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Speech and Phenomena Philosophy 157 G. J. Mattey ©2002.

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Presentation on theme: "Speech and Phenomena Philosophy 157 G. J. Mattey ©2002."— Presentation transcript:

1 Speech and Phenomena Philosophy 157 G. J. Mattey ©2002

2 Indication and Expression Husserl distinguished two kinds of signs Indicative signs indicate something to a thinking being The reality of a state of affairs of which one has knowledge indicates the reality of another state of affairs Expressions are meaningful signs In communication, expressions are indications of meaning given to the sign by the communicator

3 Expressions in Solitary Life When used in uncommunicated mental life, expressions are not indicative, though still meaningful They are not indicative for two reasons We do not effectively communicate, but only represent a communication We already have knowledge of their meaning and so cannot inform ourselves of an unknown state of affairs through a mental sign

4 Questions About Meaning For Husserl, the pure function of meaning is not to indicate Where does this leave the status of representation in language? It might mean a kind of putting-forward (Vorstellung) or a re-presentation

5 Putting-Forward The first reason for non-indicative expression was that we cannot put a meaning forward to ourselves, but only represent such a putting- forward So there is an essential difference between effective communication and an imaginary “represented” communication The “representation” would have to be a fiction But we cannot separate “real” from “fictitious” communication

6 Re-Presentation Linguistic signs are signs only through their repetition There must be something identical underlying the occurrence of different sign tokens (e.g., phoneme) The formal identity is ideal, and thus must be put forward (Vorstellung) So all effective discourse requires “unlimited representation,” i.e., putting forward and repetition

7 Breaking Down Distinctions All the modes of representation are present in solitary discourse But they are also present in all signs There is no real distinction between expression and indicative communication Even in solitary discourse we must take the repeated sign as indicative of a meaning

8 Effacing the Sign Historically, philosophers have distinguished between the meaning which is a “simple presence” and the sign which indicates it But the two are inextricably intertwined: abolishing one abolishes the other Philosophers have tried to make the sign derivative from the presence So the sign is effaced just as it is produced To restore the status of the sign is then to overturn the traditional concept of the sign

9 Reversing the Priority The differences between represented and representative, sign and signifier, simple presence and reproduction, are not real The philosopher’s “presence” depends on the possibility of repetition So the sign is not derivative from the presence, but the opposite

10 Ideality Husserl makes ideal the following: The sensible form of the signifier (word) The signified (intended sense) The object (in the case of the exact sciences) The ideality is just the permanence of the same and the possibility of its repetition Absolute ideality is the possibility of indefinite repetition

11 Platonism Husserl determines being as ideality This is an ethico-theoretical valuation in the Platonic way Ideality does not exist only in the sense that it is not empirical reality

12 Presence Husserl also determines being as presence Being is what is present a priori to intuition It is an ideal “ob-ject” (standing before the repetition, “pre-sent”) It is also infinitely repeatable only because it appears in the present (to a being with the temporal structure we have)

13 Mortality This presence signifies the certainty that the universal form of all experience (and thus life) has been and always will be present But I am only related to this universal form as present to me “I am” indicates my mortality So the Cartesian move from “I am” to “I am a thinking thing” cannot prove one’s immortality It conceals the relation between presence and ideality

14 Imagination Imagination is given a key role by Husserl It involves a re-presentation that is neutralizes the “positional” presentation of memory So it is not wholly neutral, but always points back to the original existence The ideality that neutralization achieves is therefore not a fiction

15 Self-Presence Husserl argued that expression in inner dialogue is not indicative because it does not communicate any new information Consciousness is transparently present to itself Indicative signs are foreign to this self- presence So they are foreign to presence in general

16 Voice In interior discourse, we give “voice” to the intuited presence The ideal essence expressed is retained in the voicing The phoneme is the most “ideal” sign because one hears one’s self in the voicing It shows the ideal presence without leaving the interior arena The speaker “hears” himself in voicing

17 Hearing One’s Self Speak Hearing one’s self speak is a unique auto-affection It signifies something ideal It does not have to pass through the medium of the world outside the self This makes it fit for universality Its connection with sound allows for the unity of what is worldly and what is transcendental

18 The Primacy of Voice The universality of voice makes it essential to consciousness It promises to allow for complete unity with the thing signified aimed at in intuition This unity is broken in cases where one sees one’s self speak or make a gesture

19 Différance Traditionally, philosophers have emphasized identity over difference Husserl’s transcendental ego is a unified being Voicing is required for self-presence So self-presence depends on difference Différance is the movement that produces this difference, and so it produces the subject It is more basic than the identity of self-presence

20 Temporality What distinguishes voice from other modes of signification is its pure temporality Temporality itself is a product of auto- affection, a “spontaneous generation” In generating new moments of time within a “living present,” a trace of the old moments must be retained

21 Voice and Temporalization Temporalization constantly goes beyond the present So pure subjectivity in the sense of remaining within the present is impossible Hearing one’s self speak is transcendent in this way As such, it is always indicative Meaning is not added to voice from the outside, unless it is deficient


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