Imperial Powers and Decolonization: Cold War Politics: Case Study: Congo March 14 - 18.

Imperial Powers and Decolonization: Cold War Politics: Case Study: Congo
March

Cold War Politics and Africa

From Allies to Enemies: - United States and Soviet Union ‘Allies’ in WWII - part ‘Big Three’ (including Britain) Britain economically, physically devastated by war US and USSR emerged as ‘super-powers’, controlling most significant post-war decisions, agreements ` ` 3

Atlee (UK), Truman (US), Stalin (USSR) at Potsdam (1945)

Apparent that Soviet Union was ‘Winner’ in Europe: Stalin did not achieve all he wished at Potsdam: clear that Soviet Union gained most from war soon established control over much Eastern Europe: ‘liberated’ territories from Fascism, offered them Soviet ‘socialist’ assistance - in coming year solidified control

Differences Between former Allies: Capitalism-Socialism: opposing concepts of how economy should function ‘West’ looked to market (supply-demand) to shape economy 1944: created International World Monetary system based on US$ -- fixed exchange rate, backed by International Monetary Fund and World Bank .

Soviet Union: saw this as ‘capitalist’ more than ‘internationalist’ enterprise - 1945: Stalin refused to join IMF -- feared control by US, now recognized as ‘the’ ascendant power - USSR established closed monetary system for Soviet Union and Communist allies in Europe

Differences Between former Allies: Democracy-Communism: opposing concepts of how government should function ‘West’ (including Britain, European allies) followed forms of elected government systems different but most tending to forms of welfare state, reflecting post-war destruction and poverty in Europe

‘East’ : Communism as developed by authoritarian leadership Soviet Union just beginning experience of Empire in central Europe: ‘buffer states’ to be managed from Moscow had acknowledged 1941 Atlantic Charter but had no intention of participating

Soviet Union Communism American Democracy

‘The Iron Curtain’: ideological boundary dividing Europe America’s economic, political vision for the post-war world was in direct conflict a with the Soviet Union’s - March 1946, Churchill characterized Europe as facing a new challenge: the symbolic emergence of an ‘iron curtain’ dividing the West from the East:

AND IRON CURTAIN

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Agreement Signed, Washington White House Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact) Signed, 1955 – Warsaw Presidential Palace

‘Non-Alignment’: search for neutrality non-alignment movement grew beyond this bi-polar world: in part challenge, in part escape - given formal legitimacy at Bandung Conference, 1955 - meeting of Asian and African former colonies, spoke for those still seeking independence especially in Africa

Bandung Conference: - goal to establish path reduceding dependence on former colonial powers and new ‘super powers’: - called for: protection human rights principle of self-determination end to racial discrimination importance of peaceful coexistence - Resulted in Non-Aligned Movement (1961)

Regarded with suspicion by US: many African colonies still fighting for independence, being supported by Soviet Union: non-aligned movement seen as ‘leaning left’ Underscored: US supporting colonial forces needed as part of NATO, bulwark against USSR - statements about ‘racial equality’: sensitive issue in 1950s US – Civil Rights movement

‘Ideological’ commitment of Asian, African leaders at Bandung was real: Shared, developed by those engaged in struggles for independence 1950s s - creation NAM (1961): voice for those seeking ‘middle road’ in the Cold War: India's Nehru; Burma's U Nu; Indonesia's Sukarno; Egypt’s Abdel Nasser; Ghana’s Nkrumah

1961 1963 1968

1955

Decolonization intertwined with Cold War Sometimes colonial powers resisted nationalist demands – e.g. settler colonies in Africa led to wars, often long (as in Mozambique) US generally supported NATO allies* with military equipment, sometimes troops *including Portugal: Portugal Fascist but remained ‘neutral’ in WWII. Post-War was founding member NATO

Decolonization intertwined with Cold War Soviet Union often supported nationalists who embraced (or leaned towards) Communism or Socialism (e.g. Mozambique, ZANU – Rhodesia, FLN- Algeria, ANC – South Africa)

No matter how ‘independence’ gained (negotiation or battle) throughout Africa: - new states were ‘prizes’ in competition for economic, political and ideological influence between US and USSR Decolonization did not bring ‘democracy and freedom’: ‘neo-colonialism’ was new enemy – a very dangerous one in the context of the Cold War!

