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1 Master of Business Administration Module Module Culture & Politics International Politics Prof. Dr. Uwe HOLTZ 2010, November 19-20 Hochschule Bonn-Rhein-Sieg.

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Presentation on theme: "1 Master of Business Administration Module Module Culture & Politics International Politics Prof. Dr. Uwe HOLTZ 2010, November 19-20 Hochschule Bonn-Rhein-Sieg."— Presentation transcript:

1 1 Master of Business Administration Module Module Culture & Politics International Politics Prof. Dr. Uwe HOLTZ 2010, November 19-20 Hochschule Bonn-Rhein-Sieg / University of Applied Sciences

2 2  Ursula Mogg – Lecture on Peace and Security Policy (19 Nov., 17.00 h)  Leftovers: Charcoal/Firewood, Power-shift in the IMF, Marshall Plan + start of foreign assistance  International Relations in the 21st Century > Millennium Declaration + MDGs  Development Cooperation  A) Germany B) EU  Stefan Jahn – Lecture on “Deutsche Welthungerhilfe” (20 Nov., 11.00 h)  Relationship between Democracy, Good Governance and Development  Factors responsible for (mal-)development – role of elites Cross-cutting: NGOs, civil society Structure for this week-end

3 3 International Politics It deals with some of the central issues that affect our lives. The academic discipline of IP traditionally focuses on questions of peace and war. In recent years this agenda has broadened to include issues such as development, human rights, climate/environment, and culture/religion.

4 4 Lecture of Ursula Mogg (*1953, Koblenz) on Peace and Security Policy She holds a Master of Arts in Political Science, English Philology and International Law from the University of Bonn Professional experiences in an office of an MP and in the State administration of Rhineland- Palatinate Professional experiences in an office of an MP and in the State administration of Rhineland- Palatinate Member of the German Bundestag, 1994-2009 (deputy speaker for defense of the SPD parliamentary group; member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly) Lecturer at the Federal Armed Forces Academy in Koblenz

5 5 I. Leftovers: 1. Charcoal / Firewood 2. Power-shift in the IMF 3. Marshall Plan + Start of development aid

6 6 Source: www.energyandminerals.go.ug/pdf/gtz/brochure_ee_rsdom.pdf (13.11.10) www.energyandminerals.go.ug/pdf/gtz/brochure_ee_rsdom.pdf HOUSEHOLD ROCKET STOVE: Less firewood, more efficient, cheaper, ecologically sound

7 7 Germany‘s interests?

8 8 Areas in dark blue represent the member countries in the G-20; light blue represent members of the European Union not individually represented. (Wikipedia)European Union The Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G-20, G20, Group of Twenty) is a group of finance ministers and central bank governors from 20 economies: 19 countries plus the European Union, which is represented by the President of the European Council and by the European Central Bank. Their heads of government or heads of state have also periodically conferred at summits since their initial meeting in 2008. Collectively, the G-20 economies comprise 85% of global gross national product, 80% of world trade (including EU intra-trade) and two-thirds of the world population.finance ministerscentral bankEuropean UnionPresidentEuropean CouncilEuropean Central Bankheads of governmentheads of stategross national productworld tradeworld population G 20 *1999

9 9 IMF – more power for emerging economies and developing countries (< 42,3 % share) FAZ, 8.11.10, S. 14 USA > During the G 20 heads of state and government meeting in Seoul, 12 Nov. 2010, China was elevated to No 3 on IMF Board

10 10 Source: www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pdfs/pr10418_table.pdf - 13.11.10www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pdfs/pr10418_table.pdf

11 11 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Planhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Plan Map of Cold-War era Europe showing countries that received Marshall Plan aid ( “European Recovery Program”/ERP). The blue columns show the relative amount of total aid per nation.

12 12 Of the some $13 billion allotted (= 1,2 % of the US GDP) -$3.4 billion had been spent on imports of raw materials and semi- manufactured products; -$3.2 billion on food, feed, and fertilizer; -$1.9 billion on machines, vehicles, and equipment; - $1.6 billion on fuel.

13 13 More than $11 billion of the ERP were a grant/gift – but for W. Germany it was a loan. In 1953, the “London Agreement on German External Debts” reduced the loan to 1 billion to be paid back within 30 years including an interest rate of 2.5 %. (Already in 1966 the total debt was repaid) Also established were counterpart funds, which used Marshall Plan aid to establish funds in the local currency. This was prominent in Germany, where these government-administered funds played a crucial role in lending money to private enterprises. The companies were obligated to repay the loans to the government, and the money would then be lent out to another group of businesses. A far less expensive, but also quite effective, was the Technical Assistance Program. This program funded groups of European engineers and industrialists to visit the United States and tour mines, factories, and smelters so that they could then copy the American advances at home. At the same time several hundred American technical advisors were sent to Europe.

14 14 Help for self-help In most countries, the counterpart fund money was absorbed into general government revenues – in Germany it was recycled. The German ERP Special Fund was established by law in 1953 in the form of a revolving fund. > “internal Marshall Plan” – the self-help began.* This process has continued to this day in the guise of the state owned KfW bank. In 2010: € 533 million – normally used for lowering the interest rates and channeled by the KfW. Private enterprises, in particular SMEs, get soft loans up to € 4,5 billion – half of it foreseen for environmental protection and the increase of energy efficiency. Private enterprises, in particular SMEs, get soft loans up to € 4,5 billion – half of it foreseen for environmental protection and the increase of energy efficiency. Other financial means: for business start-ups or the promotion of German development areas (since 1990 – after unification – East Germany was helped in the process of economic modernization) The Marshall Plan – a model for ODA and other continents? *www.kfw.de/DE_Home/Die_Bank/Unsere_Geschichte/Themenschwerpunkte/Marshallplan_und_ERP.jspwww.kfw.de/DE_Home/Die_Bank/Unsere_Geschichte/Themenschwerpunkte/Marshallplan_und_ERP.jsp

15 15 Start of Foreign (Economic) Assistance The Point Four Program (also known as the Bold New Program) was a program for foreign assistance to poor countries announced in 1949 by US President Truman. In his inauguration speech on January 20, 1949, he stated the fourth objective of his foreign policy as follows: „We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve suffering of these people.”

16 16 The program was approved by the US Congress on June 5, 1950 in the Foreign Economic Assistance Act, which allotted to the program a budget of $ 25,000,000 for fiscal year 1950/51. On October 27, 1950, the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) was established within the Department of State. In 1953 it was merged with other foreign-aid programs > US AID. Although it was unclear at the outset what form aid to developing countries would take, emphasis quickly was placed on technical assistance, largely in the fields of agriculture, public health, education. The program also encouraged the flow of private investment capital to these nations. Another interest > Containment policy - using military, economic, and diplomatic strategies to stall the spread of communism, enhance America’s security and influence abroad

17 17 Other industrialized countries followed the US example: In 1952, W. Germany gave a financial contribution to the Enlarged Stand-by Program of the UN. In 1956 the German Bundestag decided to allocate in the Foreign Office 50 mio. DM for the advancement of “underdeveloped countries” In 1961, the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation (and Development) was created – in the beginning with narrow competencies. Motivations and interests ranged from humanitarian to economic and national objectives.

