1. Dr. Francisco Cesar Augusto Da Silva
Technical Meeting on Radiation Safety in Industrial Radiography
IAEA – Vienna
June 2014
Dr. Francisco Cesar Augusto Da Silva
Instituto de Radioproteção e Dosimetria - IRD/CNEN
Brasil
Brazilian Industrial Radiography Accident:
Reconstructive Dosimetry and Lessons Learned

2. Brazilian Overview Nuclear and Radioactive Installations
Nuclear Installations
Nuclear Power Plant: 2
Nuclear Research Reator: 4
Nuclear Mining and Milling: 2
Fuel Cycle Industrial Complex : 2 units
Navy Industrial Complex: 1 unit
CNEN Research Institutes: 5 units
(radioisotopes production, cyclotron accelerator; industrial irradiator, gammagraphy source production, metrology laboratory,...)
Radioactive Installations: 1574
Industry Area: 635
Medical Area - Radiotherapy and Nuclear Medicine: 680
Research: 228
Service: 31
Medical X Ray Devices:
100000

3. Approved Laboratories
Reference: CASEC/IRD/CNEN June 2014 7
Calibration of Equipment Laboratories
(1 SSDL) 12
Individual Monitoring Laboratories
(Film Badge, TLD and OSL)
Approved Laboratories
165000
Radiation Workers
Medical Area: 75%
Industry, Research & Other Areas: 25%
Brazilian Overview

4. 92 Installations (Companies)
Reference: CNEN´s Database – June 2014
276 Radiation Protection Officers
1700 Radiographers (Operators)
300 Gamma Devices with sources of 192Ir, 75Se, 60Co
Industrial Radiography
200 Daily On-site Radiographies
Brazilian Overview

5. Brazilian Regulatory Authority
CNEN Regulations
General Regulations:
NN : BASIC SAFETY STANDARDS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION
NE : SAFE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Specifics Regulations applied to Industrial Radiography:
Res : Licensing Requirements for Radioactive Installations
NN : Safety and Radiation Protection Requirements for Industrial Radiography Services
NE : Requirements to Radiation Protection Services
NN : Certification of Qualification for Radiation Protection Officer
CNEN
National Commission of Nuclear Energy
Brazilian Regulatory Authority
Brazilian Overview

6. Relevant Radiological Accidents Events with severe injuries
Wrong emergency rescue procedure: a trainee operator held the source holder with his the hand.
Ir TBq (43Ci)
2000 – 60Co TBq (57Ci)
Due to a procedure failure, during routine maintenance work of a cobalt device, an operator kept his left hand very close to the radioactive source, during approximately 30 seconds.
Reference: GADE/IRD
Brazilian data include 5 serious radiological accidents affecting 7 radiation workers and 19 members of the public, resulting in the development of the Cutaneous Radiation Syndrome in hands and fingers.
A device was stolen from the transport vehicle and a truck driver found it. The radioactive source was removed and handled by members of the public.
Ir TBq (23Ci)

7. The Radiological Accident – May 2000
An industrial gamma radiographer was performing routine exposures with a 60Co Gammamat apparatus (model TK100, Isotopen-Technik Dr. Sauerwein) containing a 2.11 TBq (57 Ci) source.
The operator was not bearing a personal monitor with alarm, and did no carry a survey meter.
At the end of the tasks, when he tried to detach the guide tube from the exposure container - unaware that the source was not in the secured position - he kept his left hand very close to the radioactive source, for approximately 30 seconds.
Noticing that it was impossible to detach the guide tube from the device, area monitoring was conducted, which showed that indeed the source was not in the secured position. The source was jammed in the internal tube near the guide tube.

8. Reconstructive Dosimetry Methods
The effective and absorbed dose estimations of the Brazilian accident were performed using the following methods:
Reconstructive Dosimetry Methods
Physical Method by film badge individual monitor and a simulator of a left hand with thermoluminescent dosimeters;
Biological Dosimetry Method by cytogenetic analysis
Computational Method by a Brazilian Monte Carlo calculation code, named “Visual Monte Carlo –VMC”, with human body voxel simulator
Clinical Observation of the signs of the lesion, particularly in the fingers and hand with radiation-induced necrosis.

