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Yarnell Hill Fire Case study A learning and Discussion Tool for Firefighters
Developed By Brad Mayhew — Fireline Factors Consulting Released 9 June 2014
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Acknowledgements Special thanks to the local, state, federal, and tribal firefighters who served as subject matter experts and in beta testing groups. Your service has been invaluable in developing this learning tool for the fire community. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Contents Introduction and User Guides Module 1 – Background and Overview Module 2 – The Lunch Spot Module 3 – The Descent Point Module 4 – The Deployment Site Closeout Exercise Share Your Feedback Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Introduction and User Guides
Topics Covered Intent and background of this case study Tips for facilitators and class guides
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Intent The purpose of this case study is to provide discussion and learning exercises for operational firefighters. Much is unknown, unclear, or uncertain about this accident. Yet, there are opportunities to learn and improve for the future. What you can do: use available information, try to put yourself in the situation, think about your own experiences, and discuss with other firefighters. Group dialog will provide some of the best opportunities for insight and learning. This slideshow is a tool for facilitating discussion. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Share your feedback www.bit.ly/YarnellCaseStudyFeedback
The intent of this case study is to provide a tool for discussion and learning from the Yarnell Hill Fire. It was built using input from firefighters. You can help shape future learning tools by sharing your feedback. Go to: Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
background This slideshow is adapted from the Yarnell Hill Fire Serious Accident Investigation Report; September 23, 2013. It focuses on three key decision points, as reconstructed and interpreted by the Investigation Team. For more precise and thorough detail, see the Report, especially the Narrative (pp ) and Analysis (pp ). This slideshow does not add new information to what is publicly available. Instead, it is a tool for prompting discussion and thinking among firefighters. The primary target audience is operational firefighters. This tool is intended for training at the crew or district level, or for self study. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Tips for Facilitators Suggestions for using this slideshow in the classroom: Be selective. You do not need to go through each line or each slide. Determine how much time and how many sessions you will have. Pick which topics, slides, and exercises you want to use. Plan ample time for exercises and discussion questions. Start your class by showing the Yarnell Hill Fire Briefing Video: A projector is recommended, if available (larger display than flat screen). Consider using a sand table to model terrain and events. (For more on sand tables and tactical decision games: ) Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Suggested class Guides
Be selective. You do not need to go through each line or each slide. Determine how much time and how many sessions you will have. Pick which topics, slides, and exercises you want to use. Here are three options: Go through each slide and do all exercises. 1 session x 4-6 hours Break the slideshow into shorter sessions. Plan for each module to take about an hour. Begin with the “Intent” slide, and finish with “Closeout Exercises.” 3-4 sessions x 1-2 hours each Use slides with titles starting “Point A,” “Point B,” or “Point C.” Include additional slides as desired. Start class with the Briefing Video and “Intent” slide. Finish with “Closeout Exercises.” 1 session x 2-3 hours Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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1 Background Module Topics Covered Area overview
Fire events before 1604 on 30 June 2013 See Also: Serious Accident Investigation Report (SAIR) pp. 1-4: Executive Summary SAIR pp. 8-10: Background SAIR pp : Appendix A: Sequence of Events
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Yarnell Hill Fire Briefing video – Group Exercise
Watch the Yarnell Hill Fire Briefing Video for an overview of events. The video is available through the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center YouTube channel: xSqjRmxIE Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Yarnell, Arizona Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Lunch Spot HWY 89 Boulder Springs Ranch Yarnell (Glen Ilah) Yarnell (Shrine Area) N Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Fire Start — 28 June 2013 Late afternoon on 28 June, the Yarnell Hill Fire started high on a ridge west of Yarnell, Arizona, when lightning ignited multiple fires. The fire started in a boulder field in steep terrain with no vehicle access; it was about one-half acre in size. Responders saw minimal fire activity or spread potential, and they had several safety concerns with putting firefighters on the hill overnight with potential lightning. The Incident Commander prepared for full suppression on the following morning. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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N Yarnell Hill Fire Area, 29 June 2013 Peeples Valley Yarnell
