Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

Task : Describe the four steps of IPB. Condition: In a classroom environment and given class notes. Standard: Correctly identify the products and tools developed during the IPB process. **The task, condition and standards for the class are...

Doctrinal principles of IPB: Evaluate the battlefield’s effects on friendly and enemy operations. Determine the enemy’s possible COAs and arrange them in the order that the enemy will do them. Identify key enemy assets (High Value Targets (HVTs)) for each enemy COA and where they will appear on the battlefield (Target Area of Interest (TAIs)). Identify the activities, or lack of activities, and where they will occur on the battlefield. These activities will assist in identifying which COA the enemy adopts. The principles and steps of the IPB process remain constant regardless of the type of mission, unit, staff section, or echelon conducting IPB The application of the principles, however, varies with each specific situation.

IPB accomplishes the following: Identifies facts and assumptions about the battlefield environment and enemy. Provides direction for intelligence that supports the command’s chosen COA. Contributes to complete staff synchronization. Identifying facts and assumptions about the battlefield environment and enemy enables staff planning and development of friendly COAs.

IPB and the MDMP IPB MDMP Receipt of mission Mission analysis COA
Initial IPB completed Receipt of mission Mission analysis COA development COA analysis (wargame) comparison approval Orders production Commander’s intial guidance Warning Order 1 Initial IPB products Restated mission Commander’s intent and guidance Warning order 2 Staff Products Battlefield framework Preliminary movement Mission brief to commander Update IPB products complete COA statement and sketches IPB products brought to the wargame Wargame results Task organization Mission to subordinate units CCIR Decision matrix Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is the Army’s method for collecting, organizing, and processing intelligence. It is an analytic framework for organizing information to help provide timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence to the military decision making process (MDMP) MDMP is based on continuous IPB, especially initial IPB during mission analysis The commander drives intelligence; IPB is an integrated staff function driven by the commander Train your section to conduct IPB so you can coordinate closely with other staff. Push the staff to develop a robust and integrated R & S plan Refined IPB completed Approved COA Refined commander’s intent Specified type of order Specified type of rehearsal HPTL Continuous IPB OPLAN/OPORD DENOTES: Commander’s input

Four Steps of IPB 1 2 3 4 Define the Battlefield Environment
Describe the Battlefield’s Effects Evaluate the Threat Four Steps of IPB Determine Threat COAs **Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area **It is designed to support staff estimates and military decision making. ** It is the second step of the Mission Analysis portion of the MDMP **As you can see it is comprised of four basic steps that will be discussed in detail during this block of instruction

Tools for IPB Higher Headquarters Operations Order Graphics
Staff Estimates References: Military References - Soldiers - Information Systems (Open Source / Classified) Every soldier is a sensor.

Step 1 Focus ID characteristics of the battlefield that influence friendly and threat ops. Establish the limits of the area of interest (AI). ID gaps in current intelligence holdings. Define the Battlefield Environment : Focus the IPB effort on the areas and characteristics of the battlefield that influence the command’s mission. Acquire the intelligence needed to complete the IPB process in the degree of detail required to support the MDMP. Save time and effort by focusing only on those areas and features that influence COAs and command decisions. Identify significant characteristics of the environment. Identify the limits of the command’s AO and battlespace. Establish the limits of the AI. Identify the amount of detail required within the time available for IPB. Evaluate existing databases and identify intelligence gaps. Collect the information and intelligence required to conduct the remainder of IPB.

Characteristics of the Battlefield
Step 1 Define the Battlefield Environment Characteristics of the Battlefield Terrain. Weather. Logistical infrastructure. Demographics. **It’s important to note here that we are simply identifying the characteristics of the battlefield. Their impact is discussed in step 2. **What is important in step one is identifying your geographical space Analyze AO first, then battle space, and finally AI DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT 4-32. In defining a counterinsurgency environment, intelligence professionals do the following: Consider the nature and strategy of the insurgency. Are there internal factors, external factor, or both that form a basis for the insurgency? Is there an identifiable pattern of insurgent activities? Does the insurgent organization function primarily within the established political system or in open competition with it? Determine international and national support to the insurgents. Include sources of moral, physical, and financial support. Consider the neighboring countries, boundaries and frontiers, and coastal waterways. Consider third-country support for the insurgency. Analyze the HN population, government, military, demographics, and threat. Who are the vulnerable elements in the population? Are they subject to insurgent exploitation? Evaluate HN political structure, economy, foreign policy and relations, and policies on military use. Consider if US presence, or potential presence, by itself could be a catalyst for insurgent activity. FM Counterinsurgency Operations

Step 1 Define the Battlefield Environment
Assigned by higher based on METT-TC. METT-TC. Mission (combat, support, and stability-increases specified and implied tasks) Enemy (uniformed or not) Terrain (increased areas to analyze) Troops (more tasks to complete in a more complex environment) Time (difficult to determine) Civilians (various ethnic groups) Relevant questions for IPB Step One: What is the mission? What is the commander’s intent? What features comprise the AO? What areas can affect the current mission? How? What information is available about the terrain, weather, and threat? What information needs to be obtained about the AO, AI, battlespace, weather and threat?

Area of Operations Defined by boundaries: left, right, rear, objective. Of sufficient size to allow completion of mission. CDR has authority and responsibility to operate. AO determination must now consider: - Increased manpower requirements to seize terrain - Urban terrain aspects - Mission requirements for Stability and Support Operations (SOSO) - Information Operations (IO) - Restrictive ROE The limits of the AO are normally the boundaries specified in the OPORD from higher headquarters that define the command’s mission. Operations graphics specify the Area of Operations (AO) The degree of detail in the analysis will vary depending on the area of the battlefield environment you are evaluating. Generally, the evaluation of the AO is more detailed than the AI. Additionally, the focus will vary throughout each area. For example, rear areas within the AO may require a different focus than areas near the main battle area (MBA). Also bear in mind that the battlefield is not homogeneous. Certain areas, or sub-sectors, will affect various types of operations to varying degrees. During the evaluation, identify areas that favor each type of operation. Include the traditional operations (such as defense and offense) as well as the operations associated with any METT-TC specific factors (such as counterterrorism and peace enforcement).