18 18  Mixed outcomes of development cooperation,  unsatisfactory progress in many developing countries,  the end of the Cold War and the predominant failure of centrally planned economies,  new challenges as posed by globalization, the financial crisis, climates changes and “new wars” * led to a review and rethinking of “development” as a whole and of the international relations. *Mary Kaldor (1999): New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Oxford *Mary Kaldor (1999): New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Oxford

19 19 II. International Relations in the 21st Century should be shaped, i. a., by - the new development paradigm of sustainable human development (Rio 1992) - The Millennium Declaration and the MDGs (New York 2000/2001) II. International Relations in the 21st Century should be shaped, i. a., by - the new development paradigm of sustainable human development (Rio 1992) - The Millennium Declaration and the MDGs (New York 2000/2001)

20 20 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly [without reference to a Main Committee (A/55/L.2)] 55/2. United Nations Millennium Declaration The General Assembly Adopts the following Declaration: United Nations Millennium Declaration I. Values and principles We, heads of State and Government, have gathered at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 6 to 8 September 2000, at the dawn of a new millennium, to reaffirm our faith in the Organization and its Charter as indispensable foundations of a more peaceful, prosperous and just world. 2. We recognize that, in addition to our separate responsibilities to our individual societies, we have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level. As leaders we have a duty therefore to all the world’s people, especially the most vulnerable and, in particular, the children of the world, to whom the future belongs.

21 21 6. We consider certain fundamental values to be essential to international relations in the twenty-first century. These include: 1)Freedom 2)Equality 3)Solidarity 4)Tolerance 5)Respect for nature 6)Shared responsibility

22 22 In order to translate these shared values into actions, we have identified key objectives to which we assign special significance: I.Peace, security and disarmament II.Development and poverty eradication III.Protecting our common environment IV.Human rights, democracy and good governance V.Protecting the vulnerable VI.Meeting the special needs of Africa VII.Strengthening the United Nations

23 23 NGO + UNITED NATIONS: Article 71 of the UN Charter opened the door providing for suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations. In 1946, 41 NGOs were granted consultative status by the council; by 1992 more that 700 NGOs had attained consultative status and the number has been steadily increasing ever since to more than 3,000 organizations today. To be eligible for consultative status, an NGO must have been in existence (officially registered with the appropriate government authorities as an NGO/non-profit) for at least two years, must have an established headquarters, a democratically adopted constitution, authority to speak for its members, a representative structure, appropriate mechanisms of accountability and democratic and transparent decision- making processes. Organizations established by governments or intergovernmental agreements are not considered NGOs. www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo

24 24 The eight MDGs 2000/2001, UN Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women Goal 4: Reduce child mortality Goal 5: Improve maternal health Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development Millennium Declaration, Sept. 2000: Peace, Security & Disarmament; Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance # culture The German government's contribution to the realization of these goals is enshrined in its cross-departmental Program of Action 2015, for which the BMZ is the lead ministry.Program of Action 2015

25 25 The MDGs may pave the way to a more peaceful, prosperous and just world. peaceful, prosperous and just world. They are a – restricted, faulty – vision for a better word. The MDGs do not directly address some important issues such as democracy or peace – and some problems are underestimated (e.g. the instability of financial markets, population increase). Essential goals/targets/indicators are missing from the MDGs – especially in areas of industrialized countries’ commitments. The goals are ambitious - but progress is possible.

26 26 Goal 1 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day Target 2: Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, incl. women and young people Target 3: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

27 27 UN: MDG Report 2010 GOAL 1 Eradicate extreme poverty

28 28 World Unemployment Rate Unemployment rate: 30% (2007 est.) note: combined unemployment and underemployment in many non- industrialized countries; developed countries typically 4%-12% unemployment note: combined unemployment and underemployment in many non- industrialized countries; developed countries typically 4%-12% unemployment Definition: This entry contains the percent of the labor force that is without jobs. Substantial underemployment might be noted. Source: CIA World Factbook - Unless otherwise noted, information in this page is accurate as of September 17, 2009 CIA World FactbookCIA World Factbookwww.indexmundi.com/world/unemployment_rate.html

29 29 FAO, 2010

30 30 Source: Millennium Development Goals: 2010 Progress Chart (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg)http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg

31 31 MDGs at 2010: Mixed Results The Millennium Development Goals 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. Extreme poverty is lessening - joblessness and hunger are not. 2. Achieve universal primary education. Despite encouraging progress, the goal may not be met by 2015, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia. 3. Promote gender equality and empower women. Poverty remains a barrier to education for girls; women remain less favoured than men in the employment market. 4. Reduce child mortality. Child deaths are falling, but not fast enough to meet the 2015 target of a two-thirds reduction, compared with 1990, in the under-five mortality rate. Source www.unep.org/greeneconomy/Portals/30/docs/policymakers_brief_GEI&MDG.pdf, 9.2010 www.unep.org/greeneconomy/Portals/30/docs/policymakers_brief_GEI&MDG.pdf

32 32 5. Improve maternal health. Most maternal deaths in child-birth could be avoided with the right medical care, but giving birth remains especially risky in sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia and progress has slowed in reducing the number of teenage pregnancies. 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. The spread of HIV has stabilised in most regions, but the rate of infection continues to surpass the expansion of treatment. Procurement of antimalarial drugs is increasing, but poverty still limits the use of mosquito nets. 7. Ensure environmental sustainability. The rate of deforestation, though high, is slowing - but the world has missed the 2010 target for biodiversity conservation and the target of halving by 2015 the number of people without basic sanitation will be difficult to reach. 8. Develop a global partnership for development. Aid for the least developed countries continues to rise, despite the global economic crisis, but only five donor countries have reached the UN target for official aid. Developing and least developed countries are gaining greater access to developed markets, and debt burdens have been lightened - but they remain well behind rich countries in information and communications technology.

33 33 Roles of NGOs They address a gap in the relationship between people and government. They are vibrant, dynamic parts of the civil society. Several types of NGOs, dealing with i.a.: development, advocacy, financial cooperation or awareness-raising.  Development-type NGOs handle concerns involving refugees, health activities or other basic human needs.  Advocacy NGOs criticize government or international actors policies (TNCs, World Bank, IMF…) based on their own research and study.  Financial cooperation-type NGOs specialize in collecting donations for the use of NGOs that implement actual projects.  Awareness-Raising and education-type NGOs implement educational programs in such areas as environment and development.