Fire Origin Yarnell Hill Fire Area, 29 June 2013 N Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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N Yarnell Hill Fire Area, 29 June 2013 Yarnell
Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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29 June 2013 On 29 June, resources held the fire in check until around 1600, when winds increased, and the fire spotted outside containment lines. That evening, the Type 4 Incident Commander ordered a Type 2 Incident Management Team (IMT) and additional resources for the next morning. The fire grew throughout the night, to an estimated 300 to acres by the morning of 30 June. Air Attack reconnaissance photo. Facing northeast. 29 June 2013, 1924. N Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
30 June Granite Mountain IHC (GM) arrived and attended a briefing at around GM Supt was assigned the role of DIVS A. GM Capt would be crew boss. DIVS A’s assignment was to establish an anchor point at the heel of the fire with the crew. Granite Mountain parked crew carriers, then hiked to the heel of the fire. From this area, they could see most of the fire. They posted one of their lookouts near an old grader, at 1239. Granite Mountain IHC hiking to heel of fire. 30 June 2013. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
30 June (Continued) For most of the day, the fire spread to the northeast, threatening structures in Model Creek and Peeples Valley. Around 1550, the wind shifted and the fire started pushing aggressively to the southeast, toward Yarnell. Fire resources shifted to resident evacuation and structure protection there. Only Granite Mountain IHC remained out on the ridge, on the southwest perimeter of the fire. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
30 June (Continued) At about this same time (~1550), one of the GM lookouts, who was posted near an old grader in the flats below where the crew was working, recognized it was time to move. He called GM Capt and said the fire hit his trigger point and that he was moving towards the open area at the old grader. GM Capt calmly replied, “Okay, cool.” GM Lookout was unsure whether he would be able to reposition or whether he would need to deploy his fire shelter. At the same time, the Blue Ridge IHC (BR) Supt was driving his UTV to meet DIVS A for a face-to-face meeting. As GM Lookout reached the old grader, he saw BR Supt driving around the corner. BR Supt picked up GM Lookout and took him back to the GM trucks. The GM trucks were moved to the Shrine area of Yarnell, prior to being moved to the restaurant staging area of 89. DIVS A and GM Capt discussed options, whether to stay in the black or plan to move. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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2 the Lunch spot Module Topics Covered
Point A – Near the Lunch Spot at ~1604 What the crew likely knew at that point Options available Actions taken What they likely did not know Weather Communication See Also: SAIR pp : Narrative SAIR pp : Analysis SAIR pp : Learning Discussion
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Lunch Spot HWY 89 Boulder Springs Ranch Yarnell (Glen Ilah) Yarnell (Shrine Area) N Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Lookout Spot (left by ~1553) GM Carriers parked here (moved by ~1600)
Overview Lookout Spot (left by ~1553) N Point A: The Lunch Spot (~1604) Old Grader Yarnell (Shrine Area) GM Carriers parked here (moved by ~1600) Yarnell (Glen Ilah) The Boulder Springs Ranch 0.25 miles Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Point A — What they Likely Knew
By 1604, near the lunch spot, Granite Mountain IHC likely knew or perceived the following: Their original assignment to establish an anchor point and construct fireline was no longer valid based on the fire’s movement. They were the only resource left on the fireline. Blue Ridge IHC was pulling back to Yarnell. The primary focus of operational activity on the fire that day was on structure protection to the north and northeast. However, by this time, the fire was moving southeast and was beginning to threaten Yarnell. A crewmember sent a personal text message at 1555: “Fire is running at Yarnell!” Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Point A — What they Likely Knew (Continued)
By 1604, near the lunch spot, Granite Mountain IHC likely knew or perceived the following: They had heard the Boulder Springs Ranch was a “bomb proof safety zone” that morning. Using Google Maps and an iPad, they had seen the Ranch, as well as potential trails and roads leading to it. Fire behavior all day was in pulses and variable, not a consistent fire spread direction. A crewmember sent a personal photo text message at 1604: “This thing is runnin straight for yarnel jus starting evac. You can see fire on left town on the right.” Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Near the lunch spot. Facing north, 1550.
Old Grader
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Near the lunch spot. Facing northeast, 1604.