Battle Space Battle space is conceptual. Higher does not assign it.
Determined by CDR – Input from S2 / S3 / Battle staff. Serves to focus intelligence development. **Determined by the maximum capabilities of a unit to acquire and dominate the enemy **The command’s capabilities in this regard include the target acquisition and long range assets of supporting and higher commands as well as it’s own organic systems **Example - a mech infantry unit’s TOW ranges 3750 meters, but it’s battlespace is much greater because of the supporting artillery and aviation assets of higher Area in which threat may influence mission, space, and time.

Area of Interest ESTABLISH THE LIMITS OF THE AI The AI is the geographical area from which information and intelligence are required to permit planning or successful conduct of the command’s operation. Because the commander and staff need time to process information and to plan and synchronize operations, the command’s AI is generally larger than its AO and battle space. The limits of the AI include each of the characteristics of the battlefield environment you identified as exerting an influence on available COAs or command decisions. Base the limits of the AI on the ability of the threat to project power or move forces into the AO. Also consider the geographical locations of other activities or characteristics of the environment which might influence COAs or the commander’s decisions. Consider also any anticipated future mission or “be prepared” and “on order” missions identified during mission analysis, and determine their effect on the limits of the AI. Finally, consider changes in the command’s battle space as a result of maneuver. An additional consideration would be to divide the AI into several components, such as a ground AI, an air AI, or a political AI. One of the primary considerations is time. Base time limit not only on threat’s mobility, both ground and air, but also on the amount of time needed to accomplish the mission. For example, if it is estimated that it will take two days to complete an operation, the AI must encompass all forces or activities that could influence accomplishment of the command’s mission within two days. The area from which information and intelligence are required to permit planning Consider the locations of other activities or characteristics of the environment that might influence COAs or the commander’s decisions Consider any “be prepared” or “on order” missions Primary consideration is time

Identify Intelligence Gaps
OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS World Health Organizations Other Military Services Media Sources Relief Organizations United Nations Sources OUTSIDE AGENCIES ANP NDS SERCHES AND INTERNET SITES INTERNET Open Sources University Research International Sources DATABASES Historical Databases Topographical Surveys Intelligence Estimates Identify gaps in your intelligence holdings. What sources of information are available to help fill these gaps? Initiate collection or requests for intelligence to fill intelligence gaps. Include collection against all identified significant characteristics of the battlefield, not just threat forces, in priority order.

Step 1 Define the Battlefield Environment
Success results in: Common Operational Picture (COP) of the Operational Environment Saves time and effort by focusing on those areas and features which will influence COAs and command decisions Consequences of failure: Waste time and effort collecting and evaluating intel on features of the battlefield environment that will not influence success of the command’s mission May lead to the command’s surprise and unpreparedness when some overlooked feature of the battlefield exerts an influence on success of the command’s mission

Step 2 Terrain Analysis OCOKA Weather Analysis Visibility Wind
Describe the OCOKA Battlefield’s Weather Analysis Effects Visibility Wind **We’ve identified the battlefield environment in step one, now we are going to describe their effects on the battlefield. Describe the battlefield’s effects Analyze the battlefield environment: Terrain analysis. Weather analysis. Analysis of other characteristics of the battlefield. Describe the battlefield’s effects on threat and friendly capabilities and broad COAs. Step 2 evaluates the effects of the environment with which both sides must contend. The G2/S2 identifies the limitations and opportunities the environment offers on the potential operations of friendly and threat forces. This evaluation focuses on the general capabilities of each force until COAs are developed in later steps of the IPB process. This assessment of the environment always includes an examination of terrain and weather but may also include discussions of the characteristics of geography and infrastructure and their effects on friendly and threat operations. Characteristics of geography include general characteristics of the terrain and weather, as well as such factors as politics, civilian press, local population, and demographics. An area’s infrastructure consists of the facilities, equipment, and framework needed for the functioning of systems, cities, or regions. Products developed in this step might include, but are not limited to— Population status overlay. Overlays that depict the military aspects and effects of terrain. Weather analysis matrix. Integrated products such as modified combined obstacle overlays (MCOOs). Regardless of the subject or means of presentation, the G2/S2 ensures that these products focus on the effects of the battlefield environment. FM Precipitation Cloud Temperature

Step 2 Describe the Battlefield’s Effects
Analyze the battlefield environment: Terrain analysis Weather analysis Analysis of other characteristics of the battlefield Describe the battlefield’s effects on threat and friendly capabilities and broad COAs. Analysis of other characteristics - analyze all aspects of the environment that effect friendly or threat COAs not already incorporated into the terrain and weather analysis (i.e., logistics infrastructure, population demographics, economics, and politics). This is very important when analyzing the battlefield as it relates to SOSO. For instance, population demographics will probably reveal more than a standard Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO). DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD’S EFFECTS (TERRAIN AND HUMAN) In defining the battlefield’s effects in a counterinsurgency environment, intelligence professionals do the following: Determine points of entry, infiltration and exfiltration routes, C2 structures for operations, and agricultural areas. Evaluate weather’s effects on the mobility of insurgents and their logistic efforts, for example, the availability of food supply due to weather extremes. Consider migration and settlement patterns to identify which areas are progovernment or proinsurgent. Identify the locations of groups that create territorial boundaries the insurgents may try to make autonomous to gain political advantage. Determine how political and religious affiliation and practices influence the people’s attitudes towards both enemy and friendly operations. Examine efforts to create or increase unrest and dissension among the population. Are the insurgents conducting IO against existing or proposed HN policies and programs? Evaluate how economics and money affect the insurgents’ ability to conduct offensive operations. They will influence the populace’s active support for or against the insurgency. FM Counterinsurgency operations

