1. Post-Modernity

2.  Introduction to Post-Modernity  Notional Definitions  Epistemological Foundations  Why Post-Modernity?  History and Memory

3. Modernity Paradigm formation 1889-1925 Normal Science 1925-1950s The End of Modernity 1950-1960s

4. Post-Structuralism 1970-1979 Post-Modernity 1960-2000 1979-2000 Post-Structuralism - Post-Feminism – Post-Colonialism 1970-19791985- 1980- Post-Theory 1995- Globalization: A Permanente Condition

5.  Epistemological Foundations  The End of Master Narratives  De-Centring the West from inside and outside  Deconstruction  The End of the Logos  The End of Metaphysics/Philosophy  The End of Certitude  The Past and a Reflexive Present  The Return to Representation as Simulation  Double Codification/Intertextuality -History and Memory

6.  John Barth and Jorge Luis Borges  Borges at the Cross-roads  Ficciones 1941-1944  Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius  Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote

7.  John Barth and Jorge Luis Borges (1967)  “Literature of Exhaustion”. Atlantic Monthly, (August): 29- 34  [Pierre Menard’s Don Quixote] […] if Beethoven’s Sixth were composed today, it would be an embarrassment; but clearly it wouldn’t be, necessarily, if done with ironic intent by a composer quite aware of where we’ve been and where we are.

8.  John Barth and Jorge Luis Borges (1967)  But the important thing to observe is that Borges doesn’t attribute the Quixote to himself, much less re-compose it like Pierre Menard; instead, he writes a remarkable and original work of literature, the implicit theme of which is the difficulty, perhaps the unnecessity, of writing original works of literature.  For [Borges] no one has claim to originality in literature; all writers are more or less faithful amanuenses of the spirit, translators and annotators of pre-existing archetypes.

9.  John Barth and Jorge Luis Borges (1967)  His Ficciones are not only footnotes to imaginary texts, but postcripts to the real corpus of literature.

10.  Jorge Luis Borges (1941)  Borges: The composition of vast books is a laborious and impoverishing extravagance. To go on for five hundred pages developing an idea whose perfect oral exposition it is possible in a few minutes!  A better course or procedure is to simulate that these books already exist, and then to offer a resumé, a commentary.  More reasonable, more inept, more indolent, I have preferred to write notes upon imaginary books. Such are. Tlön, Uqbar Orbis Tertius.

11.  Borges’ postmodernity is founded in a variety of narrative devices concentrated in particular in a discursive plurality, such as rhizome, deconstruction, meta- discursive play, intertextuality, heterogeneity, subjectivity, minimalism, irony, fragmentation, erasure between fiction and criticism, between art and non art, between reality and fiction, author and reader.  These characteristics will become, during the 1970s and onward, the fundamental ones in literature and art.  What Borges did was to deconstruct the Modern paradigm and create the literary and artistic postmodernity

12. Inter-Textuality and Double Codification

13.  Three Forms of Inter-Textuality Intertextuality IntertextPalimpsestRhizome

14.  'Intertextuality' is a term coined by July Kristeva, but which we shall use to cover a somewhat broader range of theories than those which she expounds in her seminal work on intertextuality, "Word, dialogue and novel” or in Problémes de la structuration du texte (1969).  The theory of intertextuality insists that a text (for the moment to be understood in the narrower sense) cannot exist as a hermetic or self-sufficient whole, and does not function as a closed system.

15. In Art:  Termed coined in the 1960s to describe art which abandons all pretensions at either expressiveness or illusion.  It is generally three-dimensional and either shaped by chance, i.e. a heap of sand – or man made up of simple geometrical forms, often used repetitively.  In Literature: Taking structures from an original text and inserting them in a new text, thus going through a variety of transformations.

16. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy

17.  Jacques Derrida and Writing - Deconstruction  Lyotard and the End of Master Narratives  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Thinking and the non-binary thinking  Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality  Foucault and the Power of Discourse  Lacan and the Imaginary, Symbolic and the Real Orders

18.  Deconstruction

19.  What is Deconstruction?  It is not a Method  It is not a theory  It is a particular manner of reading, a special hermeneutics  It consists in inhabiting the structures and meanings of a texts in order to expose the falacy(ies) of an stutatement of truth.

20.  Deconstruction  Firstly, there is a critique of the human subject.  The term 'subject' helps us to conceive of human reality as a construction, as a product of signifying activities which are both culturally specific and generally unconscious.  The category of the subject calls into question the notion of the self synonymous with consciousness; it ‘decentres’ consciousness.

21.  Deconstruction  Thirdly, there is a critique of meaning. In post-structuralism, broadly speaking, the signified is demoted and the signifier made dominant. This means there is no one-to-one correspondence between propositions and reality.  Lacan, for example, writes of 'the incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier'.

22.  Deconstruction  The post-structuralist philosopher Derrida goes further; he believes in a system of floating signifiers pure and simple, with no determinable relation to any extra-linguistic referent at all.  While structuralism sees truth as being 'behind' or 'within’ a text, post-structuralism stresses the interaction of reader and text as a productivity.

23.  Deconstruction  Deconstruction works at t suspending all that we take for granted about human language, experience and the 'normal' possibilities of human communication.  Deconstruction is the active antithesis of everything that criticism ought to be if one accepts its traditional values and concepts.

24.  Deconstruction  That literary texts possessed meaning and that literary criticism sought a knowledge of that meaning, a know-ledge with its own proper claims to validity, were princi-ples implicit across the widest divergences of thought.  But deconstruction challenges the fundamental distinct-ion between 'literature' and 'criticism' implied by those principles. And it also challenges the idea that criticism provides a special kind of knowledge precisely in so far as its texts don't ' aspire to 'literary' status.

25.  Deconstruction  For the deconstructionist, criticism (like philosophy) is always an activity of writing, and nowhere more rigorous than where it knows and allows for its own 'literary' vagaries.  To present 'deconstruction' as if it were a method, a system or a settled body of ideas would be to falsify its nature and lay oneself open to charges of reductive misunderstanding.

26.  Deconstruction  Deconstruction can be seen in part as a vigilant reaction against this tendency in structuralist thought to tame and domesticate its own best insights.  Some of Jacques Derrida's most powerful essays are devoted to the task of dismantling a concept of 'structure' that serves to immobilise the play of meaning in a text and reduce it to a manageable compass.

27.  Deconstruction  Deconstruction, on the contrary, starts out by rigorously suspending this assumed correspondence between mind, meaning and the concept of method which claims to unite them.  Deconstruction in this, its most rigorous form acts as a constant reminder of the ways in which language deflects or complicates the philosopher's project.

28.  Deconstruction  Above all, deconstruction works to undo the idea - according to Derrida, the ruling illusion of Western metaphysics – that reason can somehow dispense with language and arrive at a pure, self-authenticating truth or 'written' character, the signs of that struggle are there to be read in its blind-spots of metaphor and other rhetorical strategies.

29.  Deconstruction  Deconstruction draws no line between the kind of close reading appropriate to a 'literary' text and the strategies required to draw out the subtler implications of critical language.  Since all forms of writing run up against perplexities of meaning for literature and a secondary, self effacing role for the language of criticism.

30.  Deconstruction  This amounts to a downright refusal of the system of priorities which has traditionally governed the relation between 'critical' and 'creative' language.  That distinction rested on the idea that literary texts embodied an authentic or self-possessed plenitude of meaning which criticism could only hint at by its roundabout strategies of reading.

31.  Deconstruction  For Derrida, this is yet another sign of the rooted Western prejudice which tries to reduce writing - or the 'free play’ of language - to a stable meaning equated with the character of speech. In spoken language (so the implication runs), meaning is 'present' to the speaker through an act of inward self-surveillance which ensures a perfect, intuitive 'fit' between intention and utterance.

32.  Deconstruction  Deconstruction is not simply a strategic reversal of categories which otherwise remain distinct and unaffected.  It seeks to undo a given order of priorities and the very system of conceptual opposition that makes that order possible.  Thus Derrida is emphatically not trying to prove that 'writing' in its normal, restricted sense is somehow more basic than speech.

33.  Deconstruction  Deconstruction is therefore an activity of reading which remains closely tied to the texts it interrogates, and which can never set up independently as a self-enclosed system of operative concepts.

