1. Metaphor, figurative language and translation Some Essential Questions Stefano Arduini

2. Introduction: new directions and essential questions Over the last twenty five years some radical rethinking has taken place in linguistics, particularly on some of the basic principles in which linguistics research since the 1950s has been grounded.

3. Why is generative grammar no longer useful?

4. How has newer research redefined the nature and scope of meaning and cognition?

5. Generative Grammar Language is a biological phenomenon Innate universals Specific parameters for specific languages Modular view of language

6. In contrast with G.G. Language is view form the point of view of meaning. Meaning is not isolated from other aspects of cognition. Language is not attributed to innate potentiality but derives from interaction and context of use.

7. Therefore the language faculty cannot be separated from other kinds of cognitive resources. Language is the result of a wide range of cognitive resources.

8. Meaning is a central aspect It is not separate from syntax Lakoff: most important aspects of syntax depend on thought, since the main function of language is that of expressing thoughts Langacker: syntax is a formal system whose purpose is to give shape to meanings

9. Grammar acquires meaning Grammatical units make up a continuum with lexis, setting un various levels of abstraction

10. How has this new research opened up new research possibilities for understanding figurative language?

11. Does figurate competence stand outside ordinary language and cognition or does it belong to them as an essential condition of thinking and language use?

12. Interesting research routes Figurative language is not only a formal (syntactic) means but the manifestation of more deeply rooted, more general cognitive competence Figurative activity is the ability to construct world images employed in reality

13. Figures are cognitive processes Anthropological processes: because they concern a specifically human characteristic Expressive processes: because they refer to the means by which human beings organize their communicative faculties These cognitive processes are not restricted to verbal expression (imaginative faculty, myth, unconscious, domains linked with expressive behavior)

14. How did Nietzsche’s View of Language anticipate some of these new directions in research and thinking about language?

15. Roots in the past Nietzsche, Darstellung der antike Rhetorik (communication is intrinsically metaphorical because a metaphorical process underpins the formation on concepts) Giambattista Vico, De Constantia Philologiae (figures give rise to knowledge: we can see the cognitive approach as leading a return to Vico)

16. How did Vico’s View of Language anticipate some of these new research insights into cognition and language?

17. Juri Lotman Metaphor and metonymy belong to the field of analogical thought. This is why they are organically linked with creative consciousness as such. In this sense it is a mistake to contrast rhetorical thought, inasmuch as it is specifically artistic, with scientific thought. Rhetoric is intrinsic to scientific consciousness in the same way as it is to artistic consciousness[1].[1] [1] Juri M. Lotman, “Retorica”, in Enciclopedia, vol. XI, Torino, Einaudi, p. 1056. [1]

18. Juri Lotman the trope is not an ornament which only belongs to the sphere of expression. It is not decoration of invariant content, but rather the mechanism for constructing content which cannot be controlled within a single language. The trope is a figure that comes into being at the joining point of two languages, and, in this sense, is isostructural to the creative consciousness mechanism as such[1].[1] [1] Ib., p. 1055. [1]

19. How does the new cognitivist approaches help us better understand the limits and the possibilities of translation?

20. What limits did a descriptivist approach to translation studies place on the theory and practice of translation?

21. In what sense can we say that a descriptivist approach to translation studies is epistemologically naïve?

22. From my point of view the new cognitivist approaches, as the perspectives of textual rhetoric, can offer new possibilities to the broad area of studies on translation, above all in the direction to go beyond some of the limits of the discipline

23. J. Holmes, “The Name and Nature of Translation studies” Two main branches of discipline: 1.DESCRIPTIVE part (concerning concrete translational phenomena) and THEORETICAL part (establishing general principles to explain and predict translational phenomena) 2.APPLIED BRANCH (translator training, translation criticism and translation aids)

24. T.S.: Epistemologically naïve stance The theoretical aspect was greatly dependent on the descriptive one In contrast with most 20th century epistemology: description of facts are influenced by code and described in the light of a specific socio-semiotic system

25. Do you agree or disagree that new research into figurative speech is as to translation as were in the 20th century newer developments in semantics?