34 34 Taisitiroo Satoo, president of the Japan Wildlife Research Center, categorizes environmental NGOs as biting dogs, barking dogs and working dogs (): Taisitiroo Satoo, president of the Japan Wildlife Research Center, categorizes environmental NGOs as biting dogs, barking dogs and working dogs (www.gdrc.org/ngo/jpngo-face.html):www.gdrc.org/ngo/jpngo-face.html 1.Biting dogs are good at biting governments or industries concerning environmental policies. 2.Barking dogs bark from a safe distance, issuing warnings and appealing to the middle-class majority. 3.Working dogs devote themselves to basic study and research [as well as to concrete projects]. The typology the World Bank uses divides them into Operational and Advocacy.

35 35 III. Development Cooperation / DC Source: BMZ (2008): Weißbuch zur Entwicklungspolitik, Berlin Pilot project by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) in a Miao village in southern China: villagers use the newly built well to wash clothes and vegetables, collect water for cooking and drinking, and to water their animals.

36 36 4 ODA principles: 1.ODA should contribute to a sustainable, human development conducive to the improvement of people‘s living conditions 2.ODA should „do no harm“* (Latin: primum non nocere) 3.ODA should be an incentive for „good performers“ (performance-based allocation) 4.Sometimes it is better to „stay engaged“ instead of “let them fail”** * Mary B. Anderson (1999): Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - or War, Boulder/London ** Tobias Debiel et al. (2007): „Stay Engaged“ statt „Let Them Fail“ (INEF-Report 90/2007 - http://inef.uni- due.de/cms/files/report90.pdf

37 37 Official Development Assistance / co-operation DC in the form of project, program or budget aid (+ debt relief) DC in the form of project, program or budget aid (+ debt relief) For projects look at http://aida.developmentgateway.org http://aida.developmentgateway.org ODA = grants or loans to countries and territories according to the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) and to multilateral institutions: ODA = grants or loans to countries and territories according to the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) and to multilateral institutions: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective (# military); (c) at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25 per cent).

38 38 Goal - ODA / GNI Ratio = ODA as % of GNI ODA goal: The international goal for rich countries to devote 0.7% of their gross national income (previously: GDP) to official development assistance. 2009: 0.31 % = 119.6 billon USD [2008: 0.31 % = 121,5 billion; 2007: 0.28%; 2006: 0.31 %] ODA/GNI ratio 2008 (ODA dependency): All developing countries: ca. 0.8 % [2007: 0.85 %; 2006: 1.1 %] All developing countries: ca. 0.8 % [2007: 0.85 %; 2006: 1.1 %] SSA: 4.2 % [2007: 4.32 %; 2006: 6.1 %] SSA: 4.2 % [2007: 4.32 %; 2006: 6.1 %]

39 39 Source: OECD / DAC, 4.2010

40 40

41 41

42 42 Dialogue: U.H. - Charles Goerens, LUX, Ministre de la coopération et de l‘action humanitaire 1999-2004, 28.4.2009 in Strasbourg Luxembourg‘s target: ODA increase up to auf 1% Luxembourg‘s target: ODA increase up to auf 1% Criteria/Preconditions: Criteria/Preconditions: - Political will - Plan by stages (in 4 years from 0.4 to 0.8%) - Parliamentary support - Internal + external solidarity

43 43 DAC members: Net flows to developing countries in 2007 USD billion Sources: OECD, World Bank, UNCTAD 1. ODA 103 2. Private Flows at market terms incl. direct investments, equities/ assets, export credits 306 3. Grants by Private Voluntary Agencies (NGOs) TOTAL 1-3 TOTAL 1-3 18 18427 4. Migrants – Remittances (2006) some 200 million migrants around the world 250 5. Private (US) Foundations (2006) 3 6. Dev. Economies Exports “ Imports (2008) “ Imports (2008) 5,07 trillion [= 31,4 % of total 16,13] 4,4 “ [total 16,3]

44 44

45 45 Some judgments and prejudices on development aid  James Shikwati, 2002 (www.africanliberty.org/?q=node/33- 17.10.10): www.africanliberty.org/?q=node/33 The developing world needs trade, not aid, to help the poor. Aid undermines the democratic accountability of government. It also exacerbates cronyism.  William Easterly, 2006: The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good.  Dambisa Moyo, 2009: Dead Aid - When aid has not been stolen, it has been unproductive. Aid is not working. - African governments view aid as a permanent source of income. There is no incentive for long-term financial planning, no reason to seek alternatives to fund development. - Aid leads to a culture of dependency and corruption and therefore causes poverty. - Africa’s era of private capital is only now beginning, and this trend has to be nurtured in order for it to continue.  World Bank, 1998: Assessing Aid. A World Bank Policy Research Report, New York-Washington, D.C: Foreign aid in different times and different places has been highly effective, totally ineffective, and everything in between.

46 46 Conclusions Development policy alone will not bring sufficient results; a number of other policies and external as well as internal factors have a major impact. Its objectives are - to contribute to the improvement of the peoples’ living conditions in developing countries, - to facilitate the flourishment – the “de-velopment” – of the partners’ own capabilities (help people to help themselves, ownership, empowerment), - to work for an enabling national and international environment. The own efforts of developing countries are critical – as well as the failures and shortcomings (learning lessons).

47 47 Principles of the „Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness“, OECD, March 2005 1. 1. OWNERSHIP: Partner countries will exercise effective leadership over their development policies and strategies and coordinate development actions. 2. 2. ALIGNMENT: Donors will base their overall support on recipient countries’ national development strategies, institutions and procedures. 3. 3. HARMONIZATION: Donors’ actions are more harmonized, transparent and collectively effective. 4. 4. MANAGING FOR RESULTS: Managing resources and improving decision-making for results. 5. 5. MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY: Donor and recipient countries are accountable for development results. “Paris” was confirmed by the “Accra Agenda for Action” (2008)

48 48 IV. German Development Co-operation IV. German Development Co-operation An independent area of German foreign policy An independent area of German foreign policy Formulated and predominantly executed by the Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development/BMZ (with the corresponding Bundestag Committee as parliamentary counterpart/AWZ + Budget Committee) Formulated and predominantly executed by the Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development/BMZ (with the corresponding Bundestag Committee as parliamentary counterpart/AWZ + Budget Committee) Carried out by implementing organizations Carried out by implementing organizations Orientations and directions are stemming from internationally agreed goals (and own interests) Orientations and directions are stemming from internationally agreed goals (and own interests) (Millennium Declaration + MDGs, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, German “Action Programme 2015”…)