34.  Deconstruction  Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) remains for most modern philosophers what he was for his contempo-raries: a scandal wrapped in layers of enigma.  One reaction in recent times has been to brand him as a dire precursor of the Nazi phenomenon, a thinker whose supposedly 'irrationalist' outlook and megalomaniac pretensions paved the way for Hitler and his idelogues.

35.  Deconstruction  But alongside these writings Nietzsche also conducted a critique of Eastern philosophy and its presuppositions which has lost nothing of its power to provoke and disturb.  It is this aspect of Nietzsche's thought which has left its mark on the theory and practice of deconstruction.

36.  Deconstruction  What Nietzsche provides, on the contrary, is a style of philosophic writing which remains intensely sceptical of all claims to truth - its own included - and which thus opens up the possibility of liberating thought from its age-old conceptual limits.  More than philosopher in the Western tradition, Nietzsche pressed up against those limits of language and thought which Derrida attempts to define.

37.  Deconstruction  He anticipates the style and strategy of Derrida's writing to a point where the two seem often engaged in a kind of uncanny reciprocal exchange.  Truth, he concludes (Nietzsche) "is a mobile marching army of metaphors, metonymies and anthromorphism... truths are illusion of which one has forgotten that they are illusions... coins which have their obverse effaced and which are no longer of value as coins but only as metal.

38.  Deconstruction  For Nietzsche this insight led to the conclusion that all philosophies, whatever their claim to logic or reason, rested on a shifting texture of figurative language, the signs of which were systematically repressed under the sovereign order of Truth.  This bottomless relativity of meaning, and the ways in which philosophers have disguised or occluded their ruling metaphors, are the point of departure for Derrida's writing like Nietzsche's before him.

39.  Deconstruction  For Nietzsche it seemed that this tradition had been firmly set on course by the style of dialectical argument invented by Socrates and passed on through the texts of his student Plato.  The dialectical method of eliciting 'truth' from a care-fully contrived encounter of wisdom and ignorance was - according to Nietzsche - no more than a rhetorical ploy.

40.  Deconstruction  If anything, the sophist come closer to wisdom by implicitly acknowledging what Socrates has to deny: that thinking is always and inseparably bound to the rhetorical devices that support it.  The texts of Jacques Derrida defy classification according to any of the clear-cut boundaries that define modern academic discourse.

41.  Deconstruction  They belong to 'philosophy' in so far as they raise certain familiar questions about thought, language, identity and other long standing themes of philosophical debate.  Moreover, they raise those questions through a form of critical dialogue with previous texts, many of which (from Plato to Husserl and Heidegger) are normally assigned to the history of philosophic thought. [...].

42.  Deconstruction  Yet Derrida's texts are like nothing else in modern philosophy, and indeed represent a challenge to the whole tradition and self-understanding of that discipline.  One way of describing this challenge is to say that Derrida refuses to grant philosophy the kind of privileged status it has always claimed as a sovereign dispenser of reason.

43.  Deconstruction  He argues that philosophers have been able to impose their various systems of thought only by ignoring or suppressing, the disruptive effects of language.  His aim is always to draw out these effects by a critical reading which fastens on, and skilfully unpicks, the elements of metaphor and other figurative devices at work in the texts of philosophy.

44.  Deconstruction  In this sense Derrida's writings seem more akin to literary criticism than philosophy.  They rest on the assumption that modes of rhetorical analysis, hitherto applied mainly to literary texts, are in fact indispensable for reading any kind of discourse, philosophy included.

45.  Deconstruction  Literature is no longer seen as a kind of poor relation to philosophy contenting itself with mere 'imaginary' themes and forgoing any claim to philosophic dignity and truth.  This attitude has, of course, a long prehistory in Western tradition.

46.  Deconstruction  Derrida’ s work provided a whole new set of powerful strategies which placed the literary critic, not simply on a footing with the philosopher, but in a complex relation-ship (or rivalry) with him, whereby philosophic claims were open to rhetorical questioning or deconstruction.  Once alerted to the rhetorical nature of philosophic arguments, the critic is in a strong position to reverse the age-old prejudice against literature as a debased or merely deceptive form of language.

47.  Deconstruction  It now becomes possible to argue - indeed, impossible to deny - that literary texts are less deluded than the discourse of philosophy, precisely because they implicitly acknowledge and exploit their own rhetorical status. Philosophy comes to seem, in de Man's work, 'an endless reflection on its own destruction at the hands of literature'.

48.  Deconstruction  Derrida's attentions are therefore divided between 'literary’ and 'philosophical' texts, a distinction which in practice he constantly breaks down and whose to be based on a deep but untenable prejudice.  Derrida has no desire to establish a rigid demarcation of zones between literary language and critical discourse by a motivating impulse which runs so deep in Western thought that it respects none of the conventional boundaries.

49. Deconstruction  Criticism, philosophy, linguistics, anthropology, the whole modern gamut of 'human sciences' - all are at some point subjected to Derrida's relentless critique.  This is the most important point to gaps about decons- truction.  There is no language so vigilant or self-aware that it can effectively escape the conditions placed upon thought by its own prehistory an ruling metaphysic.

50.  Deconstruction: Writing and Speech  For Derrida, this is yet another sign of the rooted Western prejudice which tries to reduce writing - or the 'free play’ of language - to a stable meaning equated with the character of speech.  In spoken language (so the implication runs), meaning is 'present' to the speaker through an act of inward self- surveillance which ensures a perfect, intuitive 'fit' between intention and utterance.

51.  Deconstruction  Literary texts have been accorded the status of a self- authenticated meaning and truth, a privilege deriving (in Derrida’s view) from the deep mistrust of textuality which pervades Western attitudes to language.  This mystique of origins and presence can best be challenged by annulling the imaginary boundaries of discourse, the various territorial imperatives which mark off 'literature' from 'criticism', or 'philosophy' from everything that stands outside its traditional domain.

52.  Deconstruction  The argument turns on Saussure's attitude to the relative priority of spoken as opposed to written language, a dualism Derrida locates at the heart of western philosophic tradition.  He cites a number of passages, from Saussure in which writing is treated as a merely derivative or secondary form of linguistic notation, always dependent on the primary reality of speech and the sense of a speaker's 'presence' behind his words.

53.  Deconstruction  For Derrida, there is a fundamental blindness involved in the Saussurian text, a failure to think through the problems engendered by its own mode of discourse.  What is repressed there, along with 'writing' in its common or restricted sense, is the idea of language as a signifying system which exceeds all the bounds of individual 'presence' and speech.

54.  Deconstruction  Derrida sees a whole metaphysics at work behind the privilege granted to speech in Saussure's methodology.  Voice becomes a metaphor of truth and authenticity, a source of self-present 'living' speech as opposed to the secondary lifeless emanations of writing. In speaking one is able to experience (supposedly) an intimate link between sound and sense, an inward and immediate realization of meaning which yields itself up without reserve to perfect, transparent understanding.

55.  Deconstruction  Writing, on the contrary, destroys this ideal of pure self- presence. It obtrudes an alien; personalized medium, between utterance and understanding.  It occupies a promiscuous public realm where authority is sacrificed to the vagaries and whims of textual 'dissemination'.  Writing, in short, is a threat to the deeply traditional view that associates truth with self-presence and the 'antioral’ language wherein it finds expression.

56.  Deconstruction  Against this tradition Derrida argues what at first must seem an extraordinary case: that writing is in fact the precondition of language and must be conceived as prior to speech.  Writing is the endless displacement of meaning which both governs language and places it for ever beyond the reach of a stable, self-authenticating knowledge.

57.  Deconstruction  Writing of writing lies deep in Saussure's proposed methodology.  It shows in his refusal to consider any form of linguistic notation outside the phonetic-alphabetical script of Western culture.  As opposed, that is, to the non-phonetic varieties which Derrida often discusses: hieroglyphs, algebraic notions, formalized languages of different kinds.

58.  Deconstruction  This 'phonocentric' bias is closely allied, in Derrida's view, to the underlying structure of assumptions which links Saussure's project to western metaphysics.  Where Derrida breaks new ground, and where the science of grammatology takes its cue, is in the extent to which 'differ' shades into 'defer‘.  This involves the idea that meaning is always deferred, perhaps to the point of an endless supplementarity, by the play of signification.

