1. Worldwide Equipment Guide & Key Systems
Hybrid Threat Systems
Worldwide Equipment Guide & Key Systems
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2. Terminal Learning Objective
Action: Identify threat weapons/technology and Tier Table adaptation for exercise design purposes using the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG).
Condition: Provide a classroom environment to support training, professional education, and leader development with in-class discussion and Army Training Network (ATN) and/or All Partners Access Network (APAN) website access.
Standard: Describe weapons and tactics in terms of the World Equipment Guide and other threat products.

3. Worldwide Equipment Guide
Curated listing of foreign military equipment used for training purposes
Over 800 pages in three volumes including ground, air, and naval
Data derived from unclassified, non- copyrighted sources includes variants and upgrades
Main focus is on equipment US forces might encounter in current unified land operations and in the near future
Addresses emergent real-world conditions designed to train all Warfighting Forces
The WEG is a product that is produced yearly by CTID that features weapons systems and capabilities for the training community. The product is unclassified. It is a living document that is updated yearly to provide information on weapon systems and information on existing and emerging technology to provide realistic technology and weapons threats to the warfighter.
The document is derived from a variety of open sources, including defense publications, manufacturer literature and government sources. The WEG is not designed to be encyclopedic in that it does not include every foreign system throughout the world. Instead the WEG presents representative capabilities that can be used for a variety of training purposes most notable threat force combat power.
WEG data is integrated into the training environment through a variety of live, virtual, and constructive means. Example- the Threat Force Structure.
The WEG consists of three volumes: volume one ground systems, volume 2 airspace and Air defense, volume three has naval Systems... And provides tools to create realistic and dynamically equipped hybrid threats (within the weapons arena).
Again to reinforce the point, what individuals may not be aware of is that the WEG is produced yearly. In the past, we found individuals from the CTCs using outdated Editions of the WEG. So, make sure you updated yearly and have the most current copy available. Just as an example a number of variables change within systems and systems are updated yearly. So, you want the most up to date information while preparing your training plans.
* The WEG is not a product of the US intelligence community.

4. Example WEG Sheet
Specification data on a particular piece of equipment
Includes all relevant data needed to identify and gauge capabilities
Reference allows analysts to make rapid assessments of equipment capabilities
Country of origin and proliferation data included to relate equipment to the OE
This is a typical WEG sheet.
The main functions of maneuverability, survivability, and lethality are included in the parametric data of each WEG sheet. This information in conjunction with the Threat Force Structure constitutes the combat power of the Hybrid Threat
Exercise designers can replicate threat weapons systems by simulating weapons system standoff distances, and armor protection as well as C2 functions.

5. WEG Equipment Tiers
Tier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3
Tier 4
Fielded state-of-the art technology across functional areas.
*Default OPFOR level.
Modern competitive systems fielded in the past 10–20 years.
Day/night, all-terrain, battlefield information management system capable.
Systems date back 30–40 years.
Niche upgrades provide synergistic and adaptive increases.
40 to 50 year-old systems.
Adaptive TTP, niche technology, terrain provide challenges.
OPFOR equipment is broken into four “tiers” in order to portray systems for adversaries with differing levels of force capabilities for use as representative examples of a rational force developer’s systems mix. The OPFOR organization and equipment must support the entire spectrum of Contemporary Operational Environment in U.S. forces training. The COE OPFOR includes “hybrid threats”, and represents rational and adaptive adversaries for use in training applications and scenarios.
When a system is a lower tier it doesn't mean that it's not any less of a threat to US personnel it only means that it is no longer a capable in comparison to newer threat systems. For example a T 55 is as problematic for dismounted infantry given the right set of circumstances as a newer tank.
The bottom line, as a scenario developer or trainer you can mix-and-match and use different weapon systems from different tiers to replicate different threats systems to create a realistic hybrid threat.
It is possible to have one hull that spans a number of tier tables. For example the T-72, upgrades have been made to make this basic platform a for tier 1, and 2 systems while legacy systems are still considered tier 3.
* Note: No force in the world has all systems at the most modern tier. Even the best force in the world has a mix of state-of-the-art (tier 1) systems, as well as mature (tier 2), and somewhat dated (tier 3) legacy systems. EXAMPLE: Its possible to have SPF that are equipped with Tier 1 equipment while other regular forces are equipped with a mix of Tier 2 and Tier 3. In the same country its possible to have a law enforcement force equipped with Tier 4 equipment.
Example: Main Battle Tank
T-90A
T-90S
Chieftain
T-55AM
* Note: No force in the world has all systems at the most modern tier.

6. WEG Tier Table Tanks and AT Vehicles Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4
Main Battle Tank
T-90A
T-90S
Chieftain
T-55AM
Amphibious Tank
Type 63A Modernized
Type 63AM
M1985
PT-76B
Tracked Heavy Armored CV
2S25
AMX-10 PAC 90
AMX-13
M41A3
Wheeled Heavy Armored CV
AMX-10RC Desert Storm
AMX-10RC
EE-9
Div ATGM Launcher Vehicle
9P157-2/Krizantema-S
9P149 w/AT-9 Ataka
9P149 w/AT-6
9P148/AT-5
Bde ATGM Veh Tracked
9P162 w/Kornet
AMX-10 HOT 3
AMX-10 HOT 2
Type 85/Red Arrow-8A
Bde ATGM Veh Wheeled
VBL MK2 w/Kvartet, Kornet
VBL w/Kvartet, Kornet
9P148/AT-5B
Jeep/Red Arrow-8A
Abn ATGM Launcher Veh
BMD-2 with AT-5B
BMD-1P with AT-5
As mentioned in the previous slide sometimes technological advancement creates problems within the last WEG publication and the tier tables. So, looking at a longer perspective within 5 to 10 years something that is slotted as a tier one will be Tier 2 Threat. Technology keeps moving along and the tier tables will be updated so that we can replicate realistic threat for the Warfighter.
Remember this – any system discussed today as being “Tier 1” will be “Tier 2” in 5-10 years. This means any system purchased and fielded today will be incorrectly matched to the Tier program without significant upgrade long before its service life is due.
Bottom line: Buy Tier 1 with the flexibility to easily upgrade Today to have Tier 2 at a minimum throughout the system’s life cycle.
Question what tier is an M-1 Abrams tank? It depends on the amount of upgrades. By our definition it is a teir 3 but it has had enough modifications to be considered a tier 1.
Extract. See WEG for more systems

7. Tier Substitutions
Systems in the Tier Table may be substituted for equivalents based on training requirements or to better fit a scenario
Some systems span between the tiers or can be used at more than one tier
Extract. See WEG for more substitutions

8. System Development Considerations
Reduced adaptation cycles
Equipment modifications/upgrades
Use modifications
Commercial Off the Shelf Technology (COTS)
Adaptive threats will introduce new combat systems and employ upgrades on existing systems to attain a force structure which supports its plans and doctrine.
Commercial off the shelf (COTS) Technology provides non-state and emerging nation threat actors capabilities that were reserved to advanced nation states.