Step 2 Describe the Battlefield’s Effects (Terrain)
OCOKA Observations and Fields of Fire. Cover and Concealment. Obstacles. Key Terrain. Avenues of Approach. Observation: ability to see either visually or through surveillance devices, from both ground and air Fields of Fire: ability to effectively utilize direct and indirect fires Cover: protection from the effects of direct and indirect fires Concealment: protection from ground, air and sensor observation Obstacles - Natural or manmade features that will stop, impede, or divert movement Key terrain is any locality or area the seizure, retention, or control of which affords a marked advantage to either command. It varies with the level of command. Key terrain becomes decisive terrain if it has an extraordinary impact on the mission. Avenue of Approach - Underground, ground or air route of an attacking force of a given size leading to its objective or key terrain Observation and Fields of Fire Individuals or groups in the population can be co-opted by one side or another to perform a surveillance or reconnaissance function, performing as moving outposts to gather information. Local residents have intimate knowledge of the local area. Their observations can provide information and insights about what might otherwise remain a mystery. For instance, residents often know about shortcuts through town. They might also be able to observe and report on a demonstration or meeting that occurs in their area. Unarmed combatants might provide targeting intelligence to armed combatants engaged in a confrontation. This was readily apparent in Mogadishu, where unarmed combatants with the ability to observe friendly force activities without the threat of being engaged instructed hidden threat forces on where to fire. Deception and adversarial propaganda threats may hinder a clear view of the threat’s tactics or intentions. Fields of fire can be extremely limited by the presence of noncombatants in a combat zone because restrictive ROE may prohibit firing into a crowd. Figuratively, the population or regions within a local area can be identified as nonlethal targets for IO. Cover and Concealment Threat forces operating in any part of a local urban area can instantly blend into any type of crowd or activity. Threat forces often find cover by operating within a neutral group. For instance, al Qaeda operatives and fighters are able to often move freely among and mix with the rural populace living near Afghanistan-Pakistan border. However, these same people have difficulty remaining nondescript and moving freely among urban populations due to regional differences in their accent, mode of dress, hair and beard styles, and skin pigment. Reportedly, insurgents attempted to move in the company of women and children (acting as family members) and mixed among the populace exiting and entering Fallujah during operations there in spring 2004. Obstacles One of the largest obstacles to friendly operations is the portion of the population that actively supports the insurgent. People conducting their daily activities will often “get in the way” of any type of operation. For instance, curiosity-driven crowds in Haiti often affected patrols by inadvertently forcing units into the middle of the street and pushing them into a single file. No harm was inflicted, but the unit was made move vulnerable to sniper and grenade attacks. Strategically, the world audience, as well as its local contingent, can create political, cultural, and ideological obstacles to a mission. The US audience watching events unfold in Vietnam can be understood as an obstacle to the government’s strategy of pursuing its strategic objectives. The cultural differences apparent when US forces were deployed for Operation Desert Storm could have been an obstacle if not adequately addressed. For instance, a PSYOP flier produced to encourage a sense of unity among the Arab populations included a picture of two men holding hands, a sight not common in Western cultures. A flier designed in accordance with Western standards might not have been as effective. Key Terrain The population in counterinsurgency operations is key terrain. This is based on the idea that public opinion and their support or lack thereof can change the course or the aims of a mission. The United States’ withdrawal from Somalia following the outcry after seeing a dead Soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu is often used in urban operations literature as an example of the power of an audience. Determining which population or portions of it are key to a mission should not be limited to broad-brush characterizations of large populations, however. Certain sectors or individuals within a population can be as pivotal in modern engagements as a piece of high ground was in past eras, or as the entire US population was in regard to Mogadishu. Captured combatants or a well-informed noncombatant can provide valuable information about the enemy. These individuals can be key terrain in terms of the information they can provide. A group of people that US forces are deployed to protect might be considered key terrain because loss of that group’s respect could jeopardize the entire operation. Congregated people can be considered key terrain. Whether moving or stationary, a large gathering might be a ripe target for attack, closer observation, or attempts at manipulation. Avenues of Approach Populations present during operations physically restrict movement and maneuver by limiting or changing the width of avenues of approach. People may assist movement if a group can be used as human barriers between one combatant group and another. Refugee flows, for example, can provide a concealed avenue of approach for members of an enemy force. A certain individual can provide an avenue of approach to a specific target audience when acting as a “mouthpiece” for an IO mission. FM

