1. Eliminative materialism
Michael Lacewing

2. Elimination v reduction
Eliminative materialism: the way we commonly think and talk about the mind is so mistaken that we should abandon our mental concepts, and talk about brain processes instead.
Reductionism says that there are mental properties, but they are physical properties
Eliminativism says that there are no mental properties

3. Folk psychology
Churchland: we understand and explain each other’s behaviour by referring to beliefs, desires, etc.
Explanations require laws: we use a network of commonsense laws
E.g. if someone is thirsty, they will look for something to drink
This knowledge is ‘folk psychology’
These laws form an empirical theory about human behaviour

4. Empirical theories
If empirical theories turn out not to be accurate, then they should be abandoned
If folk psychology is not good at explaining behaviour, we should reject it
Theories hypothesize that certain things exist in order to explain what we observe
E.g. atoms, germs, phlogiston, vital force
If the theory is unsuccessful, we shouldn’t think that the hypothesized thing exists
If folk psychology is unsuccessful, we shouldn’t believe that beliefs, desires etc. exist

5. Reduction or elimination?
Science shows that there is a strong connection between the mind and brain states and processes
Therefore, folk psychology must fit onto neuroscience
Reduction: folk psychology reduces to neuroscience
Elimination: folk psychology will be replaced by neuroscience

6. Is folk psychology false?
Folk psychology cannot explain much about the mind, e.g. mental illness, intelligence, sleep, perception, learning
Folk psychology has not progressed in 2,500 years
Folk psychology cannot be made coherent with neuroscience

7. Intentionality
Mental states are ‘about’, or ‘directed onto’, something, e.g. belief about Paris, desire for chocolate.
Intentionality has nothing to do with intentions.
An Intentional mental state has Intentional content.
‘What are you thinking?’

8. Irreducibility How could anything physical have intentionality?
Physical states are never ‘about’ anything
So folk psychology can’t be reduced to neuroscience

9. The intuitive certainty of mental states
Obj: Nothing could be more certain to me than the fact that I have mental states
Reply: but what seems obvious can be false
Does the Sun move around the Earth?
Am I a thinking thing?
Churchland does not deny the existence of psychological phenomena – he denies that folk psychology is the right account of these phenomena
Can we be certain of a theory?

10. Folk psychology is not false
Folk psychology is meant to explain human action
It is no objection that folk psychology does not explain mental illness etc.
It explains and predicts action very well
Much better than neuroscience!
Folk psychology is the basis of developments in scientific psychology
Reply: all this is superficial, and folk psychological explanations are very weak compared to other areas of science

11. Self-refuting?
Eliminativism tries to change our beliefs by presenting arguments
Arguments are expressions of beliefs and rely on the meaning of words
Yet it claims there are no beliefs and no meanings!
Any argument for eliminativism refutes itself – its conclusion contradicts its own assumptions

12. Reply The objection begs the question
It assumes that folk psychology is the correct account of meaning
Cp: ‘there is no vital force; life is chemistry’ ‘If there is no vital force, you would be dead! The fact that you speak refutes you.’

13. Objection
It is a conceptual truth that claims and arguments are ‘about’ something
Eliminativism denies that anything is ‘about’ anything
It is inconceivable that folk psychology is false, since the very idea of ‘being false’ depends on folk psychology being true
Folk psychology is not an empirical theory, but a condition of intelligibility
Therefore, it cannot be eliminated

14. Implication
If Churchland is right that folk psychology doesn’t reduce to neuroscience, then it is irreducible, not eliminable