9. Application (Cdr Question)
Commander wants to replicate x (country/system/etc)
Cdr saw new system on news/YouTube/etc
Focus on capabilities & effects
Is the system on the Tier Table correct for Cdr’s desired threat actor?
Is the system on the Substitution List?
Is there another system that has similar capabilities that is on the list?
unit, Cdr wants to challenge flying
Read about some cool MANPAD system “X” in magazine (Kornet?)
What Tier is this? What systems might replicate effects?
Or saw T-55 on YouTube. Wants to really challenge, so T-55 w/ATGM…

10. Multi-Purpose Systems
Harpy
Starstreak
UCAV?
Cruise Missile?
A few years back there were a number of complaints that UAVs would not be used by the enemy and that the opposing force was cheating when using weapons systems such as the Starstreak for anti-armor purposes. Using weapons in a creative manner forces training unit to think outside the box and prepares that unit for a truly complex operational environment. So my answer is it's not cheating, it's good training AND THE THREAT IS OUT THERE. I noticed that individuals tend to get wrapped up on the tier tables…And all I can say is just because it's a lower tier doesn't mean that it's not a grave threat to US personnel.
Pics Wikicommons
Air Defense?
Anti-Armor?

11. UAV Capabilities
Achieves through aerial capabilities at the tactical through strategic level.
World UAV expenditures are expected to be more than $89 billion by The US represents the largest market and Asia is the second.
Expanded Roles- EW, communications retransmission, attack, counter air etc.
Advances make them both accessible to more buyers and more capable.
Skylark IV
Show Video: 1) Top 10 Drones in the world,
2) CAMCOPTER-Introduction_mp4-720.mp4
UAV are a key Threat asset for ISR, and electronic warfare operations. Some of the capabilities of threat actors include…
• High/ Medium-altitude UAVs, long-endurance UAVs, and UCAVs seamlessly integrated with other intelligence and support systems
• Recon/attack capability with low-signature UAVs and UCAVs and stand-off munitions at all levels down to squads
• Ballistic missiles with non-ballistic trajectories , improved GNSS/homing re-entry vehicles, precision submunitions, EMP
• Shift to canister launchers of tactical cruise missiles with precision homing and piloted option, cluster warheads, EMP
• Laser designators on AT grenade launchers, also used for precision artillery/air/naval rounds/ATGMs
• Airships and powered airships for long-duration and long-range reconnaissance, and variety of other roles
• Increased use of ultra-lights and powered parachutes
UAVs: Uses have expanded beyond RISTA, to include, security patrolling, EW, communications retransmission, attack, counter-air harassment of enemy aircraft, and remote materials delivery. Advances in lightweight materials, imagery systems, and control technologies, particularly commercial, have lowered costs and facilitated these changes.
Photos L-R:
Chinese ASN-207 /206 Tactical UAV: with stabilized CCTV panoramic and frame cameras with IR option, Endurance is 4-8 hours, range of 150 km.
Austrian Schiebel S100 Camcopter: Hover capability, proliferated to Russia, Egypt and UAE, can be fitted with Lightweight Multi Role Missile. (Source MilborneOne)
Skylark IV Tactical Mini UAV:- Hand launched, Stealth capability including low radar and acoustic signature, endurance, 2 hour endurance 10 km range (LOS).
Chinese CH-3: Medium Range UAV , 12hour endurance, 200 LOS range, possible UCAV capable, proliferated to Pakistan (Burraq).
Examples:
The ASN-207 used for day/night aerial RISTA, (EW/ECM), battlefield surveillance, target positioning, artillery spotting, border patrol, nuclear radiation sampling, aerial photography and prospecting.
Trends:
Configure fixed-wing or rotary-wing piloted aircraft for remote operation.
Increase the level of processing power onboard to provide mission platforms
Indigenous efforts global, Israel a major player in proliferation of technology, China develops UAVs for export. Teal Report Pg. 120
CH-3
ASN-207
S100
Camcopter S-100

12. Selected Threat UAVs System Tier Orig Role Range Endurance Speed (kph)
Alt. (m)
Payload
MALE*: Hermes 900 1
ISR
Surveillance
200-km
36-hrs
222
30,000
300-kg
MALE*: ASN-207
CHN
EW/ECM
600-km
18-hrs
150
6,000
100-kg
Camcopter S100
1,2
AUT
130-km
6-hrs
223
55-kg
Skylark IV
15-km
1.5-hrs
111
455
Skylark III / Skylark II-LE
100-km
129
4,600
10-kg
Zala
RUS
40-km
130
700
1-kg
Hermes 900: WEG UAV, pg20
ASN-207: WEG UAV, pg16
Skylark IV: WEG UAV, pg10
Skylark III: WEG UAV, pg12
Camcopter S100: WEG UAV, pg21
Zala : WEG UAV, pg5
*MALE: Medium Altitude, Long Endurance

13. Threat Aviation System Tier Role Weapons/Transports AH-1W SUPER COBRA
Attack
M197, 3x barrel 20-mm Gatling Gun
8 x TOW or Hellfire ATGMs
2 x 2.75-in FFAR rocket pods.
Z9/WZ9 “Haitun”
Multi
Two fixed 23-mm guns or 12.7-mm MGs.
Up to 8 ATGMs, or 4 plus 2 rocket pods.
Transports Troops, 4-8 Litters or
Cargo.
GAZELLE SA/ 342M
Light
4x AT-3 ATGMs, 2x SA-7, or 128-mm or 57-mm rockets, and 7.62-mm MG. Transports 3 troops or 1 litter, or cargo.
MI-17 V7 “Hip”
Medium
Transports up to 26, 36 troops military
seating, or 12 casualties.
MI-26 “Halo”
Transport
Transports over 80 troops, 60 litters, or 2x BRDM-2 scout cars, or 2x BMDs, or 1x BMP or, 1x BTR-60/70/80 or, 1x MT-LB.
HORIZON (Cougar)
Wide Area Recon
Surveillance targets: Wheeled/tracked vehicles, rotary wing aircraft, FW aircraft, watercraft.