Existing counter-mobility obstacles
AA3C AA4A AA4B Vegetation Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) K9 + LOA (PL Gold) PL Zinc PL Silver XXX X Surface Drainage K8 + Other Obstacles K7b K7a Combined Obstacle Overlay (COO) K5 + K6 Remember that the analysis of the battlefield environment -- terrain, weather, and other battlefield characteristics -- is not the end product of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. Rather, they are the means to determine which friendly courses of action (COAs) can best exploit the opportunities the battlefield provides and how the battlefield environment affects the threat's available COAs. The Combined Obstacle Overlay depicts effects on mobility. To construct a MCOO, start with the combined obstacle overlay and consider adding— Cross-country mobility classifications. Mark areas of RESTRICTED and SEVERELY RESTRICTED cross-country mobility with easily distinguishable symbology. AAs and mobility corridors. Tailor these to the type force under consideration, basing them on factors other than mobility as required. Categorize them by the size force they accommodate and rank them in priority order if justified. While it is possible to put both ground and air mobility corridors and AAs on the same overlay, clarity may require separate overlays. Consider both friendly and threat avenues. Counter-mobility obstacle systems. Include only those known to exist within the AI. Defensible terrain. Evaluate terrain along each AA to identify potential battle positions or possible defensive sectors for subordinate units. Engagement areas. Combine the results of evaluating defensible terrain with the results of evaluating observation and fields of fire to identify potential engagement areas. Key terrain. Identify any areas or terrain features which dominate the AAs or objective areas. These will usually correspond to terrain already identified as potential battle positions or intermediate objectives. K3 Mobility Corridors Avenues of Approach Existing counter-mobility obstacles Key Terrain K2 K4 SEVERLY RESTRICTIVE TERRAIN RESTRICTIVE TERRAIN UNFORDABLE RIVER OR RESERVOIR FORDABLE RIVER CITY/VILLAGE KEY TERRAIN MCOO AA 1 K1

Weather Effect (WX) Resources
Staff Weather Officer (SWO) Aviation WX Team. Air Force Resources. INTERNET. Weather Radio. Use multiple sources and methods for weather information, just as you would use multiple sources and methods for intelligence collection. **WX - Weather Identify Systems in YOUR unit. Identify the weather effects on these systems FM Battlefield Weather Effects Blend in Operator Knowledge

Light & Weather Effects
7 JAN 8 JAN 9 JAN SR:0649 1200 2400 0600 1800 SS:1705 SS:1706 MS:0716 BMNT:0435 LIGHT TABLE SR:06:47 BMNT:0437 SS:1704 BMNT:0436 SR:0648 MS:0630 MS:0549 EENT:1949 EENT:1950 EENT:1951 TEMP HIGH LOW 76 F NNW at 19 mph Provide Weather Forecast; Include Lunar Data. WIND CEILING > 5000 FT VISIBILITY > 3000M HUMIDITY 93% PRECIP LIGHT

Weather Effects PERIOD 270600LDEC to 010600LJAN Impacted Clouds Precip
Wind Visibility Temp Items F E F E F E F E F E NBC ADA Armor Artillery Aviation CSS ENG Personnel This can be done by BOS and can also address impacts of weather on systems or activities specific to your operation. **It’s important to note that the weather can affect the enemy systems differently than our own. F= friendly E= Enemy Intel No Impact Moderate Impact Severe Impact Effectiveness 25-75% Effectiveness 0-25% Identify Systems in YOUR unit. Identify the weather effects on these systems FM Battlefield Weather Effects Blend in Operator Knowledge Highlight advantages and disadvantages

Step 2 Describe the Battlefield’s Effects (Other Effects)
Demographics: Identify population groups that are sympathetic, neutral, and hostile. Infrastructure of the Battlefield: Airfields, roads, railways and Host Nation Support capabilities. Analyze all aspects of the environment that affect friendly or threat COAs not already incorporated into the terrain and weather analysis (i.e. logistics infrastructure, population demographics, economics, and politics). For example, population demographics will probably reveal more than a standard MCOO in operations other than war.

Step 2 Describe the Battlefield’s Effects (Other Effects)
AREAS: Locations or aspects of the terrain that normally have no military significance. STRUCTURES: Location, function, and capabilities of structures and their ability to support military operations. CAPABILITIES: Who provides key functions or services to populace? ORGANIZATIONS: NGO, terrorist groups, and criminals. PEOPLE : Civilians that could influence the military mission (both inside and outside AO). EVENTS : Activities that impact civilian lives or military operations.

Step 2 Describe the Battlefield’s Effects
Success results in: - Allowing the commander to quickly choose and exploit the terrain that best supports the friendly mission. Consequences of failure: - The commander will fail to exploit the opportunities that the environment provides. - The threat will find and exploit opportunities in a manner the commander did not anticipate. Relevant questions for IPB Step Two: What terrain and weather features exist within the AO and AI? Are there elements (e.g., demography, culture, laws) that can influence the unit’s operation? How will all of these elements affect the friendly COA? Enemy COA?

Step 3 Determination of threat: Capabilities. Doctrinal principles.
TTPs. Evaluate the Threat **We’ve looked at the battlefield, the weather and terrain during steps one and two, now the focus of IPB moves to the enemy **TTP’s - Tactics, Technique and Procedures In step 3, the G2/S2 and his staff analyze the command’s intelligence holdings to determine how the threat normally organizes for combat and conducts operations under similar circumstances. When facing a well-known threat, the G2/S2 can rely on his historical data bases and well developed threat models. When operating against a new or less well-known threat, he may need to develop his intelligence data bases and threat models concurrently. The G2/S2’s evaluation is portrayed in a threat model that includes doctrinal templates which depict how the threat operates when unconstrained by the effects of the battlefield environment. Although they usually emphasize graphic depictions (doctrinal templates), threat models sometimes emphasize matrices or simple narratives. FM Step three of IPB, evaluate the threat, develops a profile of the enemy. The purpose of this step is to develop threat models which accurately portray how the adversary doctrinally operates under normal conditions. The analyst seeks to determine enemy composition, strength, disposition, tactics, goals, and vulnerabilities by using information provided by other intelligence agencies and the unit’s organic intelligence assets. FM /MCRP 2-12A, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, clearly defines the process by which the intelligence analyst should develop a model of a conventional enemy. For example, intelligence staffs are required to identify threat force structure, weapons inventories, key leaders, doctrinal formations, and TTP. Using historical information on how the known enemy generally employs his tactics, intelligence analysts are then able to create templates that portray how the enemy might operate in the area of operations. FM 34-7 (Initial Draft), IEW for Stability Operations and Support Operations, supplements this traditional analysis with an investigation of all elements that might hinder mission accomplishment. Incorporating terrain, population, man-made objects, and the psychology of both threat and friendly forces, the analyst seeks to uncover all aspects of the environment that pose a threat to successful completion of the mission. This manual highlights the fact that threats are mission dependent and therefore not consistent for every type of operation. For instance, a “threat” in a humanitarian operation might be an inadequate water supply, while a threat in a combat operation could be a determined, well-equipped, and organized force. Regardless of threat, the evaluation must include a thorough investigation of how it can directly and indirectly affect the friendly unit and its success in accomplishing the assigned mission. Describe the threat in stability and support operation (SASO) scenarios as “anything that threatens mission accomplishment.” When deployed as part of a combat operation against a clear adversary, the direct military threat is known and evaluation can proceed as dictated by the three-step process outlined in FM : 1. Identify the threat. 2. Update or create threat models. 3. Identify threat capabilities.

