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Intervention, Engagement, Confrontation

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Presentation on theme: "Intervention, Engagement, Confrontation"— Presentation transcript:

1 Intervention, Engagement, Confrontation
Cold War Strategies Intervention, Engagement, Confrontation

2 What Never Changed Goals: 1. Containment of USSR
2. Avoiding Nuclear War The Dilemma: How do you contain the USSR without risking a nuclear war?

3 What Did Change Strategies Intervention (Korea and Vietnam)
Containment by direct political-military involvement Engagement (Détente) Containment by management of Soviet behavior Confrontation (Reagan Doctrine) Containment by challenging the Soviets

4 The Dynamic Intervention was the logic of containment in action
Was engagement the result of the failures of intervention? Was confrontation the result of the failures of engagement?

5 1. Intervention How do you fight communism and avoid nuclear war? 5

6 Korean War 1950-53 Limited War Goals Weapons Geography Talk and Fight
6

7 Viet Nam (after 1954) 7

8 Strategic Logic Domino Theory 8

9 Containment and Domestic Politics
JFK LBJ 9

10 The Dilemma of Viet Nam Can’t lose South Viet Nam
Can’t do what we need to win Insurgency vs. counterinsurgency WW III? Solution Limited War Coercive Diplomacy (Bombing) 10

11 From LBJ to Nixon 1968-69 Nixon’s War LBJ says Goodbye More bombing
Withdrawing 11

12 Post-Vietnam Changes Congressional Power Foreign Policy Consensus
Vietnam Syndrome

13 1. Congress Challenges President in Foreign Policy
War Powers Resolution 1973 (PL ) (from Federation of American Scientists , see Appendix 3) The Use of Force

14 Congress finds its real power: $$$$$$$$$$
Clark Amendment to Arms Export Control Act 1976 14

15 2. End of US Foreign Policy Consensus?
Truman Doctrine: Consensus L R Post-Viet Nam: Polarization 15

16 3. Viet Nam Syndrome 16

17 The Post-Vietnam Dilemma
2. Engagement The Post-Vietnam Dilemma How do you contain and compete with the USSR while avoiding nuclear war and avoiding another Korea or Vietnam?

18 Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 18

19 Nixon and Henry Kissinger
19

20 Why Détente? Viet Nam Syndrome Strategic parity Sino-Soviet Split 20

21 Viet Nam Syndrome Nixon recognizes this: Nixon Doctrine
Remarks July 25, 1969 (see Q and A) Address to the nation, Nov. 3, 1969 21

22 Strategic Parity 22

23 Sino-Soviet Conflict

24 Detente Still containment New Goal: Change USSR behavior
Old-school Balance of Power 24

25 Arms Control Policy Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, May 1972
Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 25

26 2. Triangular Diplomacy US USSR PRC 26

27 Kissinger to China, July 1971
27

28 Nixon-Mao Summit in China, February 1972
Shanghai Communique 28

29 China and Taiwan 29

30 Détente Collapses: Ford and Carter

31 SALT II 31

32 Crises Détente Collapse Iran Afghanistan

33 Iranian Revolution Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini Shah of Iran
Mohammed Reza Pahlevi Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 33

34 November 4, 1979 34

35 December 1979

36 “Arc of Crisis” 36

37 Détente Ends Carter Gets Tough SALT II Dies Defense Buildup
Carter Doctrine Rescue Mission Secretary of State Cyrus Vance resigns 37

38 Rescue Mission April 1980 38

39 39

40 3. Confrontation The dilemma of containing the USSR,
avoiding nuclear war, avoiding direct US intervention, but pressuring the USSR

41 Ronald Reagan

42 Reagan’s View of the USSR
“Evil Empire” Speech to the National Association of Evangelicals March 10, 1983

43 Realist Secretaries of State
Alexander Haig George Shultz

44 The Problems Third Wave of Marxism Viet Nam Syndrome Decade of Neglect

45 1. Third Wave of Marxism Ethiopia 1974 Cambodia 1975 Vietnam 1975
Angola 1975 Mozambique 1975 Afghanistan 1979 Nicaragua 1979 Grenada 1979

46 Solution to Third Wave: Reagan Doctrine
Nicaragua Contras

47 Contras

48 Afghanistan Mujahadin

49 Angola UNITA’s Jonas Savimbi

50 1980s Map of the Cold War http://imgur.com/Ah9tS

51 2. Viet Nam Syndrome Fall of Saigon, April 29, 1975

52 Solution to Viet Nam Syndrome: Use Force
Libya 1981

53 Grenada 1983

54 Beirut 1983

55 3. Decade of Neglect From: ARMING AMERICA: Attention and Inertia in U.S. National Security Spending

56 Soviet ICBMs 1980s-90s From, US Dept of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1987:

57 Solution to Decade of Neglect
Source: Center for Defense Information 2004 Yearbook (

58 Strategic Defense Initiative
Reagan’s SDI speech, March 23, 1983 From:

59 Political/Cultural Effects

60 When Reagan and Congress Disagree?
Nicaragua: Boland Amendment restricts aid to Contras (1984) Administration funds them covertly Iran: Legislation prohibiting US arms sales to Iran Sells weapons to Iran in exchange for hostages held by Hezbollah-related groups

61 Big Picture Issue Congress has the power to restrict US government spending Can the President ignore those restrictions? Can President ignore aspects of law President does not agree with? If so, does Congress have any role to shape foreign policy? If so, do we have checks and balances?

62 The Iran Contra Scandal (for reference only)
Private US $ Foreign Gov’t $ $$$ Hostages weapons Swiss bank accounts; controlled by North Iran US Israel

63 Key Phrase of 2nd Boland Amendment: (1984-1986) ( for reference only)
''No funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement or individual.” From: NY TIMES on line: For Excerpts and explanation, from US Government Accountability Office – GAO,

64 Legislative Limits on Arms Sales (for reference only)
Arms Export Control Acts No arms sales to nations determined to be sponsors of terrorism (US State Dept determines which nations fit into this category; it included Iran) No arms sales of over $25 m in value without congressional approval (1974); A 1976 bill lowered this to $14 m for sophisticated weaponry and $50 m for other items Both the House and Senate would have to reject the arms sales


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