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ELECTORAL RISK MANAGEMENT ELECTION DAY REPORT ON 2015 GOVERNORSHIP AND STATE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS Prepared by: INEC Electoral Risk Management (ERM) Team.

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Presentation on theme: "ELECTORAL RISK MANAGEMENT ELECTION DAY REPORT ON 2015 GOVERNORSHIP AND STATE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS Prepared by: INEC Electoral Risk Management (ERM) Team."— Presentation transcript:

1 ELECTORAL RISK MANAGEMENT ELECTION DAY REPORT ON 2015 GOVERNORSHIP AND STATE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS Prepared by: INEC Electoral Risk Management (ERM) Team April 11, 2015 First Report as of 11am

2 Introduction The Independent National Electoral Commission is implementing an Electoral Risk Management (ERM) project to support its activities during the 2015 national and state elections using the Electoral Risk Management Tool (ERMTool). In the run-up to the elections, the ERM team identified and analysed a series of risk factors and indicators covering the pre-election period. The subsequent risk alerts were shared with the INEC leadership to help improve their situational awareness in the lead-up to election. For the April 11 Governorship and State Assembly elections, the ERM team identified a number of election day and post election factors to analyse during and immediately after the election. Methodology and data sources : The ERM team established a desk in the INEC situation room on April 11. The team was composed of seven INEC staff members and was supervised by the Chief Technical Advisor to the INEC Chairman. The team received additional support from the International IDEA programme officer as well as the IFES Electoral Security Expert. The team developed risk alerts by collecting data from ERM desk officers, INEC supervisors in the field, the EOSC desk in the situation room, the INEC Citizens Call Centre in the situation room as well as through online sources such as the media and social media (for incidents of electoral violence). To source data in the field, particularly on election day, the ERM team used the ERM desk officers and INEC supervisors. Questionnaires were prepared using an online format and the ERM team collected data by telephone, monitoring online sources and coordinating with other desks in the Situation Room. Any information obtained via social media platforms to identify incidents of election-related violence were only included once the information had been confirmed or verified by an official or secondary source in the media or from official statements. It should be noted that data obtained from the field is not necessarily comprehensive, but represents the information available at the time of this survey. Data for this report was sourced between 9am-11am. Numerical values and risk values: The values in each of the maps were developed in the election day operational plan developed prior to election day. Respondents were asked to estimate the number of polling units affected by a certain problem and were given three possible responses: -None/few = low risk -Some = medium risk -Many = high risk.

3 Legend Low risk: None/few Medium risk: Some High risk: Many No data/no election ERM RISK MAP PUs that have not started accreditation as of 11AM Mapped by INEC-ERM team on 11 April 2015 Data Source: Compilation of reports from ERM desk offices, INEC supervisors, EOSC, Civil Society Situation Room, Media reports

4 Legend Low risk: None/few Medium risk: Some High risk: Many No data/no election ERM RISK MAP Number of PUs reporting fewer than 3 security personnel as of 11AM Mapped by INEC-ERM team on 11 April 2015 Data Source: Compilation of reports from ERM desk offices, INEC supervisors, EOSC, Civil Society Situation Room, Media reports

5 Legend Low risk: None/few Medium risk: Some High risk: Many No data/no election ERM RISK MAP Reports of late arrival, inadequacy and/or incompetence of INEC staff as of 11AM Mapped by INEC-ERM team on 11 April 2015 Data Source: Compilation of reports from ERM desk offices, INEC supervisors, EOSC, Civil Society Situation Room, Media reports

6 Legend Low risk: None/few Medium risk: Some High risk: Many No data/no election ERM RISK MAP Number of PUs reporting shortages of material as of 11AM Mapped by INEC-ERM team on 11 April 2015 Data Source: Compilation of reports from ERM desk offices, INEC supervisors, EOSC, Civil Society Situation Room, Media reports

7 Legend Low risk: None/few Medium risk: Some High risk: Many No data/no election ERM RISK MAP Number of PUs experiencing difficulties with card readers as of 11AM Mapped by INEC-ERM team on 11 April 2015 Data Source: Compilation of reports from ERM desk offices, INEC supervisors, EOSC, Civil Society Situation Room, Media reports

8 Legend Low risk: None/few Medium risk: Some High risk: Many No data/no election ERM RISK MAP Number of reports of attacks on INEC ad hoc staff as of 11AM Mapped by INEC-ERM team on 11 April 2015 Data Source: Compilation of reports from ERM desk offices, INEC supervisors, EOSC, Civil Society Situation Room, Media reports

9 Legend Low risk: None/few Medium risk: Some High risk: Many No data/no election ERM RISK MAP Number of reports of attacks on polling units as of 11AM Mapped by INEC-ERM team on 11 April 2015 Data Source: Compilation of reports from ERM desk offices, INEC supervisors, EOSC, Civil Society Situation Room, Media reports

