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Institutional Design Part II: Executive-Legislative institutions POLI 334 Comparative Democratization Guest lecture by Anastasia Shesterinina March 21,

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Presentation on theme: "Institutional Design Part II: Executive-Legislative institutions POLI 334 Comparative Democratization Guest lecture by Anastasia Shesterinina March 21,"— Presentation transcript:

1 Institutional Design Part II: Executive-Legislative institutions POLI 334 Comparative Democratization Guest lecture by Anastasia Shesterinina March 21, 2011

2 Outline Introduction: – Executive, legislative, judicial – PARL and PRES defined – Why debate E-L institutions? Debate: – Pro-PRES – Anti-PRES Other elements: – Culture? – Electoral institutions? Mitigating problems? Conclusion

3 INTRODUCTION: DEFINING TERMS Executive institutions Legislative institutions Judicial institutions

4 DEFINING PARL AND PRES: Parliamentary Government Parliament only democratically legitimate institution. Executive and legislative institutions basically fused. PM dependent on parliament confidence (usually).

5 Variations of Parliamentary Gov’t Westminster model: – e.g. Canada, Britain PM & cabinet dependent on legislature confidence Consensus model: – e.g. Switzerland Executive more sheltered from legislative approval

6 Presidential Government Executive leader (president) has considerable constitutional powers. Directly elected by the people for fixed term. Parliament’s role only legislative: debating and passing laws.

7 Why debate E-L institutions? Due to a concern with stability of precarious democratizing regimes (Linz)

8 IS PRES GOOD OR BAD FOR NEW DEMOCRACIES? Pro-PRES Case 1.Executive directly elected by the people. 2.Strong check on power of legislature.

9 Anti-PRES Case 1.Anti-democratic implications: 1.“Aura” of president. E.g. Venezuela, Russia. 2.Where strong powers, heavy “winner-take-all” character (“hyperpresidencies”). 3.Where history of dictators, danger of antidemocratic behaviour.

10 Anti-PRES Case (cont’d) 2.Weakens government effectiveness. 1.Legislative “deadlock.” 2.Discontinuity due to fixed term and power concentration. 3.“Lame-duck” syndrome.

11 How different are prime ministers from presidents? Isn’t a PM with party discipline & plurality just as powerful and irremovable as a president?

12 How different are prime ministers from presidents? Cabinet shuffling equally powerful in each system, but different.

13 ARE PRESIDENTS REALLY THE PROBLEM? Other elements Political culture? (Lipset) British colonial vs. Latin colonial cultures

14 Other elements Could the problem be electoral rules? e.g. PR creates multiple parties, which polarizes electorate (Mainwaring)

15 Variations on presidential institutions to mitigate the “bads” 1.Election rules: 1.Run-off elections to make sure president elected by majority. 2.Simultaneous presidential and legislative elections. 3.Requirements for regional distribution of votes.

16 Variations on presidential institutions to mitigate the “bads” 2.Adjust powers granted to president in constitution: Decree powers. Checks & balances. Discretionary powers.

17 Conclusion: Designing Executive Institutions There are potential dangers in PRES institutions, but also ways of mitigating them by varying presidential powers. View of ideal institutions depends on values considered important (effectiveness vs. limited powers?)


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