14. Air Defense Radar and Counter UAS Capabilities
Achieves an advantage by denying enemy RISTA and aerial assets
Key anti-access area denial (A2AD) asset
Used to protect high value targets as well as large areas
Threat engages as early as possible in the disruption zone, priority is on RISTA and SEAD aircraft
BUK-2M
Show video: 1) Russian Avtobaza Iran's weapon in alleged RQ-170 affair
Integrated Air Defense systems (IADS) include complex arrays of early warning sensors and combinations of long-range and close-range surface to air missiles. advantage is achieved when advanced systems are able to defeat friendly navigations, C2 and stealth capabilities. Counter UAS capabilities will locate and disrupt navigation and command and control links in order to blind UAS sensors.
Integrated Air Defense System with day/night all-weather RISTA access for all AD units.
Improved gun rounds (AHEAD/guided sabot) and missiles (anti-radiation homing, jam-resistant).
Shoulder-launch multi-role (ADAT) hypervelocity missiles/weapons immune to helicopter decoys and jammers.
Acquisition/destruction of stealth systems and aerial munitions and ground rockets to 500+ km.
Air Defense: The objective of the Threat tactical air defense efforts is to reduce the effectiveness of enemy air attacks and prevent enemy air action from interfering with maneuver force operations.
Air Defense Radar: provides early warning based on RF signals.
Jamming Capabilities:
Disrupts communications frequencies (C,X, Ku Bands) associated with non terrestrial control of UAS’.
Jamming frequencies within .1 Ghz of GPS are enabled on Liman
Produce false signatures for enemy radar.
Photos T-B, L-R:
BUK-2M Medium Range Air Defense (MRAD) Mobile missile system Missiles engage 1-45 km range, and 0-25,000 m altitude
Avtobaza – Electronic Intelligence System, Frequency Range includes those common to satellite communication X and Ku bands.
Liman- Intercepts and jams hostile aircraft navigation and radio communications links with frequency hopping airborne or ground support platforms.
Pantsir Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) Missiles engage <1-20 km range, and 0-10,000 meters altitude .
Delilah Missile- Remote controlled cruise missile reported proliferated to India. Able to “patrol” and lock on to target after launch.
Air Defense EW Capabilities: Provide early warning based on enemy electronic emissions.
Trends: Advances in technology will increase spectral range, include spoofing data, and reduce target acquisition time.
SLAR= Side Looking Airborne Radar
Shotgun vs. UAV
Pantsir
Avtobaza
Delilah Missile
Liman

15. Threat MANPADS System Tier Alt (m) Range (m) Prob Hit Guidance
SA-24S “Grinch”
1,2
3,500
6,000
Fixed:80%
Heli: 90%
2-color IR/UV homing
Starstreak II
5,000
7,000
Fixed:60%
Heli: 95%
Laser beam rider SACLOS
SA-18 “Grouse” 3
Fixed:70%
Heli: 80%
2-color IR
SA-18: WEG: AD, pg87

16. Threat SHORAD System Tier Alt (m) Range (m) Prob Hit Guidance
Detection
Crotale
SP SAM System 1
5,000
14,600
Fixed:80%
Heli: 80%
RF CLOS, Semi-active radar homing
EO, IR
18.5
(Mirador IV)
Pantsir-S1-0
30-mm SP AA Gun/Missile System
10,000
12,000
2,500 gun
SACLOS, ACLOS, Home-on-Jam 38
2S6M
1,2
3,000
4,000
Fixed:65%
SACLOS
80 km
(DOG EAR)

17. INFOWAR - CYBER
Cyber operations achieve an advantage at the physical, informational and cognitive level by leveraging individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.
Cyber attacks can have the same effects as other Electronic Warfare Systems.
Lower tier enemy will typically use Cyber early as part of a A2AD effort.
Relative anonymity and political sanctuary makes Cyber operations a low risk high payoff threat tactic.
A cyber weapon that is both stealthy and persistent will retain both surprise and effectiveness.
Show Video: 1) Syrian Electronic Army more savvy than skilled - cybersecurity expert (Possibly 2) Syrian Electronic Army - Recruitment Video
The ubiquitous nature of cyberspace gives threat actors access to the capability to cause significant operational impact to friendly forces on a scale and scope previously reserved for traditional near peer threats.
There are two gray areas when dealing with cyber space and the ability of friendly forces to respond. One, is a common definition of what constitutes a cyber attack, and two, attributing that attack to the responsible party. The threat recognizes this problem and uses the uncertainty to obtain advantage by destroying, degrading, disrupting, denying, deceiving, exploiting and influencing friendly forces access to and use of the global information grid (GIG) and the Cyber commons.
Cyber Warfare uses a variety of computer based means to capture and exploit friendly computer based information systems. Techniques using electronic decoys can to represent a variety of personas on the Internet are used to lure persons of interest into phishing schemes. Lures include social networking, job offers, and spoofed or fabricated public affairs sites.
Recent cyber events in Syria which have included defacement of websites and denial of service attacks have been classified as nuisance hacking as it is usually not difficult to recover from these types of attacks. Many attackers will use security tools and techniques to penetrate networks. More advanced attacks include spoofed websites, DDOS attacks against financial, media and government institutions and precision attacks. Many use crossover of TTPs from Criminal elements. Nuisance hackers,
Types of attacks and terms..
Electronic Decoys, Honey Pots, and Drive by Downloads
Nuisance Hacking
Malware Attacks
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) Attacks
Precision Computer Attack
Disinformation in Trusted Networks
Advanced Cyber ISR Capabilities
Photos T-B:
Robin Sage profile- Honey Pot used to demonstrate the power of phishing.
Harvard Website after being hacked by the Syrian Electronic Army.
Diagram of a DDoS attack.
Map of Chinese organizations believed to be engaged in Cyber and electronic reconnaissance.
Stealthy cyber weapons are those cases of malicious executables that are undetected once released. Examples may be attacks that target the lower levels of the Open System Interconnection (OSI) Model. A highly stealthy resource will be used early regardless of the stakes.
Persistence refers to the likelihood that a vulnerability is patched before the cyber attack can be launched. In other words if you refrain from using the resource a persistent resource will still be effective. Relies the nature of the target as well as the resource, if it is unlikely that the vulnerability will be patched it is better to use it later when the stakes are higher.
Each has a complimentary effect on the other