Cold War Politics: the Congo
Case Study: the Congo Please refer to Lecture February 29 ‘Decolonization and Settler Colonies’ Slides 25 through 53 for Discussion of ‘Decolonization’ This Lecture/Case Study Picks Up with ‘Independence’

Video Belgian Congo 1950s [from Add’l Rdgs ]

“ History will one day have its say, but it will not be the history that Brussels, Paris, Washington or the United Nations will teach, but that which they will teach in the countries emancipated from colonialism and puppets. Africa will write its own history, and it will be, to the north and to the south of the Sahara, a history of glory and dignity” ‘[Lumumba’s Last Letter’ ]

Belgian Congo 1960

Leopoldville : Kongolese “Association des BaKongos” (ABAKO): J Kassavubu similar to mass parties West Africa with strong ethnic focus originally cultural association (founded 1950) drew on memories Simon Kimbangu ‘Prophet’ leading colonial resistance Kassavubu ‘guided by his spirit’

Elisabethville: Confederation des Association Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT), Moise Tshombe businessman, foreign financial interests fuelled fears of locals against migrant workers large Belgian settler population (more than 100,000) post-war immigration ‘2nd Colonization’ enormous wealth, talked ‘secession ‘

Stanleyville: National Congolese Movement, Patrice Lumumba favoured national unity rather than federation comparable to Nkrumah’s CPP in Ghana followers “hodge-podge” political interests less defined ethnic interests than elsewhere

Kwame Nkrumah: “The situation which faced the Congo on the eve of independence did not differ profoundly from that which threatened Ghana’s independence at the period of the ascendancy of the NLM of Ashanti, the Togoland Congress, the Anglo Youth Assoc., the Northern People’s Party and the Muslim Assoc., all of which were designed to destroy the CPP movement. As in Ghana, I was convinced that the Congo needed a strong unitary form of government. Events in the Congo since independence have only strengthened this conviction”. [Cited in Mazrui & Tidy, African Political Parties, p.96]

Riots of 1959: began in Leopoldville - post-war boom hit by depression 1955/6, fall in world copper prices 1957 - massive unemployment, acute in Leopoldville - ‘spark’: authorities banned political meeting

Riots of 1959: - spread quickly to other cities and rural areas (facilitated by large number migrant labourers) -exacerbated ethnic cleavages encouraged by work situation (migrants) and cultural associations - NOT reflection of history or tradition or ‘tribes’ as interpreted by Belgians

Rapidity of Spread into Rural Areas: unexpected - deliberately cultivated by local political parties - rooted in years of forced labour on plantations, infrastructure projects, compulsory crop growing schemes Overwhelming: local administrators forced to seek help from Congolese party leaders

Cotton was one of the ‘compulsory crops’ (Photo 1950s)

Unloading Cotton for Processing (Photo 1950s)

Cotton Processing in Belgian Factory (Photo 1950s)

Belgium Reaction: 13 January 1959 - as riots spread throughout colony Belgian Govt. issued Déclaration Gouvernmentale - promised independence “graduallement et progressivement”

Understood by Belgians (especially businesses): Belgium was capitulating to local African pressures BUT. . . - King’s endorsement reassured Belgian companies that they would have time to secure their interests

“WHY” did Belgium so suddenly move towards independence for its richest (and indeed, only) colony? - some argue Belgian politicians did not really believe that ‘independence’ meant what it said - or… that total unpreparedness of Congo with its proliferation of political parties emerging at the last minute (120) would remain vulnerable to continued Belgian influence OR BOTH!