Capabilities 9 Order of Battle Factors Composition Logistics Support
Disposition Combat Effectiveness Strength Electronic Data Material Preferred Tactics Training Status Miscellaneous Data **There are numerous characteristics that can be used to evaluate the enemy. These are 9 factors that must be considered as you evaluate the threat. Miscellaneous data includes supporting information needed but not covered by an order of battle factor. This could include— Family history. False unit identification. Names or designators Political and military goals PSYOP. Demographics. FM Appendix D Relevant questions for IPB Step Three: Who is the threat? What is his desired endstate? Where are his forces deployed? What type of weapons, equipment, and tactics will he use? How does he doctrinally conduct operations? What is the morale of personnel? Who is the key leader?

Step 3 Evaluate the Threat
Update or create threat models: - Convert threat doctrine or patterns of operation to graphics (situational templates) - Describe in words the threat’s tactics and options - Identify High Value Targets (HVTs) Identify Threat Capabilities: includes not only range of available weapons systems, but upgrades to those systems, to include innovations of systems (ex. IED). Threat models depict how threat forces prefer to conduct operations under ideal conditions. Convert threat doctrine or patterns of operation to graphics (Doctrinal Templates) Determine threat’s tactics and options Identify Threat HVT’s Identify Threat Capabilities HVTs are assets that the threat commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. Identification of Type HVTs: Assets that the threat commander requires for the successful completion of the mission depicted and described on the template are HVTs. Identify HVTs from an evaluation of the data base, the doctrinal template, its supporting narrative, and the use of tactical judgment. HVTs usually (but not always) fall within the non- maneuver BOS. Develop the initial list of HVTs by mentally wargaming and thinking through the operation under consideration and how the threat will use the assets of each BOS to support it. Identify any that are critical to the operation’s success. For example, while mentally wargaming an enemy air attack against friendly targets supported by a well prepared air defense system, it is logical to assume that the enemy will need a substantial air defense suppression package as part of the strike force. In such a case, threat aircraft commonly used in such a role become HVTs. Identity assets which are key to executing the primary operation. Also identify any assets which are key to satisfying decision criteria or initial adoption of the branches and sequels listed in the description and option statements. Determine how the threat might react to the loss of each identified HVT. Consider his ability to substitute other assets as well as the likelihood of adopting branches to the operation. After identifying the set of HVTs, rank order them with regard to their relative worth to the threat’s operation and record them as part of the threat model. An HVT’s value usually varies over the course of an operation. Identify any changes in value by phase of the operation and make the necessary annotations. As you identify key assets, group them into one of the 13 categories used to develop target sets. These 13 categories are— Command, control, and communications (C3). Fire support (includes target acquisition assets, ammunition, aircraft, fire direction control, and others). Maneuver. Air defense (includes radars, processing centers, and headquarters). Engineer. Reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA). NBC (includes support elements and weapons). Radio electronic combat (REC) or EW assets. Bulk fuels (storage and refueling assets). Ammunition storage sites and distribution points. Maintenance and repair units (includes collection points and mobile repair facilities). Lift. LOCs (roads, bridges, railheads, transloading facilities, airfields, choke points, others).

SOSO Considerations: Threat ID becomes more difficult. - Lack of uniforms and equipment - Varying levels of organization Increased threat options. - Terrorist-type activity Large scale demolitions Covert collection and operations - Unconventional & Conventional Capability - Effective environment for Economy of Force missions: Sniper Mortars Booby Traps IEDs RPGs Car Alarm D cell Batteries Explosive Charge Firing Wire Electric Blasting Cap EVALUATE THE THREAT 4-34. In evaluating the threat in a counterinsurgency environment, intelligence professionals do the following: Identify which insurgent groups are present, thought to be present, or have access to your AO. Is the insurgency linked to a racial, religious, ethnic, or regional base? FM Counterinsurgency Operations

Determine THREAT HVTs BASED ON: Mission Requirements Combat Operations Casualty Producing Weapons Systems. C2 Structure SOSO Key Individuals IO Targets HVTs - Assets that the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of his mission. Rank order by phase of the operation S2 / FSO uses HVTs to plan HPTs Threat Capabilities Reverse BOS Analysis

Success results in: Allowing the commander to know what the threat is and is not capable of and trained to do in similar situations. Consequences of failure: The staff will lack the intelligence needed for planning. The threat will surprise the friendly force with capabilities for which the S2 failed to account. The staff may waste time and effort planning against threat capabilities that do not exist.