49 49 The aims of government activities in the field of development cooperation are:   At the beginning of the 21st century, the role of development policy has changed, partly as a reaction to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.   Today, development cooperation is seen as global structural and peace policy.   It aims to help resolve crises and conflicts in a peaceful manner.   It aims to help ensure that scarce resources are more equitably shared, and that our environment is preserved for coming generations.   It aims to help reduce global poverty. Foreign policy, trade policy, security policy and development policy are today very closely linked. Source: www.bmz.de/en/ministry/index.html (14.11.10)www.bmz.de/en/ministry/index.html

50 50 BMZ/DAC: In general, evaluations aim to assess development interventions according to five basic criteria: 1. Relevance (are project goals and targets in line with the partner country's needs?) 2. Impact (what outputs benefits have people derived from the intervention?) 3. Sustainability (will positive results continue after the development intervention has ceased? – survival, lasting results ) 4. Effectiveness (have targets been reached and why or why not?) 5. Efficiency (cost-effectiveness of an intervention) Code word: RISEE (+ coordination) The BMZ evaluation unit programmes, designs, and supervises the evaluation activities of the Ministry. It provides a quality check on reports and actively engages in disseminating findings and recommendations.

51 51 BMZ Evaluation Report, 2005: Country Case Study "Tanga Integrated Rural Development Programme, Tanzania" - Summary Ex-Post Evaluation, Bonn/Berlin): The German-Tanzanian „Tanga Integrated Rural Development Programme“ (TIRDEP): In which way TIRDEP is a good example of the paradigm change in development cooperation and what are the lessons learnt from the positive effects and the deficiencies?

52 52 Country Case Study "Tanga Integrated Rural Development Programme, Tanzania" - Summary Ex-Post Evaluation, 2005 www.bmz.de/en/service/infothek/evaluation/Projektuebergreifend/BMZ_Eval-007e_print.pdf www.bmz.de/en/service/infothek/evaluation/Projektuebergreifend/BMZ_Eval-007e_print.pdf TIRDEP underwent several paradigm changes: TIRDEP underwent several paradigm changes: from top-down to bottom-up; from investing in infrastructure to institutional capacity building and improvement of living conditions Achievements: Achievements: German DC and own efforts led to food security, incomes, housing education… Limits, failures, lessons learnt: Limits, failures, lessons learnt: - Target groups - Role of history - Planning and co-ordination - Framework conditions - End of project promotion - Acceptance

53 53 www.bmz.de/en/publications/type_of_publication/evaluation/evaluation_reports_since_2006/BMZ_Eval-030e_web.pdf Evaluation Reports 030 Rural Development Support Program, Philippines summary version of the Evaluation, 2007 The subject of this evaluation is a rural development support program implemented by a Philippine nongovernmental organization (NGO). The NGO has been supported by the Catholic Central agency for Development aid (Katholische Zentralstelle für Entwicklungshilfe) with funds from BMZ since 1996. Lessons learned?

54 54 Source: BMZ (2008): White Paper

55 55 BMZ, GTZ, KfW, DED and InWent numbers of staff in 2009 Source: Data presented to the DAC peer review team by BMZ 2009 From 2011 on: GTZ, InWEnt + DED > GIZ

56 56 Bilateral official development cooperation two thirds of German ODA > to more than 100 developing countries (from LLDCs to ‘anchor countries’) and to dev. countries related activities The bilateral cooperation measures agreed upon in the government-to-government agreements form one pillar of German development co-operation with partner countries. The bilateral cooperation measures agreed upon in the government-to-government agreements form one pillar of German development co-operation with partner countries. The second pillar consists of the activities proposed by non-governmental organizations and carried out in the partner countries The second pillar consists of the activities proposed by non-governmental organizations and carried out in the partner countries The German Länder/States and municipalities are supporting the German DC efforts by own contributions. The German Länder/States and municipalities are supporting the German DC efforts by own contributions.

57 57 German ODA by government department, 2008 Source: Data presented to the peer review by BMZ Notes: AA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs; *Ministries of: Environment (BMU); Education/Research (BMBF); Culture/Media (BKM); Agriculture (BMELV); Health (BMG); Economics/Technology (BMWi); Defence (BMVg); Labour/Social Affairs (BMAS); Finance (BMF); the Interior (BMI); Family, Seniors, Women, Youth (BMFSFJ); Justice (BMJ); Transport/Building/Urban Development (BMVBS) (all less than 1%) **Other ODA sources are: debt relief and debt rescheduling; capital market funds; German Investment and Development Company; amounts received; other. Net ODA 2008: 14 billion USD

58 58

59 59 www.bmz.de/en/ministry/budget/index.html www.bmz.de/en/ministry/budget/index.html BMZ budget 2010 - www.bmz.de/en/ministry/budget/index.html www.bmz.de/en/ministry/budget/index.html The budget of the BMZ is contained in the German national budget (individual budget plan 23). In fiscal 2010, provision has been made for spending in the order of 6.070 billion euros. This is an increase of 4.4 per cent compared with fiscal 2009 (256 million euros more).

60 60 German development co-operation achieved mixed results Most of the projects and programmes are successful (KfW Evaluation Report 2006 – 177 projects in 57 countries / financing volume of EUR 6.3 bio: 71 % of the projects) Most of the projects and programmes are successful (KfW Evaluation Report 2006 – 177 projects in 57 countries / financing volume of EUR 6.3 bio: 71 % of the projects) About one fifth did not reach the expected results (KfW: 17 % slightly insufficient despite having positive impacts; 12 % insufficient) About one fifth did not reach the expected results (KfW: 17 % slightly insufficient despite having positive impacts; 12 % insufficient) In some cases a total failure (KfW: 1 project) In some cases a total failure (KfW: 1 project) For projects look at http://aida.developmentgateway.org http://aida.developmentgateway.org

61 61

62 62 The Peer Review underlined 4 very positive elements 1.Germany still is one of the world‘s largest donors (12 billion USD in 2009 = 10 % of total ODA) 2.A specific ministry dedicated to development cooperation 3.A worldwide lead role in the area of environment and climate change 4.Progress made since the last Peer Review (2005): a) Reduction of the number of partner countries b) Ways forward for reforming the development cooperation system c) Concentrating ODA for better results

63 63 4. a) Germany has narrowed its focus to 57 partner countries (down from 84 five years ago). This reduction has been achieved by applying tighter selection criteria and by prioritising. These 57 partner countries consequently benefit from more intensive co-operation; each has a country strategy in place which is generally aligned to the national development strategy. In its anchor-country concept, Germany counts 15 states as anchor countries, of which 8 (in bold) are partner countries: Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey. Its evolving cooperation with “anchor countries” focuses on regional strategies and global public goods.

