1. Unscramble The Words
What are these key terms from the current theory we’re looking at? Finicalmounts Callaroues Ipunt Optutu Relegatedgunkmown Nupmat Claysimpish

2. Unscramble The Words
What are these key terms from the current theory we’re looking at? Functionalism Causal Role Input Output Knowledge Argument Putnam Physicalism

3. Quick Recap
What strengths does functionalism have over other theories of mind we’ve looked at? Dualism MBTIT Behaviourism

4. Why is the knowledge argument potentially a problem for functionalism?
Quick Recap
Why is the knowledge argument potentially a problem for functionalism?

5. Mary’s Room + Functionalism
If we assume Mary has a full functional understanding of what happens when someone sees colour (i.e. she knows all of the inputs and all of the possible outputs in any given situation) along with all of the physical information, does she still learn something new? Again we might say that she does, she learns what it is like see red (i.e. qualia) and how the functional goings on of her mind feel to her, but if this is true then it means a functional understanding of the mind is not complete. There is some information that is not contained within a functionalist explanation – that of qualia.

6. Possibility of Inverted Qualia
What colours are the boxes above? How do you know everyone else is seeing the same colour you are?

7. Possibility of Inverted Qualia
Imagine someone whose colour vision is swapped so when they see the colour yellow they see what you call blue and vice versa. Since this has been their situation since birth, they have always called bananas yellow (despite seeing what you’d call blue) and the sky blue (despite seeing what you’d call yellow) their colour spectrum is inverted.

8. Possibility of Inverted Qualia
Imagine someone whose colour vision is swapped so when they see the colour yellow they see what you call blue and vice versa. Since this has been their situation since birth, they have always called bananas yellow (despite seeing what you’d call blue) and the sky blue (despite seeing what you’d call yellow) their colour spectrum is inverted.
Is this idea conceivable?
Would they be any different functionally to you?

9. Possibility of Inverted Qualia
The problem is, if we accept that the two people in this instance are functionally equivalent, then according to functionalism they must be experiencing the same qualia. The same mental states. If we define mental states by their functional role, then two people whose mental states have the same function (i.e. same inputs / outputs) should be having the same mental state. The problem in this case is they quite clearly aren’t. Therefore, we can repeat the idea that functionalism cannot give a full explanation of qualia.

10. Response
It’s possible that the functionalist might reply here that this is an inconceivable example. We cannot ever refute or confirm the idea of inverted qualia, there is nothing in the world we can point to that would help us, we cannot make coherent sense of the difference between the two people. So the idea of inverted qualia is nonsensical. Counter Response: This seems to be a weak response, just because we can’t confirm it to be true doesn’t make it entirely incoherent.

11. Second Response
Another possible functionalist response is to deny that there is a different in qualitative experience between the two people. If we react in similar and complex ways to the same stimuli in all situations, then this is all we need to be sure we are in the same mental state. If the different qualia were to play the same functional role in relation to our other mental states (i.e. finding blue calming, red dangerous etc.) and behaviour (stopping at traffic lights when they are red) then it becomes harder to hold on to the idea that they have distinct, intrinsic natures.

12. The Chinese Brain
Read through the argument outlined by Ned Block on page 353 and then use 323 to help you analyse it. Give a rough outline of what Block is positing. Why is this an issue for functionalism? Do you think he is correct? What argument is this similar to? What might be the functionalist response?

13. The Chinese Brain

14. The Chinese Brain
Block suggests that if we use the citizens of China (a billion or so) to represent the neurons of the brain, each with their own set of input/outputs, and functionally performing the same as the human mind (i.e. making a body they control jump on one leg when it steps on a nail) then according to functionalism we would have to say this creation is “minded”. It is having mental states. It is having qualia. Does this seem counter-intuitive?

15. The Chinese Brain
If you think it does seem counter-intuitive, then this is another argument that can be used against functionalism. This is because, the “mind” in this case is functionally equivalent to you and me, it causes the body to react in the same way to standing on a nail or being given bad news, it even may send signals through the Chinese neurons that would cause other “mental states”. But it doesn’t seem right to say it has the accompanying qualia or is conscious. And if it doesn’t truly have the accompanying mental state but can still perform functionally, it seems functionalism is not an adequate account of the mind.

16. Functionalist Response
You’re being prejudice! Yes it may seem counter-intuitive to suggest such a system would have a mind, but that is only because we’re basing our ideas of the mind on the brain. We are assuming just because something doesn’t fit in with the type of “minds” we experience it must be wrong. Maybe the Chinese Brain, if it was complex enough, if it performed all it’s functions correctly, would be conscious. After all, we’re still not sure how our brain produces consciousness / mental states, why is it so far fetched to think other things may also produce them?

17. Tasks
Explain the idea of inverted qualia and why it’s a criticism of functionalism.
How might a functionalist respond to this idea?
Explain the idea of Block’s Chinese brain.
Have these criticisms successfully defeated functionalism?

18. Final Summary:
Is functionalism an effective theory of mind? If so, why? If not, why not?