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Presentation on theme: "INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN POLITICS Dr Simona Guerra"— Presentation transcript:


2 EU ENLARGEMENT WHAT and WHEN: From 6 to 27 and theories of European Integration PERSPECTIVES: What if (MS or CC) HOW: Analysing enlargement policy HOW: Impact of enlargement WHY: Why is the eastward enlargement different? most difficult chapters, conditionality WHAT NEXT

3 FROM 6 TO 27 UK, DK and EI (1973) (NOR) GR (1981) POR and SP (1986) AUT, FIN, SWE (1995) (NOR) CYP, CZ, EE, HU, LV, LI, MA, PL, SLK, SLO (2004) BG and ROM (2007) HRV, MAC, TURK

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5 WHY ENLARGEMENT UK - (already French rejection in 1962) – Irish and Danish economies tied to the UK GR, POR, SP – consolidation of democracy (Mediterranean enl.) AUT, FIN, SWE – tradition as stable democracies, no longer bound by the post-war political settlement (EFTA enl.) 2004/7 -End of historical division (Eastern enl.) Cini 2007: 421-423

6 WHY ENLARGEMENT Enlargement by groups of states together UK – bias to big states?; rapid economic growth between industrialised countries, high rates of growth in the EC, late 1950s failure of a trade agreement, US pressure Mediterranean enl. – out of dictatorship, consolidation of democracy EFTA enl. – more difficult to explain why… 1979 oil crisis and the 1992 project (economy); end of Cold War (geopolitics) What can theories explain?

7 THEORIES AND THE EFTA ENLARGEMENT Sweden as case study – social-democratic govts rejected membership, social-dem neo corp. type of state LI or not? (globalisation pressure?) Neo-Gramscian analysis (Bieler 2000, 2002) Eastern enlargement and theoretical debate – return to Europe or passive revolution? Bache and George 2006: 535-553

8 PERSPECTIVES The enlargement policies of the applicants (candidate countries, CC) The enlargement process of the existing member states (MS) The enlargement policies of the EU The impact of enlargement Bache and George 2006: 538-539

9 APPLICANTS, MS and the EU UK- pol./ec. reasons; MS – political reasons; EU – acceptance of the acquis communautaire Mediterranean enl. – pol.; MS – stability in south- east Europe; EU – when ec. conditions are not ideal EFTA enl. – ec.?; MS – Germany (Kohl), France (Mitterand); EU – from EES to EEA, perspective towards the next enl. 2004/7 – see debate; MS – Germany (Kohl), geostrategic, security, economic reasons; EU – Copenhagen criteria Bache and George 2006: 535-553

10 HOW Simply agreement between the Six in the first enlargement, acquis Importance of stability over economic reasons with the Mediterranean enlargement Institutional architecture after enlargement – Council, QMV and size of the Commission (EFTA) Copenhagen criteria – with the Eastern enl. Bache and George 2006: 535-553

11 THE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT In no previous enlargement have EU applicants been so far from EU norms, both in terms of their different levels of economic prosperity and development and the structure of their economies The acquis communitaire the entire body of European laws, which includes all the treaties, regulations and directives passed by the European institutions as well as judgements laid down by the European Court of Justice was more complex than ever before as the Single Market developed and the EU took on additional tasks in the fields such as economic and monetary union, and justice and home affairs

12 THE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT The relationship between the EU and the post- communist candidate states was characterised by a lack of trust, exemplified by their (unprecedented) insistence upon the monitoring and verification of the candidates implementation of the acquis There was a lack of popular (and in some cases elite) enthusiasm for EU eastward enlargement in the existing Member States


14 EU ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS WITH POST-COMMUNIST STATES: THE MOST DIFFICULT CHAPTERS ChapterMain problemsSolution AgricultureExtending the existing level of subsidies to the post-communist states not possible within the EU Budget Phasing in full agricultural subsidies over nine years Regional aidExtending its current scope would have been extremely costly but reducing it might have made some current beneficiaries into net Budget contributors. Capping the amount of regional aid given to no more than 4% of their GDP EnvironmentNone of the applicant states could afford to finance all the environment measures required to achieve compliance with the acquis. Giving post-communist states transition periods over some aspects of the environmental acquis. Justice and Home AffairsThe member states did not trust the post-communist states to adequately control the EU's external frontiers. Temporarily excluding post-communist states from the Schengen zone of free travel across borders. Free movement of persons Political concerns (especially in Germany and Austria) that Western labour markets would be flooded by cheap labour from Eastern Europe. Allowing existing Member States to deny East Europeans access to Western labour markets for up to seven years. Free movement of capitalSensitivities about the sale of land to foreigners in some candidate countries (such as Poland). Allowing post-communist states to restrict sale of land to foreigners for up to twelve years. Competition policyThe EUs demanded that post- communist governments remove subsidies to loss making firms. Giving post-communist states transition periods to phase out state aids. The BudgetFor post-communist states, the fact that their governments would have to pay budget contributions from the first day of membership while aid went to individuals or local authorities (and often required matching funding) could have placed their national budgets under strain and even meant that they became net contributors. Shifting the date of accession to May; moving some money regional funds into a budget rebate; and giving a guarantee that post- communist states would not get any less income from the EU in the first year of membership than in their last year as candidates.

15 CONDITIONALITY The effectiveness of EU external governance depends on the initial conditions of the candidate country EU CONDITIONALITY WAS SUCCESSFUL IN LOCKING-IN DEMOCRACY (once in?)

16 AN EXAMPLE: KOVAC-MECIAR The most well known dispute is the feud that ran for five years between Slovak prime minister Vladimir Meciar and Slovak president Michal Kovac. They started out as close allies. Kovac was at Meciars side during the long negotiations that led to the breakup of Czechoslovakia, and he was the last speaker of the federal parliament. In March 1993, Kovac was elected the first president of independent Slovakia. Within months, however, he was arousing Meciars displeasure by refusing two of the prime ministers nominations to sensitive government positions: the head of the security intelligence service, and the privatisation ministry. Kovac then began to criticise publicly Meciars illiberal style of government, and brokered the alliance that brought Meciar down in March 1994.

17 KOVAC-MECIAR conted From that point onward, Slovakia was ensnared in revenge politics. Meciar, back in power from the end of 1994, maneuvered repeatedly to oust the president from office. Since he lacked the three-fifths majority needed to vote Kovac out, he tried to drive him out by making life unpleasant: - slashing the budget for the presidents office, - attacking him every day through the pro-government media, and - having his son abducted by the security service. Kovac, though not a remarkable man by any definition, stood his ground and served out his term, until March 1998. The Slovak presidency then remained vacant until direct elections held in the spring of 1999. In 1997 Slovakia fails the political criteria (Helsinki 1999)

18 ACQUIS CONDITIONALITY The key condition for the success of EU rule transfer is whether the EU sets its rules as conditions for countries with a credible membership perspective (once in?) Costs do not provoke the loss of office (policy areas) Salience and timing

19 WHAT NEXT FOR THE NEW EU MSs Role of policy-makers during the accession negotiations Conditionalities are not binding as full member state Acquis conditionality could have affected democratic conditionality – electoral competition and policy choices (not dependent on the parties, but on the acquis conditionality) Successful at the national level (anchoring democracy), but undermining them at the supranational level?

20 WHAT NEXT FOR THE EU AND ENLARGEMENT Development gap between existing members and potential candidates has widened Post-enlargement decision-making needs to be effective Limit to the size of the EU, where does the EU end? The more the EU expands, the more regional issues emerge? More inward looking? Cini 2007: 438


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