1. Brian Child University of Florida 31 August – 3 September 2009 Morogoro, Tanzania

2. 1. How do we measure production of environmental services? 2. Who pays? For what? 3. Economic institutions for sustainability 4. Governance

3. Illustrates economic principles through:  An example of how we turned an environmental services (wildlife biodiversity) into real value  How we made sure sure that landholders (who are deterministic of land use) benefit

4.  IF resource is valuable (PRICE)  AND value gets to landholder (PROPRIETORSHIP)  AND landholder controls decisions (SUBSIDIARITY)  THEN, natural resource will be conserved

5.  London Convention 1933  Established protected areas  Banned commercial use  Centralized control in state agencies  Effect - Made wildlife valueless so replaced by cow and plough  So now we are undoing the London Convention (and conventional conservation dogma) by ….  Promoting highest value uses  Giving wildlife back to landholders (i.e. communities)

7. 1960s – Cropping (Scientists; failed) 1970-2000 Safari Hunting Industry; succeeded and evolved) 1990s – restocking & major land transformation back to bio-experience economy Tourism (and hunting)

8. 10-14,000 properties Major shift from livestock to wildlife Increases : Jobs 4.5 time Wage bill 32X

9. 1980 S, LIVESTOCK 1990 S, W ILDLIFE Economic Transformation Jobs Jobs Economic growth Economic growth Environmental services Environmental services Environmental services Carbon Carbon

10. Range Economics, Zimbabwe, 1990 Wildlife Enterprises (48% were profitable) But … decades of previous subsidization Livestock Enterprises (5% were profitable)

11. Increase in prices related to: 1. Shift from administrative to open-competitive pricing 2. Innovation and product development on 10,000 properties LESSONS FOR INCREASING PRICES OF ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES

12.  Devolved rights to manage, benefit, sell to landholders:  100% of income (stopped licenses, reduced regulations etc)  Open, competitive marketing replaced administrative pricing  10-14,000 people experimenting rapidly drives up price of wildlife

13. Applying the same principles to rural communities – led to CAMPFIRE

14. Devolutionary Policy/ Governance Making Money Spending Money NRM Mgmt / Control Capacity Building

15.  Sell hunting openly, competitively  Pay 80-100% of income to community

16. 1.Defined membership 2.Made a list of members and checked it 3.Listed animals shot and values 4.Worked out potential share per person 5.Agreed on allocation $200/HH $100 cash $ 70 grinding mill $ 30 school

17. Debating choices Participatory Governance (NOT Representational governance)

20. Clinic Wildlife Management Take Home Cash

21. 1.Conceptual Foundation: Maximize benefits to land occupier 2.Policy (Price and Proprietorship)  Devolved use rights  Encourage commercial use, open-competitive marketing  Governance (tomorrow)

22. Government District CBO Individual REDD Payment

24. No rights Policy failures drive down price of wildlife +- 600- 700mm Bans on Use Value Rainfall Wildlife Area

25. +- 600- 700mm Value Rainfall Land Conserved by Wildlife Combine carbon payments with hunting & tourism Healthy, Unconverted Natural Habitats

26. Rainy season reduced by 20%! Areas at most risk of climate change

27.  Environmental conservation  Wildlife Economic driver  Biodiversity  CarbonNobody pays for these  Water(positive externality)  Economic development  Household benefit  Community income and projects  Jobs, economic multipliers  Mechanism for rural democratization and empowerment (tomorrow)

28. Thank you