59.  Deconstruction  Difference not only designates this theme but offers in its own unstable meaning a graphic example of the process at work.  Derrida deploys a whole rhetoric of similar terms as a means of preventing the conceptual closure - or reduction to an ultimate meaning - which might otherwise threaten its texts.

60.  Deconstruction  Among them is the notion of 'supplement', itself bound up in a supplementarity of meaning which defies semantic reduction.  To see how it is put to work we can turn to Derrida's essays on Rousseau and Lévi-Strauss, where the theme is that of writing in the context of anthropology and the cultural 'sciences of man'.

61.  Deconstruction  In this sense Derrida's writings seem more akin to literary criticism than philosophy.  They rest on the assumption that modes of rhetorical analysis, hitherto applied mainly to literary texts, are in fact indispensable for reading any kind of discourse, philosophy included.

62.  Deconstruction  Literature is no longer seen as a kind of poor relation to philosophy contenting itself with mere 'imaginary' themes and forgoing any claim to philosophic dignity and truth.  This attitude has, of course, a long prehistory in Western tradition.

63.  Deconstruction  [Derrida]’ work provided a whole new set of powerful strategies which placed the literary critic, not simply on a footing with the philosopher, but in a complex relationship (or rivalry) with him, whereby philosophic claims were open to rhetorical questioning or decons-truction.  Once alerted to the rhetorical nature of philosophic arguments, the critic is in a strong position to reverse the age-old prejudice against literature as a debased or merely deceptive form of language.

64.  Deconstruction  It now becomes possible to argue - indeed, impossible to deny – that literary texts are less deluded than the discourse of philosophy, precisely because they implicitly acknowledge and exploit their own rhetorical status.  Philosophy comes to seem, in de Man's work, 'an endless reflection on its own destruction at the hands of literature'.

65.  Deconstruction  Derrida's attentions are therefore divided between 'literary' and 'philosophical' texts, a distinction which in practice he constantly breaks down and whose to be based on a deep but untenable prejudice.  Derrida has no desire to establish a rigid demarcation of zones between literary language and critical discourse by a motivating impulse which runs so deep in Western thought that it respects none of the conventional boundaries.

66.  Deconstruction  Criticism, philosophy, linguistics, anthropology, the whole modern gamut of 'human sciences' - all are at some point subjected to Derrida's relentless critique.  This is the most important point to gaps about deconstruction.  There is no language so vigilant or self-aware that it can effectively escape the conditions placed upon thought by its own prehistory an ruling metaphysic.

67.  Deconstruction  Literary texts have been accorded the status of a self- authenticated meaning and truth, a privilege deriving (in Derrida’s view) from the deep mistrust of textuality which pervades Western attitudes to language.  This mystique of origins and presence can best be challenged by annulling the imaginary boundaries of discourse, the various territorial imperatives which mark off 'literature' from 'criticism', or 'philosophy' from everything that stands outside its traditional domain.

68.  Deconstruction  Derrida’s redistribution of discourse implies some very drastic shifts in our habits of reading.  For one thing, it means that critical texts must be read in a radically different way, not so much for their interpretative 'insights' as for the symptoms of 'blindness' which mark their conceptual limits.

69.  Derrida, Phonocentrism and Writing  Différance  Differ Defer   To disagree with To divert

70. Derrida, Phonocentrism and Writing Pharmakon Poison Medicine

71.  Lyotard and the End of Master Narratives

72.  The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979)  The object of this study is the condition of knowledge in the most highly developed societies.  I will use the term modern to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the herme-neutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth.

73.  Lyotard and the End of Master Narratives  Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incre- dulity toward metanarratives. [...].  To the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution which in the past relied on it.

74.  Lyotard and the End of Master Narratives  What is new in all of this is that the old poles of attraction represented by nation-states, parties, professions, institutions, and historical traditions are losing their attraction.  This breaking up of the grand Narratives leads to what some authors analyze in terms of the dissolution of the social bond and the disintegration of social aggregates into a mass of individual atoms thrown into the absurdity of Brownian motion.

75.  Lyotard and the End of Master Narratives  Delegitimation  The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation.  The classical dividing lines between the various fields of science are thus called into question - disciplines disappear, overlappings occur at the borders between sciences, and from these new territories are born.

76.  Lyotard and the Status of Knowledge  The old "faculties" splinter into institutes and foundat-ions of all kinds, and the universities lose their function of speculative legitimation.  The State and/or company must abandon the idealist and humanist narratives of legitimation in order to justify the new goal; in the discourse of today's financial backers of research, the only credible goal is power.

77.  Lyotard and the End of Master Narratives  Education and its Legitimation through Performativity for in addition to its professionalist function, the Univer-sity is beginning, or should begin, to play a new role in improving the system's performance - that of job retraining and continuing education.  Outside the universities, departments, or institutions with a professional orientation, knowledge will no longer be transmitted en bloc, once and for all.

78.  Lyotard and the End of Master Narratives  Knowledge will be served ”à la carte" to adults who need new skills and chances of promotion, but also to help them acquire information, languages, and language games allowing them both to widen their occupational horizons and to articulate their technical and ethical experience.  The application of new technologies to this stock may have a considerable impact on the medium of communication.

79.  Lyotard and the End of Master Narratives  It does not seem absolutely necessary that the medium be a lecture delivered in person by a teacher in front of silent students, with questions reserved for sections or "practical work" session run by an assistant.  To the extent that learning is translatable into computer language and the traditional teacher is replaceable by memory banks, didactics, can be entrusted to machines linking traditional memory banks (libraries, etc.) and computer data banks to intelligent terminals placed at the student's disposal.

80.  Lyotard and the Status of Knowledge  Seen in this light, what we are approaching is not the end of knowledge - quite the contrary.  Data banks are the encyclopedia of tomorrow.  They transcend the capacity of each of their users.  They are "nature" for postmodern man.

81.  Félix Deleuze y Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non-Binary Thinking

82.  Félix Deleuzeand Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  Literature is an assemblage.  It has nothing to do with ideology.  There is no ideology and never has been.  The binary logic of dichotomy has simply been replaced by biunivocal relationships between successive circles.

83.  Félix Deleuzeand Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  A rhizome as subterranean stern is absolutely different from roots and radicles. Bulbs and tubers are rhizomes.  Plants with roots or radicles may be rhizomorphic in other respects altogether: the question is whether plant life in its specificity is not entirely rhizomatic. even some animals are, in their pack form (ants).

84.  Félix Deleuzeand Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  Rats are rhizomes.  Burrows are too, in all their functions of shelter, supply, movement, evasion, and breakout.  1 and 2 Principles of connection and heterogeneity: any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything to anything other, and must be.

85.  Félix Deleuzeand Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  3 Principle of multiplicity: it is only when the multiple is effectively treated as a substantive, "multiplicity," that it ceases to have any relation to the One as subject or object, natural or spiritual reality, image and world.  Puppet strings, as a rhizome or multiplicity, are tied not to the supposed will of an artist or puppeteer but to a multiplicity of nerve fibers, which form another puppet in other dimensions connected to the first: "Call the strings or rods that move the puppet the weave.

86.  Félix Deleuzeand Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  It might be objected that its multiplicity resides in the person of the actor, who projects it into the text.  An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections.  4 Principle of asignifying rupture: against the oversignify ing breaks separating structures or cutting across a single structure.

87.  Félix Deleuzeand Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  A rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines.  You can never get rid of ants because they form an animal rhizome that can rebound time and again after most of it has been destroyed.

88.  Félix Deleuzeand Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  Every rhizome contains lines of segmentary according to which it is stratified, territorialized, organized, signified, attributed, etc., as well as lines of deterritorialization down which it constantly flees.  There is a rupture in the rhizome whenever segmentary lines explode into a line of flight, but the line of flight is part of the rhizome.

89.  Félix Deleuzeand Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  How could movements of deterritorialization and processes of reterritorialization not be relative, always connected, caught up in one another?  The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the wasp reterritorializes on that image.

90.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  There is neither imitation nor resemblance, only an exploding of two heterogeneous series on the line of flight composed by a common rhizome that can no longer be attributed to or subjugated by anything signifying.  The rhizome is an antigenealogy.  The crocodile does not reproduce a tree trunk, any morethan the chameleon reproduces the colors of its surroundings.