18. Deception Systems
Decoys
Deception operations strive to mislead the enemy’s decision makers and manipulate his overall understanding of threat activities.
Deception activities include manipulative jamming and emplacement of electronic decoys.
False messages and disinformation are also forms of deception.
Cicada-C
Show Video: 1) Russia Dummy tanks for the Russian army fool enemies
Deception Systems: Strive to mislead the enemy’s decisionmakers and manipulate his overall understanding of Threat activities. Deception manipulates perception and causes disorientation among decisionmakers within their decision cycle.
Decoys:
Clutter (civilian/military)
Radar/IR decoy supplements
Acoustic countermeasures
Disinformation false messages
Engineer Camouflage Assets and Decoys Low to high-fidelity (multi-spectral) decoys.
Deception Jamming
Global Navigation System Jamming and Meaconing.
Trends: Perception management campaigns that target global opinions rely on commercial information technology and cyber operations.
BAT-2
Syrian Electronic Army hack
Associated Press Website.

19. C2/Navigation Satellites
Satellite systems achieve an advantage by providing global access to navigation systems as well as long range communications.
Satellite systems are accessible to threat actors through a combination of technical advances and commercialization.
The ubiquitous nature of satellite technology has given rise to counterspace operations and technologies.
Beidou System
GLONASS K Known Specifications:
25 channels separated by MHz intervals in two frequency bands: MHz and MHz.
Beidou Known Specifications:
Navigation constellation will consist of 35 Vehicles When Complete
-27 MEO (medium earth orbit) satellites
-5 GSO (geosynchronous orbit)
-3 IGSO (inclined geosynchronous orbit).
HELIOS Known Specifications:
High resolution imaging instruments with high resolution zoom
Delivers 250 telemetry readings
Improved ground footprint
Incorporated IR channel
Platform
System
Country of Origin
Type / Notes
GLONASS K; Uragan-K1
Mil and Civ Navigation
Russia
L-Band navigation systems in 25 channels.
Beidou; BeiDou-2
China
Systems are a part of of China’s Compass Navigation System
Helios: 2A and 2B
Military, RISTA
EU Consortium:
France, Belgium, Spain and Italy.
Navigation constellation consists of 4 satellite systems.
HELIOS 2B
GLONASSK

20. Smart Decoys Smart decoys simulate a real vehicles.
Controlled decoys present a much more valid signature.
Emplacement of decoys in close proximity to prohibited targets (mosques/schools/hospitals) achieves cultural standoff while preserving combat power.
Scud launcher decoy with realistic thermal effects
Smart decoys distributed, controlled decoys designed to present a high fidelity (heat, electromagnetic, electro-optical and visual) simulation of a real vehicle.
Computerized controls will turn on decoy signatures to present a much more valid signature than previous generation “rubber duck” decoys.
Decoys will be emplaced in close proximity to prohibited targets (mosques/schools/hospitals) and civilian populations; if engaged, resulting civilian damage will be exploited in follow-on threat perception management operations.
Impact to the Warfighter:
Loss of situational awareness
Flood of fake targets – bogging down targeting process
Expenditure of limited munitions on non-targets
Negation of multi-spectral ISR assets (NVGs, IR scopes, EO)
Negation of critical targeting planning and allocation of assets
AFV decoy under Barracuda multispectral cam netting

21. Disinformation/False Messages
Susceptibility to disinformation is seen as a key US liability.
Threat uses civilian media to send official looking and sounding messages.
Wide range of messages depending on situation.
Use of culturally tailored messaging increases acceptance.
False message implicating a friendly commander in civilian casualties
For Training ONLY
Susceptibility to disinformation is seen as a key US liability.
Such disinformation helps to drive Threat fundraising, recruiting and political efforts.
Threat uses civilian media to send official looking and sounding messages.
These messages range from mildly damning messages of US Army activities to false claims of responsibility.
Threat’s understanding of local population increase acceptance of disinformation efforts.
Impact to the Warfighter:
Friendly commanders will be consistently behind the information cycle
Intelligence cycle will be disrupted
Friendly Commanders will often be tasked with de-conflicting and disproving false messages and disinformation
Friendly soldiers will be forced to remediate the unwanted effects (civilian casualties, property damage, etc.) of attacks
Did Iran doctor an image of its missile test launch?". Haaretz (Agence France-Presse) Retrieved
2. The 6 Most Absurd Military Hoaxes By North Korea And Iran How do rogue states compete with a superpower? Photoshop, apparently. By Kelsey D. Atherton Posted at 6:07 pm 4
Syrian Electronic Army hack
Associated Press Website.
Iranian missile launch photo shopped to mask the misfire of one of the TELs.

