1. INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY Presidentialism, Parties, and Legislatures

2. WEEKLY READING Smith, Democracy, chs. 5-6 Modern Latin America, ch. 6 (Andes)

4. INTRO: CHILEAN ELECTIONS Round One (12/13/09) –Sebastián Piñera (Alianza por Chile) 44.06 –Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (Concertación) 29.60 –Marco Enríquez-Ominami (Independent)20.14 –Jorge Arrate (Juntos Podemos Más) 6.21 Round Two (01/17/10) –Piñera (Alianza)51.61 –Frei Ruiz-Tagle(Concertación)48.39

7. BACKGROUND 1970 election: –Salvador Allende36.6 –Jorge Alessandri35.3 –Radomiro Tomic28.1 1964 election: –Eduardo Frei Montalva56.1 –Salvador Allende38.9 –Julio Durán 5.0

8. OUTLINE 1.Democratic challenges: survival and consolidation 2.Presidentialism or parliamentarism? 3.Proposals for reform 4.The legislative arena 5.The plight of political parties 6.Sources of disenchantment

9. DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGES Survival and consolidation of democracy Avoidance of the past (and military coups) Questions: Would institutional changes help? Did prior crises result from institutional problems? And could they be repaired?

10. THE “NEW INSTITUTIONALISM” Individuals seek to maximize gain Institutions (rules) shape incentives And can therefore determine behavior Ergo, institutional design can affect the collective behavior of political actors

11. PRESIDENTIALISM OR PARLIAMENTARISM? Presidentialism: Head of government (president) is directly elected Fixed term in office Cannot be removed by legislature (except through impeachment) Selects cabinet ministers Head of government is also head of state Separation of legislative-executive powers

12. Parliamentarism: Voters elect MPs MPs select head of government (PM) MPs approve cabinet appointments PM (and cabinet officers) dependent on continuing confidence of parliament Head of government (PM) is not head of state Fusion of legislative-executive powers

13. PRO-PARLIAMENTARY ARGUMENTS Avoid “temporal rigidity,” so crises of government would not become crises of regime Avoid polarization from zero-sum game Avoid paralyzing deadlock Thus superior durability of parliamentary regimes

14. PRO-PRESIDENTIALIST ARGUMENTS Clarity of fixed time horizon Checks and balances Democratic election of head of government Not the cause of immobilism (PR the cause) Empirical findings result from “selection bias”

15. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM Brazil Argentina Chile Why not? –Insistence on election of chief executive –Advent of polling, reduction of uncertainty –Low esteem for congress, parties –Politics of nostalgia

16. ENGINEERING PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS Electing presidents: Plurality vs. MRO [reflections on Chile, 1970-2010] MRO a “magic bullet” Reelection or not? Power domains: Constitutional or partisan? Bureaucracy, judiciary, military Decree authority

17. THE LEGISLATIVE ARENA Electoral Systems: SMDs and two-party politics PR and multi-party politics Effects of district magnitude Closed-list vs. open-list ballots The problem of term limits Institutional Performance: Essentially “reactive” legislatures Removing presidents?

18. LEVELS OF POPULAR TRUST (1996-2007) Church~ 70% Armed Forces~ 50% Media (TV+print)~ 40% Congress~ 30% Parties~ 20%

19. THE PLIGHT OF POLITICAL PARTIES Diversity of party systems Levels of popular confidence

21. Counting Political Parties: N = 1 / (Σ p i 2 ) Where p i is the proportion of votes earned by the i-th party (or, alternatively, the proportion of seats in the legislature)

23. THE POLITICS OF DISENCHANTMENT Weakness of representative institutions + judiciary branch (i.e., rule of law) Constraints on modern-day democracy Inadequate policy performance Tendency toward “delegative” or “illiberal” democracy Thus 55% would support authoritarian government if it could improve economic situation (2004)

24. AND THE RISE OF THE LEFT Hugo Chávez, Venezuela (1998) Lula, Brazil (2002) Evo Morales, Bolivia (2005)… Reliance on democratic elections Vote as popular protest Possibilities of winning Challenge of governing