1. Parties, Party Systems, and Social Cleavages

2. Big questions for today
Why have political parties? What function do they play?
Why do some countries have more parties than others?
Why do some issues become salient in some countries (and at some times) but not others?
Economics versus moral values?
The rise of post-materialism, environmentalism?

3. Big questions for today, cont.
Return to Aristotle and our basic questions about redistribution and democracy:
Why don’t the poor vote to expropriate the rich?

4. Overview Why parties? Cleavages in democracies since the 19th century
The impact of social cleavages on party systems
The role of electoral institutions
Putting it all together

5. Political Parties
A political party can be thought of as a group of people that includes those who hold office and those who help get and keep them there.
Why do we need political parties to structure political life, even in non-democracies?

6. Political Parties Political parties serve several purposes:
They structure the political world.
Remember our discussion of social choice instability.
In particular, they structure the legislative process.
They recruit and socialize the political elite
They mobilize the masses
They provide a link between the rulers and the ruled.

7. Party Systems
Political scientists often categorize democracies in terms of the type of party system that they exhibit.
They typically distinguish between party systems based on the number and size of the parties they contain.

8. Party Systems
A nonpartisan democracy is a democracy with no official political parties.
A single-party system is one in which only one political party is legally allowed to hold power.
A one-party dominant system is one in which multiple parties may legally operate but in which only one particular party has a realistic chance of gaining power.
A two-party system is one in which only two major political parties have a realistic chance of gaining power.
A multiparty system is one in which more than two parties have a realistic chance of gaining power.

9. Counting Parties Effective Number of Parties
It is a measure that weights the number of parties by the share of votes or seats they get.
So a party that is large is counted more than a party that is very small.
The idea is to down-weight the Monster Raving Loony Party, the Beer-Drinkers’ Party, etc.
Among full democracies, the range is from the United States (around 2) to Brazil (18).

10. Types of social cleavages
A quick tour of social cleavages:
Urban-rural cleavage
Confessional cleavage
Secular-clerical cleavage
Class cleavage
Post-materialist cleavage
Ethnic and linguistic cleavages
Regional cleavages

11. Social Cleavages and Party Systems
Can we explain the number of parties by examining social cleavages?

12. Social Cleavages and Party Systems
Can we explain the number of parties by examining social cleavages?
Count the number of cleavages?
Examine whether they are reinforcing or cross-cutting?

13. A closer look at social cleavages
What is a social cleavage anyway?
Where do they come from?
Primordialist vs. constructivist viewpoint

14. A closer look at social cleavages
Primordialists vs. constructivists
Is ethnicity socially constructed?
What about the class cleavage?

15. Social Cleavages and the number of parties
A classic argument: The more social cleavages there are in a country and the more that these cleavages are cross-cutting, the greater the demand for distinctive representation and the greater the demand for political parties.

16. Electoral Institutions
Social cleavages create the demand for political parties.
But electoral institutions determine whether this latent demand for representation actually leads to the existence of new parties.
Specifically, non-proportional electoral systems act as a brake on the tendency for social cleavages to be translated into new parties.

17. How does this work? Mechanical effect Strategic effect
Strategic voting
Strategic entry

18. Mechanical Effect
The mechanical effect of electoral laws refers to the way votes are translated into seats.
When electoral systems are disproportional, the mechanical effect:
punishes small, geographically dispersed parties (Liberals) or large, geographically concentrated parties (Labor)
Rewards large, geographically dispersed parties (Conservatives) and small, geographically concentrated parties (SNP, Bloc)

19. Strategic Effect
The strategic effect of electoral laws refers to how the way in which votes are translated into seats influences the “strategic” behavior of voters and political elites.
When electoral systems are disproportional, their mechanical effect can be expected to reward large parties and punish small parties.
As a result, voters have an incentive to engage in strategic voting and political elites have an incentive to engage in strategic entry.

20. Strategic Effect
The strategic voting essentially means voting for your most preferred candidate who has a realistic chance of winning.
Strategic entry refers to the decision by political elites about whether to enter the political scene under the label of their most preferred party or under the label of their most preferred party that has a realistic chance of winning.

21. A Strategic Entry Game Strategic Entry Game
There are two left-wing parties (L1 and L2) and one right-wing party (R).
If both left-wing parties compete in the election, then the right-wing party will win for sure.
If only one left-wing party runs, then the right-wing party will lose.

22. A Strategic Entry Game Strategic Entry Game
The worst possible outcome for the left-wing parties is if the right-wing party wins (0).
The best possible outcome for each left-wing party is if they win (1).
The second best outcome for each left-wing party is if the other left-wing party wins (λ, where 0 < λ < 1).

24. A Strategic Entry Game
As you can see, both L1 and L2 face incentives for one of them to drop out of the race.
They face incentives for strategic entry.
But how do they coordinate on which one of them should drop out?
The coordination game is asymmetric and therefore has distributional consequences.

25. A Strategic Entry Game
One way to solve this coordination problem is for the two small parties to merge into a single party.
Example: The Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party merged to creat the Liberal Democratic Party in the UK in 1988.
The more disproportional the electoral system, the greater the incentive for small parties to merge or to form coalitions.
This incentive not only encourages mergers between small parties but it can also deter the entry of small parties in the first place.

26. Duverger’s Law What is it? How does it work?
Why does India have so many parties? Why do different parties compete in different regions of Canada?
Why are third parties so rare in the United States?

27. Explaining the number of parties
There seems to be an emerging consensus in the literature about an interaction effect.

29. How would you test this?

32. Environment, climate change?
Does proportional representation affect the salience of non-economic issues?
Religion
Immigration
Environment, climate change?

33. Endogenous electoral rules
Functionalist arguments about social heterogeneity
Colonial and historical legacies
Strategic elites
Boix
Calvo
Strategic fools?