2. Research method
Dimensions of reform
Project outcomes
Project timelines
Propositions
Discussion

3. MULTIPLE CASE STUDY DESIGN Research method and assessment criteria
Contemporary phenomenon
Investigated in-context
Frameworks of analysis
Each case an single unit of analysis
Project objectives:
Accessibility
Attractiveness
Infrastructure
Operations
MULTIPLE CASE
STUDY DESIGN
Literal replication
Theoretical replication
Chronological sequencing
Analytical generalizations

4. Propositions 1:
The IPTN projects are delayed due to a lack of capacity within government to implement large, complex transport projects.
The IPTN projects are delayed due to the short implementing timeline objectives set out in the 2007 Public Transport Strategy and Action Plan. 2:

5. 2007 Public Transport Strategy & Action Plan
COMPETITION
Transport authority responsible for planning, managing and regulating the IPTN. Negotiated gross-cost contracts with municipal control on fare income.
BUSINESS
Inclusion of existing bus operators and the formalisation of minibus-taxi operators into vehicle operating companies that can compete for IPTN gross-cost contracts.
SERVICE
Modal integration
Electronic fare payment
16 – 24 hrs of operation
5 – 10 min peak head way
10 – 30 min off peak head way
85% of all residents within 1km Real-time user information
Source: H Schalekamp, 2015

6. “It is a complex approach as it requires concurrent changes
along all three dimensions of public transport reform:
the mode of service delivery, the competition regulatory system, and paratransit ownership structures”
H Schalekamp, 2015

7. Comparison of project outcomes

8. Comparison of project outcomes
GoGeorge
Libhongolethu
A Re Yeng
4/5
2/5
2/5
2/2
1/2
2/2
3/4
2/4
4/4
0/4
0/4
0/4
DELAYED
DELAYED
DELAYED

9. GoGeorge operational outcomes
Intended Phase 1 launch
January 2012
Actual Phase 1 launch
December 2014
Intended all phases operational
June 2015
Predicted ridership per day
(2016/17)
Actual ridership per day
(2016/17)
Predicted fare revenue per annum
R (2013/14)
Actual fare revenue per annum
R (2016/17)

10. GoGeorge timeline
The timeline details the GoGeorge’s inception to the arrival of the universally accessible minibus-taxi fleet
March, 2007: NDoT Public Transport Strategy and Action Plan launched
April 2011: WC Government and George Municipality signing support agreements
June 2012: Existing public transport operators demand industry compensation.
Prior to the launch of the 2007 Plan, George had been engaging with their public transport industry to transform into a formal bus company. The launch of the 2007 Plan and the impending 2010 World Cup caused these developments to pause until 2011.
Two years of engagement concluded with provincial government bolstering capacity of George Municipality. Both government spheres become responsible for planning, management and funding. Provincial government agreed to subsidise the operational deficit.
During the 2007 engagements, the industry had agreed to relinquish their operating license without compensation. However, by 2010 other major cities had paid compensation for operating licenses. This set a precedent and ballooned the cost the IPTN project.

11. Libhongolethu operational outcomes
Intended Phase 1 launch
June 2011
Actual Phase 1 launch
February 2013 (end - Nov 2013)
Intended all phases operational
January 2014
Predicted ridership per day
(all phases)
Actual ridership per day
(Pilot)/
0 (2016/17)
Predicted fare revenue per annum
R1 billion (all phases)
Actual fare revenue per annum
R0.00 (2016/17)

12. Libhongolethu timeline
The timeline details Libhongolethu’s inception to a preliminary forensic investigation into corruption allegations
October 2010: NMBM reveals IPTN funds spent on World Cup.
September 2011: High Court orders vetting of taxi industry structures.
November 2012: Pikoli’s investigation into corruption allegations begins.
Laph’umilanga operated the the World Cup bus services. Confusion on the funding of Post-World Cup IPTN operations initiated the eroding of trust between Laph’umilanga and NMBM. NMBM offered funding in Dec 2010 and promised the balance of World Cup funding in March 2011.
NMBM queried the validity of Laph’umilanga’s mandate to represent the minibus-taxi industry in the IPTN project. This lead to the entire industry membership being vetted, each association held AGMs and the primary and secondary cooperatives held board elections.
Following the vetting process, Laph’umilanga requested its funding but discovered it was used for concert preparations. Laph’umilanga, including internal municipal political pressure lead to a preliminary investigation which found grounds for further investigation into corruption allegations.

13. A Re Yeng operational outcomes
Intended Phase 1 launch
April 2014
Actual Phase 1 launch
November 2014
Intended all Phase 1 operational
June 2017
Predicted ridership per day
(2018/19)
Actual ridership per day
4500 (2016/17)
Predicted fare revenue per annum
R254 million (Phase 1)
Actual fare revenue per annum
R (2016/17)

14. A Re Yeng
timeline
The timeline details from A Re Yeng’s inception to the outcome of the Line 2B planning participation process
September 2010: NDoT withdraws funding citing Line 1 concerns
May 2012: Council changes tack – Line 2A construction due to start in June 2012
September 2017: Line 2B remains delayed by almost 3 years
The initial Operational Plan competed with the Mobapane – Tshwane Priority Rail, had inaccessible stations along the R80 and a full IPTN plan was absent. These concerns, cited in 2009, lead to the withdrawal of funding and delay of A Re Yeng which was due to start in-time for the World Cup.
In response to fresh pressure from the NDoT, council agreed to implement a trunk route from Hatfield to the CBD. Due to low demand on this route, industry opposition and the design changes; A Re Yeng has had lower ridership, higher industry transition costs and higher construction costs.
The Line 2B design required general traffic capacity to be reduced from two lanes to one. This plan found significant public opposition requiring the CoT to reconsider its design options. This delay has continued to cause higher industry transition costs and lower riderships.

15. Propositions GoGeorge Libhongolethu A Re Yeng
The 2007 PTSAP created conditions which increased the cost and implementation time.
Lack of capacity within National Government to apply funding conditions to local context operational requirements.
Libhongolethu
Lack of capacity within the NMBM to prevent actions that lead to the corruption allegations.
Lack of capacity to build trust-based relationships between the transport authority and the existing operators.
A Re Yeng
Lack of capacity within the CoT to plan cognisant of complex long-term implications.

16. THANK YOU

17. DISCUSSION