1. Implementing NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC): Enabled Capability (NNEC): Implications for NATO Response Implications for NATO Response Force’s Envisioned Roles Force’s Envisioned Roles Reynold F. Palaganas Reynold F. Palaganas Colonel, US Army Colonel, US Army Commander, NCSA Sector Mons Commander, NCSA Sector Mons

2. ThesisThesis DiscussionDiscussion FindingsFindings ConclusionsConclusions RecommendationsRecommendations Agenda

3. “… NATO will no longer have the large, massed units that were necessary for the Cold War, but will have agile and capable forces at Graduated Readiness levels… [to] prepare the Alliance to meet any threat….” - General (ret) James L. Jones, former SACEUR View of NATO Transformation

4. To transform NATO Response Force (NRF) operations from a “platform-centric” to a “network- centric environment,” NATO Consultation, Command and Control (C3) elements, NATO’s two strategic commands, member nations, and industry must move beyond Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) rhetoric and a “business as usual” Cold War mindset as enterprise network stakeholders by implementing a federated NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) concept as the interoperability driver that joins common interfaces and information services. Thesis

5. The Challenge: A Pictorial View Users MaritimeLandAirLogistics Network & Comm Services provided within functional areas Users / Outcomes Other AirTargeting Layers and ‘Building Blocks’ of services provided across functional areas to multiple users From this - “Stovepiped” Interoperability To this - “Gridded” Interoperability

6. NRF Concept – Two Envisioned RolesNRF Concept – Two Envisioned Roles  M odular, quick reaction force  NATO’s transformation catalyst: entry point for capability improvements NRF Principles (Relative to Capabilities)NRF Principles (Relative to Capabilities)  Deployability  Scalability  Rotation NRF Concept and Principles

7. Land Air Maritime NATO Task ForceBrigade Combat Team200 Combat Sorties/Day With Strategic Enablers Sea/AirLift Intelligence Force Protection Combat Support Combat Service Support Deployable Joint Task Force HQ Plus Special Forces Total Force – approx up to 25,000 NRF at Full Operational Capability (FOC)

8. NATO Commanders’ Bi-Strategic Vision Concepts 1/3/2006 2 2 CAPABLE FUTURE FORCES Bi - - SC Strategic Vision EFFECTS BASED APPROACH TO OPERATIONS INFORMATION SUPERIORITY NETWORK ENABLED CAPABILITY EFFECTIVE ENGAGEMENT JOINT MANOEUVRE ENHANCED CIMIC EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS INTEGRATED LOGISTICS CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK Transformation Objective Areas (TOA) Transformation Goals (TG) ACHIEVING JOINT DEPLOYMENT & SUSTAINMENT ACHIEVING DECISION SUPERIORITY ACHIEVING COHERENT EFFECTS

9. NNEC: It’s About People – Information – Networks NATO’s blueprint transformation from a stovepiped to a Networking Information and Infrastructure (NII) enterprise

10. Relevant NATO Bodies for NNEC NC3 Organisation NC3 Organisation NATO C3 Agency (NC3A) NATO C3 Agency (NC3A) NATO CIS SERVICES AGENCY (NCSA) NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC) NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC) Military Committee (MC) Military Committee (MC) SACEUR NATO C3 Board (NC3B) NATO C3 Board (NC3B) NC3 Reps OPCOM JFC NRF- # OPCON SACT STRATEGIC COORD (for CD&E)

11. Dealing with a Legacy Platform-Centric Dealing with a Legacy Platform-Centric Environment Environment  Lack of Coherent Network-centric Guiding Principles or Keystone Authoritative Reference  Outdated Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) Findings – NNEC Impediments (1 of 3)

12. Technological Insertion Concerns – two themes: Technological Insertion Concerns – two themes:  Obtaining Nations’ Consensus to Open Standards Architecture  Bridging the Technology/Capability Gap - Nations Pursuing Different Levels of Ambition - Info Technology Transfer (Transatlantic Gap; Also, Info Sharing within Europe) Findings – NNEC Impediments (2 of 3)

13. (Cont from previous slide) (Cont from previous slide) Findings – NNEC Impediments (2 of 3) - Cont

14. National Funding and NATO Common Funding National Funding and NATO Common Funding Support Concerns Support Concerns  National Funding – for Provision and Prioritized Investment of National Military Assets  NATO Common Funding – “Cost-Shares” for NATO Capability Projects or NATO Owned Assets Findings – NNEC Impediments (3 of 3)

15. NATO and nations will rely upon NRF as a focal point to operationalize CIE network enabled common services; however, implementing NNEC presents interoperability challenges in migrating stakeholders away from a platform- centric legacy environment to a network-centric force – a “paradigm shift”NATO and nations will rely upon NRF as a focal point to operationalize CIE network enabled common services; however, implementing NNEC presents interoperability challenges in migrating stakeholders away from a platform- centric legacy environment to a network-centric force – a “paradigm shift” Conclusions (1 of 2)

16. NRF in quick reaction force roleNRF in quick reaction force role - Can’t leverage NRF capabilities without NC3 bodies breaking away from stovepiped policies, architectures, and management approaches NNEC is intended to overcome with this plug-and- operate concept - Can’t leverage NRF capabilities without NC3 bodies breaking away from stovepiped policies, architectures, and management approaches NNEC is intended to overcome with this plug-and- operate concept NRF in transformation catalyst roleNRF in transformation catalyst role - Can’t accelerate NNEC evolutionary programs or improve NATO/national systems without firm mutual stakeholders’ national commitments to reduce technology and capabilities gaps - Can’t accelerate NNEC evolutionary programs or improve NATO/national systems without firm mutual stakeholders’ national commitments to reduce technology and capabilities gaps Conclusions: Role Implications (2 of 2)

17. 1st: Regarding NRF’s quick reaction force role1st: Regarding NRF’s quick reaction force role - NC3 organizational bodies must reassert overarching CIS interoperability roles and responsibilities and focus on “quick wins” - NC3 organizational bodies must reassert overarching CIS interoperability roles and responsibilities and focus on “quick wins” Recommendations (1 of 3)

18. 2d: Regarding NRF’s transformation catalyst role2d: Regarding NRF’s transformation catalyst role - NC3 organizational bodies should exploit distributed Alliance cross-cutting capabilities, integrating NNEC economies of scale where consensus is possible - NC3 organizational bodies should exploit distributed Alliance cross-cutting capabilities, integrating NNEC economies of scale where consensus is possible - Nations must have political will to invest upfront in network-centric initiatives while reducing investments to recapitalize national legacy systems - Nations must have political will to invest upfront in network-centric initiatives while reducing investments to recapitalize national legacy systems Recommendations (2 of 3)

19. 3d: Regarding industry3d: Regarding industry - NC3 organizational bodies and nations must stay connected with industry forums such as Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium – implementing NNEC in the NRF is an intellectual teaming effort - NC3 organizational bodies and nations must stay connected with industry forums such as Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium – implementing NNEC in the NRF is an intellectual teaming effort Recommendations (3 of 3)

20. Comments/Questions Published work can be found at this website: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/index.asp Click on “Information as Power”

21. Backup Charts

22. Discussion: Network Centric Warfare (NCW) Background

23. Network-Centric Frames of ReferenceNetwork-Centric Frames of Reference U.S. – Net Centric Operations and Warfare (NCOW)U.S. – Net Centric Operations and Warfare (NCOW) U.K. – Network-Enabled Capability (NEC)U.K. – Network-Enabled Capability (NEC) Discussion: NNEC - Background