Sent with text message: “This thing is runnin straight for yarnel jus starting evac. You can see fire on left town on the right.” Old Grader
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Weather pre-1550: Most of the morning and early afternoon, winds shifted between west-southwest and south-southwest. ~1402: A weather update received shortly after 1402 advised of thunderstorms to the east that could produce winds of 35 to 45 mph out of the northeast. These winds never materialized; the crew could have perceived this as a false alarm. ~1526: FBAN provided a second weather update sometime after 1526 on State Tac1: an outflow boundary north of the fire may produce north or northeast winds of 40 to 50 mph. ~1550: Granite Mountain IHC observed wind shifts. Before that, the fire was moving generally northeast. Around 1550, the fire shifted to moving east-southeast and aggressively pushing toward Yarnell. The outflow boundary itself had not arrived yet. It is possible they may have interpreted the 1550 wind shifts as the anticipated wind event. 1630: Outflow boundary hits the southern perimeter of the fire. Wind shifts again and increases, driving the fire south. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Weather (Continued) Outflow boundary: Strong downdraft winds can develop under storm clouds. Downdrafts reach the earth’s surface and become “outflow winds,” which can exceed 50 miles per hour. An “outflow boundary,” or “gust front,” is the leading edge of the outflow winds as they move away from thunderstorms. Note – Changes in air pressure can bring wind shifts, even before the outflow boundary arrives. Then, the outflow boundary itself can bring another wind shift. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Weather Discussion Questions
How long does a forecast keep you on the edge of your seat? How long do you wait before you decide a forecasted condition is not going to materialize? How long do weather bulletins remain fresh in your mind? How does this relate to planning for the worst-case scenario? Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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ESTIMATED WINDS AT SOUTH END OF FIRE
Point A – Options Approx. Fire Perimeter, 1600 A2: Head north, through the black N Point A: The Lunch Spot (~1604) A1: Stay in the black A4: Head southeast along the two-track road, toward the Ranch A3: Head southwest to the highway ESTIMATED WINDS AT SOUTH END OF FIRE WNW to NW @ 25 By 1550 Prior to 1550 Variable. SSW to WSW up to 17 0.25 miles Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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N Two-track dirt road toward yarnell, facing southeast. (29 June 2013)
Descent Point Yarnell The Ranch Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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N Two-track dirt road toward yarnell,
facing south. (Morning of 30 June 2013) N Descent Point Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Point A – Options: Group Exercise
Head north, through the black Exercise: Break into four groups, one per option. Try to put yourself at Point A, at that time. Based on your experience: 1) Discuss possible pro’s and con’s of your option. 2) Brainstorm subjective factors that might pull you in that direction. 3) What if the decision were already made to take this option — what would it take for you to be comfortable with it? Report out to the large group. Point A: The Lunch Spot (~1604) A1: Stay in the black A4: Head southeast along the two-track road, toward the Ranch A3: Head southwest to the highway Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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POINT A — Group discussion questions
Select a question or two for group discussion. Put yourself at Point A, near the Lunch Spot at 1604: Do you see other options? Or variations on those options? What might make you want to leave the black and head for the Ranch? How might the following factors influence your sense of risk: • Structures, other values at risk • How defensible the structures are • Citizens in structures • Thunderstorms • “Home turf” vs. on the road • What would you add to this list? Give examples of how these factors have shaped your own decision-making. If you were a crewmember at Point A, what questions might you ask? How do you encourage these kinds of questions and open communication? If the decision were made to head for the Ranch — what would it take for you to be comfortable with that decision? When have you made a similar decision and been surprised by fire behavior? Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Point A — Action: Head for the Ranch
At some time after 1604, Granite Mountain IHC moved from the area where they had been working throughout the day. The SAI team found no indication that anyone asked them to move or that they doubted the black was a valid safety zone. The crew started traveling southeast to the Boulder Springs Ranch along the two-track road. It is not clear whether they planned to follow the two-track road all the way to the Ranch, or whether they planned to descend and take the more direct route through the box canyon. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Point A — Action: Head for the Ranch (Continued)
While on the two-track road, these options stayed open: An alternate escape route to Hwy 89 to the southwest Returning to the black They traveled along the two-track road for about 15 min, until they reached the Descent Point at about 1620 (Point B). This was about about one mile from Point A. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Communication The SAI Report mentions communication issues on the fire, and points to “brief, informal, and vague radio transmissions and talkarounds that can occur during wildland fire communications.” (p. 55) Multiple times, the crew said over the radio that they were moving. Other resources on the fire heard this, but the meaning was not fully understood. Some were confused — they thought that the crew was already safe in the cold black, and that they were planning to stay there. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Communication Example