64 64 4. b) Germany’s development co-operation system is well established, large and complex, involving more than 40 different ministries, federal states (Länder), agencies and organisations – now the fragmentation of the technical cooperation system will be reduced DAC Peer Review: Germany, Oct. 2010 (www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/23/46287397.pdf - 14.11.10)www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/23/46287397.pdf From 2011 on: GTZ, InWEnt + DED > GIZ

65 65 4. c) Since October 2009 Germany’s development co- operation statements tend towards reducing the priority sectors from eleven to seven in order to achieve better results: 1. 1.good governance; 2. 2.education; 3. 3.health; 4. 4.protection of climate, environment and natural resources; 5. 5.rural development; 6. 6.private sector development (new); 7. 7.sustainable economic development. # peace-building; water; energy; transport/communication; regional concentration However, it will take time for this prioritisation to be reflected in Germany’s development programming and aid disbursements.

66 66 Peer Review: Criticism and 9 challenges for Germany‘s Development Cooperation 1. 1.Unclear new vision in the 2009 Coalition Agreement 2. 2.Germany is off-track for meeting its ODA commitment 3. 3.A stronger emphasis to sub-Saharan Africa 4. 4.A strategy for working with NGOs 5. 5.More efficient organization and management 6. 6.Better coherence for development 7. 7.Improve the aid effectiveness 8. 8.No clear strategy for capacity development 9. 9.A better parliamentary oversight

67 67 Lecture of Stefan Jahn (*1964, Koblenz) on Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Went to schools – i.a. in Stockholm, Tripolis, Ankara, Bonn 1984-91 Studied agriculture at the University of Bonn > Dipl.-Agro-Engineer Professional experiences i. a.: Chamber of Agriculture/Rhineland, DED in Mali, in an office of an MP in Bonn, Since 1999 Deutsche Welthungerhilfe – Head - Quality Management, Evaluation, Controlling

68 68 V. EU – Foreign and development policy What is the EU about? The EU is not a federation like the United States. Nor is it simply an organisation for co-operation between governments, like the United Nations. It is, in fact, unique. (German Federal Court of Justice: The EU is a “Staatenverbund” > joint federation of states) The EU ‘member states’ remain independent sovereign nations. However, they pool their sovereignty in order to gain an added value for mutual benefit and world influence none of them could have on their own.

69 69 EU as an alliance of States or a grouping of States Lisbon Treaty, Art. 4 ”The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities…” EU as a frontier-free Europe Art. 1: “marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” EU as part of the world, …in the world Art. 3, §5: “In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights…” The original Euro coins symbolizing targets and roles of the EU

70 70 Europe as an actor on the global stage will be achieved by bringing together Europe's external policy tools, both when developing and deciding new policies. 1.The Treaty of Lisbon gives Europe a clear voice in relations with its partners worldwide. It harnesses Europe's economic, humanitarian, political and diplomatic strengths to promote European interests and values worldwide, while respecting the particular interests of the Member States in Foreign Affairs. (< theories of Realism and Idealism) 2.A new High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Lady Ashton), also Vice-President of the Commission, will increase the impact, the coherence and the visibility of the EU's external action. 3.A new European External Action Service will provide back up and support to the High Representative. 4.A single legal personality for the Union will strengthen the Union's negotiating power, making it more effective on the world stage and a more visible partner for third countries and international organisations. 5.Progress in European Security and Defence Policy will preserve special decision-making arrangements but also pave the way towards reinforced cooperation amongst a smaller group of Member States. Source: http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm

71 71 EU - a major global actor both economically and politically (?) - largest trading block in the world taking up more than one third of world exports - producing one third of the world’s GDP - financing 50 % of the World’s Foreign Direct Investment - main financier contributor to the UN - influential in global governance institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO - the main trading partner to many developing countries

72 72 Treaty on the EU, article 21.2: The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: (a)safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; (d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; (e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; (f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development; (g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and (h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance. Theory of Realism and Idealism and Regime Theory [Theory of Realism and Idealism and Regime Theory]

73 73 Treaty on the functioning of the European Union COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES AND HUMANITARIAN AID / CHAPTER 1 - DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION Art. 208 Union policy in the field of development cooperation shall be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action. The Union's development cooperation policy and that of the Member States complement and reinforce each other. Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. (< coherence)

74 74 Article 210 1. In order to promote the complementarity and efficiency of their action, the Union and the Member States shall coordinate their policies on development cooperation and shall consult each other on their aid programmes, including in international organisations and during international conferences. They may undertake joint action. Member States shall contribute if necessary to the implementation of Union aid programmes. 2. The Commission may take any useful initiative to promote the coordination referred to in paragraph 1. 3 Cs: Complementarity, Co-ordination, Coherence

75 75 EU Development co-operation The European Community - a unique donor > triple role in development: 1. bilateral donor 2. multilateral donor 3. coordinating framework for European Union (EU) – nowadays 27 – Member States The European Commission - the executive body, accountable to the European Parliament and its Development co-operation Committee as well as the Member States meeting in Councils

76 76 Delivery The Commission’s external assistance is implemented through three main delivery modalities. The choices depend on a joint Commission/government analysis of the country and sector environment. 1. The project approach is used to support non-state actors, for regional programmes, or where conditions do not allow for use of government systems. 2. The sector approach aims to underpin a sector policy and a strategic framework monitored through performance criteria and indicators. (2007 commitments for GBS: 1.8 bn € = 23%) 3. The EC also supports national or macro level goals expressed in national policy and strategy documents through general budget support, with funds transferred to the national treasury of the beneficiary country. (2007 commitments for GBS: 1.8 bn € = 23%)

77 77 EU: Project examples in Mali, Sri Lanka and Brazil [video] Climate Change

78 78 “Evaluation of European Commission Co-operation with El Salvador”, 2010 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/e vinfo/2010/1274_ev_en.pdf http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/e vinfo/2010/1274_ev_en.pdf http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/e vinfo/2010/1274_ev_en.pdf Main characteristics of EC cooperation: Evolution from a) post-war phase, with project approach; to b) consolidation of democracy and institutional reforms, with sector approach from 2002, mainly focussed in technical education and juvenile delinquency ; c) beginning switch towards budget support from 2006 for social infrastructure. Thematic budget lines accounted 22 % of commitments but significant number of interventions. Two focal sectors from 2007: (1) Fostering of social cohesion and human security (2) Economic growth, regional integration and trade.

79 79 Implementation The European Commission, Directorate-General for Development; EuropeAid co-operation Office (the handling of the entire project cycle, i.e. from project identification to the evaluation, is now fully in the hands of EuropeAid); Other external services of the European Commission: ECHO (Humanitarian Aid), DG Relex, DG Trade…; The European Investment Bank (EIB); the EC Delegations around the world; the 27 EU Member States; NGOs and the other actors of the European civil society. [2007: Strategy for 2007–2010 Non State Actors and Local Authorities in Development]

80 80

81 81 EC, 2010: Partnership for Change. The EU’s Development Cooperation with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries

82 82

83 83 The ACP-EU partnership, signed on 23rd of June 2000 in Cotonou, Benin, concluded for a twenty-year period from March 2000 to February 2020, entered into force on April 1, 2003. The Cotonou Agreement is based on five interdependent pillars (4Ps+DC): 1. an enhanced political dimension, 2. increased participation, 3. a more strategic approach to cooperation focusing on poverty reduction, 4. new economic and trade partnerships, 5. improved development cooperation.