22. Networked and Dispersed Jammers
Alternative to barrage jamming.
Jammers can be both fixed and mobile.
Controlled through cellular network.
Achieves effects on all OE actors.
Ground-based Jammers
Impact to the Warfighter:
Loss of GPS/Comm/Data links-Blue Force Tracker (BFT), Personal/Unit Communication could be degraded
Muddles Common Operating Picture (COP)
Intel feed to/from TOC could be reduced
Jammers can be used as bait for ambushes, with the resulting ambush videoed and used for perception management operations
Units could potentially be forced onto less secure communications
Dispersion of jammers enables the threat to deny or degrade targets within a large area while remaining hidden from the enemy. If one jamming node is located and destroyed the ability to deny the signal is only degraded. This forces the enemy to doubt the information within his systems and delays decision making and causes inaction. Additionally it will require significant resources to verify TRPs and other operational data. It may also require the enemy to conduct refresher training on land navigation and map reading skills thus delaying the time it takes to deploy troops to the field.
UAV based jammers will fly a circuit around a targeted area and deny or manipulate GPS signals. Jammers that break the link between the space borne transmitter and the platform are in a position to replace the signal with a spoofed signal and may cause collateral damage due to precision guided munitions going off target, or causing airborne or air assault units to drop troops of in the wrong location.
Threat UAV jammer
Pocket RF Jammer

23. GPS Spoofing Manipulates GPS signal.
GPS is considered by both friend and foe to be the critical enabling technology advantage of the US.
Effects all aspects of navigation and target acquisition.
Threat will attempt manipulate GPS or like systems by inputting incorrect data, creating positional errors.
GPS is hardened against spoofing, but not invulnerable to this type of attack.
GPS is considered by both friend and foe to be the critical enabling technology advantage of the US.
Navigation, Blue Force Tracking, Survey, Gun/Mortar Alignment, Targeting, Sensors, Weapon Guidance, Timing, Logistics Tracking and Aviation operations will all be effected.
Supporting arms and secure comms depends upon accurate GPS.
Impact to the Warfighter:
Remediating Attack effects to determine positional error would be time-consuming
Incorrect location can cause fratricide or other accidents
Command and Control confusion
Friendly Force speed advantages in targeting, movement and coordination could be reduced or eliminated by positional confusion
The picture in the lower right is a university of Texas drone that was made to fly off its course after it received a spoofed GPS signal. Todd Humphreys is a UT researcher that has shown many different hacks against GPS including ways to spoof timing for a variety of financial and telecommunications networks. Recently Mr. Humphreys has shown how to spoof the navigation system of a large sea vessel.
Diagram: A University student acting as a GPS attacker slowly increases the power of his transmitter until he has obtained full control of the navigation system of the vessel. He then spoofs the signal to causes the navigation system to read 3° off course the crew corrects the by changing course and is now traveling in the direction of the attacker. (Images Source: University of Texas)

24. Monitoring Capabilities
Multi source monitoring system includes, cellular communications and long range telephones.
Analysts located on site to perform COMINT and establish electronic order of battle.
Exploit civilian infrastructure and open source directories.
Impact to the Warfighter:
Compelled to attack civilian infrastructure to defeat capability
Unable to distinguish between threat and civilian targets
Reduces freedom of action within the cyber electromagnetic spectrum
Compromises OPSEC efforts
The fusion of both military and civilian targets, paints a more complete picture for the enemy order of battle and those links between key leaders and resources.
Recent events in Syria illustrate the vulnerabilities of online directories such as Truecaller and Tango as electronic HVTs. Databases such as these fill a void for citizens of emerging or failing states as the lack of trust for government entities manifests in a trust relation with an anonymous website. The website is unsecured and is therefore a target for the Threat to exploit. In this scenario a database is given to cross reference signals captured at the SIGINT collection site.

25. Threat EW System Tier Role Range (km) Frequency Range (MHz) Output
vs GPS?
vs Freq Hop?
Cicada-C 1
EA, ESM/ECM, HF/VHF/UHF
100
.525-3,000
10-kW
YES
YES
Meerkat-S
ESM/ ELINT
500
2-40,000
Passive NO
Weasel 2000 2
.5-10,000
---
TRC 274
150
20-3,000
4-kW (1.4-kW on-move)
Cicada-R
6,000-18,000
1-kW
Hermes 900: WEG UAV, pg20
ASN-207: WEG UAV, pg16
Skylark IV: WEG UAV, pg10
Skylark III: WEG UAV, pg12
Camcopter S100: WEG UAV, pg21
Zala : WEG UAV, pg5