91.  Félix Deleuzeand Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  5 and 6. Principle of cartography and decalcomania – a rhizome is not amenable to any structural or generative model.  It is a stranger to any idea of genetic axis or deep structure.

92.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari TreeAmsterdam

93. Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari : Mexico City

94.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  A genetic axis is like an objective pivotal unity upon which successive stage are organized; a deep structure is more like a base sequence that can be broken down into immediate constituents, while the unity of the product passes into another, transformational and subjective, dimension.  The rhizome is altogether different, a map and not a tracing. Make a map, not a tracing.

95.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  The orchid does not reproduce the tracing of the wasp; it forms a map with the wasp, in a rhizome.  What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real.  The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious.

96.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  It fosters connections between fields, the removal of blockages on bodies without organs, the maximum opening of bodies without organs onto a plane of consistency. It is itself a part of the rhizome.  The map is open and connectable in all of its dimens-ions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification.

97.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mount-ing, reworked by an individual, group, or social formation.  Perhaps one of the most important characteristics of the rhizome is that it always has multiple entryways: in this sense, the burrow is an animal rhizome, and sometimes maintains a clear distinction between the line of flight as passageway and storage or living strata (cf. the muskrat: rat; lives in the water; glossy brown fur, odor).

98.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  A map has multiple entryways, as opposed to the tracing, which always comes back "to the same." (because is a copy).  The tracing has already translated the map into an image; it has already transformed the rhizome into roots and radicles.

99.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  It has organized, stabilized, neutralized the multiplicities according to the axes of signifiance and subjectification belonging to it.  It has generated, structuralized the rhizome, and when it thinks it is reproducing something else it is in fact only reproducing itself.

100.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  Once a rhizome has been obstructed, arborified, it's all over, no desire stirs; for its always by rhizome that desire moves and produces.  To be rhizomorphous is to produce stems and filaments that seem to be roots, or better andet ?connect with them by penetrating the trunk, but put them to strange uses.  We're tired of trees. We should stop believing in trees, roots, and radicles. They've made us suffer too much.

101.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  All of arborescent culture is founded on them, from biology to linguistics.  Amsterdam, a city entirely without roots, a rhizome-city with its stem-canals, where utility connects with the greatest folly in relation to a commercial war machine.

102. Amsterdam

103.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  Thought is not arborescent, and the brain is not a rooted or ramified matter.  What are wrongly called "dendrites" (a branched part of a nerve cell that carries impulses toward the cell body) do not assure the connection of neurons in a continuous fabric.

104.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  The discontinuity between cells, the role of the axons, (that part of a nerve cell through which impulses turn away from the cell body) the functioning of the synapses (the point of contact between adjacent neurons, when nerve impulses are transmitted from one to the other) the existence of synaptic microfissures, the leap each message makes across these fissures, make the brain a multiplicity immersed in its plane of consistency...

105.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  Let us summarize the principal characteristics of a rhizome: unlike tress or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not necessary linked to traits of the same nature; it brings into play every different regimes of signs, and even nonsign states.

106.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  The rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the multiple.  It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it grows and which it overspills.

107.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  It constitutes linear multiplicities with n dimensions having neither subject nor object, which can be laid out on a plane of consistency.  The rhizome is an antigenealogy. It is a short-term memory, or antimemory.

108.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  The rhizome operates variation, expansion, conquest, unlike tracing, the rhizome pertains to a map that must be produced, constructed, a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible,modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits and its own lines of flight.  We call a "plateau" any multiplicity connected to other multiplicities by superficial underground stems in such a way as to form or extend a rhizome.

109.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  We are writing this book as a rhizome. It is composed of plateaus.  Nowhere do we claim for our concepts the title of science.  We are no more familiar with scientificity than we are with ideology; all we know are assemblages.

110.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  There is no longer a tripartite division between a field of reality (the world) and a field of representation (the book) and a field of subjectivity (the author).  Rather, an assemblage establishes connections between certain multiplicities drawn from each of these orders, so that a book has no sequel nor the world as its object nor one or several authors as its subject.

111.  Félix Deleuze and Gilles Guattari and the Rhizomatic Non- Binary Thinking  A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, inter-mezzo.  The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb "to be," but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction,"and... and...”.

112.  Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality

113. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics\Philosophy  Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality Borges Text:…. In that Empire, the Araft of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of on single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, The entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guild struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it.

114. The New Philosophers and the End of Philosophy  Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality The following Generations, who were not so fond of the study of Cartography as their Forebears had been, saw that that vast Map was Useless, and not without some Pitilessness was it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. In the Deserts of the West, still today, there are Tattered Ruins, tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited By Animals and Beggars; in all the Land there is no other Relic of the Disciplines of Geography. Suarez Miranda, Viajes de varones prudentes, Libro IV, Cap. XLV, Lerida, 1658.

115. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the map that preceded the territory PROCESSION OF SIMULACRA - it is the map that engenders the territory and if we were to revive the fable today, it would be the territory whose shreds are slowly rotting across the map.

116. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality It is the real, and not the map, whose vestiges subsist here and there, in the deserts which are no longer those of the Empire, but our own. The desert of the real itself. In fact, even inverted, the fable is useless. Perhaps only the allegory of the Empire remains. For it is with the same Imperialism that present-day simulators try to make the real, all the real, coincide with their simulation models.

117. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality So it is with simulation, insofar as it is opposed to representation. The latter starts from the principle that the sign and the real are equivalent (even if this equivalence is utopian, it is a fundamental axiom). Conversely, simulation starts from the utopia of this principle of equivalence, from the radical negation of the sign as value, from the sign as reversion and death sentence to every reference.

118. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality Whereas representation tries to absorb simulation by interpreting it as false representation, simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation as itself a simulacrum. No more mirror of being and appearances, of the real and its concept. No more imaginary coextensivity: rather, genetic miniaturization is the dimension of simulation.

119. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality The real is produced from miniaturized units, from matrices, memory banks and command models - and with these it can be reproduced an indefinite number of times. It is a hyperreal, the product of an irradiating synthesis of combinatory models in a hyperspace without atmosphere.

120. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality In this passage to a space whose curvature is no longer that of the real, nor of truth, the age of simulation thus begins with a liquidation of all referentials - worse by the artificial resurrection in systems of signs, a more ductile material than meaning in that it lends itself to all systems of equivalence, all binary oppositions and all combinatory algebra. It is no longer a question of imitation, nor of reduplicat- ion, nor even of parody.

121. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality It is rather a question of substituting sings of the real for the real itself, that is, an operation to deter every real process by its operational double, a metastable, pro- grammatic, perfect descriptive machine which provides all the signs of the real and short-circuits all its vicissitudes. A hyperreal henceforth sheltered from the imaginary, and from any distinction between the real and the imaginary, leaving room only for the orbital recurrence of models and the simulated generation of difference.

122. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality To dissimulate is to feign not to have what one has. To simulate is to feign to have what one hasn't. One implies a presence, the other an absence. Thus, feigning or dissimulating leaves the reality principle intact: the difference is always clear, it is only masked.

123. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality So it is with simulation, insofar as it is opposed to representation. The latter starts from the principle that the sign and the real are equivalent (even if this equivalence is utopian, it is a fundamental axiom). Conversely, simulation starts from the utopia of this principle of equivalence, from the radical negation of the sign as value, from the sign as reversion and death sentence to every reference.

124. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality Whereas representation tries to absorb simulation by interpreting it as false representation, simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation as itself a simulacrum. Los Angeles and the America surrounding it are no longer real, but of the order of the hyperreal and of simulation.

125. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality It is no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology), but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real, and thus of saving the reality principle. Capital, which is immoral and unscrupulous, can only function behind a moral superstructure, and whoever regenerates this public morality (by indignation, denunciation, etc.) spontaneously furthers the order of capital, as did the Washington Post journalists.

126. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality Simulation is characterised by a precession of the model, of all models around the merest fact - the models come first, and their orbital (like the bomb) circulation constitutes the genuine magnetic field of events. Everything is metamorphosed into its inverse in order to be perpetuated in its purged form. Illusion is no longer possible, because the real is no longer possible.

127. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality Simulation is infinitely more dangerous, however, since it always suggests, over and above its object, that law and order themselves might really be nothing more than a simulation. It is impossible to isolate the process of the real, or to prove the real. And the automaton has no other destiny than to be ceaselessly compared to living man, so as to be more natural than him, of which he is the ideal figure.

128. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality The robot no longer interrogates appearance; its only truth is in its mechanical efficacy. No more resemblance or lack of resemblance, of God, or human being, but an imminent logic of the operat- ional principle. Space is no longer even linear or one-dimensional: cellular space, indefinite generation of the same signals, like the tics of a prisoner gone crazy with solitude and repetition.

129. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality Such is the genetic code: an erased record, unchan- geable, of which we are no more than cells-for-reading. All aura of sign, of significance itself is resolved in this determination; all is resolved in the inscription and decodage. The architectural graphism is that of the end of monopo- ly; the two W.T.C. towers. perfect parallelepipeds a – mile high on a square base, perfectly balanced and blind communicating vessels.

130. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality The fact that there are two of them signifies the end of all competition, the end of all original reference. For the sign to be pure, it has to duplicate itself: it is the duplication of the sign which destroys its meaning. This is what Andy Warhol demonstrates also; the multiple replicas of Marilyn's face are there to show at the same time the death of the original and the end of representation.

131. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality The two towers of the W.T.C. are the visible sign of the closure of the system in a vertigo of duplication, while the other skyscrapers are each of them the original moment of a system constantly transcending itself in a perpetual crisis and self challenge. The hyperreal represents a much more advanced phase, in the sense that even this contradiction between the real and the imaginary is effaced.

132. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality Before emerging in pop art and pictorial neo-realism this tendency is at work already in the new novel. The project is already there to empty out the real, extirpate all psychology, all subjectivity, to move the real back to pure objectivity. In fact this objectivity is only that of the pure look - objectivity at last liberated from the object, that is nothing more than the blind relay station of the look which sweeps over it.

133. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality The deconstruction of the real into details - closed paradigmatic declension of the object - flattening, linearity and seriality of the partial objects. The endlessly reflected vision: all the games of duplicat- ion and reduplication of the object in detail. The properly serial form (Andy Warhol). Here not only the syntagmatic dimension is abolished, but the paradig- matic as well.

134. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality Since there no longer is any formal flection or even internal reflection, but contiguity of the same - flection and reflection zero. The very definition of the real becomes that of which it is possible to give an equivalent reproduction. This is contemporaneous with a science that postulates that a process can be perfectly reproduced in a set of given conditions.

135. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality And also with the industrial rationality that postulates a universal system of equivalency (classical representat- ion is not equivalence, it is transcription, interpretation, commentary). At the limit of this process of reproductibility, the real is not only what can be reproduced, but that which is always already reproduced: The hyperreal. The hyperreal transcends representation [...] only because it is entirely in simulation.

136. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality Hyperrealism is made an integral part of a coded reality that it perpetuates, and for which it changes nothing. In fact, we should turn our definition of hyperrealism inside out: It is reality itself today that is hyperrealist. Surrealism's secret already was that the most banal reality could become surreal, but only in certain privileged moments that nevertheless are still connected with art and the imaginary.

137. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality There is no more fiction that life could possibly confront, even victoriously - it is reality itself that disappears utterly in the game of reality - radical disenchantment, the cool and cybernetic phase following the hot stage of fantasy. It is then that art enters into its indefinite reproduction: all that reduplicates itself, even if it be the everyday and banal reality, falls by the token under the sign of art, and becomes esthetic.

138. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jean Baudrillard and Hyperreality Art can become a reproducing machine (Andy Warhol), without ceasing to be art, since the machine is only a sign. And so art is dead, not only because its critical transcendence is gone, but because reality itself, entirely impregnated by an aesthetic which is inseparable from its own structure, has been confused with its own image. Reality no longer has the time to take on the appearance of reality.

139. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy  Michel Foucault and the Power of Discourse

140. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Michel Foucault and the Power of Discourse Foucault often uses the term genealogy to refer to the union of erudite knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today. Genealogies focus on local, discontinous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchzie and order them in the name of some true knowledge.

141. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Michel Foucault and the Power of Discourse Throughout his life Foucault was interested in that which reason excludes: madness, change, discontinuity. Most of Foucault's books are really analyses of the process of modernization. One of the characteristics of his work is the tendency to condense a general historical argument into a tracing of the emergence of specific institutions via discursive practices.

142. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Michel Foucault and the Power of Discourse What interests him, of course, is how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false within the State Apparatus. An apparatus is a structure of heterogeneous elements such as discourses, laws, institutions, in short, the said as much as the unsaid.

143. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Michel Foucault and the Power of Discourse In his view the method of genealogy: involves a pains-taking rediscovery of struggles, an attack on the tyranny of what he calls 'totalizing discourses' and a rediscovery of fragmented, subjugated, local and specific knowledge. It is directed against great truths and grand theories.

144. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Michel Foucault and the Power of Discourse Power is not an institution, a structure, or a certain force with which certain people are endowed; it is a name given to a complex strategic relation in a given society. "I am well aware that I have never written anything but fictions. I do not mean to say, however, that truth is therefore absent.” “It seems to me that the possibility exist for fiction to function in truth, for a fictional discourse to induce effects of truth.” (Power Knowledge).

145. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Michel Foucault and the Power of Discourse For Foucault power is necessary for the production of knowledge.

146. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy  Jacques Lacan and Language

147. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language For Lacan there is no separation between self and society. Human beings become social with the appropriation of language; and it is language that constitutes us as a subject. Thus, we should not dichotomize the individual and society.

148. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Society inhabits each individual. Freud made a number of biologistic assumptions. Lacan's view is that biology is is always interpreted by the human subject, refracted through language; that there is no such thing as 'the body' before language. It could be said that by shifting all descriptions from a biological-anatomic level to a symbolic one he shows how culture imposes meaning on anatomical parts.

149. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Lacan's psychoanalitic theory is partly based upon the discoveries of structural anthropology and linguistics. One of his main beliefs is that the unconscious is a hidden structure which resembles that of language. Knowledge of the world, of others and of self is determined by language.

150. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Language is the precondition for the act of becoming aware of oneself as a distinct entity. It is the I-Thou dialectic, defining the subjects by their mutual opposition, which founds subjectivity. But language is also the vehicle of a social given, a culture, prohibitions and laws.

151. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The young child is fashioned and will be indelibly marked by language without being aware of it. Let us look at some of the main stages in Lacan's theory. The first articulation of the 'I' occurs in what Lacan calls the mirror stage. Lacan often refers to the mirror stages it prefigures the whole dialectic between alienation and subjectivity.

152. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Mirror Stage Self-recognition in the mirror is effected (somewhere between the ages of six and eight months) in three successive stages. At first, the child who is together with an adult in front of a mirror confuses his own reflection with that of his adult companion. In the second phase the child acquires the notion of the image and understands that the reflection is not a real being.

153. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Finally, in the third stage, he realizes not only that the reflection is an image, but that the image is his own and is different from the image of the other. And then language takes over. Lacan suggests that, thanks to human beings' metaphoric ability, words convey multiple meanings and we use them to signify something quite different from their concrete meaning.

154. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language This possibility of signifying something other than what is being said determines language's autonomy from meaning. Lacan insists on the autonomy of the signifier.

155. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Self and Language Lacan's theory cannot be presented coherently without a discussion of the function of language. He has a complete theory of language, which he links with subjectivity. There is no subject independent of language.

156. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Self and Language While Saussure implied that we can somehow stand outside language, Lacan insists that we are immersed in everyday language and cannot get out of it. There is no such thing as metalanguage. We all have to represent ourselves in language.

157. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Self and Language In a Lacanian view of language a signifier always signifies another signifier; no word is free from metaphoricity (a metaphor is one signifier in the place of another). Lacan talks of glissement (slippage, slide) along the signifying chain, from signifier to signifier.

158. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Self and Language Since any signifier can receive signification retrospectively, after the fact, no signification is ever closed, ever satisfied. From anything that is said it cannot be predicated what is going to be said. Any 'sentence' can always be added to. No sentence is ever completely saturated.

159. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Self and Language What is it to be conscious of oneself? How do we recognize the self? what us the 'something' that reflects consciousness back onto itself? In self-consciousness the subject and the object are identical; but can I reflect on the self and reflect on that reflection?

160. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Self and Language Can the self that is self of consciousness grasp the self of consciousness? When we see ourselves we see only a look. We do not get nearer to what we are. This is called 'the infinity of reflection'. Lacan stresses the point that there is no subject except in representation, but that no representation captures us completely.

161. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Self and Language I can neither be totally defined nor can I escape all definition. There is an inherent tension, a feeling of threat, because one's identity depends on recognition by the other.

162. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Freud and Lacan In Freud's early work the ego (the conscious part of the subject) is connected with the reality principle, and the unconscious is related to the pleasure principle (the undeffirentiated sources of the organism’s energy from which both the ego and the libido are derived; the superego, a major sector of the psyche that is only partly conscious and that aids in character formation by reflection parental conscience and the rules of society).

163. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Freud and Lacan While for Freud the unconscious has a threatening aspect, in Lacan it is the locus of 'truth', of authenticity. And yet Lacan believes that the unconscious cannot be an object of knowledge; the ego projects itself and then fails to recognize itself. Self-knowledge, the notion of the self can reflect on itself, is not possible.

164. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Freud and Lacan While Freud seems to have believed in the unconscious as a substantive concept, for Lacan 'the unconscious is not the real place of another discourse'. Lacan proclaims that the unconscious is neither primordial nor instinctual. The unconscious is implicit in everything we say and do.

165. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Freud and Lacan However, in trying to grasp the unconscious is that which we can never know, but this does not mean that the effort is not worth while. Nature, for Lacan, is the Real which is out there but impossible to grasp in a pure state because it is always mediated through language.

166. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Name-of-the-Father Lacan's Name-of-the-Father operates in the register of language. The Name-of-the-father is the Law. The legal assignation if a father's name to a child is meant to call a halt to uncertainty about the identity of the father. The phallus is the attribute of power which neither men nor women have.

167. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Name-of-the-Father Lacan suggests that all our fantasies are symbolic representations of the desire for wholeness. We tend to think that if we were the phallus or had the other's phallus we would then, somehow, be whole. In other words, the phallus is the signifier of an original desire for a perfect union with the Other.

168. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Name-of-the-Father The phallus refers to plenitude; it is the signifier of the wholeness that we lack. For Lacan discourse constitutes the unconscious. Language and desire are related. Self-consciousness would not be possible without an organic lack.

169. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Lack: The Desire of Desire Generally speaking, the 'I' of Desire is an emptiness that receives a real positive content by a negating action that satisfies Desire in destroying, transforming and assimilating the desired non-I. Desire is directed towards another Desire, another greedy emptiness, another 'I'. Desire is human only if one desires not the body but the desire of the other; that is to say, if one wants to be 'desired' or, rather, 'recognized' in one's human value.

170. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Lack: The Desire of Desire All Desire is desire for a value. To desire the desire of another is really to desire 'recognition'. Desire is what cannot be specified by demand. We can never be certain that others love us for our unique particularity.

171. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Lack: The Desire of Desire Desire arises out of the lack of satisfaction and it pushes you to another demand. In other words, it is the disappointment of demand that is the basis of the growth of desire.

172. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Sense of Loss It begins with birth and then moves in turn through the territorialization of the body, the mirror stage, access to language and the Oedipus complex. Lacan situates the first loss in the history of the subject at the moment of birth.

173. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Sense of Loss The second loss suffered by the subject occurs after birth but prior to the acquisition of language. The loss in question is inflected by what might be called the 'pre-Oedipal territorialization' of the subject's body. ‘maginary' is the term used by Lacan to designate that order of the subject's experience which is dominated by identification and duality.

174. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Sense of Loss Within the Lacanian scheme (the imaginary) it not only precedes the symbolic order, which introduces the subject to language and Oedipal triangulation, but continues to coexist with it afterwards. The imaginary order is best exemplified by the mirror stage.

175. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Sense of Loss Lacan believes that once the subject has entered the symbolic order (language) its organic needs pass through the 'defiles' or narrow network of signification and are transformed in a way which makes them there after impossible to satisfy.

176. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Name-of-the-Father: The Phallus Lacan defines the paternal signifier, what he calls the ‘Name-of-the-Father’, as the all-important one both in the history of the subject and the organization of the larger symbolic field. The word 'phallus' is used by Lacan to refer to all of those values which are opposed to lack. He is at pains to emphasize its discursive (rather than its anatomical) status, but it seems to have two radically different meanings:

177. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Name-of-the-Father: The Phallus and which On the one hand, the phallus is a signifier for those things which have been partitioned off from the subject during the various stages of its constitution and which will never be restored to it. The phallus is then signifier for the organic reality or needs which the subject relinquishes in order to achieve meaning, in order to gain access to the symbolic register. signifies that thing whose loss inaugurates desire. It signifies that thing whose loss inaugurates desire.

178. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Name-of-the-Father: The Phallus On the other hand, the phallus is a signifier for the cultural privileges and positive values which define male subjectivity within patriarchal society but from which the female subject remains isolated. The phallus, in other words, is a signifier both for those things which are lost during the male subject's entry into culture and for those things which are gained.

179. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Orders of the Symbolic, Imaginary and the Real Lacan believes that the discourse within which the subject finds its identity is always the discourse of the Other-of a symbolic order which transcends the subject and which orchestrates its entire history. It is clear that the Imaginary - a kind of pre-verbal register whose logic is essentially visual- precedes the symbolic as a stage in the development of the psyche.

180. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Orders of the Symbolic, Imaginary and the Real Its moments of formation has been named the 'mirror stage'. At this stage there does not yet exists that ego formation which would permit a child to distinguish its own form from that of others. The Imaginary order is pre-Oedipal. The self yearns to fuse with what is perceived as Other.

181. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Orders of the Symbolic, Imaginary and the Real In other words, we experience a profoundly divided self. The infant wants to complete the mother, to be what she lacks - the phallus. The child's relationship with the mother is fusion, dual and immediate. Later, the child's desire to be its mother's desire gives way to an identification with the father.

182. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Orders of the Symbolic, Imaginary and the Real It is the Oedipal crisis which marks the child's entrance into the world of the symbolic. The laws of language and society come to dwell within the child as he accepts the father's name and the father's 'no'. Lacan understands the Oedipus story in terms of language, not in terms of the body, and that there is no such thing as the body before language.

183. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Orders of the Symbolic, Imaginary and the Real The Lacanian notion of the Symbolic order is an attempt to create mediations between libidinal analysis and the linguistic categories, to provide, in other words, a transcoding scheme which allows us to speak of both within a common conceptual framework. The Oedipus complex is transliterated by Lacan into a linguistic phenomenon which he designates as the discovery by the subject of the Name-of-the-father.

184. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Orders of the Symbolic, Imaginary and the Real Lacan feels that the apprenticeship of language is an alienation for the psyche but he realizes that it is impossible to return to an archaic, pre-verbal stage of the psyche itself. The unconscious is the discourse of the Other.

185. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language The Orders of the Symbolic, Imaginary and the Real The third order is the Real. The reality which we can never know is the Real-it lies beyond language... the reality we must assume although we can never know it. This is the most problematic of the three orders of registers since it can never be experienced immediately, but only by way of the mediation of the other two: 'the Real, or what is perceived as such, is what resists symbolization absolutely'.

186. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Lacan and Feminism Lacan's theory has attracted a good deal of interest among feminists because the emphasis on the production of gendered subjectivity via signification (the process whereby meaning is produced at the same time as subjects are fabricated and positioned in social relations) implies that it is possible to escape the subordination of women inherent in Freud's recourse to biological difference.

187. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Lacan and Feminism For Lacan, the subject comes into being – that is, begins to posture as a self-grounding signifier within language – only on the condition of a primary repression of the pre-individuated incestuous pleasures associated with the (now repressed) maternal body.

188. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Lacan and Feminism The masculine subject only appears to originate meanings and thereby to signify. His seemingly self-grounded autonomy attempts to conceal the repression which is both its ground and the perpetual possibility of its own ungrounding.

189. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Lacan and Feminism But further, this dependency, although denied, is also pursued by the masculine subject, for the woman as reassuring sign is the displaced maternal body, the vain but persistent promise of the recovery of pre-individual jouissance.

190. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Lacan and Feminism Women are said to “be” the Phallus in the sense that they maintain the power to reflect or represent the “reality” of the self-grounding postures of the masculine subject, a power which, if withdrawn, would break up the foundational illusions of the masculine subject position.

191. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Lacan and Feminism Hence, “being” the Phallus is always a “being for” a masculine subject who seeks to reconfirm and augment his identity through the recognition of that “being for.” To be the Phallus is to be signified by the paternal law, to be both its object and its instrument and, in structuralist terms, the “sign” and promise of its power.

192. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Lacan and Feminism But this “being” the Phallus is necessarily dissatisfying to the extent that women can never fully reflect that law; some feminists argue that it requires a renunciation of women’s own desire. Which is the expropriation of that desire as the desire to be nothing other than a reflection, a guarantor of the pervasive necessity of the Phallus.

193. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Lacan and Feminism On the other hand, men are said to “have” the Phallus, yet never to “be” it, in the sense that the penis is not equivalent to that Law and can never fully symbolize that Law.

194. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Lacan and Feminism Although thee is no grammatical gender here, it seems that Lacan is describing the position of women for whom “lack” is characteristic and, hence, in need of masking and who are in some unspecified sense in need of protection.

195. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Lacan and Feminism ‘Subjectivity’ is used to refer to the conscious and unconscious thoughts and emotions of the individual, her sense of herself and her ways of understanding her relation to the world.

196. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Lacan and Feminism Bodies cannot be said to have a signifiable existence prior to the mark of their gender; the question then emerges: To what extend does the body come into being in and through the mark(s) of gender?

197. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Lacan and Feminism Women are the “sex” which is not “one.” Within a language pervasively masculinist, a phallocentirc language, women constitute the unrepresentable. In other words, women represent the sex that cannot be thought, a linguistic absence and opacity.

198. The New Philosophers and the End of Metaphysics/Philosophy Jacques Lacan and Language Lacan and Feminism Within a language that rests on univocal signification, the female sex constitutes the unconstrainable and undesignatable.

199. Post-Modern Architecture: Fiction, Contradiction, Complexity and The Return to Ornament and History

200. Postmodernity and Architecture Torre Velasca Preconditions for Postmodern Architecture Circa 1960 The Torre Velasca (Milan, 1957-1960) At the 1959 CIAM, just as a group eagerly insisting on a renewal of modern architecture was about to enjoy consensus after the break with the great masters of classical modernism, two Italian architects entered by the back door and forced the discussion of a topic hardly ever accorded the slightest mention since the first CIAM: new architecture in context of the historical city. These two architects, Giancarlo de Carlo and Ernesto Rogers.

201. Belgiojoso, Peresutti, Rogers Torre Velasca Milan, 1957-1960

202. Palazzo Vecchio Florence 1299-1314

203. Postmodernity and Architecture Torre Velasca The controversy that broke out at this congress has proved exemplary, and it has been continued in similar terms. It is the old quarrel between the defenders of history and the adherents of modernity, which has its forerunners in the “Querelles” of the French Academy in the seventeenth century. Along with several other events that occurred around 1960, the CIAM in Otterlo was a turning point in the history of modern architecture. The blow dealt by Rogers in the name of his firm came in the monstrous shape of the first high-rise building in Milan; TORRE VELASCA, which violated the modest European standards of

204. Postmodernity and Architecture Torre Velasca permissible building size.... “This absurdity stands like a medieval defensive tower made hospitable by copious fenestration and blown up to a giant size in the midst of the old city of Milan”. Rogers: When I speak about the past and tradition, and when I speak about the building's life being connected with the past, it is not intended that this be an imitation of the forms of the past. In his statement, Rogers made the following points: The Torre Velasca, in advancing a strikingly novel novel version of the modern skyscraper, takes into account the historical environment in which it

205. Postmodernity and Architecture Torre Velasca is placed but does not declare its allegiance to the historical agents of power represented by a fortified tower. The present form contradicts the attribution of his content. The Torre Velasca undertakes to reinforce the identity of its surroundings, so as not to set in question by a self-isolating modernist stance the value of the entire environment and so as not to appeal demonstratively by its mere presence for the exchange of all is old for that which is new Rogers concluded with a summary statement of his objective: [The] attitude of the fathers of modern

206. Postmodernity and Architecture Torre Velasca architecture was anti-historical. But this was an attitude which was born of great revolution, and it was necessary that the first premise of our culture be a new attitude to history. But this is no longer necessary.

207. Aldo van Eyck Theo Bosch Row Apartment Project Zwolle, Holland 1977

210. Aldo van Eyck Theo Bosch Row Appartment Project Zwolle, Holland 1977

211. Postmodernity and Architecture Heinrich Klotz Louis Kahn was the leading figure of the generation that succeeded the masters of modern architecture, and his work was pivotal in the transition from modernism to post- modernism. Kahn’s intermediary position, so rich in the impulses it yielded, becomes immediately a apparent when one observes how much he emphasized the primary Geometric figures.in the Ministerial residence. Khan’s architecture reveals his special sense for the archaic, mythical magnitude of larger-than-life buildings. Even though his spatial units that surpass all previously used dimensions have some link to superscale container

212. Postmodernity and Architecture Heinrich Klotz stage-like buildings look like a direct continuation of Roman architecture. His complex, irregular ground plans, with their axial breaks occurring as if by chance and with their order alternating between symmetry and chance grouping, recall the Villa Adriana.

213. Louis Kahn Institute of Public Administration Ahmedabad, India 1963

214. Entrance to Warehouse Ostia Antica, Italy

215. Postmodernity and Architecture Heinrich Klotz The thin-walled loggias of the Institute of Public Adminis- tration in Ahmedabad, India (1963) are good example of this transformation. According to Kahn, the segmental arches of the individual loggias normally would have required thicker walls to support the side thrust of the arches. In Entrance of warehouse (Ostia Antica, Italy), Kahn took up an ancient construction element and gave it a new efficiency through the proven strength of concrete. Because he concerned himself intensely with the constitutive process of a construction, he insisted on building walls

216. Postmodernity and Architecture Heinrich Klotz articulated in a great variety of ways. To make this characterization of individual spaces and structures possible, Kahn studied the most modern and the most conventional construction methods down to the last detail. One moment he used ancient Roman brick structures; the next moment he used the newest discoveries of Fuller, whose tetrahedral chain construction he developed into a framework for a projected high-rise building.

217. Postmodernity and Architecture  Charles Moore: Building Places

218. Charles Moore Piazza d’Italia Ground Plan New Orleans 1976-1979

219. Postmodernity and Architecture Charles Moore’s Piazza d’Italia The most telling example of postmodern architecture is Charles Moore’s Piazza d’Italia in New Orleans - not because the historical forms of the classic orders were used in an almost excessive profusion, but because a fiction was created in a direct way. The Piazza (New Orleans, 1976-1979) was intended to become the center of a predominantly Italian section of New Orleans where the Italo-American Institute is located. The immediate are in fact, the entire part of the city - was in need of renovat- ion and was dominated by large modern edifices. There was nothing alluring or inviting about the area little to

220. Charles Moore Piazza d’Italia New Orleans, 1976-1979

221. Charles Moore Piazza d’Italia New Orleans 1976-1979

222. Charles Moore Piazza d’Italia Socales of Tuscan Columns New Orleans 1976-1979

223. Charles Moore Piazza d’Italia “Doric” Water Column New Orleans 1976-1979

224. Postmodernity and Architecture Charles Moore’ Piazza d’Italia make one linger. Moore created a totally building site by cutting into the space intended for a projected building (never executed). The site is circular. Groups of columns provide a backdrop for a topographic map of Italy, which juts out from the middle of a large arcade and reaches right into the center of the concentric circles of the piazza, with a fountain as the Mediterranean. (Sicily has the central position, because most of the residents of the neighborhood are Sicilian). The piazza wall was supposed to be the purely decorative part of the project building, against whose modern forms, smooth white facade, and simple square