26. How do concepts like rhetorical field or, in a cognitive framework, domain, frame, profile, mental spaces, and similarity help us understand the limits and possibilities of translation?

27. the importance of the role of figurative speech in the new rhetoric is as important to translation as was the explosion of semantics in the cognitive studies and the idea that metaphors structure our world perception. Such an appreciation of figurative speech can permit us to go beyond these limits and encourage a possible rethinking of translation studies founded on a wider consideration of the kind of facts which are connected with translation.

28. Concept like: RHETORICAL FIELD, DOMAIN, FRAME, PROFILE, MENTAL SPACE, SIMILARITY can be very productive

29. Contrastive Linguistics could be rethought in cognitive terms

30. How do the examples below illustrate the important role of frames in the process of translating concepts from one culture to another?

31. Partial equivalence In Italian “casa” (house) presumes a frame that specifies some important structural characteristics English: “house” is outlined by physical objects, while “home” conveys to the affective sphere BUT both “house” and “home” are translated in Italian into “casa”!!!!

32. Another example: “mangiare” The Italian term for “eat”, “mangiare”, stands for the process of consuming food In German we have “essen” and “fressen”: both describe the process of consuming food, but one is used for human beings and the other for animals

33. Croft and Cruse (2004) “to genuflect” “to genuflect” is a movement of the body, more or less the same concept of kneel down, but “to genuflect” belongs to a more specific frame, which is Catholic liturgical use Often the frames are very culturally specific: translating imply a loss (there is non- equivalence of frames)

34. Profile and frame in the analysis of “untranslatable” words

35. Do you agree or disagree that some concepts are not translatable?

36. How do the hypotheses of Frames and Profiles assist in overcoming the problem of non-translatability?

37. Can you provide from your own research or case studies similar examples?

38. Kuki Shuzo: the Japanese concept of “iki” In the XVII century it meant something worth of particular attention. In successive age it changed its meaning into someone who is expert of making love. In the XIX century it stands for a behavior of the geishas, the ability to move in situations under pressure. Therefore the ability of being deceiving, spontaneous and elegant. The maximum level of the Japanese culture. It can mean elegance, but also to despise someone, and at last, it can stand for the best behavior and essence of someone.

39. “esprit” Germans generally translate it with “Geist” (but it doesn’t have the same meaning) Not even “geistreich” is exhaustive “Esprit” doesn’t have a perfect translation into English: “spirit” and “intelligence” diminsh its meaning, while “wit” is excessive

40. Croft and Cruse: the German term “Bildung” The reason why “iki”, “esprit” and “Bildung” are not translatable is due to the fact that specific cultural characteristics of the frame against which the concept is profiled. Translating “iki” with “elegance”, “esprit” with “Geist”, or “Bildung” with “culture” creates an approximate equivalence between the profiles, but absolutely non on the frame level.

41. END OF PRESENTATION ONE

42. PRESENTATION TWO

43. What is the consequence of a mistranslation of one of the most foundational texts and concepts in western philosophy?

44. How does a new approach to figurative language help us rectify this mistranslation?

45. Parmenides, Perì phüseos. B1: The first fragment is the proem. It describes a trip Parmenides takes on a chariot to the house of Dike, who offers to teach him how to distinguish between discourse founded on truth (aletheia) and discourse founded on human experience.

46. B2:-B3: This fragment is the logical consequence. It points at the method to attain what has been laid out earlier. There are two ways for the investigation (odoi dizesios). The first one is a persuasive method and leads to truth (it will be revealed in B8); the second cannot be pursued, because that which does not exist cannot be known. Being and thinking are one and the same thing (thinking-seeing); one can only think, know and talk about what is.

47. B4-B5 (B5-B4): These fragments develop the line of argument whereby doxa and aletheia are not opposite. They are one and the same reality which becomes the object of sensible perception and discourse.

48. B6: This fragment completes B2-B3. One can think and express what is, but one cannot talk about nothingness. Therefore, the method that does not reflect reality must be dropped; however, one should not be misled by reality's contradictions and confusion.

