1. Origins of Extremism in Terrorist Movements Why do some terrorists refuse to accept deals that are efficient in favor of fighting that is inefficient? Why aren’t ‘moderates’ deterred from negotiating? Argument: Extremism is not caused by ideology, but rather by fear of exploitation in movements with multiple factions. Violence occurs when weaker factions accept deals in static movements. Or, when stronger factions collaborate when they are in decline.

2. The Problem of Extremists “Extremist” factions oppose peace because they are rent seeking, intensely resolute, or simply do not prefer it. Extremists → extremist violence → failure of peace processes. Cannot identify ex ante. Cannot really establish causality.

3. Re-conceptualizing Extremism Individual terrorists may be thrill-seeking, religious, criminals, local warlords, or political reformers. These individuals have distinct preferences, but coalesce into a group or movement to coerce governments. However, since there are varying preferences within larger terrorist movements, there may be no one deal that satisfies all factions. This implies that any deal will exclude some parts of the terrorist movement while including others.

4. Internal Commitment Problem Leads to internal competition over what faction represents the movement. This decision is made by governments, who decide which faction to include in negotiation and which to exclude. The “extremists” may oppose deals not because they hate negotiating, but because their issues are excluded from negotiations and the government empowers the included faction. We now need to identify specifically when we should observe extremist violence empirically.

5. Model Three players: Government G and two terrorist factions (A, B) involved in a dispute. G prefers to end the conflict. A and B prefer to get a settlement, but both prefer to control how the benefits of the settlement are distributed. G is free to negotiate with either A or B. Once G chooses a partner (A, B), the excluded faction either accepts the deal, or rejects it and begins a terrorist campaign.

7. Terrorist Attacks Number of successful attacks drawn from a Poisson distribution. λ = 10(p φ w) for A and λ = 10(1-p φ )w for A. G’s payoff following these attacks is 1 – w – α(k).

8. Terrorist Attacks Assume that infighting between the factions collectively weakens the movement. G upholds peace if 1 – w – α(k) > w 2 Negotiation therefore subverted if k > (1-w-w 2 )/α

9. Assumptions G strictly prefers a deal to no deal (1 – w > -w). A disarms B in an internal conflict with probability, and is initially more powerful: p > 1-p. But, assume power may be in flux. Assume power in the movement is static if φ=1 and A is declining if φ=2, where: p φ  [0,1] (A, B) receive respective payoffs that are consistent with their internal power: pw and (1-p)w, where w  [0,1]. Collectively weaken if infighting begins: w falls to w 2.

10. SPE as a Function of the Balance of Power between Factions

11. Case 1. A is Preponderant Over B A deters B from using terrorism after negotiation. A can therefore accept any deal without risk (w > pw). Since G’s best outcome is to negotiate with A, a deal is reached. Empirical Implication: No extremism if one faction is dominant over the others.

12. Case 2. A is Moderately Powerful Static power in this case creates a mutual balance of terror. A rejects negotiation because it fears internal conflict. B also rejects negotiation for fear of an internal conflict. Empirical Implication: Negotiation is less likely to occur if power in the movement moderately favors one faction. Ex: Taliban.

13. Case 3. A and B are Balanced In static cases, A will retain the majority of power in the future. A therefore prefers to reject negotiation and avoid a conflict with B. However, B may attempt a power grab by cutting a deal with the government since A’s relative power is relatively less. Implication: G is more likely to negotiate with weaker factions if the power is relatively balanced within the terrorist movement. Ex. Boko Haram.

14. Case 4. Shifting Power A commitment problem is created if power is shifting in favor of the weaker faction… A is powerful at time t, but will see its share of the movement fall if it waits to negotiate. Fear of losing influence in the movement later motivates more powerful factions to settle with government immediately. Implication: Stronger factions are more likely to negotiate if power is shifting within the terrorist movement. Ex: MEND.

15. Hypotheses Hypothesis 1. Extremist violence is less likely to occur in movements dominated by one faction. Hypothesis 2. Weaker factions are more likely to accept negotiation in static movements, triggering extremist violence. Hypothesis 3. Stronger factions are more likely to accept negotiation in dynamic movements, triggering extremist violence.

16. Comparison of Boko Haram and MEND Nigeria faces two different groups in the 2000s. Both relatively successful, and both have factions with comparable power. Allows us to examine the effect of shifting power. Boko Haram was relatively static: comprised of several similar cells led by Shekau’s more powerful one. MEND was dynamic: consisted of factions that all drew their power from oil rents and control of extortion rackets.

17. Boko Haram “Defectors” from Boko Haram attempt to negotiate. –2011: Individual claiming to represent the group offers to disarm in exchange for religious protections from Nigeria, but is shot. –2012: More moderate Boko Haram faction states that it is willing to negotiate. Boko Haram officials deny this and state that “internal divisions were eliminated.” Done through beheadings. –2014: Alleged “Shekau” is killed following significant fighting with state and discussions of peace. Result: Weaker factions appear to attempt negotiation, but they are punished and stopped by stronger faction.

18. MEND 2009 Amnesty provides key leaders with substantial financial windfalls and gives all of their followers jobs. But, the amnesty did nothing to clean up land or regulate oil production. Eleven commanders reject the deal and continue to fight. Major leaders fend off challenges with government assistance by maintaining control of oil fields and providing protection to MNCs. Result: Stronger factions agree to negotiation and hold the peace despite ‘extremist’ terror from excluded factions.

19. Conclusion We propose a rationalist explanation for extremism: results from internal commitment problem within terrorist movements. In static movements, weaker factions may try to grab power through negotiation – and will face punishment from stronger ones. In dynamic movements – stronger factions will try to lock in their power by cutting deals – and will face punishment from weaker ones. Third type of extremism occurs where all factions are deterred – and the movement looks like it will never negotiate. Suggests that further theoretical and empirical investigation into internal dynamics of rebel movements is worth pursuing.