26. Infantry / Anti-Tank Systems
RPG-29
Infantry Operations achieve an advantage with improved weapons/sensors combined with stealth and mobility, and are the primary lethal agent for combined arms.
Infantry weapons are both mobile and concealable.
Improved penetration and fire control provides standoff to engage decisively with low risk.
Adaptability of infantry ensures novel uses of technology and tactics.
Ability to attack and disperse before friendly forces have time to react.
M-40 Recoiless Rifle
Show Video: 1) Recoilles Rifle Crew Get A Clean Hit On Syrian Army Tank 2) Starstreak SAM
• Weapon-delivered remotely-guided submunitions and sensors for infantry weapons
• Day/night sensors integrated, netted, with UAVs, robotics, and direct links to fire support
• Visual/IR/MMW materials with signature management to avoid detection
• Increased lethality weapons and precision for man-portable and vehicle weapons, robotic weapons
• Increased range and effectiveness for use in Beyond Line-Of-Sight (BLOS) and MOUT operations
• Tube launch UAVs, UCAVs, and remote overhead camera munitions for vehicles and dismounts limit collateral damage
Increased penetration (1,500+ HEAT/1,000+ KE), including lightweight capability for infantry.
Infantry homing grenades with top-attack EFP or tandem.
KE hypervelocity missiles/missile rounds 10+ km vehicles. KE ATGMs for infantry.
Laser designators on AT grenade launchers, also used for precision artillery/air/naval rounds/ATGMs.
Attack UAVs and laser target designator UAVs for precision strikes throughout the battle zone
Infantry systems:
Photos:
Russian- RPG-29 Grenade Launcher used extensively in Syria
US- M mm Recoiless Rifle US developed weapon system 1950’s – present used extensively in Afghanistan and Syria.Ammunition includes ammunition included HEAT, High Explosive Plastic-Tracer (HEP-T), canister, High Explosive Anti Personnel (flechette) range 990 m
Chinese- QLZ-87 Multiple grenade launcher,
UK- Starstreak AD/ AT dual use hypersonic missile.
Capabilities:
Ranges 200m to 700m depending on the platform
Can penetrate up to 900mm of rolled homogeneous armor (RHA) or 3000mm of brick depending on the platform.
Targets tanks, light vehicles, and infantry in cover.
Trends: Increasing lethality of the tandem shaped charge provides the Threat a capability to defeat active protection systems and penetrate the armor of main battle tanks.
Starstreak advantages and disadvantages
Advantages
Starstreak has a number of advantages over infrared guided, radar guided, and radio command MCLOS/SACLOS (Blowpipe or Javelin) missiles:
It cannot be jammed by infrared countermeasures or radar/radio countermeasures.[10]
It cannot be suppressed with anti-radar missiles.[10]
Its high speed makes it more likely to be able to intercept a fast moving aircraft.
Three submunitions increase the size of the lethal area, increasing the probability that the target will be hit by at least one submunition. This is partially reduced by the missile's attack pattern (see disadvantages).
Its high speed reduces the amount of time for effective usage of any potential countermeasure, such as the beam manoeuvring or illuminating the guidance laser source with a dazzling battlefield laser.
Disadvantages
The major disadvantage is the submunitions, having no proximity fuze, must collide with the target in order to harm it.
The guidance laser may be detected after the missile is fired, if the target aircraft is equipped with a suitable passive laser warning system. In contrast, to detect a passively guided Infrared homing missile requires MAWS detectors with significant disadvantages: radar-based closure-detecting style MAWS radiate an easily-detectable signal that reveals the aircraft and may be used as an auxiliary homing signal by AA missiles, and Infrared launch signature detector-based MAWS tend to be subject to a high false alarm rate, which reduces attention paid them by the pilot.
Battlefield obscurants, such as smoke, can degrade the ability of the missile operator to see the target, and could potentially interfere with the guidance laser.
The training level of the operator is critical since, unlike infrared guided missiles, the operator has to track the target exactly with the sighting unit aimpoint (SACLOS). If the aircraft detects the targeting laser, it has the whole period of the missile flight time to engage in avoidance manoeuvres, which adds additional challenge to the missile operator's target-tracking task.
AT-5B Konkurs
Starstreak
QLZ-87

27. Threat Tanks System Tier Protection Fire Control Weapons T-90S 1
ERA: Kontakt-5 2d gen
Active protection system:
Shtora TshU1-7
Fire Control: 1A45T
Ballistic Computer: 1V528-1
Gunner’s Range-Finder Sight: 1V43
Gun Stabilization: 2E42-4 
125-mm Smoothbore Gun
12.7-mm 6P49 MG (Roof)
7.62 mm 6P7K MG (Coax)
Smoke grenade launcher
T-72BM 2
ERA: Kontakt-5
Active system: Arena available
Fire Control: 1A40
Ballistic Computer: 1V528
Gunner’s Range-Finder Sight: 1K13-49
Gun Stabilization: 2E42-2
12.7-mm NSVT MG (Roof)
7.62 mm PKT MG (Coax)
T-80U
1-2
ERA: Kontakt-1 or 5
Fire Control: 1A45
Gunner’s Range-Finder Sight: 1A42
Gun Stabilization: 2E42
12.7-mm MG (Turret-TC)
7.62 mm MG (Coax)
T-14
Active System: Afganit active protection complex
Counter-mine defenses
Advanced defensive aids system
Fire Control: Computerized FCS
Ballistic Computer: NA
Gunner’s Range-Finder Sight: NA
Gun Stabilization: NA
125-mm Smoothbore Gun Laser-guided projectile
7.62 mm PKTM (Remote Control)
T-90S notes:
The T-90S was selected for the OEMP based off offensive capabilities (‘FCS’) survivability (due to ERA and countermeasures). This representative threat system would provide a worthy adversary for the US Training Community. The reason for not choosing a system such as the T-14 was the lack of current prototypes, proliferation, and the fact that the program could be canceled such as the T-95, program.
The T-90 was originally a variant of the T-72BM with a number of improvements that also included upgrades from the T-80 system.
The most significant difference in the T-90 versus most of the other platforms are in its weapon systems. The T-90 employs an upgraded components such as the 1A45T fire-control system, based on the system in the T-80U; and the 1V528-1 ballistic computer. The fire-control system allows the main gun to be fired when the vehicle is stationary or moving under day and night conditions. The tank commander has a video display that shows the same image that the gunner sees.
The T-90’s main weapon (gun) is the 2A46M4 (or D-81TM) which is a 125-mm smoothbore gun. The main gun is stabilized by the 2E42-4 system. The barrel is claimed to be percent more accurate than previous platforms (such as the T-80 and T-72MB).
The improved turret used for the T-90 is fitted with a remote controlled NSVT 12.7-mm machine gun and an associated PZU-7 sight. The turret uses NII Stali Chobham-style armor, offering 3.2 in (810 mm) of protection against APFSDS rounds and 4.8 in (1,220 mm) of protection against HEAT rounds.
Reporting indicates that the Shtora electro-optical countermeasures system reduces the hit probability of anti-tank missiles by a factor of three.
Sources:
ACE-TI
WEG:
FMSO:
Janes:
Military Periscope:
Defense Update:
Global Security

28. Threat ATGMs System Tier Range (m) Penetration (mm)
Panzerfaust 3 T-600
110-mm Tandem-HEAT
1,2
600
Armor: 800 ERA
RPG-29/32/ HASHIM
105-mm Tandem-HEAT
(Disposable)
AT-29: 500
AT-32: 700
Armor: ERA
950+ conv
Other: 1,500+
Concrete: 1,500
Brick: ,000
Earth: ,000
Armbrust
67-mm grenade HEAT
1,2,3
1,500
Armor (CE): 300
Reinf Concrete: INA
RPG-27 2
200
Armor: 750+ ERA,
950+ conv
Brick: 2,000
Reinf Concrete: 1,500+
Log/Dirt (m): 3,700
Eryx SR-ATGM
Tandem Shaped Charge (HEAT)
600
Armor (CE): 900
Panzerfaust 3 T-600: WEG: Inf Wpns, pg68
RPG-27: WEG: Inf Wpns, pg56
RPG-29/RPG-32/HASHIM: WEG: Inf Wpns, pg58
Armbrust: WEG: Inf Wpns, pg71
Eryx SR-ATGM: WEG AT, pg55

29. Threat IFVs System Tier Armor Weapons BMP-3M * Heavy IFV 1
Applique Armor on Turret 
ERA on Stand Off Plate 
Active Protection System (APS) 
100-mm 2A70 gun
Kornet-E, SA-24 
Kornet, SA-18
7.62 Coax PKT MG
BMP-2M Berezhok
1,2
Applique Armor on Turret (avail)
ERA on Stand Off Plate (avail)
30-mm dual-feed auto cannon
Kornet-LR
BMD-3
Airborne IFV
Turret can sustain 7.62
No Applique Armor
May have Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA)
30-mm cannon
7.62-mm MG
BMP-3UAE
Desert BMP-3
Applique Armor on Turret
ERA on Stand Off Plate
No APS
T-15 ARMATA
*In Trial / Development
DEV
Steel and ceramic composite 1,200-1,400 mm vs HEAT
2A42 30 mm Auto Cannon rounds (AP/HE)
7.62 mm coax PKT, Kornet-EM

30. Threat APCs OEMP differentiator System Tier Armor Weapons Remarks
BTR-90 1
Applique, ERA, and APS available
2A42 30 Caliber AG
AT-5 Konkurs; AT-5B
Konkurs-M; AT-4 Fagot (less likely); AT-4b Faktoriya (less likely)
8 X 8 wheeled APC with side exit doors; 4 firing ports on the right side & 3 firing ports on left
BTR-80
No applique armor, ERA, or APS.
KVPT 14.5 HMG
Soldiers exit through 2 side doors; 4 firing ports on the right & 3 firing ports on the left
BTR-D
AGS mm AGL
KILIVER Turret (30-mm gun, 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun, thermal sights, superior day sights, and 4 KORNET ATGM launchers)
Air droppable IFV, space for 10 soldiers; 2 firing ports on each side; 1 firing port in left rear door
OEMP differentiator

31. Active Protection Systems
Active Protection Systems (APS) achieve an advantage by increasing survivability by engaging threat in one of two ways:
Hardkill systems—actively intercepts incoming projectiles and destroys them prior to impact.
Softkill systems—disrupts munitions' sensors through a variety of means. Includes radar and IR warners and jammers, chaff, flares, dazzlers, and other deception measures.
Mi-24/35 HIND
T-72BM
Show Video: 1) Arena Active Protection Armour in Slow Motion FPS HD
APS - active protection system: System which uses sensors to trigger launch of a grenade, flare, decoy or other projectile to intercept and / or negate an incoming munition.
Photos:
T-72 BM and T-80 comes with the Arena APS includes doppler radar scanner and 26 projectiles for intercepting incoming threats.
Type 99A2 Has a Chinese version of the Russian Shorta APS
Types:
Hardkill systems- actively intercepts incoming projectiles and destroys them prior to impact.
Softkill systems- disrupts munition’s sensors through a variety of means. Includes Radar and IR warners and jammers, chaff, flares, and various decoys.
Examples:
Arena-Active Protection System.
LSDW- Laser Self Defense Weapon.
DEW- Direct energy weapon.
Chaff / Flares.
Infrared Jammers.
T-80U
Type-99A2

32. Artillery Systems 2S23 Type 90 2S9-1 2A45M
Artillery provides tactical advantage in both the offense and the defense. Specialized munitions and high mobility maintain advantage capability.
Autonomous operation/rapid self-emplace/displace with integrated networked Fire Control Systems (FCS).
Precision munitions:
Laser/IR/Radar homing, explosively formed projectile, multi-sensor fused.
Inertial/GPS/muzzle-velocity radar course-correction on conventional rounds/rockets.
Combination guns integrate tactical unit BLOS fires and strikes.
2S23
Type 90
Autonomous operation/rapid self-emplace/displace with integrated netted Fire Control System (FCS).
Precision munitions: laser/IR/MMW homing, Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP) multi-sensor fuzed.
Inertial/GPS/muzzle-velocity radar course-correction on conventional rounds/rockets.
Combination guns integrate tactical unit Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) fires and strikes.
Artillery Systems: Can provide significant tactical advantage in both the offense and the defense. Current systems are dated however upgrades to munitions maintain tier 2 capability.
Capabilities:
Majority of Threat artillery (152-mm and above) and large-caliber MRLs are capable of firing nuclear munitions .
Trends: Specialized munitions and improved targeting systems.
Mortars:
Especially effective, with their high-angle trajectories, for smoke and illumination missions.
Light weight offers mobility.
Provides commander his own close and direct support.
Trends: Mortars emphasis on weapons for beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) and non-line-of-sight (NLOS) engagements.
2S9-1
2A45M

33. Threat Fires System Tier Cal Range (km) Remarks 2S19M1-155 SP (T) How
155mm
33.8
41 assisted
Reduced emplace/displacement time (powered spades & travel locks)
Reduced signatures (viz, IR, radar) G6
SP (W) How 2
30-39
Enhanced mobility (run-flat, dynamic inflation)
Enhanced mine protection.
9P140
Heavy MRL
1,2
220mm
16-tube 35
Fin & spin-stabilized.
9A52-2 Heavy MRL
300mm
12-tube 90
9A51 MRL
122mm
50-tube
20.5

