1. DBA Tasks Supporting a SOX Audit of an 11i Environment Brian Hitchcock OCP 10g DBA Sun Microsystems brian.hitchcock@sun.com brhora@aol.com Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 1 www.brianhitchcock.net

2. Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 2 Presentation is Available

3. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 3 SOX Audit  SOX Auditors – Have a job to do  Making you happy isn’t one of them – Are not Oracle DBAs  Are not Oracle Applications DBAs – Have to audit many different applications  No two work the same way – Have to get something done  Audit may not be perfect…

4. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 4 DBA and the SOX Audit  DBA – Can make things difficult for the auditor  I am a genius (Guilty Spark 343)  This is how we do things here  That’s a stupid question  I don’t have time for this – Can make themselves invaluable  Here is what I know  This is my understanding of how Oracle works ­(WOW) Way Oracle Works

5. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 5 Auditors Want to Know  Who can update data – I’m also concerned about who can read data  Company financial data is not public  Who can access passwords in files – Typical application has password file(s) – Application reads file(s) to setup db access – This is really the first issue in disguise…  These are reasonable questions – “Were it so easy” (Arbiter) – Not easy to answer – Lots of details and exceptions

6. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 6 Theme  Started out with – “Who can update data?”  Turns into – “Do we know who can update data?”  We know the individuals that can update data – Link this back to approval process  Create and modify users – Link this back to the audit process

7. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 7 Theme  We offer auditors – How we know who can update data – How we know who should update data – How we maintain the answers to the first two  This is the practical answer to – “Who can update data?”

8. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 8 Users That Can Update Data  Oracle Applications Users – SYSADMIN – Application Responsibilities  Oracle Database Users – APPS, Select any table privilege  OS level Users  Remote Users – Database links  Users in Clones  Password Files

9. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 9 Who Can Update Data? Production Oracle Applications Environment Application Tier End-User Browser Database Tier Application Users Application Responsibilities UsersData OS Users SQL*Plus Database UsersData DbLinks Oracle Applications Clone Passwords Not Changed --same as Production Single Tier OS users SQL*Plus End-User Browser Remote Users Password Files Database user with select any table

10. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 10 Oracle Applications Users  Don’t have any direct access to db data  Apps access is through responsibilities – What is a responsibility?  How to link Apps user with db data access? – Apps does this through responsibility – Apps users access changes when DBA changes responsibilities assigned to Apps user – How to help auditors to understand this? – Document who has which responsibilities and why

11. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 11 Oracle Applications Users  Disabling Applications users – Can’t drop applications user once created – Do end-date, change passwords – Do not disable SYSADMIN, GUEST  Best Practices for Securing E-Business Suite – Page 23 shows users  Which can be disabled – Doc 189367.1

12. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 12 Oracle Applications User  Connects to Applications – Based on responsibilities assigned – Can access specific forms  Tied to specific data in tables – Database access done through APPS db user  APPS database user – Doesn’t own data tables – Has synonyms to schemas that own data tables  Auditors aren’t used to this architecture…

13. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 13 Active Applications Users  SQL to find – All applications users – Active users (no end-date) – Active users that have end-date in the future  SQL for reports – Same as above – But linked with user employee information  Identifies apps users not linked to a person – Audit against creation tickets and approvals

14. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 14 Active Applications Users SQL --Total of All Users Active and Inactive select count(*) from apps.fnd_user; 997 --Total of Active Users, no end date select count(*) from apps.fnd_user where end_date is null; 755 --Total of Inactive Users, end date has passed select count(*) from apps.fnd_user where end_date is not null and end_date < sysdate; 241 --Total of Active users with end date specified in the future select count(*) from apps.fnd_user where end_date is not null and end_date > sysdate; 1

15. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 15 Active Applications Users SQL --> report with employee information spool PROD_FND_USER_02062007.txt select sysdate from dual; select user_name, employee_id, end_date, email_address from apps.fnd_user order by employee_id; spool off spool PROD_end_date_NULL_02062007.txt select sysdate from dual; select user_name, employee_id, end_date, email_address from apps.fnd_user where end_date is null order by employee_id; spool off

16. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 16 Active Applications Users SQL spool PROD_end_date_NULL_full_name_02062007.txt select sysdate from dual; select U.user_name, H.full_name, U.email_address, U.employee_id, U.end_date from apps.fnd_user U, hr.per_all_people_f H where U.employee_id=H.person_id (+) and U.end_date (+) is NULL order by U.employee_id; spool off spool PROD_end_date_in_future_02062007.txt select sysdate from dual; select U.user_name, H.full_name, U.email_address, U.employee_id, U.end_date from apps.fnd_user U, hr.per_all_people_f H where U.employee_id=H.person_id (+) and U.end_date > sysdate order by U.employee_id; spool off

17. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 17 Can’t Drop Users  Oracle Applications – Can’t remove a user once created – Can only end-date the user – Can end-date all the user’s responsibilities  Issues – Users can be un-end-dated – Who can do this?  Any apps user with System Administrator responsibility – Need to audit routinely – Change user password and end-date  Prevent access even if someone else un-end-dates

18. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 18 Diagram – APPS users access APPS Schema GL Schema AR Schema Views Triggers Packages Tables Synonyms Runtime usage of Oracle Applications is through APPS schema only. Users do not connect directly to product schemas such as GL or AR.

19. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 19 Diagram of Apps user connecting End-User APPLSYSPUB APPS GLARHR connect …

20. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 20 SYSADMIN  Oracle Applications user – Created by default when installed – Has System Administrator responsibility  Can do anything in Oracle Applications  SYSADMIN isn’t the problem – Can lock down this user login  change password – It is the responsibility that matters  May have been assigned to other Apps users  Audit?

21. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 21 SYSADMIN  When environment first installed – Developers had SYSADMIN password  Sad, but true – truly bad management  After go-live – All DBAs shared SYSADMIN login – SYSADMIN password changed ‘mysteriously’  All DBAs locked out – If anyone failed 3 logins (password failure limit)  All DBAs locked out  How to recover?

22. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 22 SYSADMIN  Switch to each DBA has individual account – BH1234 with System Administrator responsibility – No further password issues  If any DBA has 3 login failures – Any other DBA can reset password – Only one DBA locked out  More robust support process  Can audit DBA activity to an individual

23. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 23 Oracle Database Users  For every database schema – Associated database user – GL db schema  Db user can update everything in associated schema  Auditors looked at list of db users – Two letter usernames must be end-users  GL – George Lucas? ­This is how he paid for the Death Star? ­Updating GL in systems in a far away galaxy?  Auditors need your help to understand – Oracle Applications is different… Already discussed APPS database user

24. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 24 Oracle Database Users  Auditors – Wanted to drop all of these ‘end-users’  Oracle Applications won’t work – How to resolve this? – Identify db users needed for  Oracle Applications  Oracle Database  Other – Show auditors how we control all types of users

25. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 25 Oracle Database Users  Oracle Applications Database Users  Multiple types of database schemas – exist in every db, Applications or not – used by shared Apps components  APPS, APPLSYS, APPLSYSPUB – provided by individuals Apps products  GL, AP, HR etc. – optional db features, end users  CTXSYS, SCOTT, BH1234

26. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 26 Oracle Database Users  Best Practices for Securing Oracle E- Business Suite, Version 3.0.5 – Metalink 189367.1 – Appendix C, page 51, Database Schemas Shipped with E-Business Suite – lists schemas, which schema passwords can be changed by FNDCPASS – which schema passwords should not be changed – details on how to change password for the various db users

27. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 27 Oracle Database Users  Oracle Database Security Checklist, January 2007, Appendix A – 10g Enterprise Edition Default Accounts – locked at install if you used Database Creation Assistant (DBCA) – not locked if db created manually – Appendix B, C, D for Oracle 9iR2, 9iR1, 8i respectively

28. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 28 Database Users Script  Document all db users – Ties back to Oracle documents  Auditors like this  Repeatable process  Identify why users exist  Identify end-users – Audit specific privileges

29. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 29 Database Users Script ####--> Create table and populate... #### ####sqlplus / set pagesize 1500 set linesize 200 alter session set nls_date_format = 'DD-Mon-YYYY hh24:mi:ss'; ####WHY_CREATED ####Apps Module -- for specific Oracle Applications products ####Database -- created when Oracle database installed ####Apps Db -- created when database installed for Oracle Applications ####Discoverer -- Oracle Discoverer End User Layer ####Database Admin -- DBA account ####--> create table create table SOX_dbuser_doc (username varchar2(20), user_id number, created date, account_status varchar2(32), Why_Created varchar2(15));

30. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 30 Database Users Script ####--> insert data for all existing db users insert into SOX_dbuser_doc (username, user_id, account_status, created) select username, user_id, account_status, created from dba_users order by created; ####--> update db users that are Applications Module schema owners update SOX_dbuser_doc set Why_Created='Apps Module' where username in (select oracle_username from apps.FND_ORACLE_USERID); ####update Database ####--> db users created when Oracle database installed or optional ####products installed ####--> from Appendix A - Oracle Database 10G Release 1 and Release 2 Enterprise ####Edition Default Accounts and their status, from Oracle Database Security Checklist ####January 2007. update SOX_dbuser_doc set Why_Created='Database' where username in ();

31. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 31 Database Users Script update SOX_dbuser_doc set Why_Created='Discoverer' where username in ('EUL4_US','EUL_US'); update SOX_dbuser_doc set Why_Created='Database Admin' where username in ('OPS$ORACLE', 'DBA_PROBE', 'STBY_PROBE'); ####--> db users created for Oracle Applications in addition to Apps modules whose database ####accounts are stored in the database table FND_ORACLE_USERID ####--> from Appendix C - Database Schemas Shipped with E-Business Suite, from Best ####Practices for Securing Oracle E-Business Suite, Version 3.0.4, Metalink Note 189367.1 update SOX_dbuser_doc set Why_Created='Apps Db' where username in (); ####--> Generate report sqlplus / set pagesize 1500 set linesize 200 alter session set nls_date_format = 'DD-Mon-YYYY hh24:mi:ss'; select * from SOX_dbuser_doc order by created;

32. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 32 Select any Table  Why is this granted – User wants ‘read-only’ access – Hit the easy button  Why is this a bad thing? – User can see data in all tables – Violates principle of Least Privilege  Only grant what is really needed and approved – How is this related to updating data?

33. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 33 Select any Table  User can select from FND_USER – Can see encrypted user passwords  For Oracle Applications users – FND_ORACLE_USERID isn’t good either  Encrypted db schema passwords  Well known issues with Oracle passwords – Doc 340240.1 Assessment of Oracle Password Hashing – Users can find methods to crack passwords  Take passwords to another Apps installation  APPS user can update any/all data  As well as view confidential data

34. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 34 Select any Table  But I know I didn’t grant this…  You have to check your databases – On-site consultant granted this to our developers – Why?  Because “they needed it”  Regular audit for ‘select any table’ grants  See documents list for further issues – Other tables, privileges that should not be granted

35. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 35 Cracking Passwords  I’m not suggesting you do this  But if I can find out how it’s done – Your users can figure it out as well  If we trusted everyone – No need for SOX – No need for security audit  Assume someone will try to crack passwords  Auditors won’t know about this – You have to explain it to them – Have plan to explain how you will deal with this issue

36. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 36 Select any Table  Release 12 (and RUP6) may be better – Doc 457166.1 Non-Reversible Hash Password  Database users – Dba_users – Encrypted passwords visible – Not as bad as FND_USER  Once user has encrypted passwords  Can send elsewhere for cracking  Why takes this chance?

37. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 37 OS Users  Database user oracle identified externally – Granted DBA_ROLE – Used by DBAs – Connect using SQL*Plus  Sqlplus / as sysdba  OS user ‘oracle’ connects without db password – Then has DBA_ROLE – Anyone with ‘oracle’ password  Can connect from anywhere on your network  Can’t audit who this person is

38. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 38 Remote Users  Connecting from other servers – Database links – Created in remote database – Won’t show up in audit of local database  Security relies on protecting passwords – Managed SQL*Net Access  Invited nodes (more later…)  Most remote servers locked out  Access limited to small number of remote servers ­Ideally, only the 11i apps tier server

39. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 39 Users in Clones  Production environment – Others created as clones of prod  Cloning process – Brings production db/apps user passwords – Doesn’t change passwords automatically  If DBA doesn’t change passwords – They can be the same in dev as in production – Dev users may not know it  But they have prod access, can update prod data  Doc 419475.1 – Not just user passwords…

40. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 40 Password Files  Auditors concerned – Who can access passwords in files  Many applications store passwords in files – Oracle Applications  No, users don’t access passwords in a file  Yes, passwords may be in some files – No for applications users connecting – Log files may have passwords

41. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 41 Password Files  Many Apps DBA tasks – Require APPS and SYSTEM password – Appears on screen – Adadmin, adpatch – Email screen output, save to file  Passwords in email, in files on disk  Are those emails, files properly secured? – Send output to Oracle Support  Can they see your passwords?

42. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 42 What Would Sgt. Johnson Do?  Let’s “get tactical”  Practical steps – Oracle Applications Users – Oracle Database Users – OS Users – Remote Users – Users in Clones – Password Files

43. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 43 Applications Users  Who approved each of them?  Who approved their responsibilities – In Oracle Applications  Who approves changes to responsibilities?  Separate organization maintains – Master list of all approved users/responsibilities – Each user created in a separate ticket – Responsibilities modified for one user in a separate ticket

44. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 44 Report on Apps Users  Active Users – Active Users Concurrent Request – SQL presented earlier  Active Responsibilities – Concurrent Request(s) – Tedious, each report requires entering responsibility  Users that shouldn’t have access – Left company for example – End-date – Change password

45. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 45 System Administrator  Find all apps users that have – System Administrator responsibility  Revoke from apps users except for – DBA users – SYSADMIN  change password

46. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 46 Database Users  SQL, generate reports  Multiple types of database schemas – exist in every db, Apps or not – used by shared Apps components  APPS, APPLSYS, APPLSYSPUB – provided by individuals Apps products  GL, AP, HR etc. – optional db features, end users  CTXSYS, SCOTT, BH1234  Change passwords – RUP4, FNDCPASS, change all apps users at once – Prevents database link issues from remote systems

47. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 47 Database Users  Database end-users – Not needed for Applications or database – Examine each user  Database privileges ­Dba_role_privs ­Dba_sys_privs ­Dba_tab_privs  Roles granted ­Examine privileges of each role

48. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 48 Database Users  SQL to examine each user  What to look for – Non-standard role (SUN_SELECT)  What privileges does this role have?  Who else has this role  Examine these users – Access to FND_USER – Other system tables  Who has “select any table” – Revoke select any table from all non-dba users

49. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 49 Database Users  Get specific approval for each – And all of their db privileges  Watch for users created before go-live – Used by developers – Everyone has the password – Was granted full privileges on all db objects accessible by APPS – Developers ran a script while they had access

50. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 50 Database User With Grants  How to deal with existing user – Has access to all db objects – Granted when developers had full access  Developers don’t know what they need – “everything” – They don’t know what their code access

51. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 51 Select any table  Database users – Should not have ‘select any table’ privilege – Only DBA db users have this privilege  Restrict access to system information – Encrypted passwords

52. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 52 OS Users  Change passwords – Don’t wait for password change in clones  Prevent OS level connections – Using ‘oracle’ – From anywhere in your network  RBAC roles – User must connect to host first – Su – oracle – Auditing shows individual connecting as oracle

53. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 53 Remote Users  Use Managed SQL*Net Access – Restrict hosts that can connect to database – Ideally only Apps tier can connect  Prevents OS connections from other hosts  Database links – Change database user passwords – Don’t wait for password changes in other systems

54. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 54 Managed SQL*Net Access  How it works – For 11i this means only apps tier can connect to database  Why it is important – Without it, we can’t identify who is connecting – Anyone with a db account password can connect from anywhere on the net – Invited nodes, forces users to connect to one (or more) specific servers, users forced to connect as themselves and connect to database

55. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 55 Invited Nodes Production Oracle Applications Environment Application Tier End-User Browser Database Tier Application Users Application Responsibilities UsersData OS users SQL*Plus Two Tier Sqlnet.ora 1.2.3.4 Database Listener IP Address 1.2.3.4 Remote Host IP Address 5.6.7.8 Invited Node

56. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 56 Invited Nodes  Database Tier  sqlnet.ora ############################################################### # # This file is automatically generated by AutoConfig. It will be read and # overwritten. If you were instructed to edit this file, or if you are not # able to use the settings created by AutoConfig, refer to Metalink document # 165195.1 for assistance. # #$Header: NetServiceHandler.java 115.50 2006/07/18 14:57:50 nsugguna ship $ # ############################################################### NAMES.DIRECTORY_PATH=(TNSNAMES, ONAMES, HOSTNAME) SQLNET.EXPIRE_TIME= 10 tcp.validnode_checking = yes tcp.invited_nodes=(.,. )

57. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 57 Cloning Oracle Applications  Cloned environment has same passwords – Clone prod to beta – Beta users have prod passwords  Applies to – Applications users, db users, db links etc.  FND_USER table in clone database – Contains encrypted prod passwords  Must change all passwords in clone

58. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 58 Cloning Oracle Applications  Cloned environment – Has lot and out files from source – Passwords? – Sensitive data?  Remove log and output files – As part of cloning process  You need a documented cloning process

59. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 59 Who Can Update Data Now? Production Oracle Applications Environment Application Tier End-User Browser Database Tier Application Users Application Responsibilities UsersData OS Users SQL*Plus Database UsersData DbLinks Oracle Applications Clone Passwords Not Changed --same as Production Single Tier OS users SQL*Plus End-User Browser Remote Users Password Files Database user with select any table Invited Nodes Change Passwords Change Passwords Revoke select Any table RBAC roles

60. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 60 Password Files  Oracle Applications – Doesn’t use passwords in files – Log and output files  Owned by ‘oracle’  Owner of applications software  Output that contains passwords – Don’t email – Store only on restricted servers – Don’t upload to Oracle support  Can be problematic…

61. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 61 Password Files  Oracle DataGuard added later – Uses oracle password file – Stores SYS password on both primary/standby – SYS password encrypted – Owned by UNIX user oracle  Even oracle can’t see the password  Auditors not concerned

62. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 62 Password Files  Passwords in Oracle Applications files – Latest doc for FNDCPASS 159244.1 – Also in Sys Admin Guide B13925-06 page 11-7 – Must run autoconfig  to put new password into specific files – Files are listed in both docs – Tells me that passwords are in these files – These files have group, world permissions  Can be read by non-owner users

63. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 63 Password Files  Open SR on this – Oracle says that was the way it worked – Now, no passwords in any config files  Check these files – No passwords found  Auditors accepted this

64. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 64 Real-World  Are we done? – No – Still no resolution for ‘read-only’ issue  Politically – No user will be granted ‘select any table’ – Any user requesting ‘read-only’ access  Must supply list of specific tables – If approved, create role  Grant select on tables to role  Grant role to user

65. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 65 Real-World  Don’t grant privileges to users  Grant role(s) to users – Easier to audit who has access to which tables – Easier to maintain  Add privileges to roles  Users automatically get added privileges – Easy to revoke  Revoke role from user

66. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 66 Real-World  User suggestion – Grant select any table to user – Revoke select on from user  For all sensitive tables – Doesn’t work  Can’t revoke a privilege that hasn’t been granted – Select any table doesn’t grant select on all tables  It works some other way  Can’t revoke select on specific tables

67. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 67 Real-World  User Suggestion 2  Create role – Grant select on all objects owned by APPS  APPS user owns – Some tables – Lots of synonyms  Including synonym for FND_USER table  This isn’t a solution

68. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 68 Real-World  User suggestion 3  Create read-only schema in database – No such SQL in Oracle  Sounds good – Reasonable proposal – Create read-only user (schema)  No such functionality

69. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 69 Real-World  Oracle must have a ‘best-practice’? – Open SR for read-only database user – Especially for Oracle Applications database  Users need to see business data – Oracle tells us not to grant ‘select any table’  They must have a better idea  What does Oracle say? – No recommendation for read-only db user – Do not grant ‘select any table’ – Grant only specific tables user needs to access – No way to identify what a users needs  “I need to look at all GL data…”

70. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 70 It’s Not Over  Recent Request – Verify that Brian Hitchcock does not have access  Sounds very reasonable – But it can’t be done  What access? – Applications – Database – OS – Remote – Knows another user’s password  Perhaps from dev period

71. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 71 The End  “It’s Finished” (Cortana)  “No, I think we’re just getting started” (S117) – None of these issues are static – Auditing must be done regularly

72. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 72 Editorial Opinion  Auditors start with rules  They work with you  Accept workable solutions  Want to be reasonable – You may not think so…  You need to offer solutions – Can’t remove GL db account – But we can change the password regularly

73. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 73 Editorial Opinion  Worth what you paid…  This sort of task is hard – And hard to out-source  Requires communication skills – DBA needs to be on-site  Smartest DBA doesn’t win – Best DBA is the DBA that can communicate – Patience required to understand auditors needs

74. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 74 Conclusion  SOX Audit is challenging – Auditors have simple questions  But the answers are complicated  For everything you tell the auditors – Provide evidence  Tie it back to Oracle docs, db tables  Develop repeatable process – This is what YOU want from the SOX audit

75. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 75 Conclusion  SOX Audit  Do – Develop repeatable process – Use each audit to validate, refine your process – Make each audit easier, quicker than the last  Don’t – Wonder how you passed the last audit – Recreate this process for the next audit

76. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 76 Documents  Oracle Applications 11i Password Decryption – Google ‘oracle applications 11i password decryption’ – Integrigy Corp, Stephen Kost and Jack Kanter  Oracle Database Security Checklist, January 2007 – http://www.oracle.com/technology/deploy/security /pdf/twp_security_checklist_db_database.pdf http://www.oracle.com/technology/deploy/security /pdf/twp_security_checklist_db_database.pdf – Google ‘Oracle Database Security Checklist’

77. www.brianhitchcock.net Brian Hitchcock November 3, 2007Page 77 Documents  Metalink – 419475.1 Removing Credentials from a Cloned EBS Prod Db – 189367.1 Best Practices for Securing Oracle E-Business Suite – 340240.1 An Assessment of Oracle Password Hashing Algorithm – 398942.1 FNDCPASS Utility New Feature ALLORACLE – 396537.1 Guest account password – 189367.1 Best Practices for Securing EBS – 398942.1 FNDCPASS ALLORACLE option – 291897.1 Managed SQL*Net Access – 457166.1 Non-Reversible Hash Password