1. Joint programming process in Mali Concrete case and questions raised : the process is deemed as a success, why? How was it organized? What are the issues that remain to be solved?

2. How was it organized?  -By the EU Del in the lead, in close cooperation with Member states: active participation of MS present in Bamako  -Reminder: 8 Member states and EC in Mali (FRA, DEU, SWE, LUX, NDL, ESP, DNK, BEL), EU is the most important donor  -The joint programming process has already started before the 2012 crisis, in 2010, through the Joint Assistance Strategy (SCAP). The process was interrupted during the crisis and back on track in 2013

3. How was it organized? (2)  -Alignment on the national development strategy (CSCRP 2012-2017) and the Plan d'action du Gouvernement (PAG 2013-2018). PAG is a post-crisis strategy by the new elected governement. However: Malian Government was informed but has not yet formally approved the JPD.  -Concentration on three intervention areas (domaine de concentration (structural reforms, infrastructure and productive sector, social sectors)  - Division of labour between EU Delegation and Member states within these intervention areas / sub-areas / sectors.

4. How was it organized? (3)  -Questionnaire sent to MS bureau in Bamako (interest for JP? Synchronization possible? Sharing strategies?...)  -Joint analysis of the situation, problems, solution by EU Delegation and MS  -Elaboration of a framework document by two external consultants (support to the EU Delegation but funded by Denmark) based fully on the structure and requirements of a NIP, however giving due space in the document to the individual contributions by MS and EC to the joint strategy, objectives, indicators and financial planning.  -Final document approved first by Heads of cooperation and then by the Ambassadors: operational then political level

5. The joint programming document High quality document: precise, inclusive and consensual  => a European analysis and response to the challenges the country currently faces for the years 2014 – 2018 (consistent with term of the newly elected government)  => analysis of each sector (situation, difficulties, challenges, donors already involved…)  => Identification of principles that must guide European strategy with Mali (alignment, frank and reinforced political dialogue, capacity building, risk sharing in post-conflict environment, transparency, division of labour, etc.)

6. The joint programming document (2)  => identification of results to be reached, indicators to measure it, clear identification of EU donors (MS and EC) for reaching the indicators.  => identification of potential risks and corresponding mitigating measures  => identification of division of labour according to sectors and results to be achieved  => high level of details in terms of financing forecasts sector by sector until 2018, for each EU donor (MS and EC)

7. Questions raised for the future - Endorsement by the Government: How and when will it be involved formally? Do we prefer a formal signature by the Government of Mali and EU MS and COM or can there be other forms of endorsement (take into account legal issues of financial commitments). - For the EU: Information and/or approval in the EDF Committee. How can we give the document the formal weight it deserves? Simple annex to the NIP or the only programming document reliable? Internal process of approval in MS? Should it replace the NIP and other bilateral strategy documents? Some MS are fine with this solution, others argue that they cannot yet replace their own strategy documents.

8. Questions raised for the future (2) - How to deal with non EU-donors? Some are largely involved in the local coordination mechanisms (Canada and Switzerland) and might perceive JP as a parallel procedure. We look at it as a motor for donor-wide coordination in the Joint Assistance Strategy (SCAP) where also other OECD and non-OECD-donors should be involved. - Follow-up / Monitoring of the joint programming strategy 2014 - 2018? Joint Midterm Review at the end of 2016 with a view to adapting and extending the JPD until 2020 and a joint ex-post evaluation is already foreseen in the JPD. - How to deal with synchronization of programming cycle issue? There could be more clarity when the new commitments that are expressed in the financial planning will arrive. The Joint Midterm review will be the opportunity of further synchronizing programming cycles.

9. Questions raised for the future (3) Next steps: - Formal Presentation of the document to the Government - Presentation and approval / information to the December EDF Committee (ideally, the JPD should have been approved replacing the NIP or at least before the NIP which was approved in the EDF Committee on October 29 th, 2014) - If not yet the case: Adoption by member states present in Mali as their only country strategy or reference document for further programming. (EC has already adopted its NIP consistent with the JPD on October 29 th 2014).

10. Conclusion - The formulation process for the joint programming was efficient (based on the structure and requirements of the NIP): good cooperation between EM and EC, high level quality of the document, very precise and in accordance with European conception of aid effectiveness - To give the document more weight, we need to present the joint documents to our respective approval mechanisms in the EU capitals (EDF committee, individual MS approval mechanisms) and to replace individual strategy/programming documents - We need to involve the Partner Government formally in an earlier stage even though it is understood as a response strategy to Malian plans (CSCRP, PAG)

11. Conclusions (2) - The added-value of the EU joint programming: more precise on sectoral policies and approaches then the NIP and the Joint Assistance Strategy, clarity division of labour (according to sectors and results to be achieved) opening the possibility to joint funding mechansims, clarity on financial planning, lowering the burden of strategic planning for each individual EU donor (EC and MS). - This being said, we will have to implement and monitor the JPD jointly in order to further elaborate it for the next phase starting in 2018 (consistent with mid-term review of the NIP and new government term). Joint Programming should reinforce EU’s development effectiveness and political weight to promote reform vis-à-vis the Government and other non EU-partners.