49. B7-B8: This is the beginning of the part that—as it is stated—concerns Being (to eon, Being or that which is). Being is not generated and is indestructible, its totality is immutable, it has no goal to tend to. It has neither past nor future, but it is always present. It has no birth nor growth, because outside of it there is only me eon, nothingness. It exists in an absolute sense, it is not born, it does not die. It is equivalent to itself, because it expresses being at its fullest. Because the processes of birth and death are alien to it, it is immutable, stationary, not incomplete and nothing is wanting in it. If thinking is worth only to the extent it reflects that which is and if it must be expressed within the constraints of reality, the names men give to eon are necessarily untrue. Such terms as being born, dying and the like are true only relative to the mutability of phenomena and of man's everyday experiences. Relative to that which is, they are untrue. "That which is" is an order without divisions, it is homogeneous. These considerations bring the discourse about truth to a close.

50. Line 50 marks the beginning of the second part, which will interest us. After closing the part about the semata of eon, sensible reality is ushered into the discourse. Here, discourse cannot be as precise as before; what follows will be a way for arranging sensible reality. In order to make sense of the world and its changeability, men decided to name two elements: pur and nux. If unity is the inevitable principle to explain eon's semata, duality is required to explain the semata of eonta.

51. B9: This fragment completes the last lines in 8. To justify their experiences, men must identify two elements, in this case light and night, out of whose mix all the things issue. This duality does not imply contradiction; as a principle to make sense of sensible reality, duality is as legitimate as unity was for the abstract world.

52. B10-B19: These fragments include an account of Parmenides' theory on the origin and nature of the universe, the stars, earth, the moon, man's pathology and physiology, and the origin of thought. Very little of it has survived; but we are in luck, because this part is irrelevant to our point.

53. Fragment B8, lines 50-52 [50] Ἐ ν τ ῷ σοι παύω πιστ ὸ ν λόγον ἠ δ ὲ νόηµα ἀ µφ ὶ ς ἀ ληθείης· δόξας δ΄ ἀ π ὸ το ῦ δε βροτείας µάνθανε κόσµον ἐ µ ῶ ν ἐ πέων ἀ πατηλ ὸ ν ἀ κούων. Μορφ ὰ ς γ ὰ ρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώµας ὀ νοµάζειν· τ ῶ ν µίαν ο ὐ χρεών ἐ στιν - ἐ ν ᾧ πεπλανηµένοι ε ἰ σίν -· [55] τ ἀ ντία δ΄ ἐ κρίναντο δέµας κα ὶ σήµατ΄ ἔ θεντο χωρ ὶ ς ἀ π΄ ἀ λλήλων, τ ῇ µ ὲ ν φλογ ὸ ς α ἰ θέριον π ῦ ρ, ἤ πιον ὄ ν, µέγ΄ ἐ λαφρόν, ἑ ωυτ ῷ πάντοσε τω ὐ τόν, τ ῷ δ΄ ἑ τέρ ῳ µ ὴ τω ὐ τόν· ἀ τ ὰ ρ κ ἀ κε ῖ νο κατ΄ α ὐ τό τ ἀ ντία νύκτ΄ ἀ δα ῆ, πυκιν ὸ ν δέµας ἐ µ ϐ ριθές τε.

54. En. (Parmenides. A Text with Translation, edited by Leonardo Tarán, Princeton, Princeton University Press 1965): 8.50 Here I end my trustworthy account and thought concerning truth. From now on learn the beliefs of mortals, listening to the deceptive order of my words.

55. En. (Parmenides of Elea. A Text and Translation with an Introduction by David Gallop, Toronto, University of Toronto Press 1984): 8.50 Here I stop my trustworthy speech to you and thought About truth; from here onwards learn mortal beliefs, Listening to the deceitful ordering of my words.

56. It. (Giovanni Casertano, Parmenide. Il metodo la scienza l’esperienza, Guida, Napoli 1978): 8. 50 Con ciò interrompo il discorso certo e il pensiero intorno alla verità; d’ora in poi apprendi le esperienze degli uomini, ascoltando l’ordine, che può trarre in inganno delle mie parole.

