1. 1 Flights of Fancy Who knew what when between 8:14 and 10:03 AM on September 11?

2. 2 Understanding what should have happened The flights -- destinations and times The players -- civilian and military The protocols -- emergency vs. hijack

3. 3 Flight Crashes American Airlines 11 North Tower 1 United Airlines 175 South Tower 2 American Airlines 77 Pentagon United Airlines 93 ? (Pennsylvania)

4. 4 Flight Paths per 9/11 Commission 11: Boston -> LA 175: Boston -> LA 77: DC -> LA 93: Newark -> SF

5. 5 Flight Times per 9/11 Commission AA 11 7:59 8:14 8:46:40 UA 175 8:14 8:42+ 9:03:11 AA 77 8:20 8:51 9:37:46 UA 93 8:42 9:28 10:03:11 Flight Takeoff Takeover Crash

6. 6 The Civilian Side: Federal Aviation Administration Boston Air Traffic Control Center....Nashua NH Herndon Command Center...............Herndon VA (DC area) FAA Headquarters.............................DC

7. 7 The Civilian Side: FAA Regions

8. 8 The Civilian Side: People Colin Scoggins -- military liaison to FAA in Boston Ben Sliney -- operations manager at FAA Command Center (Herndon, VA) Monte Belger -- Acting FAA Deputy Administrator Terry Biggio -- operations manager at FAA Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (Nashua, NH) Robin Hordon -- former Boston ATC

9. 9 The Military Side: Agencies NORAD North Amer. Aerospace Defense Cmd (Colorado Springs, CO) – NEADS Northeast Air Defense Sector (Rome, NY) NMCC National Military Command Center (Pentagon)

10. 10 The Military Side: NEADS

11. 11 The Military Side: Nearby Air Force Bases Andrews AFB 11 mi SE of DC Bolling AFB 3 mi S of US CAPITOL Dover AFB 3 mi SE of Dover, DE Hanscom AFB 17 mi NW of Boston Langley AFB 3 mi N of Hampton, VA McGuire AFB 18 mi SE of Trenton,NJ

12. 12 The Military Side: People Gen. Richard Myers -- acting chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (confirmed 2 days later, Medal of Honor 2005) Gen. Larry Arnold -- Head of NORAD Continental US region NMCC –Gen. Montague Winfield, Deputy Dir. of Ops –Capt. Charles Leidig -- asked by MW on 9/10 to take his place at 8:30am on 9/11 Col. Robert Marr -- NEADS battle commander Maj. Kevin Naspany -- Otis AFB fighter team commander

13. 13 Standard Operating Procedure “in-Flight Emergency” Criteria Loss of radio contact -- OK for few minutes Loss of transponder transmission -- OK for few minutes Failure to respond to radio transmission or obey a repeated ATC order -- OK for few minutes Course deviation (15deg or 2mi) -- serious

14. 14 Standard Operating Procedure Emergency Protocol: fast 1.ATC controller notifies superior 2.Superior notifies NORAD (NEADS) 3.NEADS launches fighters

15. 15 Emergency Interception Launch within minutes In open hangar at end of runway Flight crews within a few minutes (“jump out of shower unrinsed”) Planes kept mechanically fit and warmed up to start Fly to target at top speed Pull alongside, assess, communicate -- Robin Hordon, former ATC, p.39

16. 16 Emergency Interception Speed to airborne NORAD -- command/control break-down caused 5 min instead of 2-3 mins (2000 press release) Otis AFB -- 24hr/day, airborne in 5 mins (Cape Cod Times, 9/15) USAF -- F15’s scramble to 29K in 2.5 mins (website prior to 9/11) Florida ANG --“If needed, we could be killing things in five minutes or less” (AF web: Capt. Tom Herring, full-time alert pilot)AF web

17. 17 Emergency Interception Speed to airborne: 9/11 Scoggins: asked Otis and NEADS several times why no launch yet (seemed an eternity) Otis pilots sitting in jets “straining at the reins” for 6 mins

18. 18 Emergency Interception Quality Most important elements: speed, efficiency, timeliness of launch and interception Years of practice, experience Pilots, mechanics, aircraft, airport configurations and NORAD/FAA radar procedures honed to save time in seconds -- Robin Hordon, former ATC

