1. sUAS Certification Working Group
Navy/USMC Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Clearance Process
Dr. Steve Cook
Navy/USMC Airworthiness Office
(301)
Presented to:
sUAS Certification Working Group
26 June 2008
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

2. USN/USMC Airworthiness Office Mission
The Navy’s Airworthiness Office (AIR-4.0P) is responsible for the independent engineering assessment of all aircraft (manned and unmanned) and airborne weapon systems to ensure these air vehicles can be operated safely within defined operating limits.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

3. USN/USMC Flight Clearances for UAS
A flight clearance is required for any Navy/USMC-owned or Navy/USMC- leased UAS or aerial target IAW OPNAVINST T
Not all UAS have to be airworthy, but all must be safe for flight!
If UAS is deemed expendable by the owner/sponsor, a flight clearance may be issued on the assurance of safety to people and property on the ground (Safety of Flight IFC).
Engineering requirements are tailored based on system complexity, risk to third parties, desired usage, expendability, etc. External mitigations (e.g., airspace restrictions) are typically added to the IFC to limit risk to third parties.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

4. The Wide Spectrum of Navy UAS IFCs Issued
Since 2004, Over 140 UAS Airworthiness IFCs and over 100 Safety of Flight IFCs issued
Currently supporting 24 Platforms
No reported flight-related injuries or damage to non-program property to date
N-UCAS
Future
COST
MQ-8 FireScout
ScanEagle
RQ-7 Shadow
MQ-9 Reaper
AquaPuma
Silver Fox
RQ-1 Predator A
RQ-15A Neptune
Wasp
Not to scale
WEIGHT
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5. The Navy Flight Clearance Process
ACC/ARC/ NAT IPT/EDT ENGINEERING
OWNER
PROGRAM INITIATED
The Navy Flight Clearance Process
FLEET
REQUIREMENT
IDENTIFIED
INFORMED OF PROGRAM
FLT CLNC REQUIRED? NO
YES
FACILITATE
PLANNING MEETING
ATTENDEE LIST and AGENDA
ESTABLISH REVIEWERS
PLANNING MEETING NO
ESTABLISH ENGINEERING
REQUIREMENTS
CONCURRENCE
NAVAIRINST C
YES
ENGINEERING/DATA REQUIREMENT AGREEMENT PLAN
ANALYSIS
TEST & EVAL NO
YES
OWNER CONCUR
CLEARANCE REQUEST
REQUIREMENTS
MET?
REQUEST
ASSIGNED AND LOGGED IN
DRAFT CLEARANCE
REVIEW OF CLEARANCE AND SUPPORTING DATA
YES
REQUIREMENTS
MET? NO
QUALITY
ASSURANCE &
RISK ASSESSED NO NO
MODIFIED CLEARANCE ACCEPTABLE
FLIGHT CLEARANCE
YES
OPT
YES
BACK TO Planning Meeting
PROBABILITY OF LOSS
FLIGHT CLEARANCE
REVISED CLEARANCE
INCREASED RISK
CLEARANCE DENIED
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

6. Navy/USMC Systems Engineering Review
Thermal
Hydraulics
System Safety
Weight and Balance
Materials
Mechanical Systems
Class Desk
Avionics
Fuel Containment
Core Avionics
Navy/USMC Systems Engineering Review
Aviation/Ship Integration
Software E3
Store Integration
Target Controls
Loads and Dynamics
Store Separation
Landing Gear
Flying Qualities/Stab & Cntl
Strength
Performance
Wiring
Instrumentation
APU & Drive Systems
Human Systems
Radar & Antenna Systems
Flight Controls
Electrical Power
Propulsion
Safe Escape
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

7. Partnerships and Ongoing Efforts
US Army and Air Force
Tri-Service MOA for cross-Service certification support (e.g., Shadow, Raven, Predator, ScanEagle)
MIL-HDBK-516 updates for UAS
OSD Task Force
Standards and Interoperability sub-group
Airspace Integration Joint IPT
FAA, Universities, OSD, Services working to identify and close gaps in airworthiness standards for UAS
NATO FINAS (Flight in non-segregated airspace)
STANAG 4671: CS-23 based airworthiness standard for fixed-wing military UAVs
Standards for rotary-wing and light UAS in work
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

