is the relocation of forces and materiel to the desired OA. The Chairman, by the authority of and at the direction of the President or Secretary, issues a prepare-to-deploy order (PTDO) or deployment order (DEPORD) to: (1) Increase or decrease the deployability posture of units. (2) Transfer forces from one CCDR to another with the gaining CCDR exercising combatant command (COCOM) authority or OPCON of the assigned forces. (3) Deploy or redeploy forces from one CCDR’s AOR to another. (4) In the case of a PTDO, propose the day on which a deployment operations begins (C-day) and the specific hour on C-day when deployment is to commence (L-hour). (5) In the case of a DEPORD, establish C-day and the specific hour on C-day when deployment is to commence (L-hour). (6) Direct any other action that would signal planned US military action or its termination in response to a particular crisis event or incident. Alert Order Planning Order Plan Development Execution Planning OPORD OPORD

Major Crisis Situation Awareness CCDR’s Assessment Cdr’s Estimate COA Planning Alert Order Planning Order Warning Order Combatant Command CoCom HQ Pres SecDef CJCS The operational activity starts when the deployment or execution order is issued. This component is comprised of deployment and employment sub-components. Deployment is the relocation of forces and materiel to the desired OA. The Chairman, by the authority of and at the direction of the President or Secretary, issues a prepare-to-deploy order (PTDO) or deployment order (DEPORD) to: (1) Increase or decrease the deployability posture of units. (2) Deploy or redeploy forces from one CCDR’s AOR to another. (3) In the case of a PTDO, propose the day on which a deployment operations begins (C-day) and the specific hour on C-day when deployment is to commence (L-hour). (4) In the case of a DEPORD, establish C-day and the specific hour on C-day when deployment is to commence (L-hour). (5) Direct any other action that would signal planned US military action or its termination in response to a particular crisis event or incident. Plan Development Execution Planning OPORD OPORD Deployment Order SecDef Approval Can be Issued at Any Time in CAP Signals Pres/SecDef Decision to Begin Preparation for Military Response

Major Crisis Situation Awareness CCDR’s Assessment Cdr’s Estimate COA Planning Alert Order Planning Order Warning Order Combatant Command CoCom HQ Pres SecDef CJCS Continued from previous slide … Plan Development Execution Planning OPORD Deployment Order (cont.) Reduces Reaction Time Increase Posture / Deploy Forces Establish / Activate JTF & Designate CC Also used to Terminate / Redeploy

Major Crisis Situation Awareness CCDR’s Assessment Cdr’s Estimate COA Planning Alert Order Planning Order Warning Order Combatant Command CoCom HQ Pres SecDef CJCS Planning Refinement and Adaptation continues during deployment, with an emphasis on updating the OPORD. Plan Development Execution Planning OPORD Deployment Order

Major Crisis Situation Awareness CCDR’s Assessment Cdr’s Estimate COA Planning Alert Order Planning Order Warning Order Combatant Command CoCom HQ Pres SecDef CJCS Execution begins when the President or Secretary decides to use a military option to resolve a crisis. Only the President or Secretary can authorize the Chairman to issue an EXORD. The EXORD directs the supported commander to initiate military operations, defines the time to initiate operations, and conveys guidance not provided earlier. The Chairman monitors the deployment and employment of forces, acts to resolve shortfalls, and directs action needed to ensure successful completion of military operations. USTRANSCOM manages common-user global air, land, and sea transportation, reporting the progress of deployments to the Chairman and the supported commander. Execution continues until the operation is terminated or the mission is accomplished or revised. The CAP process may be repeated continuously as circumstances and missions change. Plan Development Execution Planning OPORD Execute Order President Directs Commander to Begin Military Operations Defines Time to Initiate Operations Conveys Guidance Not Provided Earlier

Major Crisis Situation Awareness CCDR’s Assessment Cdr’s Estimate COA Planning Alert Order Planning Order Warning Order Combatant Command CoCom HQ Pres SecDef CJCS Planning continues during execution, as the operation progresses. The joint force J-5’s effort focuses on future plans. This typically is a period beyond 96 hours, with an emphasis on planning the next phase of operations (sequels to the current operation). In a campaign, this could be planning for the next phase of the current major operation or planning for the next major operation (the next phase of the campaign). Planning also occurs for branches to current operations (future operations planning), which the joint force could execute typically within a hour window. Depending on the command’s SOP, future planning could occur in the J-5 or JPG, while future operations planning could occur in the joint operations center or J-3. The procedures in the preceding discussion have been described sequentially. During a crisis, they may be conducted concurrently or even eliminated, depending on prevailing conditions. In some situations, no formal WARNORD is issued, and the first record communication that the JPEC receives is the PLANORD or ALERTORD containing the COA to be used for plan development. It is also possible that the President or Secretary may make the decision to commit forces shortly after an event occurs, thereby significantly compressing planning activities. No definitive length of time can be associated with any particular planning activity. Severe time constraints may require crisis participants to pass information orally, including the decision to commit forces. Plan Development Execution Planning OPORD Conduct Operation Execute Order Deployment Order