57. It. (Pio Albertelli, in Hermann Diels, I Presocratici, edited by Gabriele Giannantoni, Bari, Laterza 1981): 8.50 Con ciò interrompo il mio discorso degno di fede e i miei pensieri intorno alla verità; da questo punto le opinioni dei mortali impara a comprendere, ascoltando l’ingannevole andamento delle mie parole.

58. It. (I Presocratici, introduction, translation and annotations by Angelo Pasquinelli, Torino, Einaudi 1958): 8.50 E qui termino il discorso della certezza e il pensiero intorno alla verità; e da questo momento apprendi le opinioni dei mortali, ascoltando l’ordine ingannevole che nasce dalle mie parole.

59. Fr. (Le poéme de Parménide, edited by Jean Beaufret, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France 1984) 8.50 Ici je mets fin à mon discours digne de foi et à ma considération qui cerne la vérité; apprends donc, à partir d’ici, qu’ont en vue les mortels, en écoutant l’ordre trompeur de mes dires.

60. Sp. (Parmenides - Zenon - Meliso - Escuela de Elea, Fragmentos, translation, preface and annotations by José Antonio Miguez, Buenos Aires, Aguilar 1965): 8.50 Sobre lo cual dejo de pronunciar mi discurso digno de fe y ceso en mi pensamiento referente a la verdad. En adelante, serán las opiniones de los mortales las que tú podrás aprender al dar oídos a la ordenación engañosa de mis versos.

61. Why has the traditional treatment of kósmon apatelón decided in favour of “deceptive order”, which is a thoroughly dark and pessimistic approach to this side of reality?

62. What cultural and cognitive frames and profiles led to this “dark” translation of the text?

63. kósmon apatelón 'deceptive order‘ ordine ingannevole ordre trompeur ordenación engañosa

64. Simplicius Simplicius advised not to interpret logos doxastós and apatelós as logos pseudés (false) but rather as a discourse that went beyond intelligible truth to cover the world of the senses

65. Pistón lógon and amphís alethéies This is the certain discourse about truth This phrase can be referred back to lines 28-32 in B1 The goddess says that one should attain a knowledge that includes both (emén) THE TRUTH (aletheia) and (edé) what is called doxa. In two places (B 1.28 and B 1.31) the goddess repeats that knowledge should include ta dokóunta. It follows that doxa and dokóunta have no negative values attached to them, the genuinely wise man investigates in all directions (B1.32).

66. Dóxas brotéias The discourse of the world of human opinions follows the pistós logos about to eon. Doxai must be comprehended (mánthane); one cannot build a pistós logos on their basis, all we can do is try and interpret them through a kósmos apatelós.

67. Kósmon apatelós Kósmos apatelós is not a lógos pseudés, deceitful discourse or reasoning.

68. Kósmon apatelós: apáte (1) In ancient Greece (e.g. in Thucydides III, 43, 2) apáte is a creative act of the intellect which transforms something (whereas pseudés possesses an ethical undertone of lying and must be condemned). In Homer the act of apáte is often attributed to a god and directed to other gods or mortals (apáte = intellectual creativity and the gods’ superiority over men). Apáte as an act is carried out through péithein, persuasion - a nexus that we already find in Homer - and constitutes a world alternative to our own.

69. Kósmon apatelós: apáte (2) in Hesiod's (line 224), apáte becomes a goddess, daughter of the night and dweller of a world that is irrational or, at least, that logico-formal investigation cannot fathom. in the, Hesiod accurately distinguishes apáte from falsehood, in a place where the Muses put the former close to truth in poetry.

70. Kósmon apatelós: apáte (3) in the Homeric hymns, apáte is also associated with musing and joie de vivre. Beginning with the school of Pythagoras, the notion of apáte is linked with that of kairós, the. kairós is one of the universal laws which finds its origin in Pythagorean philosophy and in the doctrine of the opposites which - held together by harmony - generate the universe. kairós allows one to highlight a logos or its opposite, and the upshot is apáte.