Step 4 ECOAs Situation Template(s). Adaptive Operations. Pattern Analysis. Event Template. Event Matrix. Determine Threat COAs **Step three looked at the enemy in an unconstrained environment. Step 4 looks at determining enemy COA’s on the specific battlefield. Step 4 integrates the results of the previous steps into a meaningful conclusion. Given what the threat normally prefers to do, and the effects of the specific environment in which he is operating now, what are his likely objectives and the COAs available to him? In step 4, the G2/S2 develops enemy COA models that depict the threat’s available COAs. He also prepares event templates and matrices that focus intelligence collection on identifying which COA the threat will execute. The enemy COA models developed in step 4 are the products that the staff will use to portray the threat in the decision making and targeting processes. The G2/S2 cannot produce these models, effectively predicting the threat COAs, unless he has— Adequately analyzed the friendly mission throughout the time duration of the operation; identified the physical limits of the AO and AI; and identified every characteristic of the battlefield environment that might affect the operation (step 1). Identified the opportunities and constraints the battlefield environment offers to threat and friendly forces (step 2). Thoroughly considered what the threat is capable of and what he prefers to do in like situations if unconstrained by the battlefield environment (step 3). In short, the enemy COA models which drive the decision making process are valid only if the G2/S2 establishes a good foundation during the first three steps of the IPB process. FM Replicate the set of COAs that the threat CDR and his staff are considering.

Step 4 Determine Threat COAs
Identify the threat’s likely objectives and desired end state. Determine system capabilities and vulnerabilities. Identify the full set of ECOAs available to the threat. Evaluate and prioritize each ECOA. Develop each ECOA in the amount of detail time allows. Identify initial collection requirements. Identify likely objectives and desired end state one level above your own and working to two levels down from your own. In some cases you may go lower if those actions will significantly affect your success. Example: A sniper team seeking to delay defensive preparations, insurgent teams conducting recon and direct action missions to prepare the battlefield for a larger attack. In most cases you won’t have time to develop COAs for all possible enemy actions. The G2 should focus on situational templates that identify, as a minimum, the enemy’s most likely and most dangerous courses of action. Design your collection strategy to assist you in deciding what COA the enemy is opting to use. The collection strategy must support the commander’s intent. The collection strategy should concentrate on the differences between the NAIs, and indicators of each COA. The NAIs, indicators, and time-phase lines form the basis of the event template, the guide for collection and R&S planning.

Situation Templates Graphic depiction of the threat, with terrain
and weather constraints, at a particular location and time of an operation. Focus on the key area agreed upon by the S2 and the S3. Determine critical events. May need more than one SITTEMP per ECOA. **Taking the doctrinal template and relating it to the current enemy unit on the current battlefield. **Sit temps use time phase lines (TPL) to indicate movement of forces and the expected flow of the operation. CURRENT DOCTRINAL IPB STEP FOUR: DEVELOP ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION Step four of IPB, develop enemy courses of action, incorporates the first three steps of the process into a picture of how the enemy will use terrain, weather, and its existing assets to achieve its goals within the designated AO, AOI, and battlespace. FM /MCRP 2-12A defines this step as “the identification and development of the threat plans adopted by them to accomplish their mission, thus showing their direct impact on the accomplishment of the friendly mission or stated goals.” The resulting products are templates depicting predicted enemy behavior throughout the AO. A consolidated list of all potential adversary COAs should be developed during this step. At a minimum, the list will include “all COAs the adversary’s doctrine considers appropriate to the current situation and accomplishment of his likely objectives [and] all adversary COAs which could significantly influence the friendly mission, even if the adversary doctrine considers them suboptimal under current conditions, and all adversary COAs indicated by recent activities or events. Named areas of interest (NAIs) are associated with each templated enemy COA. NAI are designated points that will help confirm or deny a particular enemy COA. The formal definition is “a point or area along a particular avenue of approach through which enemy activity is expected to occur. Activity or lack of activity within an NAI will help to confirm or deny a particular enemy course of action.” For instance, many maneuver NAI are key intersections along designated avenues of approach. By placing intelligence-gathering assets at these locations, the COA chosen by the adversary can be determined based on whether his force goes left, right, or in another direction. Also included as part of the overall enemy COA development is the identification of high-payoff targets (HPT) and high- value targets (HVT). HPT are targets the loss of which by the threat “will contribute to the success of the friendly force course of action.” HVT are “assets that the threat commander requires for the successful completion of a specific course of action.” Targeting these assets is therefore critical to the successful accomplishment of the friendly mission. Identification of HVT may also lead to elucidation of the enemy’s center of gravity (COG), which is doctrinally defined as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.

Guidelines for Depicting
SITTEMPs Determine the snapshot in time to depict the enemy. Adjust the SITTEMP and battlefield framework IAW: - Weather and Terrain Effects - Threat Doctrine / Preferred Tactics Template 2 levels down from YOUR unit. Depict all BOS / Special Munitions available to the threat, as they support each ECOA. Address the full spectrum of enemy capabilities. Use correct symbology.

Conventional Warfare Situational Template (SITTEMP)
EVALUATE THE THREAT: Composition, disposition, strength, tactics, combat effectiveness DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION Threat Model FIRE SAC G2: Please tell us what a SITEMP is? ANS: Situation templates graphically depict expected threat COAs, should he chose to adopt a particular COA. Usually depict the most critical point in the operation as agreed upon by the G2 and G3. Used to support staff wargaming and develop event templates. (FM , p This when combined with a enemy COA statement provides you with ECOAs to wargame against. Very critical for subsequent planning. As you prepare and mentally wargame the situation template, note how and where each of the BOS provides critical support to the COA. This leads to identification of High Value Targets (HVTs). HVTs are assets that the threat commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. A Doctrinal template – depicts enemy forces according to doctrinal deployment, unconstrained by terrain A Situation template depicts deployed enemy forces adjusted for obstacles and terrain (FM ) At a minimum identify enemy most probable and most dangerous COAs MCOO EN COAs FIRE SAC SITTEMP

Regional Operations Adaptive Operations Destruction of all enemy maneuver elements Overwhelm with echelons Attack from march to timetable Rely on use of massed artillery systems Destroy key systems. Eliminate resolve. Neutralize technological overmatch. “Create a window of opportunity”. Preserve own combat power. As you can see, regional operations they can take a more conventional approach, and as extraregional forces enter their AO/AI, they switch to different tactics.