Shortly after the Blue Ridge IHC Supt picked up the GM Lookout, DIVS A said over the radio: “I want to pass on that we’re going to make our way to our escape route.” BR Supt attempted to clarify: “You guys are in the black, correct?” DIVS A responded: “Yeah, we’re picking our way through the black.” DIVS A then mentioned a road in the bottom and “going out toward the ranch.” BR Supt thought DIVS A was talking about heading northeast, through the black, to one of the ranches in that direction. BR Supt said: “DIVS A, to confirm, you’re talking about the road you saw me on with the UTV earlier, in the bottom.” DIVS A replied: “Yes, the road I saw you on with the Ranger [the UTV].” Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Communication Discussion questions
If you heard this exchange, what assumptions would you make? How is communication different in normal vs. high tempo operations? Give examples of a time you were part of a conversation where the same word had two different meanings. When you communicate what you see, how much detail do you give? How can people in other locations help you assess risks near you? What practical issues can get in the way of having this level of communication on the fireline? Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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3 The Descent point Module Topics Covered
Point B – The Descent Point at ~1620 What the crew likely knew at that point Options available Actions taken What they likely did not know See Also: SAIR pp : Narrative SAIR pp : Analysis SAIR pp : Appendix B: Fire Environment & Behavior Analysis
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Approximate Fire Perimeter at 1615
Point B – Arrival Point A: Lunch Spot (~1604) Approximate Fire Perimeter at 1615 N Point B: Descent Point (~1620) ESTIMATED WINDS AT SOUTH END OF FIRE WNW to NW @ 25 By 1550 Prior to 1550 Variable. SSW to WSW up to 17 0.25 miles Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Point B — Arrival At some time after 1604, Granite Mountain IHC moved from the area where they had been working throughout the day (Point A). Along the way, these options were still open to them: An alternate escape route to Hwy 89 to the southwest Returning to the black They traveled along the two-track road for about 15 min, until they reached the Descent Point at about (Point B). This was about about one mile from Point A. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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POINT B — WHAT THEY Likely KNEW
As Granite Mountain IHC was travelling southeast along the two- track road, up to about 1620, they likely knew or perceived: They had attempted to communicate their movement to other resources on the fire. They could see and confirm the size of the cleared area around the Boulder Springs Ranch and could conclude that it appeared to be a valid, “bomb-proof” safety zone. The Ranch appeared very close. Several Accident Investigation Team members, looking at the Ranch from the road during site visits, agreed that it “seems so close, almost as if you could reach out and touch it.” If they descended from the ridge, they would maintain sight of the Ranch. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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POINT B — WHAT THEY Likely KNEW (Continued)
As Granite Mountain IHC was travelling southeast along the two-track road, up to about 1620, they likely knew or perceived: Fire was still heading east-southeast toward Yarnell. Smoke column was predominantly going east-southeast with clear air south of the fire. Below the two-track road, they could see the following: A box canyon Pockets of heavy brush and large boulders Washes and game trails and areas of lesser vegetation they could tie together and make a path Steep descent initially and then flattening terrain The direct path to the Ranch appeared shorter, and potentially faster, than continuing to follow the two-track road around the rim of the box canyon. The weather in the update had not materialized at their location and the update was about 50 minutes old. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Approximate Fire Perimeter at 1615
Point B – Options Point A: Lunch Spot (~1604) Approximate Fire Perimeter at 1615 N Point B: Descent Point (~1620) B4: Return to the black (~0.65 mi) B1: Descend here; move directly toward the Ranch through the box canyon (~0.65 mi) B3: Head southwest, down and out to the highway (~1.25 mi) B2: Continue toward the Ranch along the two-track road (~1.3 mi) ESTIMATED WINDS AT SOUTH END OF FIRE WNW to NW @ 25 By 1550 Prior to 1550 Variable. SSW to WSW up to 17 0.25 miles Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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N Near the Descent Point, Facing East.
(The dozer line to Deployment Site was constructed for access after the entrapment.) Yarnell (Shrine Area) N Yarnell (Glen Ilah) The Ranch Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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View of column at 1627 (From ~3.5 mi southwest of the Descent Point. Facing northeast.) N Outflow winds had not yet reached south end of fire. Note direction of column lean. C) Deployment Site (behind ridge) A) Lunch Spot (behind ridge) B) Descent Point (behind ridge) Image Courtesy of Matt Oss Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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N Aerial view facing west into the box canyon.