71. Kósmon apatelós: apáte (4) This apáte can also be identified with dike (the law of the world) because the world is irrational and this irrationality can be represented only through it. Men experience páthema through apáte and this constitutes a kósmos. This is an idea which Aeschylus well illustrated in his and which pervades all classical Greece. The author of Dissoi Logoi takes up the notion to introduce it into the world of art. Gorgias too will interpret apáte as a basic element of poetic experience.

72. Kósmon apatelós: apáte (5) In Parmenides, apatelós has the same character we found in Gorgias. kósmon apatelón is the correlative to pistós lógos for the sensible world. It is the order that follows the complexity of reality and tries to interpret it and relive it by narratives means. It is emphatically not a deceitful order, but one that allows us a non–abstract knowledge of complexity, irrationality, and passions; which can all be managed by fiction.

73. What have we gained with a translation of kósmon apatelón as a perfectly legitimate path to knowledge?

74. What have we lost, translationally, conceptually, culturally, and ideological with a translation of kósmon apatelón as a deceptive order of things?

75. We can therefore affirm that, in Parmenides, the fictional order - e.g., of myth and tragedy -is a perfectly legitimate way to knowledge; the only one that allows us to come close enough to the world of eonta.

76. It remains to be explained why all the translations we have seen above refer to an inexistent deceit.

77. Parmenides identifies two ways to attain knowledge of reality: the one for to eon, in the sense of stationary and immutable perfection, uses the language of logic; the other, for experience, requires a kósmon apatelón, a narrative language.

78. Reality is not given It follows that reality is not given, but depends on the languages we employ. Ultimately, reality is nothing else than the object of interpretation, as Freud and Niestzsche would maintain in our day.

79. After Parmenides the two ways become radical alternatives Gorgias would take the way of lógos apatelós, discarding Parmenides' noema. In fact, for him truth does not exist, and even if it existed, it could not be communicated because there is no correspondence between truth and words. Plato would instead choose the other way: he stripped lógos apatelós of any value and identified it with lógos pseudés.

80. To what extent must we lay at Plato’s feet the responsibility for encouraging the traditional understanding and translation of Parmenides’ view of being?

81. What did Plato (and with him the western world that absorbed his philosophy) from this devaluation of Parmenides?

82. Plato Sophist (here the Plato’s confutation of Parmenides is ‘relative’) Phaedo (Parmenides' two ways get totally reinterpreted in the Phaedo and, consequently, the sensible world and the kósmos apatelós are deprived of value).

83. John’s Gospel “En arché en o Lógos ” Jerome rendered the incipit: “In principium erat verbum”

84. Have you ever considered the semantic, cultural, and ideological consequences of mistranslation?

85. What is gained by translating logos with verbum? What is lost?

86. What is gained by tranflating logos with sermo? What is lost?

87. To what extent does research into figurative language help us understand the gains and losses?

88. “In principium erat verbum” Italian 1. “In principio era il verbo”: versione CEI; 2. “Al principio c’era colui che è “la Parola””: versione interconfessionale in lingua corrente; 3. “In principio era la Parola”: Società Biblica Britannica e Forestiera, Roma 1999.

89. “In principium erat verbum” English 1. “In the beginning was the word”: Tyndale NT 1526, Geneva Version 1557-1560, Rheims NT 1582, King James Version 1611, Revised Standard Version 1946, New American Standard Version 1960, New King James Bible 1979-1982, New Revised Standard Version 1989; New International Version 1973; New American Bible 1970, Jerusalem Bible 1966, New Jerusalem Bible 1985; 2. “When all things began, the Word already was”: New English Bible 1970;

90. “In principium erat verbum” English (2) 3. “Before the world was created, the Word already existed”: Good News Translation 1966-1976; 4. “Before anything else existed, there was Christ, with God”: Living Bible 11966-1976; 5. “In the beginning was the one who is called the Word”: Contemporary English Version 1991- 1995; 6. “The Word was first”: Eugene H. Peterson, “The Message” 1993:

91. “In principium erat verbum” Spanish 1. “En el principio ya era la Palabra”: Reina 1569, Valera 1602; 2. “En el principio era el Verbo”: Scio de San Miguel 1793, Moderna 1893, Biblia de las Americas 1973, Reina-Valera 1960 revision, RV 1995 revision; 3. “En el principio era ya el Verbo”: Torres Amat 1823-1825; 4. “Al principio era el Verbo”: Nacar & Colunga 1966, Garofalo 1969; 5. “Cuando todo comenzo, ya existia la Palabra”: Version Popular 1966, 1970; 6. “En el principio ya existia la Palabra”: Version Popular 1979, 1983, 1994; 7. “En el principio existia El Verbo”: Latinoamericana 1971;

92. “In principium erat verbum” Spanish (2) 8. “En el principio la Palabra existia”: Jerusalem Bible 1967; 9. “En el principio existia la Palabra” Nueva Version Internacional 1980; 10. “En el principio ya existia la Palabra”: Version Popular 3rd ed. 1995; 11. “En el principio ya existia el Verbo”: Nueva Veraion Internactional 1999; 12. “Al principio ya existía la calabra”: Mateos-Schökel; 13. “Antes de que todo comenzara ya existia aquel que es la Palabra”: TLA (= Traduccion en lenguaje actual) 2003.

93. “In principium erat verbum” French 1. “Au commencement etait la parole”: Lefevre d’Etaples 1530, Olivetan 1535, Chateillon 1555, Diodati 1644, Martin 1712, Segond 1880-1978, Nouvelle Bible Segond 2002, Synodale 1910 ; 2. “Au commencement etait le verbe”: Louvain 1550 ; 3. “La parole etait des le commencement”: Beausobre & Lenfant 1718 ; 4. “La parole etait au commencement”: Ostervald 1824 ; 5. “Au commencement de tous les temps etait deja le Verbe”: de Sacy (Port Royal) 1667 ; 6. “Au commencement le Verbe etait”: Jerusalem 1953, 1956 ;

94. “In principium erat verbum” French (2) 7. “Au commencement etait le Verbe”: Jerusalem 1973, 1998, Osty 1955-1973, Maredsous 1948, Crampon 1952, TOB (= Traduction OEcumenique de la Bible) 1972-1988 ; 8. “Au principe etait la parole”: Pleiade 1971; 9. “Avant que Dieu cree le monde, la Parole existait deja”: FC (= Francais Courant) 1971 ; 10. “Au commencement, lorsque Dieu crea le monde, la Parole existait deja”: FC 1982 ; 11. “Au commencement la parole existait deja”: FF (= Francais Fondamental) 1989-2000.

95. “In principium erat verbum” German 1. “Im Anfang(e) war das Wort”: 1466 Bible (based on 14th c. ms.), Luther 1522, Zuerich 1531, van Ess 1807 (we have only 1816 ed.) Allioli 1830 (we have only 1866 ed.), Herder (Jerusalem) 1966, Einheitsuebersetzung 1972, 1980 ; 2. “Bevor die Welt geschaffen wurde, war das Wort schon da”: Gute Nachricht 1967; 3. “Am Anfang, bevor die Welt geschaffen wurde, war schon der, der “Das Wort” heisst”: GN 1971; 4. ”Am Anfang, bevor die Welt geschaffen wurde, war Er, der ‘Das Wort’ ist”: GN 1982; 5. “Am Anfang war das ewige Wort Gottes: Christus”: Living Bibles International 1983, 1991.

96. But translating lógos into verbum raises a few questions.

97. Some notes on Greek linguistics The Greek term lógos is strongly polysemous. It does mean 'word', but in Homer, for instance, it appears only twice with this meaning and only in its plural form. In fact, it can also mean the following:

98. 1.expression, way of saying; 2.saying, telling, but also rumour, renown, news; 3.discourse, conversation, dialogue, discussion; 4.tale, narration, scientific and literary genres; 5.reason and reasoning; 6.explanation, justification, account, counting; 7.opinion, assessment; 8.relationship, correspondence, ratio, rationale, analogy; 9.divine idea or thought (e.g, in Plotinus).

99. Latin translation of lógos include Ratio Sermo Oratio Verbum is closer to Greek lexis, onoma or sema.

100. The history of translation and interpretation of Lógos has had enormous consequences in the formulation of Christian orthodoxy. What are some of these?

