1. United Nations
Preventive Diplomacy

2. “Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and limit the spread of the latter when they occur.” (An Agenda for Peace).

3. “Preventive diplomacy is non-forcible action made by all actors to prevent all conflicts between the parties concerned from becoming violent, deteriorating and spreading, and to prevent them from becoming armed conflicts being likely to endanger international peace and security.

4. “Preventive diplomacy is defined here as the range of peaceful dispute resolution methods mentioned in Article 33 of the UN Charter when applied before a dispute crosses the threshold to armed conflict.” (Connie Peck)

5. “Preventive diplomacy is defined in a broad sense which comprehends the definition in “An Agenda for Peace”, that is, “to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts.” It should be noted, however, that, preventive diplomacy is closely related, and is sometimes inseparably related to such as “peace-making”, “peacekeeping”, “peace building” and “peace enforcement”. In this regard, needless to say, preventive diplomacy is just a means to resolve conflict.

6. Secretary-General Annan has noted, “Just as the root causes of armed conflict may vary widely, the nature of appropriate preventive actions and the resources needed to implement them cover a broad spectrum”. In taking this into account, nothing remains but to explain general problems regarding preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, apart from concrete methods of preventive action mentioned in Annan’s Report.

7. Diplomacy efforts discuss concrete cases in relation to preventive conflict resolutions and important tools for solving International Political Crises.
Some Fundamental Principles of Modern International Law It seems to be important to reaffirm some fundamental principles of modern international law concerning preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution.

8. Prohibition of the use of force
A central feature of the modern international legal system in comparison with ‘classical’ international law is the normative attempt to control the use of force. The movement to prohibit war has begun in the early 20th century, and the High Contracting Parties of the Covenant of the League of Nations accepted obligations not to resort to war.
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits war totally, by prohibiting ‘the threat or use of force’.
Then, the Charter elaborates a system of economic, political and military enforcement measures against aggression in Chapter VII, that is, the collective security system. The monopoly in enforcement power was made subject only to two exceptions: first, the individual or collective right of self-defense in Article 51 and, second, enforcement measures by regional organizations authorized by the Security Council under Article 53.

9. (2) Peaceful settlement of disputes
Disputes between States arising from claims and counter-claims concerning a matter of fact, law and policy are an inevitable part of international relations and have frequently led to armed conflict.
In ‘classical’ international law, enforcement measures using armed force had been legal. As the use of force has become illegal, only peaceful means to settle disputes have been seen as legal ones, since the adoption of Article 2 of the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928, which stipulates that “The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.”
In modern international law, Article 2(3) of the Charter obliges Member States to “settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered”, and Chapter VI of the Charter is completely devoted to this purpose.
As will be discussed later, needless to say, peaceful means of disputes cannot be limited to those of Chapter VI of the Charter.
as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter. However, the most striking feature of this Supplement was the “need for hard decisions” he newly proposed, which included sanctions and enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the Charter. As to Annan’s Report, it will be referred to later.

10. Overview of Preventive Diplomacy in the United Nations
Hammersköld and Preventive or Quiet Diplomacy
Hammersköld regarded the United Nations not as static conference machinery but as a dynamic instrument enabling Governments to develop forms of anticipatory action before a crisis boiled over- “preventive diplomacy”. Its purpose was to create conditions where each main military block could not meddle in others, by filling up a vacuum of power taken place between the blocks by the United Nations, and its concrete means was the so-called “UN Presence”, that is, the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the first United Nations peacekeeping force.

11. Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Preventive Diplomacy
In 1992, in “An Agenda for Peace”, the Secretary-General said: ” Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, over 100 major conflicts around the world have left some 20 million dead. The United Nations was rendered powerless to deal with many of these crises because of the vetoes-279 of them- cast in the Security Council which were a vivid expression of the division of that period.
…With the end of the cold war there have been no such vetoes since 31 May 1990, and demands on the United Nations have surged.”
Then he regarded “preventive diplomacy” as follows: “The most desirable and efficient employment of diplomacy is to ease tensions before they result in conflict – or, if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly 4 to contain it and resolve its underlying causes. Preventive diplomacy may be performed by the Secretary-General personally or through senior staff or specialized agencies and programmes, by the Security Council or the General Assembly, and by regional organizations in cooperation with the United Nations. Preventive diplomacy requires measures to create confidence; it needs early warnings
based on information gathering and informal or formal fact-finding; it may also involve preventive deployment and, in some situations, demilitarized zones.”

12. Annan and Preventive Action
In 2001, Annan proposed to rename the activity called “preventive diplomacy” as “preventive action”.
“Preventive diplomacy is particularly favoured by Member States as a means of
Preventing human suffering and as an alternative to costly politico-military operations to resolve conflicts after they have broken out. Although diplomacy is a well-tried means of preventing conflict, the United Nations experience in recent years has shown that there are several other forms of action that can have useful preventive effects: preventive deployment; preventive disarmament; preventive humanitarian action; and preventive peace-building, which can involve, with the consent of the Government or Governments concerned, a wide range of actions in the fields of good governance, human rights and
economic and social development. For this reason, the Secretary-General decided to rename the activity called “preventive diplomacy” as “preventive action”.
It should be noted, however, that Annan emphasized that “preventive action should mostly be limited to measures under Chapter VI of the Charter, but noted that enforcement action under Chapter VII must remain a legitimate means of last resort to prevent massive violations of fundamental human
rights or other serious threats to peace”.

13. …... Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution
The following are the roles and activities of the United Nations departments, agencies and programmes in the prevention of armed conflict proposed by Annan.
1. Political action
The Department of Political Affairs (of the Secretariat) is currently endeavoring to improve its early warning and analysis capacities; to improve its cooperation with Governments and with regional organizations, and so on.

14. 2. Peacekeeping operations
While all peacekeeping operations could be said to have a preventive function in that they are intended to avert the outbreak or recurrence of conflict, their preventive role has been particularly clear where they have been deployed before the beginning of an armed conflict. This has taken place three times over the last decade, with the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).
In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) and a succession of operations in Haiti.
More active use of preventive deployments before the onset of conflict is needed.

15. 3. Disarmament
The evolution of disarmament norms is a continuous process, and there are still some areas , such as nuclear weapons, missile development and small arms, which lack an international normative framework. (While the problem of nuclear weapons is extremely important, the problem of small arms and light weapons (including anti-personnel mines) is also vital. In the last 10 years, some 4 million people, among them 90 % civilians (80 % of which are women and children), have been killed in various armed conflicts. As to the issue of small arms, it should be noted that the Japanese Government has contributed to make a legal framework to control them.)

16. 4. Human rights action
Sustainable and long-term prevention of armed conflict must include a focus on strengthening respect for human rights and addressing core issues of human rights violations, wherever these occur. In this respect, the Secretary-General has urged Member States to ratify or accede to human rights treaties and the statute of the International Criminal Court.

17. 5. Developmental assistance
Development assistance cannot by itself prevent or end conflict. It can, however, facilitate the creation of opportunities and the political, economic and social spaces within which indigenous actors can identify, develop and use the resources necessary to build peaceful, equitable and just societies.

18. 6. Humanitarian action
While humanitarian action clearly plays a critical role in alleviating the plight of affected civilian populations in crises, humanitarian actors can also contribute to conflict prevention by implementing targeted projects to avert recurrence of conflicts.
Preventing the internal displacement of civilians can play an important and at times pivotal role in the prevention of conflict.
As to the specific aspects in this field, the problems of food security and emergency food aid, refugees, health and children are important.

19. 7. Media and public information
Mass media has the power to shape and mobilize public opinion and is often manipulated by the conflicting parties to incite violence and to provoke armed conflicts.
The presence of the United Nations may have a moderating role in the sense that it provides impartial information to the local population, and may help to reduce tension between the conflicting parties and prevent the resumption of armed conflicts.