84 84 The co-operation with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries is still primarily funded under the European Development Fund (EDF), as the European Council decided in December 2005 that the EDF should continue to be financed separately from the budget. The co-operation with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries is still primarily funded under the European Development Fund (EDF), as the European Council decided in December 2005 that the EDF should continue to be financed separately from the budget. With € 22.7 billion worth of funding, the 10th EDF (2008-2013) sets the basis for co- operation with the ACP countries. With € 22.7 billion worth of funding, the 10th EDF (2008-2013) sets the basis for co- operation with the ACP countries. The most controversial issue is the conclusion of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and the 6 ACP regions. The most controversial issue is the conclusion of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and the 6 ACP regions.

85 85 Cotonou ACP-EU Agreement, 2000-2020, favours an integrated, holistic approach of development > the paradigm of “sustainable development centred on the human person“ (Art. 9 § 1) cultural environmentalsocial economic political development U. Holtz: A human being – this animal rationale = zoon logon echon – is not just a „homo oeconomicus“, but also a „zoon politicon“ as well as homo socialis, oecologicus and culturalis. http://bonnsustainabilityportal.de

86 86 NGOs > http://ec.europa.eu/development/how/relations/relnsas_en.cfm Relations with Civil Society The EU is committed to strengthening the role of civil society in development, see e.g. Cotonou. Development policy and programmes are generally more effective when the priorities of the different development actors are consistent with those of civil society, as this gives local populations a sense of ownership of national development policy. EU development policy encourages non-state actors to play an active role. Recent EU emphasis on participatory approaches has resulted in many innovations, such as more decentralised management and empowering and involving a broad range of civil society bodies, e.g. NGOs, trade unions, political foundations, private companies, universities and the media. Civil society involvement in ACP countries has recently been found to be patchy, with significant country to country variation. In response the EU has made a number of recommendations that could help improve participation. Civil society will also be participating in the international discussions on making aid more effective. As watchdog, implementer, donor and recipient, civil society is a development actor in its own right, distinct from governments and donors. If aid is to have the optimum impact, all 3 groups must examine how their policies and activities complement and/or undermine each other, and work together for best effect.

87 87 DAC Peer Reviews – EC 2002 + 2007 A major success with policy coherence has been achieved through the “Everything But Arms” initiative. A major success with policy coherence has been achieved through the “Everything But Arms” initiative. There are other coherence issues to address in the relations between development policy and the European Community’s internal policies, for example the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy. There are other coherence issues to address in the relations between development policy and the European Community’s internal policies, for example the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy. A pro-poor growth strategy could help integrate poverty eradication more directly into Economic Partnership Agreements and aid-for-trade plans. A pro-poor growth strategy could help integrate poverty eradication more directly into Economic Partnership Agreements and aid-for-trade plans. Greater reliance on budget support requires systematic use of risk assessments and a good understanding of the appropriateness of budget support in the local context. Greater reliance on budget support requires systematic use of risk assessments and a good understanding of the appropriateness of budget support in the local context.

88 88 In the field, better communication and co- ordination are required, both with headquarters and among EU Members and the country delegations. In the field, better communication and co- ordination are required, both with headquarters and among EU Members and the country delegations. Increased Commission attention to more effective policy co-ordination in selected thematic areas. These include: Increased Commission attention to more effective policy co-ordination in selected thematic areas. These include: -- democratic governance (clearer guidance on country performance standards to facilitate policy dialogue, manage expectations and enhance predictability) ; -- fragile states and security system reform (need for strategy and for resource allocation criteria, strengthened co-ordination on security and defense policy instruments and better integration of missions to the field); -- gender (better mainstreaming into programmes and more effective performance measurement).

89 89 2007 Evaluations The relevance of Commission programming and implementation is generally good. The Commission response addresses the needs of partner countries and is coherent with EU goals. Several major positive impacts have been noted, e.g. on the social sectors in India, economic stability in Jordan and Mozambique, the water sector in Jordan, food security in Mozambique, and economic integration in Central America. However, delays in implementation, lack of flexibility and cumbersome procedures lead to recurrent efficiency weaknesses. While the high quality of projects within some sectors (such as rural development) is recognised, impact on the sectoral policies of partner countries is often poor.

90 90 The European Union and International Climate Politics The Copenhagen World Climate Conference in December 2009 ended with a nonbinding declaration of intent. The Copenhagen Accord did not live up to the goals the EU had laid down. The impasse in international climate negotiations continued in 2010, with the industrialized nations, on one side, and the developing and rapidly industrializing countries, on the other. Crucial issues remain unresolved. The EU failed in its role of agenda-setter and was unable to implement its climate protection proposals. At the follow-up conference in Cancún at the end of 2010 the EU will concentrate on achieving partial successes with regard to specific issues with a revised strategy and modified goals. While hopes of a legally binding climate protection agreement remain modest, numerous bilateral and multilateral projects initiated outside the official negotiations can function as catalysts. This could offer the EU a new role as the driving force of this development. Cf. S. Fischer/J. Leinen (2010): The European Union and International Climate Politics (http://www.fes.de/cgi- bin/gbv.cgi?id=07636&ty=pdf)http://www.fes.de/cgi- bin/gbv.cgi?id=07636&ty=pdf

91 91 New Alliances for Climate Protection – „climate diplomacy“ Probably the most important of these initiatives to date was launched by Norway and France, whose governments succeeded in establishing agreements with a number of states whose forests are especially important for climate protection. Indonesia, Brazil and the Democratic Republic of the Congo agreed to become partners in the preservation of the tropical rain forests, and will receive financial and technical support. Financial input from the participating Western industrialized countries was a decisive factor in establishing this REDD*-Plus initiative. The German–South African technology cooperation initiative represents a step towards closer cooperation that could lead to rapid and substantial results outside the cumbersome and slow processes of the UNFCCC. The environment ministers of the three largest member states – Germany, France and the United Kingdom – have called for Europe to increase its emissions-reduction target unilaterally to 30 per cent by 2020 in order to boost its international credibility and advance the development of new technologies. Sections of European business now share this argument. The new motto is »climate protection in our own economic interests«. *Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

92 92 VI. Relationship between democracy, good governance and development Democracy promotion

93 93 Freedom House, January 2010 green = free yellow = partly free blue = not free 194 countries: 89 58 47 Source: www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010 www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010

94 94 Democracy Index 2008 – Economist Intelligence Unit Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008 (http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy Index 2008.pdf - 12.11.10

95 95 The international community about the links WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Vienna, June 1993: Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. UNDP‘s HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: The links between democracy and human development are not automatic. Political freedom and participation are part of human development, both as development goals in their own right and as means for advancing human development. COTONOU AGREEMENT, 2000: The partnership shall actively support the promotion of human rights, processes of democratisation, consolidation of the rule of law, and good governance. NEPAD, 2001, art. 71 African leaders have learnt from their own experiences that peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development.

