1. Threat Tactics Foundations OPFOR Threat Design Concepts
Introduction to Functional Tactics
and Hybrid Threat Concepts

2. Terminal Learning Objective
Action: Understand the fundamentals of Functional Tactics and Systems Warfare as portrayed in ACE Threat Integration products.
Condition: Provide a classroom environment to support training, professional education, and leader development with in-class discussion and Army Training Network (ATN) website access.
Standard: Be familiar with concepts unique to the Hybrid Threat.

3. Functional Tactics
Challenge: Design tactics, force structures, task organizing that represent a realistic threat with minimal biases
Functional design seeks to distill military actions to their most basic purpose.
Ensures consistent mission focus
Allows designer to highlight HT uniqueness
It is the pervading law of all things organic and inorganic, of all things physical and metaphysical, of all things human and all things superhuman, of all true manifestations of the head, of the heart, of the soul, that the life is recognizable in its expression, that form ever follows function. This is the law."
Louis Henry Sullivan

4. OPFOR Tactics – Rules of Thumb
Always plan for reactions
Attack where your enemy is weakest
Start and stay with your objective
Leverage Rules of Engagement
Use ALL capabilities: yours, others’, real and perceived
Always plan for reactions - Tactics are not “fire and forget”
 Graphic: football game – set up and run play.
 Consider a phased tactic to ensure reactions/branches/sequels/etc are planned
Attack where your enemy is weakest - Don’t meet strength with strength
 Graphic illustrates pervasive mindset of glorious force-on-force battles
Start and stay with your objective
 Graphic: Zombie target. Body shots (v.main force) easy, ineffective.
 Find key system, don’t get distracted.
Leverage Rules of Engagement (you, your enemy, the people)
 Graphics: Gandhi, ISIS, mosque.
 Know yours, enemy’s, population. Most limits are self-imposed.
Use ALL capabilities: yours, others’, real and perceived

5. Systems Warfare
A system is a set of different elements so connected or related as to perform a unique function not performable by the elements or components alone.
The essential ingredients of a system include the components, the synergy among components and other systems, and some type of functional boundary separating it from other systems.
Systems Warfare is the disaggregation of enemy combat power by destroying or neutralizing vulnerable single points of failure in enemy Functions.
The Threat will take heavy causalities to destroy single points of failure for higher objective.
The HT will disaggregate enemy combat power by destroying or neutralizing vulnerable single points of failure in enemy warfighting functions. A system is a set of different elements so connected or related as to perform a unique function not performable by the elements or components alone. The essential ingredients of a system include the components, the synergy among components and other systems, and some type of functional boundary separating it from other systems. Therefore, a “system of systems” is a set of different systems so connected or related as to produce results unachievable by the individual systems alone. The HT views the OE, the battlefield, its own instruments of power, and an opponent’s instruments of power as a collection of complex, dynamic, and integrated systems composed of subsystems and components.
Systems warfare serves as a conceptual and analytical tool to assist in the planning, preparation, and execution of warfare. With the systems approach, the intent is to identify critical system components and attack them in a way that will degrade or destroy the use or importance of the overall system.
The primary principle of systems warfare is the identification and isolation of the critical subsystems or components that give the opponent the capability and cohesion to achieve his aims. The focus is on the disaggregation of the system by rendering its subsystems and components ineffective. While the aggregation
of these subsystems or components is what makes the overall system work, the interdependence of these subsystems is also a potential vulnerability.
En route
Arrival
Departure
Fuel
Comms
Ammo
Potentially Vulnerable System Elements
People
Parts

6. Exploit Regular/Irregular Synergy
Potential threats will exploit and leverage regular and irregular synergies simultaneously to threaten US forces using regular, irregular and criminal capabilities. Examples:
Irregular and regular actors/proxies (Syria ??)
Threat state actor using irregular capabilities (Georgia 08)
Threat non-state actor makes use of regular capabilities (Lebanon 06)
Future threats provide many diverse challenges such as…
Technological (where did they get that?)
Analytical (who is doing what?)
Tactical (what will we do about it…and how will we do it?)
Adversaries understand that the environment that would produce the most challenges to U.S. forces is one in which conventional military operations execute in concert with irregular warfare. Units that are well-trained and equipped for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations often do not retain the precise skills, equipment, and mindset for conventional combat and vice versa. In addition, there is a synergy to the simultaneous use of regular and irregular methods that is difficult to counter. Synergy will be achieved in one of two basic ways: by a threat state actor executing conventional operations that ensure the U.S. is also simultaneously presented with an irregular warfare environment; or by a threat non-state actor conducting irregular warfare that integrates conventional means and tactics into its operations.
Non-state threat actors will continue to seek and employ paramilitary capability. They will organize, train, and equip themselves as cohesive units. This training will continue to require sanctuary—training facilities and

