1. National Security & Politics
History, Geopolitics and International Affairs

2. War Powers Resolution

3. War Powers Resolution

4. War Powers Resolution

5. War Powers Resolution

6. Passed November 7, 1973, over a presidential veto.
War Powers Resolution
Passed November 7, 1973, over a presidential veto.

7. PBS NewsHour – February 11, 2015
( 1:06 – 3:22 )

8. PBS NewsHour – February 11, 2015
( 24:10 – 31:25 )

9. Lessons Learned from Vietnam War
Weinberger Doctrine
Caspar W. Weinberger
"The Uses of Military Power"
National Press Club, Washington, D.C.
Nov. 28, 1984
• Secretary of Defense under President Reagan
• Drafted by his military assistant, Brig Gen Colin Powell

10. Weinberger Doctrine
• The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies

11. National Interest National Interest:
the collection of issues that support our vision and goals

12. National Interest National Interest:
 The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and
partners;
 A strong, innovative and growing U.S. economy in an open international
economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;
 Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and
 An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace,
security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global
challenges.
National Security Strategy of the US, 2010

13. Vital National Interest
Vital National Interests:
those issues of such importance over which the nation is willing to go to war

14. Weinberger Doctrine
• The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies
• If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning . . .

15. Weinberger Doctrine
• The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies
• If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning
• If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives

16. Weinberger Doctrine • The relationship between our objectives
• The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies
• If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning
• If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives
• The relationship between our objectives
and the forces we have committed -- their size, composition, and disposition -- must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary

17. Weinberger Doctrine
• The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies
• If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning
• If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives
• The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed -- their size, composition, and disposition -- must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary
• Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress

18. Weinberger Doctrine
• The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies
• If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning
• If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives
• The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed -- their size, composition, and disposition -- must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary
• Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress
• The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.

19. Weinberger Doctrine
• The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies
• If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning
• If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives
• The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed -- their size, composition, and disposition -- must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary
• Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress
• The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.

20. Thesis
The Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) was the only war in U. S. history where we successfully implemented the lessons of the previous war from the beginning. 20

21. Weinberger Doctrine
Caspar W. Weinberger