96 96 ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, signed in Cotonou, 23 June 2000 Article 9 Essential Elements and Fundamental Element (1) Cooperation shall be directed towards sustainable development centred on the human person, who is the main protagonist and beneficiary of development; this entails respect for and promotion of all human rights. Respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including respect for fundamental social rights, democracy based on the rule of law and transparent and accountable governance are an integral part of sustainable development. (2) The Parties reaffirm that democratisation, development and the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.

97 97 International Democracy Promotion Objective: External IDP should contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy Reasons: - democracy is a universal value (A. Sen) - moral obligation - instrumental rationale grounded in the goals of universal peace, social justice and global development IDP – democracy building: - promoting the (pre-)conditions for development - assisting the democratisation -in failed, weak states - for the time being - political stability may be a priority Means, approaches: A continuum from ‘soft power’ and other non-coercive form of influence to diplomatic pressure, political conditionalities and (threat of) sanctions (‘hard power’ - # war)

98 98 Lise Rakner, Alina Rocha Menocal, Verena Fritz.: Democratisation’s Third Wave and the Challenges of Democratic Deepening: Assessing International Democracy Assistance and Lessons Learned, London 2007 (http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/2761-democratisations- third-wave-and-the-challenges-of.pdf); http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/2761-democratisations- third-wave-and-the-challenges-of.pdfhttp://www.cmi.no/publications/file/2761-democratisations- third-wave-and-the-challenges-of.pdf Democracy assistance: Lessons learned and remaining challenges.....................23 3.2 Forms of democracy assistance 3.2.1 Electoral assistance..................................... 3.2.2 Assistance to political parties ……………… 3.2.3 Justice sector assistance............................. 3.2.4 Assistance to civil society............................. 3.2.5 Assistance to media..................................... ----- [3.2.6 Assistance to decentralization of a country + to local democracy………………………………………..]

99 99 What worked? - In the 70ies: support to states transitioning from dictatorship to democracy, incl. Portugal, Spain and Greece. (< German political foundations). - 1993 Copenhagen criteria of the EC for accession countries > good results - Sanctions: apartheid South Africa; Cuba and Zimbabwe (mixed results) Democracy assistance assessments (so difficult): - Political foundations: in some countries very successful, in others helpful (Indonesia, Chile) or poor results (China) - Evaluation of the EU efforts in Ukraine, Indonesia, Angola and Guatemala: The impact of external assistance has been modest. - USAID: more than 100 countries between 1990-2003 achieved higher scores for democracy, but the overall democracy dividend was itself small, because the aid commitment has been small - Other studies (SIDA, DANIDA, GTZ, political foundations): both yes and no (promotion of parties, parliaments, civil society)

100 100 Since the end of Apartheid, South Africa has made considerable progress in building a democratic society with a growing economy. Yet, major development problems such as high unemployment, widespread poverty, crime, HIV/AIDS and a big skills deficit, persist. According to the concept of “developmental local government” (White Paper 1998), local government is intended to play a critical role in addressing these development challenges. April 2009

101 101 Total costs: 29 million EUR

102 102 Assessment of impact: Significant progress has been made in implementing a new democratic and poverty oriented system of local government. However, the skills deficit is the main hindrance in implementing government programs at a faster pace. In the field of public participation, apathy and a culture of entitlement are widespread. The evaluation team consequently assesses the impact of the program as satisfactory and gives it an impact rating of 3.----------- The program has no specific gender focus. Civil society is now generally weak and tends to lack the managerial and intellectual resources to engage proactively and constructively in the process of development and building democracy. The bigger challenge lies in the question of impact where the linkage between strengthened local governance and poverty reduction and development needs to be more firmly established.

103 103 January 2009 The government of Ghana launched one of the most ambitious decentralization processes in Africa in 1998 as part of its strategy to address some of the key development challenges in the country and reduce poverty and inequalities.

104 104 Total costs: 15 million EUR

105 105 Effectiveness: During the first project phase, project activities produced some positive results. However, their effectiveness on strengthening capacities of district assemblies was largely undermined by the project’s inability to strengthen the enabling environment for local public service provision. However, key challenges remain such as the lack of national ownership and low demand for policy advisory services by the project. Overall, the evaluation team rates the effectiveness of the project to date as unsatisfactory (level 4). The project has to work with a variety of actors, such as ministries, district councils and administrations, traditional leaders and civil society, following a multi-level and multi- stakeholder approach > what a challenge!

106 106 To be successful, democratisation processes need to be driven from within and supported by (at least some) key domestic actors. Donors and international organisations may push for democratic reforms and provide resources to strengthen domestic capacity. They should provide a constituency that civil society, the political opposition, courts and legislatures can depend on for support and protection. But too much aid and external involvement can negatively affect the legitimacy of domestic actors and make them vulnerable to accusations of being ‘Western’ or foreign. Democracy assistance should therefore emphasise the strengthening and formalisation of rules governing executive powers and duties (and other powers of individual members of the executive), as well as those of other branches of government, including the legislature, judiciary and civil service. The aim should be to develop the independence and capacity of other government branches and strengthen the accountability mechanisms among them. At both the national and local levels, democracy assistance should also seek to improve transparency by identifying innovative ways of building the autonomy and capacity of oversight institutions such as freedom of information agencies and ombudsmen.

107 107 The form of democracy support that helped end the Cold War rested on three strategies relevant to today: 1.Strong civil society cooperation between democratic and undemocratic countries to protect human rights defenders; 2.Intensive efforts to defend emerging democracies; 3.Recognition of international organizations as frameworks for dialogues over values (CSCE) and protecting young democracies (EC).