7. Employ a Range of Technology
Threat technology can be just as sophisticated and sometimes better then US, which, provides the possibilities of overmatch capabilities.
The Threat is often able to focus on precise technological requirements.
The Threat will develop or use systems for multi-use purposes
Many Threats do not have long acquisition cycles.
Commercial off the shelf (COTs) technology is increasing and creating more possibilities and opportunities.
Adversaries will employ niche technologies at the tactical level that are just as sophisticated, and sometimes more so, than those possessed by the local U.S. unit and its partners. Tandem-warhead anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), sophisticated EW, communications and encryption devices, and modern air defense missiles are just some examples of the many types of systems in which threat actors can and will achieve parity or superiority in tactical actions. This is not to say that threat actors will not continue to employ improvised devices of many types. On the contrary, the trend will be for threat actors to employ modern niche technologies in a synergistic manner with improvised devices.
One of the most important areas in which threat actors will seek to operate in the future is in the acquisition and employment of sophisticated EW systems. Threat actors understand the continued reliance the U.S. places on communications, intelligence and surveillance, and visualization technologies. These technologies are vulnerable to disruption and exploitation by systems far easier to
obtain and simpler to master.
The enemy’s use of countermeasures (both traditional and nontraditional) will limit the U.S. military’s ability to achieve overmatch against a determined enemy in restricted terrain. Forces will have to engage in close combat to find and defeat the enemy. In addition, future enemies will attempt to counter our most significant advantages in communications, surveillance, long-range precision fires, armor protection, and mobility. Tactical units will require a suite of adaptable combined arms capabilities and the ability to integrate joint effects.

8. Information Warfare: Weapon System
Deception
Electronic Warfare
Perception Management
Computer Warfare
Information Attack
Physical Destruction
Protection and Security
Adversarial tactical actions will be designed to achieve information warfare objectives rather than purely military ones. Causing U.S. casualties; exposing weaknesses in training, equipment, or resolve; and forcing redeployment will be paramount over such considerations as seizing or retaining terrain features or battlefield victory. Adversaries will attempt to deny and degrade U.S. mission command by constant cyber and EW attacks.
Photo Three U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft mockups parked on a fake runway at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, during exercise "Salty Demo '85" on 29 April "Salty Demo '85" was an air base survivability exercise evaluating passive and active defenses, aircraft operation and generation, and base recovery systems.
Three F-16 mockups during exercise
N Korea propaganda

9. Employ CBPs and Cultural Standoff
Complex Battle Positions
Designed to protect and/or hide--not necessarily tied to an avenue of approach.
Provide sanctuary from which to launch attacks.
Made possible by C3D, underground facilities, complex/urban terrain, fortification, false and decoy positions, and information warfare support.
Cultural Standoff
Uses social aspects to--protection and freedom to maneuver.
Integrating sensitive facilities into CBPs; employing human terrain for deception purposes; and exploiting a population using information warfare.
Reduce exposure to stand-off fires and ISR
NOT same as US term
Adversaries reduce exposure to stand-off fires and reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence by utilizing complex battle positions (CBPs) and cultural standoff. CBPs are locations designed to protect the occupants from detection and attack while denying their seizure and occupation by the enemy. They are not necessarily tied to an avenue of approach. CBPs protect forces while providing sanctuary from which to launch attacks. Camouflage, concealment, cover and deception (C3D) measures are critical to the success of a CBP. These efforts and actions include, but are not limited to, underground facilities, complex/urban terrain, fortification, false and decoy positions, and information warfare support.
Cultural standoff is the act of using social aspects of the environment to provide protection and freedom to maneuver. Cultural standoff tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) employed by threat actors include integrating religious, medical, and other sensitive facilities into CPBs; employing human terrain for deception purposes; and exploiting a population using information warfare.
Hospitals, schools, hanging prisoners out windows, religious sites, etc

10. Adaptive Strategy Conduct Preclusion Control Tempo Attack Will
Employ Shielding
Negate Technological Overmatch
Change Nature of the Conflict
Allow No Sanctuary
Hamas Firing rockets from civilian population
Preclusion – Anti-access is defined as those actions and capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an adversary from entering an operational area. Area denial includes actions and capabilities, usually of shorter range, that are not designed to keep an adversary out, but rather to limit its freedom of action within the operational area.
Tempo – Keep the speed of operations moving at a pace that best suits threat goals. Usually rapid at first to conclude regional ops before an extraregional actor can influence and then slow to drag out conflict and affect political will.
Will - Adversaries will try to inflict highly visible and embarrassing losses on U.S. and partner forces to weaken domestic resolve and national will to sustain the deployment or conflict. Potential adversaries believe they can have a comparative advantage against superior forces because of the collective psyche and will of their own forces and leadership to endure hardship or casualties, while we may not be willing to do the same. They will try to influence public opinion in the Homeland to the effect that the goal of intervention is not worth the cost. They will use violence, intimidation, and coercion against U.S. supporters and partners.
Shielding -
• Complex terrain
• Noncombatants
• Risk of unacceptable collateral damage
• Countermeasure systems
• Dispersion
• Fortifications
• Information campaigns
Negate Tech - Adversaries will attempt to use the physical environment and natural conditions to neutralize or offset the technological advantages of modern reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence operations and use our own tech against us.
Change Nature – Adversaries will try to change the nature of conflict to exploit the differences between friendly and enemy capabilities. Peace to war and back before we can react.
No Sanctuary - Our adversaries seek to deny our forces safe haven during every phase of a deployment and as long as they are in the region. The resultant drain on manpower and resources to provide adequate force-protection measures can reduce our strategic, operational, and tactical means to conduct war and erode our national will to sustain conflict.
JMRC OPFOR placing artillery in populated area

11. Questions?