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© Crown Copyright (2000) Module 2.6 Vulnerability Analysis
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You Are Here M2.1 Security Requirements M2.2 Development Representations M2.3 Functional Testing M2.4 Development Environment M2.5 Operational Environment M2.6 Vulnerability Analysis M2.7 Penetration Testing M2.8 Assurance Maintenance/Composition MODULE 2 - ASSURANCE
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What is Vulnerability Analysis? A search for vulnerabilities in the TOE or its intended operation Analysis of their impact Input to penetration testing Involves –assessment of developers analysis –evaluator analysis based on previous results
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Vulnerabilities - A Few Terms potential vulnerability –suspected, not proven known vulnerability –demonstrated by developer or evaluator exploitable vulnerability –leading to compromise of assets non-exploitable vulnerability –assets will not be compromised in practice
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Sources of Vulnerability The security functions could be inadequate to counter the threats incorrectly implemented bypassed tampered with directly attacked misused
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Bypassing Attacks Avoid monitored interface Inherit privilege to bypass Access unprotected area Attacker Asset Security Function
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Covert Channels Subject A Resource Subject B Reads Modifies Access Denied Unclassified Secret
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Tampering Attacks Modify/spoof/read critical data Undermine assumptions/dependencies De-activate, disable or delay enforcement Attacker Asset Security Function
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Direct Attacks Security function behaves as specified Attacker manipulates input/outputs Attacker Asset Security Function
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Misuse Consider all modes of operation Examine potential for insecure states: –mis-configuration of security functions –insecure use of TOE Can insecure states be detected or prevented? Repeat/witness TOE installation procedures
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Exploitability Are known vulnerabilities exploitable? Suitable countermeasures –procedural –technical Relevance to Security Target? Within attacker capabilities?
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Strength Determination - 1 Confirm minimum strength met LevelResistant to BasicCasual unsophisticated attacks MediumKnowledgeable attackers with limited opportunities or resources HighBeyond normal practicality to defeat
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Strength Determination - 2 STRENGTH RATING Detection Equipment Time Collusion Expertise Chance
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ITSEC Requirements - 1 Effectiveness Analysis Developer Analysis –Binding –Strength of Mechanisms –Ease of Use –Construction & Operational Vulnerability Assessment Independent Vulnerability Analysis
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Binding Analysis Analysis of mechanism interactions –permissible –mandatory –forbidden Protection against indirect attack Absence of conflict ITSEC Requirements - 2
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ITSEC Requirements - 3 ITSEC Figure 4
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Common Criteria Requirements
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Evaluation Reporting Examination of documentation –show how & where requirements satisfied Analysis –demonstrate completeness with respect to vulnerabilities considered –justify non-exploitability
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Summary Methodical search for vulnerabilities –checklist approach Validation of developer analysis –confirm absence of exploitable vulnerabilities Independent analysis by evaluators Input to penetration testing
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Further Reading - 1 ITSEC Evaluation UKSP 05 Part III, Chapter 3 UKSP 05 Part V UKSP 04 Part III, Chapter 4 ITSEM, Annex 6.C
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Further Reading - 2 CC Evaluation CC Part 3, Sections 2.6.7 and 14 CEM Part 2, Chapters 6-8 (AVA sections) & Annex B UKSP 05 Part V
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Exercise 1 - Vulnerabilities Client Object Server Mechanism access request notify object mediates subject (client) object details
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Exercise 2 - Strength Password mechanism can be defeated by –manual attack, taking 20 days –automated attack, taking 5 minutes What is the strength of this mechanism? How might the strength be improved?
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Exercise 3 - Misuse Should lamp be lit in –CIPHER mode? –CLEAR mode? CRYPTO DEVICE DATA CIPHER Encrypted CLEAR Cleartext
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