108 108

109 109 „ Transitology“ - ELITES transition > liberalization > democratization > consolidation of democracy Wolfgang Merkel (1999): 4 levels of consolidation: institutional (polity), representative (politics), behavioral (elites) and civic culture (masses) [+ integration of veto actors > military] Juan J. Linz /Alfred Stepan (1996): 3 dimensions: “Behaviorally” (societal actors), “Attitudionally” (broad population), “Constitutionally” 5 arenas: “Civil society”, “Political society”, “Rule of law”, “State apparatus", ”Economic society”) Authoritarian regimes > elites: hardliners and softliners > opposition: moderate and radical democrats Schubert, Tetzlaff (1994): Strategische und konfliktfähige Gruppen

110 110 VII. Positive factors responsible or supportive for development progress 1.A development-oriented behaviour of governments and elites, which includes the participation of the population and its ownership 2.Functioning governments and administrations incl. the rule of law (good governance) 3.Fight against poverty by a national framework setting, which promotes the private sector and doesn’t gag it 4.Mobilization of domestic (financial) resources 5.Material and immaterial infrastructure equipment incl. ICT and capacity building Cf. U. Holtz: Die Millenniumsziele – eine gemischte Bilanz, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte/APuZ 10/2010, p. 3-8. (www.bpb.de/publikationen/D37YQ5,0,Entwicklungspolitik.html) www.bpb.de/publikationen/D37YQ5,0,Entwicklungspolitik.html

111 111 6. Development of a favourable mental and cultural enabling environment 7. Acknowledgment of the important role of women 8.Industrialization and making use of the international division of labour 9.Containment of the population rise 10.Efficient use of ODA in the sense of help for self- help 11. External and internal peace

112 112 Two cause bundles are responsible for lagging behind: A. Factors, which were particularly virulent after the adoption of the Millennium Declaration in 2000 B. Factors, which were always of great importance A. 1. After the terrorist attacks from September 2001 some industrialized countries prioritized rather military and geopolitical aspects than civilian and socio-economic development 2. The significant increase of failed, collapsed states and of violent conflicts 3. The climate change with its growing negative effects 4. The energy, food and financial, economic crises

113 113 B. Factors, which were always of great importance and must be considered, if a turn to the better is intended 1. The population growth (the earth population - 1990 5,3 bn - 2010 6,9 billion - 2050 9 bn) 2. Corrupt, cleptocratic elites 3. Bad governance and poor performance 4. The neglect of the rural areas, (traditional) agriculture and the informal sector 5. A development-hostile environment (the non-recognition of education, training and knowledge as well as of tolerant cultures open for change) 6. Difficult internal situations (land locked, military conflicts, hostile ecological systems, relying on fossil energies instead of renewables) 7. The developed countries unwilling to build up a truly fair trade and financial global system 8. Despite some efforts to increase ODA and its efficiency the unwillingness of the industrialised countries to undertake serious, strong steps in the direction of a quantitatively higher and qualitatively better development policy.

114 114 VIII. What must happen so the elites in developing countries pursue development paths favouring poor people? A. Elites: 1. function/sectoral elites (managers, NGOs); position (party, religious leaders); power (government, state bureaucracy, parliaments, judiciary, military); educational (scientists, teachers); mass media (radio, tv, newspapers, web) 2. Regional/local/informal elites or “heroes” – influential women, chiefs, successful farmers 3. Development pioneers / drivers or agents of change B.Development paths? path towards sustainable, human development – MDGs, Rio >Jo‘burg, PRSPs etc. Source: Society for International Development, Chapter Bonn, 13.1.2009: Discussion on elites (resumed by Uwe Holtz)

115 115 What must happen? How? By whom? A.Pressure from inside and outside a country 1.Inside: - the more democratic and participatory a country is structured (good governance), the more successful the pressure will be (performed by trade unions, NGOs, MPs etc.) - capacity and willingness to understand the development necessities, in particular to promote poverty eradication and pro-poor growth (PPG) - no willingness of the power elites > coercion 2.Outside: donor countries/national and international agencies; diplomatic means - sanctions: African leaders must pressure Mugabe, the EU stopped ODA for Zimbabwe; conditionalisation of development co-operation (but consider ODA-GNI-ratio) # ownership

116 116 B. DC instruments: 1. political dialogue; development projects, budget support; development projects, budget support; micro-financing; micro-financing; enhancing the advancement of rural areas; enhancing the advancement of rural areas; capacity building – empowerment (> enrichment). capacity building – empowerment (> enrichment). Governmental DC has to negotiate ODA with the state elites – the aid channeling organizations like GTZ have often to deal with regional and local elites

117 117 Challenges for DC 1. How to deal with undemocratic, cleptocratic regimes and with failed states? 2. Danger of getting into the omnipotence trap 3. The dialectic relationship between ownership and the donors’ “expectations” 4. Too many donors > increased need for co- ordination 5. Dialogue with “Non DAC Donors” (BRIC/BASIC) 6. Development rather a marathon than a 100- metre sprints

118 118 Making globalisation a positive force for all of humankind – the European model? Politics: Democracy, human rights and the rule of law guiding the political sphere Economy: The Social and Ecological Market Economy – an order that seeks to combine the freedom of the market – the law of supply and demand and of competition between free enterprises – with the imperative of social balance and environmental viability. Leading paradigm: sustainable human development

119 119 IX. What to do in the future? A. Basis I. Making use of the experiences and the thinking of Willy Brandt, Amartya Sen and Wangari Maathai 2. The UN Millennium Declaration and the MDGs being a good road map for international politics and development cooperation in the 21st century B. Implementation imperatives 1. Creation of more nuclear-weapon-free zones / world – disarmament 2. Strengthening of regional organizations in a multipolar world 3. More Global Governance, stronger institutions and stronger United Nations 4. UN-Security Council for economic, social and environmental issues 5. International social and ecological market economy instead of wild, barbarian capitalism > a fair, human globalization 6. Strengthening of parliamentary oversight and influence in global affairs — a UN Parliamentary Assembly 7. New alliances — coalition of the willing (States, Regional Grouping, private sectors, trade unions, NG0s, international political party organizations...)

120 120120 Look at the future of IR Lauren M. Phillips, LSE, 2008: International relations in 2030. The transformative power of large developing countries, Bonn (www.die-gdi.de/CMS- Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/(ynDK_contentByKey)/ANES-7FFHZ9/$FILE/DP%203.2008.pdf) www.die-gdi.de/CMS- Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/(ynDK_contentByKey)/ANES-7FFHZ9/$FILE/DP%203.2008.pdfwww.die-gdi.de/CMS- Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/(ynDK_contentByKey)/ANES-7FFHZ9/$FILE/DP%203.2008.pdf 1. The realist view of current international relations and (balance of) power theory. US economic, military and social / ideological power is unrivalled by any other nation state. (“soft” and “hard” power – Nye) 2. The world through institutions. (but international institutions are facing a crisis of legitimacy and a severe democratic deficit, rise of large developing countries) 3. Three contrasting visions for 2030: a)conflictual bipolarity between China and the US; b)conflictual multipolarity amongst China, the US and a number of other states including potentially a more unified Europe; c)non-conflictual multipolarity > considered by Philipps to be the most probable outcome. Bipolarity > Unipolarity > Multipolarity

121 121 Thank you very much for your attention and active participation All the best for you!


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