Event-based not Maneuver-based Events Intended Effects Desired End State Sniper Bombing Mortar Attack Observe Only Loss of Public Support Lower Morale Operation too long too costly ANA Fails CF Leaves COA’s may consist of linked singular events to reach a desired end-state vice conventional maneuver operations to destroy enemy forces and seize terrain.

Tools to help determine Threat TTPs and Patterns Analysis: Incident Overlay. Pattern Analysis Plot Chart. Time-event Chart. Association and Activities Matrix. Link Diagram.

Incident Overlay: Herat K K This is just an example of an incident overlay. You could number these and cross reference them to a log for more detailed information to include date and time. K Kidnapping VBIED Rocket/Mortor Point of Impact

Pattern Analysis: DETAINEES CACHE RECON BOMB DRIVE BY PROPOGANDA DIRECT ACTION AMBUSH MORTAR CHEMICAL PARAMILITARY CAMP 13 8 11 10 9 12 7 14 0001 L 0600 L 1200 L 0400 L 0200 L 1000 L 0800 L 2000 L 1600 L 1400 L 2200 L 1800 L 6 How are the threat’s activities related? A time pattern analysis worksheet is used to record the date and time of each serious incident. The rings depict days of the month, the segments depict hours of the day. Similar tools help distinguish patterns in activity that are tied to particular days, dates, or times. Reference: FM

Pattern Analysis: Are we creating patterns? Does our pattern coincide with threat activities? HN LIAISON CHECK PT OPS SECURITY PATROL BUB (KEY LDR MOVEMENT) LOGPACK 13 8 11 10 9 12 7 14 0001 L 0600 L 1200 L 0400 L 0200 L 1000 L 0800 L 1900 L 1600 L 1400 L 2200 L 1800 L 6

Association Matrix: Name one Name two Name three Name four Tools currently used by the Army can assist in mapping the relationships between one population element and another. The association matrix helps to identify the nature of the relationship between individuals or groups. It is a helpful way to identify intelligence requirements about particular people. Suspected Known

Activities Matrix: Name one Name two Name three Name four Charting the individual to his known activities, can serve to identify the capabilities and intentions of the various groups to which he belongs. INTEL PSYOPS Suspected TRAINING TERRORISM PROPAGANDA Known

Link Diagram: Intel F C Finance Kidnapping Extortion J K Terror Foreign Support A B Recruiting G H I Propaganda D Training A link diagram graphically represents the relationships between population elements. Each of the circles represents individuals; the boxes that surround them indicate their group affiliations. Note that the boxes can represent the name of a group, if known, or an activity in which the individual is known to have participated. Logistics E

Event Template: Identifies critical enemy activity locations. Guide for intelligence collection, and Intel Surveillance Recon (ISR) planning. Event Matrix: Supports Event template. Provides details on: - Type Threat activity expected in NAI - Time the NAI is expected to be active - Relationship to other events on the battlefield The event template depicts locations where critical events and activities are expected to occur and where HVTs will appear. The purpose is to analyze time-related events within critical areas. Provides a basis for collection operations and for locating and tracking HVTs. 4

Event Template (EVENT TEMP)
MAP Enemy SITTEMP 3 Enemy SITTEMP 2 MCOO Enemy SITTEMP 1 H+1 H+2 NAI 3 1 2 Event Template After identifying the set of potential threat COAs, the challenge is to determine which one he will actually adapt. Initial collection requirements are designed to help you answer this. You must predict specific areas and activities, which, when observed, will reveal which COAs the threat has chosen. The areas where you expect key events to occur are called Named Areas of Interest (NAI). The activities which reveal the selected COA are called indicators. The IPB process identifies any critical gaps in the command’s knowledge of the battlefield environment or threat situation. As part of his initial planning guidance, the commander uses these gaps as a guide to establish his initial intelligence requirements. The event template allows the G2 to confirm or deny the situation templates, gauge enemy and friendly rates of movement, compare rates of movement between mobility corridors and avenues of approach, and cue other collection assets based on friendly and enemy movement. On each Situation template identify locations to look for enemy activity Focus on locations and activities that assist in identifying which COA the enemy has chosen The key locations that you choose are called Named Areas of Interest (NAI) The event template will help in development of the Reconnaissance & Surveillance Plan

Event Matrix Example Figure , Page 3-54, FM **This is an example but remember these event matrixes can take many forms. The event matrix supports the event template by providing details on the type of activity expected in each NAI, the times the NAI expected to be active, and its relationship to other events on the battlefield. Its primary use is in planning intelligence collection; however, it also serves as an aid to situation development.

fixing force moves south on Rt Red
Why have an ISR plan? Fill in information gaps. Answer Commander’s PIR. Support Commander’s decision making. R&S Tasking Matrix UNIT START REPORTING REMARKS Tasking PIR NAI LOCATION STOP EVENT OR INDICATOR SCT 1945 fixing force moves south on Rt Red Surveillance 1 B2 CH512420 2145 6 BTRs & 3 T-72 moving south Priority intelligence requirements (PIR) in stability operations and support operations may differ from those in offensive and defensive operations. In combat operations, PIR focuses on the enemy’s military capability and intentions. However, intelligence collection in stability operations and support operations may adjust to the people and their cultures, politics, crime, religion, economics, and related factors, and any variances within affected groups of people. Generally, in offensive and defensive operations, PIR are answered and targets are attacked and destroyed. In stability operations and support operations, collection and production to answer PIR may be ongoing tasks. For example, PIR related to treaty verification or force protection may continue as long as the mission requires. Ref: FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations

Targeted Area of Interest (TAI) Template
MAP Enemy SITTEMP 3 Enemy SITTEMP 2 MCOO Enemy SITTEMP 1 H+1 H+2 NAI 3 1 2 A B TAI Template High Value Targets (HVTs) are assets that the enemy needs to accomplish his mission Identify locations and events where the enemy may employ high value targets (HVTs). These locations become TAIs. TAIs are areas where the friendly commander can influence the action by fire and/or maneuver.