20. 8. Gender equality
6 Ever since the First World Conference on Women, held in Mexico in 1975, there has been recognition that women have an important role to play in the promotion of peace.
An essential aspect of conflict prevention is the strengthening of the rule of law, and within that the protection of women’s human rights achieved through a focus on gender equality in constitutional, legislative, judicial and electoral reform.

21. 9. Drug and crime prevention
There is a need to address illegal business activities that fuel the fires of conflict. In this respect, the role of the relevant United Nations bodies, particularly in prevention of transnational crimes, drug trafficking and illicit trade in small arms is important

22. KOSOVO Preventive Diplomacy (case study)
Preventive Diplomacy of Slovenia applied during the period Kosovo was preparing to declare its independence, as well as in the months that followed. In the first half of 2008, when the question of independence was the most pressing and when independence was finally declared, Slovenia was performing one of the most demanding foreign policy tasks in its history - presiding over the EU Council. The methodology is based on two methods: first, on an analysis of press releases of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia; and second, on an analysis of semi-structured interviews with high-ranking Slovenian diplomats who were actively engaged in preventive diplomacy in the case of Kosovo. The analysis shows that Slovenia exercised a continuous "policy of balancing" between Kosovo and Serbia, in constant co-ordination with some influential EU countries, as well as with the USA and the Russian Federation. Slovenia's quite active inclusion in that process was possible because of the credibility the country enjoys in South-east Europe, as well as the quality of information about Kosovo's declaration of independence Slovenia had. However, it must be noted that Slovenia was left out of certain negotiations on Kosovo's declaration of independence despite the fact that it was presiding over the EU Council.

23. Iraq Preventive Diplomacy (case study)
The UN's contribution to preventative diplomacy was too little too late. The UN showed little interest in the initial dispute, even after Iraqi troops began massing on the Kuwaiti border. UN member states also failed to bring the issue before the Security Council. The UN Secretary- General failed to exercise his broad discretion, and neither discussed the issue with the parties, nor brought it before the Security Council. The Secretary-General may have failed to act due to insufficient information on the crisis.
Regional organizations did not do much preventative diplomacy either. The Gulf Cooperation Countries did not adequately stress its principle of collective self-defense. The Arab League did not pursue mediation, though its charter authorizes it to mediate any dispute which threatens to lead to war. This failure was largely due to divisions among its member nations.

24. Western Sahara: The Failure of preventive Diplomacy- "Negotiations without Preconditions“ (Case Study)
The ongoing effort to use negotiations without preconditions to resolve the conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front over Western Sahara has not produced results. The April 6, 2010 report of the United Nations secretary-general to the U.N. Security Council admits that there has been no movement on the core substantive issues.
The informal talks between the government of Morocco and the Polisario Front organized by Christopher Ross, current personal envoy to the U.N. secretary-general, from February 10-11, 2010, resulted at an impasse.
Neither Morocco nor the Polisaro Front is prepared to accept the other’s proposal as the sole basis for future negotiations. Barring pressure from their Western allies, nothing in their relations, in the region or international environment is likely to occur to change this in the foreseeable future.

25. How Preventive Diplomacy be more effective?
The Political Researchers makes four suggestions for more effective preventative diplomacy in the future. First, UN member states should act promptly to bring disputes to the attention of the Security Council. Second, the UN Secretary-General should initiate informal discussion with disputing parties before the dispute becomes a crisis. If those discussion are unproductive, then the Secretary-General should refer the matter to the Security Council. Third, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) should be used more. "Where a dispute has been present for many years, and has the potential to lead to a major crisis," it should be brought to the ICJ for adjudication or an Advisory Opinion. Finally, regional organizations should play a greater role in preventative diplomacy. However, such organizations are often internally divided and lack credibility, and so in many cases the UN will remain the best suited organization to undertake preventative measures.
The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established by Security Council resolution of 29 April 1991 in accordance with settlement proposals accepted on 30 August 1988 by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO).

27. Siham Al-Jiboury