8. Demonstrating Software Airworthiness in UAS via Assurance Based Cert Methodology
University of Virginia Dr. John Knight
Challenges
“Off the shelf” UAS with proprietary software difficult to certify
Many UAS produced by non-traditional aerospace manufacturers that have little/no experience with producing flight-critical software
Many international partners are legally bound to produce safety cases for their military aircraft
Objective
Develop assurance-based certification processes and templates for software-intensive UAS
Goal Structuring Notation for Software-Intensive System
Closing UAS Airspace Integration Gaps
Key Deliverables
Track 1: Assurance-based methodology provides a structured argument to prove and document that software is safe within a given context for temporary approvals to fly Navy/USMC UAS in the NAS
Track 2: Application of assurance-based methodology will inform critical airworthiness criteria, processes and standards needed to account for software-intensive nature of UAS
Goal Structuring Notation methodology
Structured Safety Case Templates
Methodology of implementing into NAVAIR flight clearance processes
Timeline
Phase 1 Complete pending deliverable
Phase 2 ECD: November 2009
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

9. Evidence-Based Approach to Improved Small UAV Reliability
Virginia Tech University Dr. Jim Marchman and Dr. Craig Woolsey
Challenges
Many small UAS lack the reliability to safely fly over densely populated areas
Non-traditional aviation manufacturers use components of questionable reliability, making fault tree analysis difficult
Cost and capability impacts of “designing-in” reliability into a small UAS are unknown
Objective
Develop methodologies/tools to identify cost-wise improvements to small UAS reliability
VULTURE highly reliable small UAV
Closing UAS Airspace Integration Gaps
Key Deliverables
Track 1: Application of Dempster-Shafer methodologies as part of fault tree analysis provide a means of identifying reliability improvements for “off-the-shelf” UAS to enhance incremental access to airspace
Track 2: Identification of cost-wise component level reliability improvements will inform airworthiness standards for incorporation into MIL-HDBK-516
Dempster-Shafer Theory based methodology for incorporating reliability into small UAS design
MATLAB toolboxes to inform trades of potential investments into UAS reliability
Case study of impacts of designing in reliability into the VULTURE UAS
Timeline
Phase 1 Complete (31 May 2008)
Phase 2 ECD: 31 May 2009
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

10. Quantitative Airworthiness Scheme
North Carolina State University Dr. Chuck Hall
Challenges
Airworthiness standards for small UAS do not yet exist in many disciplines
Lack of systematic method for substantiating the airworthiness of small UAS
Documentation of safety considerations for small UAS including lethality scaling for small UAS, mitigation factors, and target level of safety
Objective
Develop quantitative scheme to assess airworthiness of small UAS
Quantitative Airworthiness Scheme
Closing UAS Airspace Integration Gaps
Key Deliverables
Track 1: Application of QAS provides a means to substantiate COA statements of airworthiness for small UAS that intend to fly over populated areas
Track 2: Identification of airworthiness standards gaps for small UAS and development of best practices to fill those gaps
Report on Failure Modes and Functional Hazards for small UAS
Lethality Scaling Factor for small UAS
Documented Quantitative Airworthiness Scheme with user’s guide
Timeline
Phase 1 ECD: November 2008
Phase 2 ECD: November 2009
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

11. Conclusions
Navy/USMC UAS require a flight clearances per OPNAVINST T
Flight clearances for “expendable” UAS can be issued on the basis of safety-of-flight
Flight clearance requirements for UAS can be tailored based on weight, complexity, usage spectrum, autonomy, and cost
Partnering with DoD, FAA, NATO, industry and academia to tackle UAS certification challenges
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

12. BACKUP
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

13. Definition: Airworthiness
B-17
The property of an air system configuration to:
safely attain, sustain and terminate flight
IAW approved usage limits.
Usage limits include: flight limits, fatigue life, maintenance, etc.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

14. Definition: Safety of Flight
The property of an air system configuration to safely attain, sustain and terminate flight within:
Prescribed and accepted limits for injury/death to personnel and damage to equipment, property and/or environment.
Safety of Flight identifies risks associated with use of aircraft systems and are normally identified by a Hazard Risk Analyses. These risks can be conveyed by NOTES, CAUTIONS and/or WARNINGS.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

15. Sample Engineering Data Requirements Agreement Plan (EDRAP)
AIRWORTHINESS:
BASED ON MIL-HDBK-516
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

16. Typical Navy UAS SoF IFC Data Requirements Toolset
SAFETY-OF-FLIGHT: SOMEWHAT SIMILAR TO RCC
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY