1. Erik.ranheim@intertanko.com Safety performance of tankers Manager Research 11 September 2005

2. The complexity of safety P resentations based on o bservations R egulations have basically been reactive created to l imit c onsequences rather than addressing b asic c auses of accidents C auses of shipping accidents have been recorded for the last 100 years and it was soon recognised that every accident has a unique character with a multiple of potential causes and numerous possible combinations* Studies show that 80% or more of accidents are caused by operator or h uman e rror (including collective management failure) Poor s afety c ulture is caused by poor management not ensuring that work morale and commitment, communication, crew qualifications, training, procedures, equipment and other resources are sufficient and efficient to meet aims. *Blue-chip or sub-standard – DNV study

3. The complexity of safety Zero accident tolerance has raised the safety culture Since 1993 and $125 bn has been invested in modern tankers 163 m dwt of SH tonnage has been removed from the market P ollution from tankers has been reduced, but E ffect of DH not yet seen to any great extent

4. Tanker incidents down

5. Reported tanker incidents 1978 - 2005

6. Reported tanker incidents 9 ms 2005 - total 104 Hull & Machinery (18 engine, 2 hull, 14 others)

7. Tanker pollution down

8. Accidental pollution from tankers oil spilt per tonne mile 1990 - 2005

9. Accidental oil spills from tankers Major structural accidents - 000 tonnes Source: INTERTANKO/ITOPF

10. Tanker accidental oil spills down 80% Source: ITOPF ts spilt 99.9999% of the oil arrived safely ‘000 bn tonne-miles

11. Oil pollution into the sea Maritime sources Source: GESAMP

12. Total losses down

13. Tanker total losses by size Source: Clarkson Shipyard Monitor/INTERTANKO No 1988 – 1996: 29 CTLs 1996 – 2005: 14 CTLs

14. Tanker and bulker total losses Source: Clarkson Shipyard Monitor/INTERTANKO %

15. Explosions

16. Large tankers explosion before IGS requirements 1983/1985 TankerSizedwtYear Seatiger, 123,6921979, 2 fatalities Atlantic Empress292,6661979, 29 “ Energy Determination321,1861979, 1 “ Albahaa B239,4101980, 6 “ Mycene238,8891980, 6 “

17. Tanker Fire & explosion 2001-2005 Type/cause F&E dwt range Total Below 10,00010-29,99930-99,999 Above 100,000 Engine room fire10 121 During repairs5 6617 Tank related21216 Boiler3 25 Accommodation211 4 Cleaning3 3 Electrical2 1 3 Load/Discharge3 3 Bunkering11 2 Various/Unknown1307315 Total443271387 %51%3%31%15%100% Source: Informa/INTERTANKO

18. Tanker Explosion 2001-2005 Source: Informa/INTERTANKO Type/cause F&E dwt range Total Below 10,00010-2999930-99,999 Above 100,000 During repairs3 3410 Tank related21216 Engine room fire4 15 Cleaning3 3 Load/Discharge3 3 Various/Unknown1307315 Total20210840 %50%5%25%20%100% 25/20% 15/7% 13/24% 8/3%

19. Average age down

20. Tanker incidents and age development Source:LMIS/Informa/INTERTANKO %

21. Tanker pollution and age development Source:LMIS/Informa/INTERTANKO 000 ts Years

22. Tanker fleet double-hull development Source: Fearnleys/INTERTANKO %

23. Improving safety

24. In shipping high standards reflect the quality of the owner not the regulatory regime Erik Murdoch Director of Risk Management, The Standard P&I Club

25. Regulating safety Source: INTERTANKO Formal regulations and controls Self regulation Unsafe - Chaos Alienation Lack of motivation and flexibility Procedures purely to meet reg. req. Compliance culture Bureaucracy Check list mentality stops initiative Confusion Lack of global standards Safety culture

26. Leading members of our community, politicians, regulators and charterers alike, appear to be digesting the fact that mere legislative or penalising measures are already reaching their limitations as a driver for further improvement. Many have even started to express their concerns that all such externally imposed controlling devises are becoming counterproductive or even harmful. Emmanuel Vordonis, Executive Director Thenamaris Ships Management, Member of iNTERTANKO’s Executive Committee Poseidon challenge

27. Conclusion

28. S trong i mprovement in tanker s afety p erformance since beginning 1990s L ack of good statistics r oot cause information N ew s afety i nitiatives should be based on thorough r esearch B alance s elf-regulation of o verregulation N o complacency: initiatives on n ewbuilding standards, e xplosions, P oseidon challenge