1. Does Magical Ideation Combined with Need for Cognition Facilitate Belief in Conspiracies? Rick Stevens, PhD & Mary Medlin, M.S. University of Louisiana at Monroe
Abstract
This study investigated the belief in conspiracy theories. Cacioppo and Petty (1982) describe the need for cognition as the “tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking”. Cohen, et.al. (1955) referred the need for cognition as a need to understand the world. A third factor investigated by this study was the existence of Magical Ideation, as defined by the Magical Ideation Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). Eckblad and Chapman defined magical ideation as “belief in forms of causation that by conventional standards are invalid”.
It was found that Need for Cognition was positively correlated with belief in conspiracy theories. Another factor investigated by this study was the existence of Magical Ideation. Magical ideation was positively correlated with the belief in conspiracies and with Need for Cognition.
Introduction
Few people would doubt that conspiracies exist. However, when using the term “conspiracist ideation” there is the implication that the person engaging in beliefs about these conspiracies is basing the belief on something other than a logical evaluation of the available information. One implication might be that a person who engages in conspiracist ideation keeps looking for explanations after finding that the commonly accepted explanation for an event is not emotionally satisfying. Cacioppo and Petty (1982) describe the need for cognition as the “tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking”. Cohen, et.al. (1955) referred to the need for cognition as a need to understand the world.
If those who believe in conspiracies which do not seem to be supported by logic or accepted by the general population have a greater need for cognition, it seems reasonable that they would spend time seeking explanations. However, some of the explanations that they arrive at seem puzzling due to their apparent lack of logical consistency. A
third factor investigated by this study was the existence of Magical Ideation, as defined by the Magical Ideation Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). Eckblad and Chapman defined magical ideation as “belief in forms of causation that by conventional standards are invalid”.
Methods and Results
Need for cognition was found to be positively correlated with belief in conspiracy theories, r(149)=.16, p<.05.
The correlation between magical ideation and conspiracist thinking was significant, r(149)=.87, p<.05.
A correlation was also found between the need for cognition and magical thinking (r(149)=.28, p<.05).
While a correlation of .16 is a bit weak, it is significant in this case (N=151). The correlations between all 3 scales would
suggest that those who believe in conspiracies also engage in magical thinking, pretty consistently. Further, both of the conspiracy and magical thinking scales correlate with need for cognition, suggesting a motivation that drives a belief in conspiracies and perhaps an active imagination.
Conclusions
The combination of these three factors suggests that those who are more likely to believe in questionable conspiracies engage in thinking processes that are not logical, even when they are not thinking about conspiracies. Also, they have a tendency to seek explanations for things that fit their unconventional worldviews. The picture presented by the combination of these three factors suggests that a combination of thinking processes which do not follow the logical processes of cause-and-effect (magical ideation) and a desire to seek out explanations and make sense of the world sometimes results in belief in theories that the majority of people in society view as illogical.
References
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Table 1: Correlations between data from the scales in belief in conspiracies, need for cognition, and magical thinking.