1. Topics in moral psychology
What is trust?
Matt Bennett
Drmattbennett.weebly.com

2. Topics in Moral Psychology
What is trust?
When should we trust?
Trust in politics and public life
Ethics of knowing – epistemic justice
Ethics of knowing – implicit beliefs and bias
Responsibility I
Responsibility II
Responsibility III

3. Why think about trust? Trust is inescapable
Trust is fundamental to morality
Trust is (arguably) fundamental to society

4. Trust and contractarianism
But isn’t trust covered in promises, agreements, contracts?
Moral contractarianism: moral norms derive their force from the rationality of mutual agreement
Baier: trust is not contractual
Trust is not willed
Trust can be unconscious or unchosen
One contracts where trust is lacking
Trust is available/applies to those excluded from contracts

5. Trust and contractarianism
But isn’t trust covered in promises, agreements, contracts?
Moral contractarianism: moral norms derive their force from the rationality of mutual agreement
Baier: trust is not contractual
Trust is not willed
Trust can be unconscious or unchosen
One contracts where trust is lacking
Trust is available/applies to those excluded from contracts

6. Trust and reliance Provisional definition of trust:
To trust someone to  is to have a strong conviction that one can depend on that person to 
Problem – this applies equally to trust and reliance
Baier:
To trust someone is to rely on that person’s goodwill towards me
Problem – confidence trickster

7. Trust and betrayal Richard Holton
Trust is reliance + participant stance
Failures of trust (and distrust) warrant reactive attitudes

8. Deciding to trust? Trust and beliefs
One argument for thinking we do not decide to trust: A necessary condition for trust is the belief that someone is trustworthy Beliefs are not something I decide to have Therefore it cannot be the case that we decide to trust

9. Deciding to trust? Trust and beliefs
Thesis: It cannot be the case that we decide to trust Objection 1: some beliefs are arrived at through deliberation Counter 1: concluding deliberation does not involve an additional act of will Objection 2: trust is emotional, not epistemic Counter 2: even affective theories of trust include “expectations” (see e.g. Karen Jones)

10. Trust and Normative Pluralism
Richard Holton: Sometimes we rely on something contrary to evidence of dependability (e.g. mooring a boat with an old rope) Sometimes we trust without judging that the person is trustworthy Consider e.g. a trust fall We can have different kinds of reasons to trust