19. 19 Emergency Interception Permission 1 4.7. Requests for military assistance should be made and approved in the following ways: 4.7.1. Immediate Response. Requests for an immediate response (i.e., any form of immediate action taken by a DoD Component or military commander to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions) may be made to any Component or Command. The DoD Components that receive verbal requests from civil authorities for support in an exigent emergency may initiate informal planning and, if required, immediately respond as authorized in DoD Directive 3025.1. [see next slide] -- DOD Directive 3025.15 2/18/97, p.4

20. 20 Emergency Interception Permission 2 4.5.1. Imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack may require immediate action by military commanders, or by responsible officials of other DoD Agencies, to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. When such conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials of other DoD Components are authorized by this Directive, subject to any supplemental direction that may be provided by their DoD Component, to take necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities. All such necessary action is referred to in this Directive as "Immediate Response.” -- DOD Directive 3025.1 1/15/93, p.7

21. 21 Emergency Interception Permission 3 (See “Hijacking -> Secy of Defense”)

22. 22 Standard Operating Procedure Hijacking Protocol: slow 1.Harder to establish “hijacking” 2.ATC notifies hijack coordinator at FAA HQ -- directly or thru Herndon 3.FAA HQ notifies NMCC (military) 4.NMCC forwards to Secy of Defense for approval (see next slide) 5.If approved, NMCC notifies NEADS 6.NEADS scrambles fighters 7.Fighters stay behind target, “escort”

23. 23 Standard Operating Procedure Hijacking -> Secy of Defense? Did Rumsfeld pull a fast one on 6/1/01 by changing hijacking procedure to require that approval of FAA requests for military assistance go through the Secretary of Defense -- i.e. did NEADS need to get SoD permission (or even NMCC permission)? “The sector commander would have authority to scramble the airplanes.” -- Air War Over America (intro for which was written by NMCC’s Genl. Arnold, yet Arnold implied (testimony) NEADS needed permit)

24. 24 Standard Operating Procedure Hijacking -> Secy of Defense? In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA. The NMCC will monitor the situation and forward all requests or proposals for DOD military assistance for aircraft piracy (hijacking) to the Secretary of Defense for approval. -- DOD hijacking Directive 3610.01, 7/31/97, par 4a In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA. The NMCC will, with the exception of immediate responses as authorized by reference d [3025.15], forward requests for DOD assistance to the Secretary of Defense for approval. -- DOD hijacking Directive 3610.01A, 6/1/01, par 4a

25. 25 So... Was it an emergency, or a hijacking?

26. 26 What should have happened with Flight 11 8:14 -- order to climb ignored, radio contact apparently lost 8:18-8:20 -- emergency protocol: supervisor contacts NEADS, scramble order given 8:21 -- loss of transponder signal (not vital) 8:25 -- sounds like hijacking (4-11 min after emergency protocol should have started) 8:26 -- interceptors airborne (assume 6 min) 8:39 -- over NYC (153mi @.9mach = 13 mins) 8:46 -- crash (7 min later @ 500mph = 60 miles)

27. 27 The three stories and their problems

28. 28 Review: Evidence/testimony credibility Story changes Where were you the night of the crime? –I was at the theater. The theater was closed. –Oh, that’s right, I was with my girlfriend. She says she was with her husband. –Oh, yeah, I was home reading the Bible. -- from David Ray Griffin, 9/11 Myth and Reality

29. 29 Story # 1 -- September 11 No planes were launched before the Pentagon was hit (9:38) -- JCS Chief Gen. Richard Myers -- NORAD Spokesperson Mike Snyder

30. 30 Story # 1 Problem 1: 9/12 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/articles/timeline.html http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/articles/timeline.html Washington Post -- (citing witnesses, authorities & media reports) 8:38 -- FAA notifies NEADS of hijacking #1 8:43 -- FAA notifies NEADS of hijacking #2 8:53 -- Otis jets airborne for NYC (15 mins?) 9:10 -- 77 heading E over WVa on radar 9:25 -- FAA notifies NEADS 77 is heading to DC 9:35 -- Langley jets airborne for DC

31. 31 Story # 1 Problem 2: 9/14 http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/planes/defense/cbs_otis_scramble.html http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/planes/defense/cbs_otis_scramble.html ”Pentagon sources told CBS’s Bob Orr that contrary to early reports, US Air Force jets did get into the air on Tuesday while the attacks were underway.” -- Dan Rather 8:38 -- FAA notifies military 8:44 -- Otis AFB F-15s scrambled 8:52 -- airborne (still 70 mi away @ 175 crash) 9:30 -- Langley AFB F-16s launched (150 mi) 10:00 -- arrive over DC (5 mi/min?) -- Bob Orr

32. 32 Story # 2 -- September 18 NORAD issues timeline which implies FAA notifications were too late.