Recent scholarship suggests that Belgian authorities intentionally moved quickly - to prevent Congolese politicians from developing a more radical agenda - to contain the challenge presented by Patrice Lumumba and his supporters

La Table Ronde Belgo-Congolaise, January 1960: - Belgians expected Congolese representatives to be divided along ethnic and regional lines - But they presented ‘common front’ At the political talks: Belgians agreed to Independence on June 30, 1960

Lumumba: “We demanded the immediate and unconditional independence of our country. We have just won it. We demanded that this independence should be complete and absolute. The Belgian Government, in compliance with our demand, assures us that Belgium will retain no measure of control after June 30, 1960.

On that date, the Congo will accede to international sovereignty. The Congolese Government and the Belgian Government will be proud to sit side by side at international assemblies where they will defend their common interests” [Lumumba: following agreement on date for Independence.]

Belgium exception among Settler Colonies: - in all other cases, ‘independence’ came only after protracted wars of resistance and often civil wars between different African factions - in this case the ‘civil wars’ and bloodshed were yet to come!

Independence Day, June : Belgian King spoke of civilizing role of Leopold II, advantages brought by colonialism warned Congo not to jettison Belgian institutions, policies Kassabuvu read out pre-planned, obsequious response

Independence Day, June : Lumumba gave an unscheduled speech: completely, vehmently denouncing colonialism “ [Even as we are now dealing with each other as Equals] . . .no Congolese worthy of the name will ever be able to forget that is was by fighting that it has been won [applause], a day-to-day fight, an ardent and idealistic fight, a fight in which we were spared neither privation nor suffering, and for which we gave our strength and our blood.

We are proud of this struggle, of tears, of fire, and of blood, to the depths of our being, for it was a noble and just struggle, and indispensable to put an end to the humiliating slavery which was imposed upon us by force. [see “Lumumba’s speech”, ‘Discussion Rdgs’]

Independence Day Lumumba arrives Palais de la Nation, Leopoldville for Independence Ceremony, 30 June [Ludo de Witte, The Assassination of Lumumba, London 2001:96&ff.] Lumumba and Gaston Eyskens (Belgian Prime Minister) sign Declaration of Congolese Independence. [Ludo de Witte, The Assassination of Lumumba, London 2001:96&ff.]

Patrice Lumumba (centre) forms his first government as Prime Minister Joseph Mobutu (far right) ‘waits in the wings’. [Ludo de Witte, The Assassination of Lumumba, 96&ff]

Responses to Independence Day Speech: - Belgium concluded that Lumumba was a ‘madman’ who had to be eliminated: - Tshombe (CONAKAT- copper company) worried about implications for investment (following on Lumumba’s speech) - ‘West’ in general (US in particular) worried about Lumumba’s ‘unpredictability’

Independence Day Speech: “Key” moment in Congo’s future Lumumba had made it clear he was not going to be controlled by any existing party or interest – domestic or foreign This made him the enemy of Belgian, US and (existing) Congolese Business interests

Katanga: - center of Congo’s wealth - centre of foreign investment - Tshombe pressing for loose federation that would allow Katanga to operate as more or less independent state

Katanga (Tshome): - worked closely Belgian Business interests - refused to co-operate with new government - maintained (financed) mercenary army: put Belgian officers in charge

Tshombe inspecting His Troops (n.d.)

Soviet Union in Post-War Africa : - USSR active in Africa but through 1950s, little success in gaining influence in Congo - with independence and ‘unpredictable’ Lumumba: saw possible ‘opening’ for changing situation

Soviet Union in Post-War Africa: - US (also Britain, France and especially South Africa) saw investments threatened - American State Department, CIA actively stepped up efforts, including interference with local media - this, in turn further stimulated Soviet interest and activity

Within days of Independence: - Army mutinied: felt betrayed that they remained in hands of Belgian officers - 4 July: further provoked by Belgian commander, who publicly demoted a Congolese n.c.o., wrote inflammatory words on blackboard at meeting: Avant l'indépendance égale après l'indépendance