10 Legend Low risk: None/few Medium risk: Some High risk: Many No data/no election ERM RISK MAP Number of reports of attacks on voters as of 11AM Mapped by INEC-ERM team on 11 April 2015 Data Source: Compilation of reports from ERM desk offices, INEC supervisors, EOSC, Civil Society Situation Room, Media reports

11 Legend Low risk: None/few Medium risk: Some High risk: Many No data/no election ERM RISK MAP Number of reports of theft or destruction of election material as of 11AM Mapped by INEC-ERM team on 11 April 2015 Data Source: Compilation of reports from ERM desk offices, INEC supervisors, EOSC, Civil Society Situation Room, Media reports

12 Analysis and Recommendations Start of accreditation Overall, accreditation had started throughout most of the country by 11am – a significant improvement on the March 28 elections. There were fewer reports of polling units opening late for accreditation. However, in Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta and Edo there were reports that many PUs had not started accreditation during the period concerned (9am-11am). Similarly, there were reports that some polling units had not opened for accreditation in Kebbi, Rivers and Nasarawa. Recommendations Determine the reasons behind the delays in accreditation. If delays are related to the shortage of material or absence of polling staff, contact the State office to determine if the situation has been resolved. If delays are related to violent incidents, coordinate with the security services to determine the best course of action. In certain cases, continue to monitor the situation and consider postponing the election until the security of INEC personnel and material can be guaranteed. Presence of security personnel Overall, 23 states reported having adequate security (3 agents per PU). However, many of the higher risk states have reported many PUs without the required number of security personnel including Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Ekiti, Lagos, Gombe and Yobe. There are also reports of inadequate security in other states that have experienced a number of violent incidents including Rivers, Ekiti and Ondo. Recommendations Coordinate with the security agencies at both the federal and state level (through the REC) to deploy additional personnel in high risk states and other states that have experienced violent incidents today. Late arrival, inadequacy and or incompetence of INEC staff Overall there has been a marked improvement in the performance of poll officials. Only 5 states have reported isolated incidents of late arrival/inadequacy and/or incompetence of INEC staff. There have also been reports of cases where INEC ad hoc staff have been replaced by untrained personnel. Recommendations Contact the State office and/or Electoral Officers to investigate cases where the INEC staff are not performing. Discuss ploling procedures with the relevant INEC ad hoc staff and monitor their performance to ensure improvements in managing their polling units. If necessary, replace the presiding officer of the affected PUs. Availability of election material Overall, there have been fewer reports of unavailable material compared to the March 28 election. However, there have been a number of isolated reports (although many have since been resolved) of insufficient material. Results forms and Incident forms seem to be widely available, but in the few cases where material has been in short supply – ballot papers have been the predominant problem. This is the case in Bauchi, Bayelsa, Cross River, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, Enugu, Kaduna, Kano, Kogi, Lagos, Ogun, Osun and Oyo.

13 Analysis and Recommendations (continued) However there are two states of particular concern. In Borno, the majority of election material has not been distributed and there are many PUs without any material at all. In Taraba, there are many reports of insufficient material, but this might not be a problem if turnout remains low. Recommendations Monitor the situation in Borno closely and consider postponing the election until material can be distributed throughout the state. Contact the State office and/or Electoral Officers to ensure missing material is delivered to PUs in a timely manner. Card readers Overall, card readers seem to be functioning much better than on March 28. However, Anambra, Enugu, Kwara and Plateau have reported many problems with their card readers. Almost all states have reported a few problems with card readers. Many of these appear to be difficulties with authentication (finger print reading). However, a number of states are reporting verification problems and some are reporting that card readers are not functional at all (see below). In the latter cases, many have been resolved by the technical support teams. Verification problems: Benue, Delta, Ekiti, Enugu, Imo, Kaduna, Kebbi, Kwara, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, and Zamfara Non functional card readers: Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Ebonyi, Edo, Jigawa Recommendations: Ensure there are sufficient replacement card readers and that technical support teams are available to deploy to affected polling units. Monitor the situation closely and consider allowing manual accreditation only in polling units where card readers are failing (very few). Incidents of election related violence and/or theft and destruction of material Overall, the majority of the country has remained relatively peaceful, however certain states have recorded a significant number of violent incidents. The most affected are Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Lagos, and Nasarawa. Incidents include killings, physical assault, kidnapping and intimidation. There have also been widespread reports of theft/destruction of election material in a number of states including the hijacking of ballot boxes, result forms. So far there have not been reports of Boko Haram disrupting the elections and most violence seems to be politically motivated. Recommendations Coordinate with the security forces to deploy additional security to the affected areas and apprehend the perpetrators where possible. Ask the INEC state offices to coordinate with political party stakeholders to address their supporters through the media to appeal for calm. Continue to monitor the situation closely, particularly in Rivers. If there is no improvement in security and the environment is not conducive for voters to cast their ballot, consider postponing the elections (until the security situation can be guaranteed)in affected Wards, LGAs or even the entire State. Investigate cases of election material snatching. Inform the collation centre of the disappearance of the material for these PUs so that they can cancel results for the affected PUs.


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