33. 33 Speeds Mach 1 = 761mph ~ 12.7 mi/min Mach.9 = 11.4 mi/min F-15 max –hi altitude = mach 2.5 = 32 mi/min –lo altitude = mach 1.2 = 15 mi/min F-16 max: mach 2 = 25 mi/min

34. 34 Story # 2 Timeline http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/planes/attack/presrelNORADTimelines.htm http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/planes/attack/presrelNORADTimelines.htm Flight 11 175 77 93 FAA->NEADS 8:40 8:43 9:24 n/a Scramble Order 8:46 9:24 Location Otis (MA) Langley (VA) Equip 2 F15s 2 F16s Airborne 8:52 9:30 Distance (mi) 153 71* 105 100** Time (.9mach)*** (17) 8 12 11 Poss. Arrival (9:09) 9:00 9:42 -- Crash 8:46 9:02 9:37 10:03 * 153 vs 71? ** from DC ***~12mpm

35. 35 Story # 2 Problems Contradicts many testimonies by FAA and others Even if true, there still would have been time for interceptions

36. 36 Story # 3 -- July 04 according to the 9/11 Commission, based on the finally-released NORAD/FAA tapes Focus on hijack (not emergency) protocol Boston ATC calls Herndon CC Herndon CC calls FAA HQ in DC FAA HQ does NOT call NEADS Boston ATC calls NEADS direct (8:38)

37. 37 Story # 3 Problems The FAA Tapes Boston has 130-150 positions with “hot button to NEADS, each w/dedicated tape channel -- where? Flight 11 tape starts in middle of furniture conversation at 8:26 –normally only record when mike keyed –if that not done, why do the tapes start mid- conversation instead of shift start? Few of these tapes have been made public

38. 38 Story # 3 Problems The NORAD Tapes: “authentic history of 9/11” DON’T INCLUDE NMCC -- the military/FAA “focal point” –particularly Marr/Arnold NORAD between its facilities Communication with Secret Service Don’t include higher-ups (JCS Myers, Rumsfeld, Cheney, Bush)

39. 39 Hijacking vs/& Emergency? Sliney: FAA Center reporting a hijacking always calls military, NORAD was called Both in parallel –Hijack: Biggio called FAA Reg.Op.Ctr –Emergency: Scoggins: not my job to call NMCC, I have agreement w/NEADS to call, and I did Hordon: Emergency situation preceded awareness of hijacking, many ATC’s know something was wrong, are suppressed* * http://www.prisonplanet.com/articles/december2006/141206trafficcontroller.htm

40. 40 Story #3 Timeline Boston 8:28: Boston calls Herndon 8:32: Herndon calls FAA HQ 8:34: Boston calls FAA Cape Cod 8:38: Boston calls NEADS (see next slide) –NEADS calls Marr, who orders battle stn –Marr calls Arnold (NORAD), Arnold tells Marr to scramble 8:46: Scramble 8:53: F15s in air, no idea of target

41. 41 Story # 3 Problems When was NEADS notified? 8:38: Boston calls NEADS (9/11 Comm) 8:34 –Jane Garvey (FAA head) –Boston calls Otis at Cape Cod (911C says only called FAA Cape Cod facility, Scoggins says made several calls to Otis) –Otis pilot Tim Duffy: got call “about 8:30,8:35,” gave call to commander Treacy, called NEADS 8:28/29 –NORAD tapes: Scoggins tells NEADS 11 is 35mi N of JFK –Scoggins 1st call: 11 90 mi north of that (11 min @ 500mph) 8:27/28 –Scoggins: Cooper called NEADS before Scoggins arrived

42. 42 Story # 3 Problems Otis delay: NEADS can’t find 11 Military scopes older than FAA’s (but system was state of the art) Naspany: “Thousands of blips” (but breakdown into sectors means only a limited number) No transponder (dashes instead of dots) –How would military track enemy planes? –Boston provided numerous physical position points 8:43: Naspany orders launch anyway –better to have them in the air –but why not at 8:38?