Yarnell and the Ranch are below and behind photographer. Lunch Spot Two-track road Two-track road Descent Point Deployment Site Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Point B – Options: Group Exercise
Point A: Lunch Spot (~1604) Exercise: Break into four groups - one per option. Try to put yourself at Point B. Based on your experience: 1) Discuss possible pro’s and con’s of your option. 2) Brainstorm subjective factors that might pull you in that direction. 3) What if the decision were already made to take this option — what would it take for you to be comfortable with it? Report out to the large group. Point B: Descent Point (~1620) B1: Descend here; move directly toward the Ranch through the box canyon B4: Return to the black B3: Head southwest, down and out to the highway Continue toward the Ranch along the two-track road B2: Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Point B — Group Discussion Questions
Select a question or two for group discussion. Try to put yourself at Point B: What factors might pull you to take the direct route through the box canyon? Assume that decision has already been made, what would it take for you to be comfortable with it? If you were a crewmember, what questions might you ask? As they travel, their options narrow. Which course of action narrows their options the most? Which course of action keeps the most options open? How far does the Ranch appear to you? Give examples when something looked close, but you were surprised how long it took to arrive. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Point B — Action: Descend, take most direct route
At Point B, around 1620, Granite Mountain IHC descended from the two-track road, taking the most direct route toward the Boulder Springs Ranch. We do not know if the entire crew descended together. It is possible some crewmembers scouted first, or some stayed higher up. This is not known. By the time they began their descent: the wind still had not shifted to the north-northeast at their location, and the fire still had not hooked around the ridge. The wind was still driving the fire to the east-southeast, and the fire was still west of the rock outcropping. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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POINT B — WHAT THEY LIKELY DID NOT KNOW
A large thunderstorm over 15 miles to the north and northeast was creating an outflow boundary. This would bring a wind increase and shift, driving the fire south and increasing fire spread. This outflow boundary had reached the north end of the fire at 1618 according to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) radar. The crew’s possible rate of travel would be less than half of what it had been to this point due to lack of a defined trail, heavy vegetation, and rocky terrain between the crew and the Ranch. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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POINT B — WHAT THEY LIKELY DID NOT KNOW (continued)
Other resources did not understand fully when the Granite Mountain IHC attempted to communicate their movement. Boulder Springs Ranch was further away than it appeared. Several Investigation Team members, looking at the Ranch from the road during site visits, agreed that it “seems so close, almost as if you could reach out and touch it.” This is due to a number of perceptual factors. For example, the structures (and structure clearance) are larger than others in the area and in the background. This could help make the Ranch seem closer than it was. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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4 The Deployment Site Module Topics Covered
Point C – The Deployment Site at ~1642 Perspective as they descended from road Options available Actions taken Crew movement and fire progression Modeled winds at the Deployment Site See Also: SAIR pp : Narrative SAIR pp : Analysis SAIR pp : Personal Protective Equipment Analysis
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As they Descended from point b
At Point B, around 1620, Granite Mountain IHC descended from the two-track road, taking the most direct route toward the Boulder Springs Ranch. The wind was still driving the fire to the east-southeast, and the fire was still west of the rock outcropping. Then, as they descended - Soon the rock outcropping blocked their sight of the fire. Soon, the ridge, boulders, and brush sheltered them. It is likely that: They could no longer see the fire, including its direction and rate of spread. They lost the ability to feel or see wind changes. They had a limited view of the smoke column, a lagging indicator of fire location and fire behavior. The smoke was heading parallel to them, and as an indicator of fire spread likely means that the fire was not headed toward them. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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ESTIMATED WINDS AT SOUTH END OF FIRE
Descending from Point B Point A: The Lunch Spot (~1604) N Point B: The Descent Point (~1620) Approx. Fire Perimeter, 1630 ESTIMATED WINDS AT SOUTH END OF FIRE WNW to NW @ 25 By 1550 Prior to 1550 Variable. SSW to WSW up to 17 0.25 miles Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Point C – Arrival At about 1639, about a quarter mile from the descent point, they reached flatter terrain and a small opening in the brush (Point C). The Ranch was still about 0.4 miles away. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Point C – Small Clearing
100 ft Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Fire Behavior An outflow boundary originating from a line of thunderstorms to the north-northeast swept over the fire area. Outflow winds reached the south end of the fire by The effect on the fire was immediate and impressive. The primary fire spread direction changed to the south; fire intensities and resulting flame lengths doubled, while rates of spread tripled. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Fire Behavior (Continued)
About ten minutes later, the fire reached the Glen Ilah community in Yarnell. As the fire and smoke ran through town, Sheriff’s deputies and firefighters quickly evacuated residents. Some residents were overwhelmed, not knowing where to go. Some they loaded into ambulances, others they picked up and drove to to safety. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Point C – what they likely Knew