9. Physical and Computacional Methods
The dose reconstruction used for assessment of the distribution of doses on the worker’s left hand and organs were made using two methods: physical and computational techniques.
For the first technique a physical hand simulator was built and it was also used the Alderson Rando phantom for organs doses.
The computational method was performed using microcomputer software for external dose calculations, named ‘Visual Monte-Carlo - VMC’, together with a hand voxel simulator and Alderson Rando phantom.
The values obtained through both methods for the distribution of absorbed doses on the operator’s left hand and organs doses were compared.
Computational Simulation to Hand Dose
Computational Simulation to Organ Dose

10. Results of Dose Estimations
Effective dose of 88.1 mSv using film badge individual monitor.
Effective dose of 60 mGy based on observation of none dicentrics observed at one thousand cells scored using the cytogenetic analysis.
Results of Dose Estimations
Absorbed doses of 7.41 Gy and Gy in the thumb and index fingers using a left hand physical simulator.
Absorbed doses between 10 Gy and 20 Gy in the thumb and index fingers based on the clinical observation of oedema and erythema in operator`s hands after 8 days; appearance of blisters on his left hand, mainly on the thumb and index finger after 21 days and dry desquamation on both hands after 23 days.
Absorbed doses of 7.80 Gy and Gy in the thumb and index fingers using Visual Monte Carlo computational dosimetry method
Absorbed doses (mGy)

11. Regulatory Authority Enforcement Main Causes Operator Consequences
Erythema, oedema and blisters on the operator’s hands (Day 30).
Regulatory Authority Enforcement
Formal reprimand to the Company’s Director.
Temporary suspension of the facility operation.
Restriction of using of the 60Co gamma device.
Permanent removal of the operator from radiation job.
Main Causes
Operator Consequences
The radioactive source had stuck inside the exposure container, but not in the secured position due to corrosion inside the container and poor maintenance of the equipment.
The operator was not carrying his personal alarm.
The operator did not perform the proper and necessary radiation monitoring of the gamma device with a portable radiation monitor.
The operator failed to follow the safety procedures.

12. To assess periodically the gamma device internal channel with an industrial borescope.
To perform periodically the smear test inside the gamma device internal channel.
To provide the use of individual monitor with audible and vibrating alarms for all operators permanently.
To maintain continuous education and training in radiation protection and safety in industrial radiography.
Lessons Learned

13. Education and Training in Radiation Protection and Safety in Industrial Radiography
Lessons Learned

14. Education and Training in Radiation Protection and Safety in Industrial Radiography
Lessons Learned

15. Evaluation of Eye Lens Doses on Industrial Gamma Radiography Workers using Monte Carlo Method
Portable Gamma Devices
Radioactive Source:
Iridium-192 – gamma radiation
Activity Max. 3.7 TBq
Education and Training in Radiation Protection and Safety in Industrial Radiography
Lessons Learned

16. Safety Evaluation of Gamma Radiography Devices
Portable Gamma Devices
Radioactive Source:
Iridium-192 – gamma radiation
Activity Max. 3.7 TBq
Industrial radiography is used throughout the world to examine the structural integrity of materials in a non-destructive manner.
In Industrial Radiography were recorded more than 40 radiological accidents involving 37 workers, 110 members of public and 12 deaths, around the world.
Education and Training in Radiation Protection and Safety in Industrial Radiography
Lessons Learned

17. Education and Training in Radiation Protection and Safety in Industrial Radiography
Lessons Learned
ANALYSIS OF RADIOLOGICAL
ACCIDENTS IN INDUSTRIAL
RADIOGRAPHY
LESSONS
IDENTIFIED
LEARNED

18. Radiation Overexposure Analysis Group
Main Objectives:
To investigate all radiation overexposure cases recorded by personnel dosimetry.
To evaluate the worker dose and, if necessary, to give information for medical actions.
To find out the real causes of the event and to emit recommendations to avoid other radiation overexposure cases.
To modify or to ratify the exposure recorded on the personnel monitoring register.
To publish scientific information about all radiation overexposure cases.
To maintain a database of radiation overexposure cases.
Radiation Overexposure Analysis Group
Main Activities:
Technical and scientific analysis of the accident.
Dose investigation and accident reconstruction
Dose calculation
Cytogenetic dosimetry
Technical report with recommendations to avoid other radiation overexposure cases
From 1985 to 2012, 560 persons were investigated of having been overexposed.

19. Francisco Cesar Augusto Da Silva dasilva@ird.gov.br - Brasil
Thanks
Francisco Cesar Augusto Da Silva
- Brasil