43. 43 Story # 3 Problems Time to target “I just wanted to get there. I was in full- blower all the way.” -- Lt.Col. Tim Duffy, Otis F15 pilot

44. 44 Story #3 Timeline Washington 8:54: Indianapolis ATC loses 77, doesn’t know about WTC, thinks 77 crashed, later notifies Herndon 9:20: FAA teleconference set up 9:25: Herndon calls FAA HQ 9:28: Cleveland ATC hears screams on 93 9:32: “when hears about bomb on 93, tells supervisor, who notifies FAA HQ 9:34: NEADS (on call to FAA HQ) hears that 77 was lost 9:36: Herndon tells Cleveland FAA superiors need to make decision on call to military about 93 9:49: Herndon/FAA HQ waffling about calling military on 93 10:07: NEADS notified of 93 hijack 10:25: Cheney gives Clarke shootdown authorization

45. 45 Story # 3 Problems 77 notification 8:25-30: FAA notifies regional centers (incl Indianapolis) of 11’s hijacking 8:46: goes off course for 4 minutes, then transponder lost 8:50: approx time of FAA phone bridge (next slide) 9:20: FBI notified of 77 hijack (says FBI) 9:24: NORAD’s initial claim of notification

46. 46 Story # 3 Problems Laura Brown memo, 2003 http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=126363 http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=126363 After WTC1, FAA establishes phone bridges: –FAA field facilities DOD –FAA Command Ctr Secret Service –FAA headquarters other government agencies –USAF liaison joins -> NORAD FAA shares real-time info on flights of interest –loss of communication unauth’d course changes –loss of transponder other info Other agencies share their info FAA -> NORAD about 77 –formal = 9:24, but much earlier informally

47. 47 Story # 3 Problems 93 notification ??: Gen. Winfield: NMCC heard about 93 transponder loss and heading to DC 9:03+: Arnold: military notified of possible hijack shortly after WTC2 hit 9:16: Military learns of 93 hijack (according to NORAD) 9:20: FAA phone bridge started (911 Commission version, not FAA’s 8:50) 9:34: FAA knew of 77 (911 Commission) 9:34: 93 passenger’s wife tells FBI about hijack 9:35: in Clarke’s White House videoconference (which includes Rumsfeld & Myers) -- Jane Garvey notes 93 potential hijack Above all, military liaisons present at Herndon -- Belger and Sliney (omitted from 9/11 Commission Report)

48. 48 Story # 3 Problems Secret Service Arrangement w/FAA to monitor FAA radar (acknowledged by Barbara Riggs, deputy director of SS) Also Cheney: “The Secret service has an arrangement with the FAA. They had open lines after the WTC was...”[stop] 9:30: SS notifies Clarke about errant plane heading towards DC

49. 49 Shootdown Story 3 version Cheney issued authorization, but didn’t get the situation room until 10:00 NEADS didn’t learn about 93 until 10:07, so couldn’t have been tracking 93 Cheney notified of 93 at 10:02 Cheney gave authorization 10:10-15

50. 50 Shootdown Story 3 problems Cheney was in the situation room before 9:20 (Mineta) Arnold (Air War Over America): tracking 93 even before off course (at 9:36) Myers (9/13): had a fighter close to 93 when it crashed Pilot of an E-3 with 2 F-16s near Pittsburgh ordered to shoot down an airliner North Dakota National Guard General: Secret Service told his F-16s to “protect White House at all costs,” only the crash made this unnecessary

51. 51 Shootdown Story 3 problems In situation room, staffer kept providing updates on 93, shootdown decision made and passed to military (Cheney, Rice, Card) Bolton: the military asst kept asking (and getting) shoot-down authority Clarke: received authorization 9:45-55 Marr & Arnold: we had authorization and ND F-16’s would have shot 93 down if continued to DC Winfield (NMCC) had permission to shoot down civilian planes threatening DC, FAA informed of fighters getting “closer and closer...”

52. 52 Story # 3 Problems Phantom Flight 11 per 9/11 Commission (via NORAD/FAA tapes) Reasons given for Langley scramble: –NORAD (2001): Flight 77 –General Arnold, (to 911 Comm, 2003): Flight 93 But tapes say “no scramble until after Pentagon” All flights used up, need something else: hence Phantom 11

53. 53 Flight 93

54. 54 Flight 93 Flight Path

55. 55 Flight 93 Shanksville Map

56. 56 Flight 93 Flight Path NTSB: FDR says 93 came in from North Some witnesses say from East Fisherman at marina says it flew right over the Indian Lake

57. 57 Flight 93 The hole

58. 58 Flight 93 The hole, debris?