101. Philo of Alexandria Lógos was a link between God and the world. This idea runs beneath the interpretations of John's Lógos among the early Fathers of the church, although these latter insisted on two basic points: i) Logos-Son is a perfect peer to God the Father; ii) humankind participates in Logos.

102. How does the Polysemy of lógos in John’s Gospel force us to make translation choices with strong implications for John’s conceptual, semantic and cultural world?

103. How did the history of translation and interpretation of lógos create a divide between traditions stamped as orthodox and those labelled heretical?

104. Origin Lógos, not God, is the being of beings, the substance of substances, the idea of ideas. God instead is beyond all this. In this sense, Lógos is co-eternal to the Father but not in the same sense.

105. The conceptual shifts may be explained perhaps with an attempt at using the notion of Lógos to salvage the philosophical speculations of ancient Greece. Justin’s Book of Wisdom Eusebio of Cesarea Cyrill of Alexandria Theodoret of Cyrrhus

106. Gregorio of Nazanzio Lógos is the link between man and the divine Lógos, the continuty between divine and the human

107. Cyprianus Used sermo to arrive at the following for John's incipit: "in principio erat sermo” (Testimoniarum libri adversus Iuddaeos); verbum, by contrast, is used only in quotations.

108. Novatianus He uses both sermo and verbum although he seems to prefer sermo. De Trinitate: "Verbum made itself into flesh and lived among us; in this way, it really had our body, because sermo really takes up our flesh".

109. Tertullianus, Apologeticum Even among your wise men, logos--which means sermo and ratio--was the creator of the universe (21, 10). For us too, sermo and ratio, as well as virtus through which God created everything, are but one substance which we consider the spirit. Sermo is in Him in so far as it pronounces itself, ratio assists when He decrees, and virtus presides when He accomplishes His work (21, 11).

110. Goete, Faust Wort (word) Kraft (power) Sinn (meaning) Tat (deed)

111. O. Messiaen, Traité de musique, de couleurs et d’ornithologie “In the beginning was the Rhythm”

112. Tertullianus, Adversus Praxean (a) God is rational and ratio is in Him first, therefore everything proceeds from Him. This ratio is His mind. The Greeks called it logos, a term we use also to say sermo. This is why we usually translate in a simple way "sermo was originally with God".

113. Tertullianus, Adversus Praxean (b) However, it would be better to consider ratio older, because God is not a speaker since the beginning but He is rational even before the beginning, and also because sermo, which consists in ratio, shows that it is preceded by the latter as far as substance is concerned. But it makes no difference. In fact, even when God had not spoken His sermo yet, He already had ratio and He had sermo in Himself. He was silently thinking and arranging within Himself that which he would later say by means of sermo… (5, 2-7).

114. Tertullianus Sermo is speech faculty (, not to speech). Dialogical idea of lógos Sermo is a process rather than a static entity; it is that which can generate, a creative force which in the beginning acted according to ratio.

115. Lattanzio, Divinae institutiones the Son is the sermo of God, whereas angels are His spiritus. And if spiritus manifests itself without sound, sermo proceeds from the mouth, therefore with voice and sound. …lógos means both sermo and ratio, because it is the voice and the wisdom of God at a time. Not even Pagan philosophers ignore this divine sermo (4, 9). Lógos represents God’s creative power.

116. In what way did Augustine close down the debate about the translation of lógos ?

117. What cultural, ideological and semantic frames and profiles might have guided Augustine translational choice?

118. Augustine: verbum replaces sermo Augustine chooses verbum as opposed to ratio: lógos is not more polysemous, but it only means “individual word”. Augustine eliminates the term’s dialogical implications.

119. Why? from a dynamic theology of dialogue to a static theology of the word. Moreover, this translation implies a conceptualization of God's verbal activity that holds a highly complex relationship with that of man. In Augustine, God's verbum is the founding metaphor of Christ. Divine lógos is not a sound emitted by phonatory organs, but a will. It is an inner, mental lógos (comparable to de divine one).