Crisis Action Planning Checklists
Contained in Enclosure G to JOPES Vol I List general responsibilities and considerations during CAP Identified for various levels -- CJCS -- supported command -- component commands -- supporting commands -- Services -- USTRANSCOM -- other commands and agencies

CAP Orders WARNO PLORD ALORD DEPORD EXORD
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (94) X X X XX SAFE BORDER (95) X X PROMPT RETURN (95) X X X JOINT ENDEAVOR (95) X XX ASSURED RESPONSE (96) X X X QUICK RESPONSE (96) X X BURUNDI (96) X DESERT STRIKE (96) XX X INTRINSIC ACTION (96) XX GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE (96) X X X SILVER WAKE (97) X X ENDURING / IRAQI FREEDOM (03) X X X The procedures in the preceding slides have been described sequentially. During a crisis, they may be conducted concurrently or even eliminated, depending on prevailing conditions. In some situations, no formal WARNORD is issued, and the first record communication that the JPEC receives is the PLANORD or ALERTORD containing the COA to be used for plan development. It is also possible that the President or Secretary may make the decision to commit forces shortly after an event occurs, thereby significantly compressing planning activities. No definitive length of time can be associated with any particular planning activity. Severe time constraints may require crisis participants to pass information orally, including the decision to commit forces. This slide includes crisis responses over the past 11 years to show that steps in CAP may be conducted concurrently or even eliminated, depending on prevailing conditions. UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Haiti (Sep 94) 2 Execute orders due to Gen Cedros stepping down SAFE BORDER Peru / Ecuador (Feb 95) Peace Operations for Border Dispute PROMPT RETURN Alien Migration (Jul 95) Interagency Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR IFOR Bosnia (Nov 95) Multiple execute orders due to ROE changes ASSURED RESPONSE Liberia (Apr 96) NEO QUICK RESPONSE Central African republic (May 96) NEO BURUNDI Humanitarian Asst (Jul-Aug 96) warring Tribes and mass refuges and Neo that was completed by Belgians DESERT STRIKE Iraq (Sep 96) Strike against Iraq targets in support of Northern watch INTRINSIC ACTION Kuwait (Sep 96) FDO Deployment of US Army troops to marry up with Prepo armor in Kuwait PACIFIC HAVEN/QUICK TRANSIT) Guam (Sep-Oct 96) Migrant Camp/NEO) GARDIAN ASSISTANCE Zaire (Nov 96) Humanitarian Assistance SILVER WAKE Albania (Mar 97) NEO GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL Zaire (May 97) NEO ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM (Feb 03) Much completed with RFFs LIBERIA (Jun-Sep 03) NEO/Humanitarian Assistance operations

Contingency Planning Strategic Guidance Concept Development Plan Development Plan Assessment JSCP OPLAN CONPLANs SCP Commander’s Strategic Concept - In closing, JOPES is designed to help joint commanders and planners develop and execute war plans - It is a system of joint policies, processes, procedures and supported by IT Crisis Action Planning Execution Situational Awareness OPORD Planning Crisis No Plan Campaign Plan OPORDs

JCL “Bill, may I be excused? My brain is full.”

RETROSPECT Joint Electronic Library : www.dtic.mil/doctrine
Joint Deployment Training Center: Combatant Commands: This slide reminds personnel where they can find key information. Information concerning all the schools at JFSC and the most updated JPOC presentations. The Joint Electronic Library provides the link to all the publications we have discussed throughout the course that are not classified (you can mentioned specifics ones if you desire). For those that need to consider additional training on the programs that are used to manage and deploy the forces JDTC sets up classes around the world. Finally, a link that will allow you to go to each of the Combatant Commanders to review what is going o in their areas of responsibility.

Dr. William J Davis, Jr. USACGSC

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Dr. William J Davis, Jr. USACGSC

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