225. Charles Moore Piazza d’Italia Showing Portrait of Charles Moore New Orleans 1976-1979

226. Postmodernity and Architecture Charles Moore’ Piazza d’Italia windows openings its breathtakingly classical decorum was to contrast sharply. All the classical orders are present: Doric, Tuscan (red and square), Ionian (inside Arch), and Corinthian (Arch, center) and Composite (sides of Arch in yellow). Together they provide the “boot” of Italy with a complete cultural background and a reminiscence of the heroic columnar orders of Italian architectural facades. However, classical greatness in evoked here with touches of humour and commented on with irony. There are collars of neon-light tubing under the capitals of the central arcade. Other

227. Postmodernity and Architecture Charles Moore’ Piazza d’Italia “columns” are actually curved sheets of steel,with rivulets of water creating effect ¯ of fluting (decoration consisting of long, rounded grooves, as in a column). The Tuscan columns next to these Doric “columns” are made steel and are “cut open” to reveal marble. Their metopes are “wetopes” with tiny fountains. (an opening hole in frieze for beam; any of the square areas, plain or decorated, between triglyphs in a Doric frieze. On this “narrative” plane, the classical columnar orders are reinterpreted through the playful divestment of their monumental dignity. Yet, at the same time, the architraves (horizontal beam

228. Postmodernity and Architecture Charles Moore’s Piazza d’Italia between the columns and the top) are inscribed with words of dedication and with the title Fons sancti Jesephi (Fountain of Saint Joseph], and the architect’s face is immortalized in a water-spouting mask in the spandrel. The Piazza d’Italia was created solely for the purpose of fiction. The collonade fragments of this stage of memory do not ant to be serious, perfect architecture. Rather they want to be the vocabulary of a narrative: architecture between the Old World and the New, between wit and seriousness, between perfection and fragmentation,

229. Postmodernity and Architecture Charles Moore’s Piazza d’Italia between the columns and the top) are inscribed with words of dedication and with the title Fons sancti Jesephi (Fountain of saint Joseph], and the architect's face is immortalized in a water-spouting mask in the spandrel. The Piazza d’Italia was created solely for the purpose of fiction. The collonade fragments of this stage of memory do not ant to be serious, perfect architecture. Rather they want to be the vocabulary of a narrative: architecture between the Old World and the New, between wit and seriousness, between perfection and fragmentation, between historical exactness and humorous alienation. The Piazza risks making

230. Postmodernity and Architecture Charles Moore the political statement “Here is Italy!” only to add immediately, with a sad smile, “Italy is not here.” Charles Moore (who, although he came from the Midwest and studied at Princeton and Yale, must be considered the head of the Californian school) is an architect who knows how to use modest means to create complex, exciting spaces that combine surprise with familiarity. Moore has developed the interview with a client into an art. While carrying on an intense dialogue, he makes little hieroglyphic sketches that capture all the client’s wishes - the obscure as well as the obvious ones. The summoning up and examining of

231. Postmodernity and Architecture Charles Moore conscious and unconscious wishes connected to housing and to being sheltered is the starting point for Moore’s architectural endeavors and for his architectural theory, both of which are focused on “making places”. Moore has searched as no other contemporary architect has to find architectural means of meeting the most marginal human needs as well as the anthropologically constant ones, and to respond with innovative as well as with archetypal motifs to promptings which our orientation toward securing our existence predominantly in terms of the means-to-an-end rationality hardly ever allows for.

232. Postmodernity and Architecture Charles Moore To make a house a place of shelter and personal identity is an avowed aim to all architects. However, the need for adequate human shelter can hardly be met with an architectural language that is attuned more to the dictates of geometrically perfect figurations than to the wishes of the inhabitants. What is more important to Moore and his Partners is “making places rather than manipulating formal configurations,” and this statement rejects a modernism that places its faith in the effectiveness of pure geometric forms and holds a successful composition of such forms to be the highest goal of architecture.

233. Postmodernity and Architecture Charles Moore Moore’s own house Orinda, California, (1960-1962) is such a place. One feels at home in an almost primordial way in this bachelor house, a one-room, single-level rectangular unit. Light comes in from the sides and from an opening in the tent-like roof. The whole thing is grasped at a glance. Some of the walls slide open like a large barn doors, so that one can look out on the countryside, the lawn, and the surrounding plants. The glass surfaces extend from the floor to the ceiling. Looking out, one has the impression of Moore’s grand piano standing as an amusing alien object in midst

234. Charles Moore House of Charles Moore Orinda, California 1960-1962

235. Charles Moore House of Charles Moore Orinda, California 1960-1962

236. Postmodernity and Architecture Charles Moore of the green outdoors. The co-presence and intertwining of disparate elements is used as much as a narrative means by Moore as the exploration of essential relationships and basic interconnections. The four columns in the center of the house set off the living and dining area as a place within a place, with its own roof and its own skylight. [...]. Since ancient times the space marked off by four columns in a square formation has had a profound significance; it has stood for the center of the universe. For a person sitting inside an aedicula, secure under the projection of a ciborium, the world

237. Postmodernity and Architecture Charles Moore is concentrated in that space; if another person enters the space, their joint presence acquires the aspect of a ceremony. Architecture as the framework of ceremony is Moore’s intended goal; function is a side issue. The space seems to be an ideal prototype of space. And the fact that the four supports of the baldachin are actual Tuscan columns from a nineteenth-century building introduces a temporal dimension that connects the present with the past. For Moore, a house must always refer to something beyond itself, and only when dreams have a chance of being

238. Charles Moore House of Charles Moore Orinda, California 1960-1962

239. Postmodernity and Architecture Charles Moore realized does a house become a place of shelter and of identity. Moore’s living room aedicula is not an object for use or a suitable implement of practical goals but an element of fiction, a poetic metaphor for the center of the world. The house at Orinda also has a second, smaller aedicula: a monumentalized shower cabin. For Moore the morning shower is a ceremonial pleasure, and his shower cabin certainly reflects this; however, the real “purpose” of the smaller aedicula is to relativize the larger one and to humanize it with a gentle touch of irony.

240. Postmodernity and Architecture Charles Moore The skylights in he ceilings of the two aediculas (placed off center, perhaps so as not to appear too nearly perfect) also serve to minimize the representative aspect of the form.

241. Charles Moore House of Charles Moore Orinda, California 1960-1962

242. Postmodernity and Architecture Charles Moore Moore’s little house at Orinda is permeated by a hard-to- define sense of comfort and by a “power of place” that connects ceremony and humour. It is a place of fiction, whose illusionistic power is much more potent than the most compelling objective elements. Along with Robert Venturi’s “My Mother’s House" (also completed in 1962), it represents a turning away from the ruling notions of the International Style. The combination of historical columns, a saddle roof, barn doors, and floor-to-ceiling glass walls was a fundamentally new thing and a questioning of the progressive stance of modernism.

243. Postmodernity and Architecture Charles Moore To every architect thinking in terms of modernist notions, what Moore termed the “creation of a place” was bound to seem a mystification of architectonic space and a lapse from the spirit of rationalism. The aesthetic of stereometry would have called for a simple shell as the enclosure of an unbroken spatial unit, as in Philip Johnson’s glass house. But Moore did not want any abstract rationalist simplification; he was striving to present a fiction based not on the composition of solid forms but on the idea of home and of security. Thus, human emotions and the human need for protection became fundamental motivational

244. Postmodernity and Architecture Charles Moore factors in the design process. The aediculas were typological answers to archetypal wishes. A functional analysis, such as the calculation of the most efficient use of kitchen space, was not capable of fulfilling such wishes. The range of the to architecture was widened when psychological needs that had been neglected as functionally irrelevant began to be treated as necessary conditions requiring formal definition.

245. Michael Graves Fargo/Moorhead Cultural Centre Bridge Fargo, USA, 1977-1978

246. Ponte Vecchio Florence, Italy

247. Ponte Rialto, Venice

248. Rob Krier Housing Block Ritterstrasse, Berlin, 1978-1981

249. Robert Krier Ritterstrasse Apartments Berlin, 1978-1988

250. Ponte Rialto, Venice

252. Ponte Vecchio, Florencia, Italia

253. James Stirling and Michael Wilford Neue Staatsgalerie Stuttgart, 1977-1984

254. James Stirling and Michael Wilford Neue Staatsgalerie Stuttgart, 1977-1984

255. Colosseo, Rome - Siglo I - AD

257. Robert Stern New York Coliseum New York 1996-1998

258. Helmut Jahn Bank of the Southwest Tower Huston, 1981