120. Like our word (verbum) somehow becomes voice when it issues from our body to manifest itself to the senses, so God's Word (verbum) became flesh to manifest itself to men's senses.

121. Per speculum in aenigmate Human word refers to the divine Word per speculum in aenigmate because it reflects the mind's spiritual interiority; in this sense it can be its METAPHOR. However, the soul cannot manifest itself through words alone because it includes an ineffable part which--á la Wittgenstein--escapes conscience itself. Such ineffability and incommunicability merely manifest the non-coincidence of word to reality and gives rise to our ability to lie.

122. This is the clearest difference between human word and divine Word. In God, Word and reality coincide because God generated reality to show Himself identical to the generator (De fide et symbolo III, 4). The Word is also called the self-present Truth precisely because of its complete identity with God. We can find here a very strong commitment to totality.

123. What conditions existed in the 16th century that probably made it impossible to return to an understanding of Logos as sermo?

124. Erasmus (John’s prologue) 1515: “In principio erat verbum” 1519: “In principio erat sermo”. 1520: Apologia de In principio erat sermo.

125. Novum Testamentum 335 A-B Logos Graecis varia significat, verbum, orationem, sermonem, rationem, modum, supputationem nonnunquam et pro libro usurpatur, a verbo lego, quod est dico, sive colligo. Horum pleraque divus Hieronymus aliqua ratione putat competere Filium Dei. Miror autem cur verbum Latinis placuerit magis quam sermo. Nos tametsi videbamus sermonis vocabolo rectius esprimi Graecam vocem, qua usus est Evangelista, logos, tamen in Editione prima superstizioso quodam metu non mutaveramus verbum, quod posuerat Interpres: ne quam ansam daremus iis, qui quidvis ad quamvis occasionem calumniantur.

126. (Novum Testamentum 335 A-B). Tantum testati sumus alicubi sermonis nomine non infrequenter signari Filium Dei in Sacris Volumnibus. Mox ubi comperimus hoc tam passina fieri et hoc ipso in loco quondam Ecclesiam legisse, In principio erat sermo, atque ita citari in libris Cypriani et Augustini, non existimabam quemquam fore, qui offenderetur: praesertim cum haec demus non in Templis, sed in Musaeis legenda”.

127. A possible objection to Erasmus verbum is a conceptus tacitus more applicable to Christ than sermo which indicates a conceptus expressus voce.

128. Erasmus’ reply Erasmus makes reference to the metaphorical ability of the human mind. The lógos metaphor is telling us that the Son of God is neither an unuttered nor a spoken concept; it is something more and utterly different and irreducible which--at any rate--the translation cannot simplify.

129. Different names are adapted to the divine persons on the basis of the habits of human language, thanks to which our slowness can more easily approximate a cognition of the divine. Some things are thus attributed to particular realities as if they were proper to them, even though they are not proper to actual reality; however some things are predicated of certain realities in a more practical way according to the ability of the human mind. Whenever we do so, we cannot but stretch the sense of human words. At any rate, the Son of God is not a thought, neither internal nor expressed by voice (119B-C).

130. Preserving sermo would mean preserving the original polysemy because it offers a wider interpretative spectrum. Verbum would weaken the metaphor's power to produce diverse interpretations and would narrow it down towards one direction only.

131. What resources do your working languages contain to translate lógos along the lines of the Latin concept of sermo?

132. Would such a dynamic and figurate treatment of lógos be helpful in creating engagement and readability in the cultures and language you are working?

133. How can we interpret the history of these translations? To the modern eye, the question of lógos can be analysed from three viewpoints at least: linguistic, theological, and conceptual.

134. Linguistic plane Verbum sweeps away the polysemy of lógos forcing the metaphor into a straitjacket.

135. Theological plane sermo implies a theology of dialogue verbum implies a theology of monologue.

136. Conceptual plane Two worlds are built on opposite interpretations of classical culture. Opting for sermo is in line with an effort to maintain the totality of the classical world into Christianity. Sermo stands for the lógos of antiquity insofar as it grasps the idea of multifarious oneness; it also stands for the dialogues of the Olympians.