At Point C, in a small clearing in the brush at about 1639, Granite Mountain IHC likely knew or perceived: They suddenly had a view of smoke in front of them and coming over the ridge behind them. The smoke was now blowing southward. Within minutes, flames were visible ahead of them and were coming over the ridge behind them. Winds were coming out of the north and had pushed the flaming front into the mouth of the canyon, and the fire was spreading directly towards them. They could not escape the box canyon before the fire reached them. They had limited time until the fire reached their location. They had very few options. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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ESTIMATED WINDS AT SOUTH END OF FIRE
Point C Point A: The Lunch Spot (~1604) N Point B: The Descent Point (~1620) Point C: The Deployment Site (~1642) Approx. Fire Perimeter, 1640 ESTIMATED WINDS AT SOUTH END OF FIRE WNW to NW @ 25 By 1550 45 At 1630 Prior to 1550 Variable. SSW to WSW up to 17 0.25 miles Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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N Modeled Winds at 1640 near the Deployment Site
(Modeled through Wind Wizard program) N Deployment Site Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Point C – Options The crew had very few options. Course of Action C1: Run away, seek a safer location or move to another site to deploy fire shelters. They may have perceived or considered: No obvious safe locations were visible. Nearby rock piles appeared to have less vegetation. Rocky areas were about 120 yards uphill through heavy brush and there would not have been enough time to reach them. Uneven terrain and rock piles are not preferred fire shelter deployment locations. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Point C – Options (Continued)
Course of Action C2: Prepare current location and deploy fire shelters here. They may have perceived or considered: Certainty that survival from advancing fire was not possible outside shelters. Uncertainty of whether survival from advancing fire was possible inside shelters. Remaining together rather than scattering best maintained crew cohesion. Very little time for any other course of action. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Point C – Action: Prepare Deployment Site
By 1639, Granite Mountain IHC was preparing the site for fire shelter deployment. They contacted the Aerial Supervision Module to say “our escape route has been cut off. We are preparing a deployment site and we are burning out around ourselves in the brush and I’ll give you a call when we are under the sh— the shelters.” Within minutes they were deploying fire shelters. Seven firefighters were fully deployed inside shelters, while 12 firefighters had shelters either mostly or partially deployed. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Deployment Site Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Time Lapse Images showing a view of column from southwest
Photo location Descent Point 1630 Fire Perimeter N Yarnell The following five slides are from a sequence of photographs taken between 1627 and These were taken approximately 3.5 miles southwest of the Descent Point. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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N View of column from southwest 1627 Outflow winds had not yet reached
south end of fire. Note direction of column lean. C) Deployment Site (behind ridge) A) Lunch Spot (behind ridge) B) Descent Point (behind ridge) Image Courtesy of Matt Oss Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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N View of column from southwest 1640
Outflow winds driving smoke over ridge. Flames cresting ridge near Descent Point. C) Deployment Site (behind ridge) A) Lunch Spot (behind ridge) B) Descent Point (behind ridge) Image Courtesy of Matt Oss Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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N View of column from southwest 1641 C) Deployment Site A) Lunch Spot
(behind ridge) A) Lunch Spot (behind ridge) B) Descent Point (behind ridge) Image Courtesy of Matt Oss Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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N View of column from southwest 1643 C) Deployment Site A) Lunch Spot
(behind ridge) A) Lunch Spot (behind ridge) B) Descent Point (behind ridge) Image Courtesy of Matt Oss Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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N View of column from southwest 1648 C) Deployment Site A) Lunch Spot
(behind ridge) A) Lunch Spot (behind ridge) B) Descent Point (behind ridge) Image Courtesy of Matt Oss Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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ESTIMATED WINDS AT SOUTH END OF FIRE
Crew Movement and Fire Progression Point A: The Lunch Spot (~1604) Approximate Fire Perimeter 1600 1615 Point B: The Descent Point (~1620) Point C: Deployment Site (~1642) 1630 1640 ESTIMATED WINDS AT SOUTH END OF FIRE WNW to NW @ 25 By 1550 45 At 1630 Prior to 1550 Variable. SSW to WSW up to 17 1650 N 0.25 miles Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Granite boulder spalling (flaking) from extreme heat near Deployment Site. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Burnt stobs, hand tool, chainsaws and fireline packs at Deployment Site. Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Close out Exercise
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Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
Close Out Exercise Group discussion questions: What discussion point made the biggest impression on you? What is one lesson you will bring forward? What is one thing you can do differently on future fires? Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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Share your Feedback
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Share your feedback www.bit.ly/YarnellCaseStudyFeedback
The intent of this case study is to provide a tool for discussion and learning from the Yarnell Hill Fire. It was built using input from firefighters. You can help shape future learning tools by sharing your feedback. Go to: Yarnell Hill Fire – Case Study
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