34. Counter Mortar/Battery Systems
Counter battery systems improve counter battery fires accuracy band response time.
Trends include high speed processors and improved interconnectivity provided by wireless technology.
Acoustic sound ranging equipment accurate from 1 to 2 percent depending on range.
1L220
Counter Mortar / Battery Systems: Indirect fire target acquisition detects identifies and locates elements of the enemy mortar, cannon, and rocket units for counterfire and counterbattery fire.
Photos:
Russian- ARK-1M Rys- Track up to 3 targets at a range of 13 (mortars) to 30 (TBM) km away depending on gun system.
Russian- 1L219 Zoopark Artillery locating Radar- Dual use tracks all form of artillery including mortars and rockets: secondary mission as air traffic control system for UAV and Aircraft. Tracks up to 12 targets at one time.
Ukraine- 1L220 Zoopark- Ukraine version of 1L-219
Sweden- SORAS SOund RAnging System- Passive sound ranging system capable of locating enemy gun positions. ( schematic representative of the system and not of the actual SORAS).
Platform
Target Sets
Country of Origin
Type / Notes
1L220
Artillery, Mortars, Rockets, Tactical Missiles
Ukraine
1L219
Russia
Tracks 12 targets simultaneously
SORAS
Artillery, Mortars, Rockets,
Swedish
Sound ranging System
ARK-1M Rys
Tracks 3 targets simultaneously
Capabilities:
Weapon-locating radars detect targets following a ballistic path.
Sound ranging. Determine the precise location of hostile artillery by using data from the sound of its guns, mortars, or rockets firing.
Trends:
Advances in RISTA and fire control systems provide the Threat a capability to rapidly disseminate information on suspected enemy targets within one minute or less. This includes the time from acquisition to firing data computation and the initial transmission of data to a firing battery.
ARK-1M Rys
SORAS
1L219

35. Chemical Systems
Chemical operations are able to affect mobility in the AOR as well as change the nature of the conflict.
Most threat artillery is capable of delivering chemical weapons.
Toxic industrial chemicals can be used as precursors and mixed into 4th generation chemical weapons.
Obscurants can degrade infrared ISR optics when used in smokescreens.
TZ-74
Show Video: 1) BM-21 Grad rocket launcher system - Shooting on the range 14 March, 2013
Chemical weapons are considered game changers and can cause a change in how the conflict is addressed both strategically and tactically. Changes in rules of engagement and property resource control can become more restrictive if there is a threat for the proliferation of CBRN weapons.
Novichok means “newcomer” once the precursors are mixed the combination becomes a chemical weapon.
Chemical Systems: The use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons can have an enormous impact on all combat actions and change the nature of the conflict.
The Threat is equipped, structured, and trained to conduct both offensive and defensive chemical warfare.
Chemical Capabilities: Virtually all Threat indirect fire weapons can deliver chemical agents.
2S19 Howitzer is chemical capable for blister and non-persistent nerve agents at range of 24 km.
2S9-1 Combo Gun is chemical capable for blister and nerve agent est. range at 5.9 km
2S23 Combo Gun is chemical capable for blister and nerve agents at 5.9 km
BM-21 Grad MRL system is capable for nerve agents at 20 km
BM-14 MRL system is capable for nerve agents at approximately 10 km
Platform
Function
Country of Origin
Type / Notes
RKhM-4-01
CBRN Recon
Russia
BTR-80 Variant
TZ-74
Chemical Decon
Slovakia
System, can provide protective smokescreens
120 mm SP Combo Gun 2S9-1 tracked
Smoke; Chemical
Optional proximity fuzes for air bursts
120 mm SP Combo Gun 2S23 wheeled
152 mm SP Howitzer 2S19 tracked
Range between 1 and 45 km
IED Vests
Biological, Chemical
Worldwide
Wearable IED, with placed by hybrid threat
Trends:
Other possible delivery means of the Hybrid Threat could include SPF, affiliated insurgent or guerrilla organizations, or civilian sympathizers.
BM-21 Grad
RKhM-4-01
BM-14

36. Theater Ballistic & Cruise Missiles
TBMs achieve an advantage by extending threat deep-attack capabilities by means other than manned aircraft.
Improvements in guidance systems, propulsion, warhead options, launch platforms, and affordable designs have vaulted CMs to the role of the first option for deep attack against point and small area targets.
Pre-programmed missiles flying non-ballistic trajectories with a mix of PGM options may be categorized as NLOS munitions.
Shahab-3
Show Video: 1) Iranian Shahab 3B Missile test fire
Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBM)
Characteristics: Employ a high-atmospheric or exo-atmospheric ballistic trajectory to reach target. Most TBMs follow a set course that cannot be altered after the missile has burned its fuel. Majority of TBMs launch from ground or from naval assets. Missile ground launch platforms vary.
Trends: TBMs will proliferate and evolve considerably in next 5-10 years. Increase in flexibility, mobility, survivability, and reliability in missiles and missile platforms from potential Threats. Improvements in guidance systems, propulsion, warhead options, launch platforms, and affordable designs have vaulted CMs to the role of the first option for deep attack against point and small area targets.
Missiles flying non-ballistic trajectories with a mix of pre-programmed phase and options for manned guidance, loitering in the target area, as well as separate homing by GPS, radar or passive RF seeker, and/or IR/MMW homing. These systems may also be categorized as non-line-of-sight antitank guided missiles
Photos:
Iranian- Shahab: The original Shahab-3 missile and warhead resembled the Nodong-1, with a 1,200 kg warhead and a range of 1,300 km. Accuracy is said to be 190 m. With advent of the new missile design, it is now called Shahab-3A. The newer Shahab-3B version has a new design separating RV with 2,000 range and smaller kg warhead. Accuracy is said to be 190 m. It mounts on a different MEL trailer.
Indian Russian- Brahmos Supersonic Cruise Missile: Primarily developed as an anti- ship missile. It can be used as a land-attack cruise missile (LACM). Launchers include land- based TEL, aircraft and ships (e.g., destroyers). It can also be launched from submarine, fixed
ground site or pontoon underwater silo.
Israel –Harpy: Using the preprogram mode, the aircraft can be treated as a cruise missile. But it can also be piloted as a UAV, with homing mode for attack. Other UAVs, such as the South African Lark, feature radar attack modes. Alternative uses for the Harpy could include attacking other high-value radar targets, such as artillery counter-battery radars and ground surveillance radars.
Cruise Missiles
Characteristics : Unmanned, precision guided, subsonic weapons propelled by either rocket motors or jet engines. Assumes non-ballistic flight path remaining within the atmosphere. Programmable delivery course, and low terrain hugging capability. Flexibility payload and multiple launch configurations, including air, sea (surface and subsurface), and ground.
Trends: Proliferate (including non state actors) and evolution (greater speed, accuracy, and programming with technology).
Harpy
Brahmos

37. Questions?