59. 59 Flight 93 Debris Mostly paper, virtually no metal Metal parts began showing up after reached a certain level of digging This occurred after there had been a hiatus in the digging

60. 60 Flight 93 Debris Debris in Indian Lake Wind was not blowing in right direction Debris field 8 miles away over a ridge, cordoned off by FBI, no admittance

61. 61 Flight 93 Debris fields

62. 62 Flight 93 Shot down? NSA personnel: shot down by Andrews AFB jets Charles Lewis at LAX overhears report of shoot-down on security guard’s radio 3 AF pilots say they were given direct orders to shoot down an airliner

63. 63 The Phone Calls Were they possible? Were they fake?

64. 64 Phone calls mechanism in 2001 Phone contacts tower 1 Electronic handshake (~8sec) If phone moves, when it gets out of range of tower 1, call is handed off to tower 2

65. 65 Phone calls Flight 93 parameters Altitude: 34,300 -> 40,700 Speed: ~500 mph

66. 66 Phone calls A.K Dewdney experiments http://www.physics911.net/projectachilles http://www.physics911.net/projectachilles Canadian mathematician & computer scientist, Scientific American column Single engine –< 2000’: likely (75%) –2-8000’: unlikely (13%) –> 8000’: very unlikely –20,000’: < 1% getting to ground & tower Double engine –2000’: 95% success 5000’: 44% –6000’: 10% 7000’: 0%

67. 67 Phone calls Speed issue Marco Thompson, president of San Diego Telecom Council –Cell phones not designed for planes –Maximum speed of 60-100 mph

68. 68 Phone calls When was tech possible? 7/15/2004 -- Demonstration of third generation “pico-cell network” –Plane has base station –Communicates via satellite Commercial availability: 24 months Why a big deal if already possible?

69. 69 Phone calls Story changes 2001: 9 cell phone calls from 93 2006: 5 cell calls (United 93 film) 2006: 2 cell calls (Moussaoui trial) –made at 9:58 after down to 5000’ –earlier ones, essential to details of story, included those with cell-phone caller-ID –35 others made from air phones

70. 70 Phone calls Voice morphing 1999: 10-min sample enables cloning of speech patterns, make accurate facsimile “Gentlemen, we have called you together to inform you that we are going to overthrow the U.S. government” -- “Gen. Steiner,” former Commander-in-Chief of US Special Operations command NSA eavesdropping

71. 71 Phone calls Ted & Barbara Olson 1 Ted: solicitor general, Barbara: conservative TV commentator 9/11: she “called him twice on cell phone” 9/14: called Justice Dept collect, must have been using airplane phone, didn’t have credit card 9/14: second call went dead because cell calls don’t work well on airplanes later: collect call must have been seat phone and she didn’t have her purse

72. 72 Phone calls Ted & Barbara Olson 2 AA: no seatback phones on 757’s, passengers used their cell phones FBI 9/11: interviewed Olson, said he reported two calls FBI at Moussaoui trial: phone records indicate only one call, “unconnected,” lasted “0 seconds” Pentagon 9/11 (history by DoD) -- insists the pilots did not give up the plane and go to the back, as Olson said he’d been told

73. 73 Phone calls Other calls Tom to Deena Burnett –Mentions her name, no others –Hijackers on suicide mission, will crash into ground –10min later: passengers must try to gain control –10 min later: Kids want to talk to him –Says he’ll “talk to them later” Honor Wainino to stepmother Esther Heyman –Remarkable calm through whole call –Couldn’t hear anyone else

74. 74 Phone calls Other calls Mark Bingham to mother Alice Bingham via Aunt Kathy Hoagland –KH: sounds matter-of-fact –AB: Hi Mark –MB: Hi, Mom, this is Mark Bingham Alice Bingham still believes it was Mark

75. 75 Phone calls Other calls

76. 76 11 & 175 at the WTC Were the speeds practical, or even possible? Pilots for 9/11 Truth

77. 77 11 & 175 at the WTC Speeds NTSB: Radar Data Impact Speed Study used Airport Surveillance Radar (highly accurate) Flight 11: 404 knots Flight 175: 510 knots (1 knot = 1.15 mph)