Within days of Independence: - unleashed uncontrolled attacks on, rapes/slaughter of Belgians (by Congolese soldiers) - six deaths reported Katanga - led to exodus white civil servants, technicians, army personnel - Belgium demanded (of Lumumba) that order be restored

Responses: - Tshombe declared formal secession of Katanga - Kisai followed soon after

Army under Joseph Mobutu: rampage continued - ‘unable’ to bring them under control? - Many say ‘let them loose’ Mobutu himself said to be ‘ambitious, determined, ruthless’

Belgium sent in Paratroopers – against Lumumba’s express objections

Lumumba facing: - social chaos - foreign (colonial) troops back on Congolese soil - disintegration of state Turned to (in this order): - United Nations - United States - African Allies - Soviet Union

Lumumba with UN Secreatry General Dag Hammarskjold, after their conference at UN Headquarters in New York on the critical situation in the Congo, 24 July 1960. [Ludo de Witte, The Assissination of Lumumba, 96&ff]

UN Security Council Response: - Britain and US supported Belgium’s move to “recolonize” Katanga - All [UK, US, Belgium] distrusted Lumumba: saw him as a ‘socialist’ -- feared he would nationalize resources - UN accepted a mandate to intervene, troops arrived August 1960, but. . .

Agreed only to “restore” law and order, not to support Lumumba against the secessionists - Persuaded Belgians to withdraw. . . BUT - made no attempt to remove them from Katanga

However: - When army loyal to Lumumba tried to retake Katanga for Congo: UN also refused to prevent them from entering the seceding province ‘Peace Keepers’ setting up conditions for continuing War

Katanga determined to fight for independence from Congo: - refused to comply with UN ultimatums about use foreign, mercenary troops: Rhodesians, South Africans (among others) - by 1961, UN pulled into conflict itself

UN Secretary General to Commander on the ground: ‘do what needs to be done militarily’ - operation involved soldiers, equipment supplied by some thirty countries - decision to be ‘active’ participant in attempt to bring Katanga back into Congo very controversial

Complicated further by: - ‘collateral damage’: too many civilian deaths, injured, property damage - turned all of Katanga’s population (black and white) against UN - Katanga government fueled flames with incendiary media messages

“Bring out your guns, spears, knives, axes and clubs, and kill all the U.N. to combat the murder campaign of Secretary-General U Thant and his international minions!” [see ‘Congo: Battle for Katanga’, Readings; U Thant succeeded Dag Hammarskjold – see below]

Lumumba turned to Soviet Union for arms when UN refused: - now ‘proof’ of his Communism - neighbouring South Africa, British Central African Federation (Zambia, Rhodesia, Malawi) openly supported Katanga - Tshombe in exile in Rhodesia

1961: mysterious death of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold in plane crash while en route to talk with Tshombe in Rhodesia - many felt decision to ‘step beyond his mandate’ in Katanga hurt ability UN to function effectively - Rumoured: CIA, British intelligence behind crash True or Not: reflects upon how ‘Congo Crisis’ perceived internationally at the time

UN Moroccan Troops Landing in Elizabethville, Katanga

UN Troops Represented over 30 Countries: here India, Ireland, Ethiopia

UN air attacks rapidly escalated, contributed to resentment local populations Two IAF Canberras flying in formation with a pair of Swedish J29s and a pair of Ethopian F-86 Sabres a photograph that epitomises the nature of the United Nations effort in the Congo

Eisenhower administration sent in CIA: - Chose Joseph Mobutu, former aide to Lumumba, ranking Colonel in army, as ‘their man in the Congo’ - CIA actively involved in recruiting, cultivating him Began extensive paramilitary campaign to ensure Western influence/control

Following Eisenhower: Kennedy and Mobutu: a young, ambitious President reaches ‘an understanding’ with equally young, ambitious Army Officer Michela Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz, London, 2001: 132&ff]