Friendly Course of Action (COA) Development
MAP Enemy Most Probable COA MCOO H+1 H+2 NAI 3 1 2 A B TAI Template I Friendly COA The commander’s guidance provides a basis for the initial forces array needed to counter the enemy’s actions. The G-2’s role in friendly COA development is to ensure that each friendly COA takes advantage of the opportunities offered by the environment and the threat situation (enemy weaknesses) The staff develops friendly COAs based on the commander’s guidance and the facts and assumptions identified during IPB and Mission Analysis.

Decision Point and Critical Event Development
MAP MCOO Enemy Most Probable COA I Friendly COA Decision Support Template H+1 H+2 NAI 3 1 2 A B The TAI/event template is placed over the friendly and enemy COA overlays. As the staff wargames the COAs, a recorder, writes down the results on a synchronization matrix. Decision points are identified throughout the battlefield when the staff wargames the enemy and friendly COAs. During the wargame the staff identifies all the critical events, locations, times and decisions that both friendly and enemy commanders must make. Using the action/reaction/counteraction drill, information is added to the TAI/event template. At the completion of the wargaming process the TAI/event template becomes the decision support template Decision points are identified when the staff wargames the enemy and friendly COAs. During the wargame the staff identifies all the critical events, locations, times and decisions that both friendly and enemy commanders must make. Using the action/reaction/counteraction drill, information is added to the TAI/event template. At the completion of the wargaming process the TAI/event template becomes the decision support template. The Decision Support Template is a graphic form of the synchronization matrix

What collection assets does your unit have?

Success results in: The commander and staff will avoid being surprised with an unanticipated threat action. You will be able to quickly narrow the set of possible threat COAs to the one he has chosen. Consequences of failure: You will fail to identify which of the possible COAs the threat has chosen, leading to surprise of the friendly command. Many of the steps involved in IPB are time intensive. This is especially true at the tactical echelons where automated support for terrain analysis and other functions is not available. Unfortunately, these echelons generally have less time available for the IPB process. Following are some effective techniques for abbreviating the IPB process: The best solution is to complete as much ahead of time as possible. Work Ahead Establish a series of base products, particularly those that deal with the battlefield environment’s effects on operations. Keep the data bases on the threat up to date. As you develop intelligence that indicates changes or evolution in threat doctrine, change the threat models to match. Keep them updated by periodic review instead of waiting until receipt of a new mission. Focus on Essentials making process. Consider the general factors of METT-TC when starting the IPB effort, particularly that of time. Backward plan the IPB effort. Determine how much time you can devote to each step of the IPB process. Ensure that the timeline allows you to properly support the decision Decide which products you will develop and to what degree of detail. Focus on the products most important to your mission. Rather than fully developing one threat COA at the expense of all others, identify the full range of available COAs. Determine the degree of detail required and then develop all COAs to that level of detail. Always work in a priority order established by the commander’s intent and needs. He may specify which COAs he wants you to focus on, such as the most likely or the most dangerous. This implies that you first identify all COAs and evaluate them to determine which is the most likely or most dangerous. The objective of IPB is to help the commander and his staff put together the best possible plan in the time available. This requires models of the range of viable threat COAs that will influence mission accomplishment. Supporting the finished plan with intelligence requires a good event template and matrix. Everything else is only a means to producing these essentials. Stay Objective Oriented In a pinch you can get by with just a good set of threat COA models and a good event template and matrix. To save time and materials, you can combine all threat COA model templates and the event template on a single map overlay, or use cartoons and sketches as a map substitute. The Minimum Essentials If you have not yet described the battlefield environment’s effects, work directly from the map or a sketch of major terrain features. Start by identifying the set of threat COAs and briefly comparing them to determine which is most likely and which is most dangerous considering the current situation and your command’s mission. Rank the remainder in order of likely adoption. Begin by developing the most dangerous or most likely threat COA. In the absence of guidance from the commander you will have to use your own judgment on which to do first. Develop the selected COA to as much detail as the available time allows before turning to the other. Next, construct an event template that focuses on identifying which of the two COAs the threat has adopted. Then turn to developing the remaining courses of action. Work each COA in the priority order you put them in when evaluating their likelihood of adoption. As each COA is finished to the determined degree of detail, incorporate NAIs associated with it into the event template. The initial structuring of the collection requirements can actually wait until after staff wargaming. The most important milestone prior to wargaming is to develop the most likely and most dangerous COAs. If the most likely COA is also the most dangerous COA, develop the second most likely or the second most dangerous COA. NEVER take just one COA into wargaming—this is not an acceptable way to abbreviate the IPB or staff planning processes. The single product that results from this approach is a far cry from the fill-blown set of products described in the first scenario of Chapter 3. However, the “one-overlay product,” when developed to a quality standard, has repeatedly proven to be effective on the battlefield. This is IPB in its most elementary form, and it proves the strength of the fundamental IPB process. FM

QUESTIONS? 1 2 3 4 Define the Battlefield Environment Describe the
Battlefield’s Effects Evaluate the threat Determine Threat COAs

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

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