78. 78 11 & 175 at the WTC Speeds Maximum Operating Speeds Vmo: velocity max op speed at sea level Mmo: Mach max op speed at high altitudes

79. 79 11 & 175 at the WTC Speeds

80. 80 11 & 175 at the WTC Speeds For Boeing 757: Vmo:.86 Mach Mmo: 360 knots

81. 81 11 & 175 at the WTC Speeds Egypt Air (only available comparison) –Suicide dive by officer –FDR: highest speed.99 Mach at 22,000.86M = 522 knots at 22K’, 369 knots at sea level.99M = 600 knots at 22K, 435 knots at sea level –Indications that the plane fell apart Loss of power Two debris fields

82. 82 11 & 175 at the WTC Speeds Contradiction of this line –Australian aeronautics engineer –Claims max-op-speeds are not actually that –Ran test in state-of-art simulator (737, but close) –Got up to.86M at 2000’, found easy to control http://911blogger.com/node/20232 http://911blogger.com/node/20232

83. 83 11 & 175 at the WTC Speeds Contradiction of that: –Misrepresentation of max-op-speed –Description of test stated that the over-speed warnings were disabled so as not to be annoying –Did this disable the simulator’s crash logic ?

84. 84 11 & 175 at the WTC Control

85. 85 Flight Control Could the planes have been remotely controlled? http://www.journalof911studies.com/volume/2008/AutopilotSystemsMonaghan.pdf

86. 86 Flight Control GPS –originally deliberately inaccurate (~ 100 yards) WAAS (Wide Area Augmentation System) –designed to replace expensive ground-based navigational aids –uses ground stations to correct GPS errors –horizontal/vertical (h/v) accuracy to 1-3 meters –FAA announced availability August 2000 LAAS (Local Area Augmentation System) –< 1 meter h/v –was being used in 1999 The National System

87. 87 Flight Control Accuracy –Routes vary within 60 feet –WAAS v/h accuracy: 6-9 feet –Corridors: 243 feet wide –Runways: 150-200 feet wide –WTCs: 300 feet wide Waypoints at intervals: 3-D location within the National Air Space -- longitude, latitude and altitude coordinates. RNP: Required Navigation Performance “Highway of the Sky” routes

88. 88 Flight Control RF: Radius to Fix (constant radius turn) FAF: Final Approach Fix (beginning of landing approach) Can be done automatic Final Maneuvering

89. 89 Flight Control The Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)... allows pilots to fly... approaches that cannot necessarily be flown with current instrumentation... Complex curved approaches, including approaches turning to a short (less than one mile) final... Pathways were constructed from... climbing, or descending constant radius arcs... Autopilots could use WAAS position and velocity to fly curved trajectories.” -- Stanford U. Aeronautics & Astronautics Dept after 1998 tests of prototype WAAS (activ’d 2000) What can it do?

90. 90 Flight Control DARP: Dynamic airborne reroute procedure Downloads new course via ground VHF or satellite By May 2000: Implemented in Honeywell’s Pegasus FMS (Flight Management System) Honeywell, Sept 1998: American and United will be installing Pegasus Flight Management System on their 757s and 767s (RNP capable, 150 waypoints) June 2001: DARP available, not fully operational Changing routes

91. 91 Flight Control The accuracy of the system at any point depends on how many GPS satellites are visible from that point. Coincidentally (?), the WTC and Pentagon were at or near the maximum visibility at the 9/11 crash times Satellite visibility WTC Pentagon

92. 92 Flight Control FMC: Flight management computer EGPWS: Enhanced ground proximity warnings take control if pilot does not respond soon enough Pilot Override

93. 93 Flight Control Honeywell, Sept 1998: American and United will be installing Pegasus Flight Management System on their 757s and 767s (RNP capable, 150 waypoints) NASA runway approach/landing tests, 1994-2002: 757s and 767s WAAS+auto-land achieved routine h/v accuracy of several meters or less FAA/OhioU, Oct 1994: 50 successful autopilot approach/touchdowns by 757 using WAAS in The Equipment

94. 94 Flight Control The WTCs and Pentagon are waypoints in the system 9/11 Boeings were equipped with EGPWS and database that contained the WTCs WTC strikes were exactly at bottom edge of recently re-fireproofed areas Flight 77’s descending 330º spiral was declared to be way too difficult for inexperienced pilot What’s the point?