“We now know that even though the threat of communism in Congo was quite weak at the time of Congo’s independence, the CIA engaged in pervasive political meddling and paramilitary action between 1960 and to ensure that the country retained a pro- Western government and to help its pathetic military on the battlefield

. . . So extensive were these efforts that at the time, they ranked as the largest covert operation in the agency’s history, costing an estimated $90–$150 million in current dollars, not counting the aircraft, weapons, and transportation and maintenance services provided by the Defense Department.” Stephen Weismann, What Really Happened in Congo? Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2014

Following Independence, Lumumba’s control: ‘power vacuum’ sucked in foreign powers - extraordinary mineral wealth combined with physical position made Congo ‘Strategic’ Whoever controlled Congo (especially Katanga) had potential to influence political, economic developments throughout central, southern Africa!

In ‘Cold War’: Africa new arena -- Congo flashpoint - US feared African leader preaching non-alignment opened door to Communism - Lumumba frequently labeled ‘Communist’: echoed by Belgians and South Africa (whose own position in Africa and support by Americans hinged on its role as bastion against communist influence – last case study) UN would not intervene where American interests were strongest, namely Katanga

America’s chosen Army Officer Joseph Mobutu was now called upon: - Lumumba arrested (Kassabuvu permitted it, though he was eventually ‘neutralized’ as well) - Mobutu took control, though not office per se - UN provided ‘protection’ for Lumumba’s house arrest

- Lumumba escaped: UN withdrew protection - captured by army and taken to Katanga (secretly) - murdered with Tshombe’s conivance and consent

Joseph Mobutu in Leopoldville on 15 September 1960, having just announced that the Congolese army would be taking over the running of the country. Ludo de Witte, The Assassination of Lumumba, 96&ff.]

Lumumba and his aids in a truck at Leopoldville airport, on the day after their arrest by Mobutu’s army, 2 December 1960.

Lumumba ‘Hands Tied’ during Arrest (Bettman / Corbis) in Weissmann, Foreign Affairs, 2014)

Officials next to the Ford sedan car alleged to have been used by Lumumba and his aides to escape prison, 11 February (From left: commissioner for Katanga police, unknown police commissioner, Belgian agent of Katanga Intelligence service, captain in charge of Prison Guards.)

Kwame Nkrumah: “The assassination of Lumumba is the first time in history that the legal ruler of a country has been done to death by the open connivance of a world organization [UN] in whom that ruler put his trust.” - argument that this was purely ‘domestic’ murder proven recently to be inaccurate: Belgium, the US and the UN have all been implicated

News of Lumumba’s murder: - drew crowds to streets New York, protest at UN headquarters - stimulated new support by Black Americans through Pan-Africanism - spearheaded Kennedy’s ‘New Frontier’: created Peace Corps and advance into Africa Congo Crisis made Africa into Cold War Battlefield

Protesters in London’s Piccadilly on their way to the Belgian Embassy, 19 February, 1961.
[Ludo de Witte, The Assassination of Lumumba, 96&ff.]

Followed by three-year battle to re-integrate Katanga and Kasai into state: Civil War Tshombe arrested, charged, exiled - returned as premier when he agreed to recognize Katanga as Congo

Tshombe’s troops recapture a North Katanga town and American Weaponry, February 1962.
Bill Freund, The Making of Contemporary Africa, facing 177]

- Congolese people crying for a ‘second independence’ received with success of Mobutu and American backing – but at a cost:

Led to Nightmare of 32 years of Mobutu’s rule of Congo as Private Fiefdom: all resources – human, material – his to be exploited. Leopold’s Ghost! [see recent appropriately titled book, “King Leopold’s Ghost”]

Mobutu ‘Sese Seko’ Nkuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga “Mobutu the all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, goes from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake”

Imperial Powers and Decolonization: Cold War Politics: Case Study: Congo March 14 - 18.

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Imperial Powers and Decolonization: Cold War Politics: Case Study: Congo March 14 - 18.

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