1. Fourth Generations of Modern Warfare (4GW)
Centre of Excellence - Defence Against Terrorism
Fourth Generations of Modern Warfare
(4GW)
COL Engr. JÁNOS TOMOLYA Ph.D.
HUN Army
Chief of Capabilities
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2. Classify : Unclassified Agenda : Introduction;
Subject : 4th GW
Time : 20 minutes
Classify : Unclassified
Agenda :
Introduction;
Different classification of war (epochs, waves, forms);
Asymmetric Warfare;
Military cultures;
Fourth Generation of modern warfare;
Why we have military science and theory of war?
Just because the humanıty spent much more time in war then in peace. So the war is quite loyal phenomen escorting the humanity.
What we are waiting from the military science?
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3. The Next War?
How can we avoid being like the French knights at the Battle of Agincourt?
Whom future wars will be fought, what they will be about, how they will
be fought, what wars will be fought for and why people will participate in it.

4. Future Warfare
How we will fight the next war?

5. Or this one?

6. Lets see a little bit the statistics.
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7. Number of terrorist attacks 2003-2011

8. Military Expenditure
SIPRI: 1531 billions USD in 2009
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10. 1. Different classification of war: Epochs
Dr T. Lindsay Moore and Robert J. Bunker :
4 epochs, based on energy sources
human energy
animal-based energy
mechanical energy
post-mechanical energy:
Advanced technology warfare
Non-Western warfare
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11. Waves Agricultural war Industrial-based war (late of 17th century)
Alvin and Heidi Toffler developed a theory of warfare based on the economic and societal changes of civilization.
Agricultural war
Industrial-based war (late of 17th century)
Knowledge-based war (from 1980s)
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12. Forms of warfare Symmetric Dissymmetric Asymmetric /Eric Walters/
After WWII more than 160 armed conflicts; 75% of them were asymmetric
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13. Symmetric
In symmetric conflicts, the two opposing adversaries dispose of armed forces that are similar in all aspects such as force structure, doctrine and assets and have comparable tactical, operational and strategic objectives.
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14. Dissymmetric
A conflict is dissymmetric when one of the opposing forces is superior by means of force structure, doctrine and assets, but both parties are striving for similar political and military objectives.
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16. 2. Asymmetric Warfare (AW)
One of the opponents is unable or unwilling to wage the war with comparable force structure, doctrine and assets and has different political and military objectives than his adversary.

17. Asymmetric Warfare (AW)
What is it?
David and Goliath warfare
Unsophisticated vs. the sophisticated (technologically)
Poor countries or entities against rich countries or rich entities
Threat can be internal or external (i.e. Israel, Vietnam or Afghanistan)
Often state sponsored/supported
Attacking opponent via indirect means such as
Terrorism
Critical infrastructures
Avoids combat w/ conventional forces
Tends to have a purpose that focuses on a force, but not always the case
Misc. unconventional means i.e., poisoning water/food supplies, exploitation of media by staging scenes to sway public opinion.
AW IS JUST A FANCY WAY OF SAYING “SUCKER PUNCH”. IF THE ENEMY EXPECTS YOU TO HIT W/ A RIGHT HOOK, HIT W/ THE LEFT HOOK INSTEAD. In Sun Tzu’s terms, AW is a way of maintaining “formlessness”
Hannibal crossed the Alps on elephants
Russia invaded by Napoleon.
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.
Vietnamese & United States’ lack of will (as a Nation) to win.
INTRODUCTION TO AW 4GW MW

18. The way of application of force depends on the military culture.
3. Military cultures
Clausewitz: „War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force.”
The way of application of force depends on the military culture.
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19. Kinds of Military Cultures
Material-centric;
Movement-centric;
Guerilla warfare
Forms: terrorism, guerilla warfare, orthodox warfare;
Types: anarchism; equality-based; tradition-based; pluralist; secessionist; divider; reformer;
Used methods: coup d’état; exhausting, focus on military, warfare in build-up areas;
Orthodox warfare
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20. Material-centric Indirect approach Strategy of „indirect approach”
Characteristics:
Daggering wars;
Defence;
Strategic objective: exhausting of enemy
Indirect warfare- not only with military means
Main services: air force, navy
Preferred by: maritime powers
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21. Movement-centric Strategy of „direct approach” Characteristics:
Blitzkrieg;
Offence;
Strategic objective: destroy the enemy
Direct warfare- decisive maneuvers
Main services: land force,
Preferred by: continental powers
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22. Guerilla warfare Strategy of „indirect approach in irregular form”
Supported by people
Characteristics:
Hit and run actions;
Offence;
Strategic objective: exhausting of enemy, provoke a collapse internally
Media
Indirect warfare- not only with military means
Main services: land force
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23. 4. Generations of Warfare
COL BOYD
Non-linear warfare
Focuses on moral-mental-physical portions of enemy & as single entity
Focus on the enemy and environment
Knowledge of strategic environment
Interact w/ environment appropriately
Fourth generation warfare(4GW) is a concept defined by William S. Lind and expanded by Thomas X. Hammes, used to describe the decentralized nature of modern warfare. The simplest definition includes any war in which one of the major participants is not a state but rather a violent ideological network. Fourth Generation wars are characterized by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, soldier and civilian, conflict and peace, battlefield and safety.
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24. New dimensions
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25. Trinity Clausewitz: „the war is monopoly of the state” government
society
army
people
Clausewitzian trinitarian paradigm the western conceptualization of nation-state warfare,
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26. 1GW= Age of Napoleon
Massed manpower
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27. 2 GW= Age of Firepower Massed firepower... But still in lines
Second Generation Warfare was based on massed firepower. Tactics relied on fire and movement, with heavy reliance on indirect fire from artillery. It was different, but still essentially linear.
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28. 3 GW= Age of Maneuver
Third Generation Warfare was based on maneuver and real time communications. It was best exemplified by World War II's "Blitzkrieg".
The attack relied on infiltration to bypass, cut off and collapse the enemy's main combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them.
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29. 4 GW= Age of Independent Action Cells
Asymmetric warfare in irregular form
Fourth Generation Warfare is based on dispersion and communications that remove the battle front entirely. Attackers rely on cultural/media attack and coordinated violent actions to and paralyze or collapse the enemy's political will, rather than seeking decisive combat.
Fourth Generation war is the greatest change since the Peace of Westphalia, because it marks the end of the state’s monopoly on war.
Once again, as before 1648, many different entities, not states, are fighting war. They use many different means, including "terrorism" and immigration, not just formal armies. Differences between cultures, not just states, become paramount, and other cultures will not fight the way we fight.
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30. 4 GW= Age of Independent Action Cells
the Western rules and conventions guiding and constraining the conduct of war do not apply at all. There are no fronts, no
campaigns, no bases, no uniforms, no publicly displayed honors, and no respect for the territorial limits of
states.

31. Role of Technology in 4GW
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32. The “generations of war” model
Peace of Westphalia
State-vs-state— only “legal” form of war
Nuclear Weapons Proliferate
Fall of USSR
state vs. state
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
States & non-states wage war
States & non-states wage war
1 GW
2 GW
Precursor activities – going back to Alexander & Sun Tzu (and before)
3 GW
New weapons & concepts
New commo & transport networks
4 GW
This chart plays well as a slide show.
As Echevarria rightly notes, 4GW does not lie in the logical sequence of 1/2/3 GW. In fact, the two vertical red lines on the right imply that that sequence has played itself out as state-vs-state warfare fades in significance. 4GW rises from the swamp at the bottom of the figure.
The reason that 4GW is sometimes confused with guerrilla warfare is that violent transnational entities often use terrorism and guerrilla warfare methods - the classical way for militarily weak forces to defeat stronger ones. What defines 4GW is - as Lind and van Creveld insist - who fights and what they’re fighting for. Hammes observed that the transnational nature of 4GW means that networking (as in “social networking”) will be an important tool – see The Sling and the Stone – and so successful 4GW groups may resemble political parties that also have an armed component. Hezbullah fits this model, and the events of July 2006 shows how effective it can be.
In this chart, “insurgents” are fighting the established government of a state, and “partisans” are fighting occupiers. Clearly there is a lot of overlap and both often use terrorism and guerrilla warfare at various stages of their campaigns. States also employ terrorism against their state and nonstate opponents and often against their own citizens (e.g., Reign of Terror, Halabja, the Holocaust, etc.)
Nobody is exactly sure what “anarchists” were fighting for.
Nonstate armed groups: partisans, insurgents, anarchists, criminal organizations, etc.
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33. Definition
4GW can be defined as a method of warfare that uses the following to achieve a moral victory:
Formless and most deadly kind of war
Undermines enemy strengths (this may seem obvious, but most of modern warfare has involved direct attacks on enemy strengths -- find the enemy army and destroy it).
Exploits enemy weaknesses.
Uses asymmetric operations (weapons and techniques that differ substantially from opponents).
While this term is similar to terrorism and asymmetric warfare, it is much narrower. Classical insurgencies and the Indian Wars are examples of Pre-Modern War, not 4GW. Fourth generation warfare usually has the insurgency group or non-state side trying to implement their own government or reestablish an old government over the one currently running the territory. The blurring of lines between state and non-state is further complicated in a democracy by the power of the media.
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34. Drivers The loss of the nation-state's monopoly on violence.
The rise of 4GW is both a product and a driver of the following:
The loss of the nation-state's monopoly on violence.
The rise of cultural, ethnic, and religious conflict.
Globalization (via technological integration).
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35. Characteristics Violent non-state actor (VNSA) fighting the state.
lacks hierarchal authority
lack of formal structure
patience and flexibility
ability to keep a low profile when needed
small size
VNSA’s forces are decentralized
Fourth generation warfare is normally characterized by a violent non-state actorr (VNSA) fighting a state. This fighting can be physically done, such as by modern examples Hezbollah or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In this realm the VNSA uses all three levels of fourth generation warfare. These are the physical (actual combat; it is considered the least important), mental (the will to fight, belief in victory, etc.) and moral (the most important, this includes cultural norms, etc.) levels.
Another characteristic of fourth generation warfare is that as with third generation, the VNSA’s forces are decentralized. With fourth generation warfare there may even be no single organisation and that smaller groups organize into impromptu alliances to target a bigger threat (that being the state armed forces or another faction). As a result these alliances are weak and if the state’s military leadership is smart enough they can split their enemy and cause them to fight amongst themselves

36. Tactics 4GW is fought on the tactical level via:
Rear area operations -- 4GW warriors do not confront a nation-state's military but rather it society. 
Psychological operations -- terror.
Ad-hoc innovation -- use of the enemy's strengths against itself
Human shields

37. Tactics of 4GW Ethnic cleansing Attacking C4I networks
Exploitation of rules of engagement (ROEs) and International laws of war (ILOW)
Exploitation of humanitarian relief organizations i.e. Red Crescent, CAIR, etc…
Shift in focus from enemy’s front to his rear;
Use the enemy’s strength against him
ETHNIC CLEANSING: FORMER YUGO, PARTS OF AFRICA
HUMAN SHIELDS: IRAQ, SOMALIA, TALIBAN?
EXPLOITATION OF POVERTY: I.E. FORMER USSR’S WMD SCIENTISTS MAKING A LIVING BY PROSTITUTING THEIR DEADLY SKILLS/KNOWLEDGE. RUSSIAN MAFIA PROCURING WEAPONS AND WMD TO SELL TO TERRORISTS AND ORGANIZED CRIMINAL ELEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.
REST IS SELF EXPLANATORY.
EXAMPLE OF EXPLOITATION OF U.S. LAWS/U.S. CONSTITUTION
----- Original Message > From: XXXXX > To: <undisclosed-recipients:> > Sent: Sunday, June 16, :26 AM > Subject: MILINET: I accuse the media in the United States of treason--Dennis > Pluchinsky > > > > > > washingtonpost.com > > > > They Heard It All Here, And That's the Trouble > > > > By Dennis Pluchinsky > > > > Sunday, June 16, 2002; Page B03 > > > > > > I accuse the media in the United States of treason. > > > > I have been analyzing terrorism for the U.S. government for 25 years. My > > specialty is "threat analysis." This is a rather difficult field that > > requires the imagination of Walt Disney, the patience of a kindergarten > > teacher, the mind-set of a chess player, the resolve of a Boston Red Sox > fan, > > the mental acuity of a river boat gambler, and the forecasting ability of > a > > successful stock market analyst. > > > > While the media have, over the past several weeks, written extensively on > > alleged intelligence "failures" surrounding the events of Sept. 11, I want > to > > address the media's common-sense "failures." As a terrorism analyst, I am > > both appalled and confused by many of the post-9/11 articles published at > > home and abroad, in newspapers, news magazines and academic journals, as > well > > as on the Internet. > > > > Many of these articles have clearly identified for terrorist groups the > > country's vulnerabilities -- including our food supply, electrical grids, > > chemical plants, trucking industry, ports, borders, airports, special > events > > and cruise ships. Some of these articles have been lengthy and have > provided > > tactical details useful to terrorist groups. No terrorist group that I am > > aware of has the time and manpower to conduct this type of extensive > research > > on a multitude of potential targets. Our news media, and certain think > > tankers and academicians, have done and continue to do the target > > vulnerability research for them. > > > > Imagine that you are a supporter or sympathizer of a terrorist group and > you > > have been tasked to identify and collect tactical information on potential > > U.S. targets. Consider some of the following headlines that have appeared > > since 9/11: "Private Plane Charters: One Way Around Air Security," > "Suicidal > > Nuclear Threat Is Seen At Weapons Plants," "Priority Required for > Protecting > > Utilities," "NRC Warns of Missing Radioactive Materials," "Freight > Transport: > > Safe from Terror?" "Chemical Plants Are Feared As Targets," "America's > Roads > > May Be Just As Vulnerable As Its Skies," "Study Assesses Risk of Attack on > > Chemical Plants," "Terror Risk Cited for Cargo Carried on Passenger Jets: > 2 > > Reports List Security Gaps," and "Truck Terrorism Possible, U.S. Says: > > Investigation Finds Lack of Licensing Safeguards." > > > > I do not understand the media's agenda here. This country is at war. Do > you > > honestly believe that such stories and headlines, pointing out our > > vulnerabilities for Japanese and Nazi saboteurs and fifth columnists, > would > > have been published during World War II? Terrorists gather targeting > > information from open sources and field surveillance. What other sources > do > > they have? Do they have a multibillion-dollar intelligence community with > > thousands of employees? Do they have telecommunications satellites to > > intercept communications? > > > > If there's one thing terrorists have been open about, it's their reliance > on > > open information. In the mid-1980s there was a Belgian left-wing terrorist > > group called the Communist Combatant Cells, or CCC. At the time, it was > > carrying out a series of bombings against American targets in Belgium. The > > media there were speculating that the CCC had plants or spies inside > various > > Belgian agencies to be able to carry out attacks so efficiently. "NATO > > Pipelines Sabotaged: Military Secrets in the Hands of the CCC?" read a > > headline in the Dec. 12, 1984, edition of the Belgian newspaper Le Soir. > > Finally, in a written communiqué disseminated in April 1985, the CCC > > explained how it acquired its targeting information. The communiqué > stated: > > "Being methodical types and having considered the relative accessibility > of > > the pipeline, we consulted the top-secret telephone book where, under > > 'Ministry of Defense,' every pumping station in the entire country is > listed. > > We drew up our lists of all the towns these stations were located in, and > > decided to explore them during long walks in the countryside." > > > > Terrorist groups continue to rely on open sources to come up with > targeting > > ideas and tactical information. This is why the Internet has become so > > valuable to terrorist groups. Richard Clarke, head of the White House's > > Office of Cyber defenses and probably the most knowledgeable high-level > > government official on terrorism, testified to Congress on Feb. 13 that, > > based on evidence found in the caves of Afghanistan, al Qaeda "was using > the > > Internet to do at least reconnaissance of American utilities and American > > facilities." Furthermore, he noted, "if you put all the unclassified > > information together, sometimes it adds up to something that ought to be > > classified." > > > > So why do the research for the terrorists? For example, "vulnerability" > > articles appearing in the media always contain interviews or comments from > > three or four experts or specialists. It could be the former head of the > > National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, an American Trucking > > Associations official, a union leader, technician or consultant. These > > experts will talk to reporters. None of them would ever talk to a > terrorist. > > Therefore, if not for the media, terrorist groups would have no access to > the > > insights and wisdom of these people. What also infuriates me is when the > > media publish follow-up reports noting that security measures or > procedures > > around a specific target or system still have not been implemented. Not > only > > do the media identify potential target vulnerabilities for the terrorists > but > > they also provide our foes with progress reports! > > > > In a war situation, it is not business as usual. Use some common sense. > > Certainly, if a reporter or academician believes that he or she has > > discovered a vulnerability or flaw in one of our sectors or systems, it is > > important to let others know. It seems reasonable to me that a process > should > > be established where such articles are filtered through a government > agency > > such as the proposed Department of Homeland Security. A skeptic would call > > this censorship; a patriot would call it cooperation. This type of > > cooperation existed during World War II and believe me, this current war > is a > > "world war" also. > > > > I also am concerned about the many articles detailing how the 9/11 > terrorists > > were able to come and live in the United States. These articles have noted > > which mannerisms of the terrorists aroused the suspicion of their > landlords, > > acquaintances, neighbors, flight instructors and others. Articles have > > pointed out what mistakes the terrorists made and how we failed to pick up > on > > those mistakes. Al Qaeda terrorists now know to pay a speeding ticket > > promptly. They now know not to pay for things with large amounts of cash. > > They now know to buy some furniture for their apartments or rooms. They > now > > know that they have to act friendly and not surly or antagonistic in their > > dealings with neighbors and other locals. They know now that they should > have > > a phone installed in their apartments or rooms. > > > > The U.S. media's autopsy of the movements and interactions of earlier > > terrorists may have helped the 9/11 hijackers and others seeking to come > to > > the United States to do us harm. In a March 23 article entitled "The > Jackals > > of Islam" that was published on an Islamic Web site, Abu-Ubayd al-Qurashi, > > believed to be a close aide to Osama bin Laden, commenting on the 9/11 > > operatives, stated that "the suicide hijackers studied the lives of > > Palestinian Yehiya Ayash [a Hamas bomb maker who was himself assassinated] > > and Ramzi Yousef [operational planner of the 1993 World Trade Center > bombing] > > and the security mistakes that led to their downfall while they were > > preparing for the September 11 operation." How did al Qaeda know about the > > security mistakes that led to the death of Ayash and the capture of > Yousef? > > The media, at home and abroad. > > > > Courtrooms can also give terrorists windows into our thinking and methods. > In > > the 1980s when German terrorists from the leftist Red Army Faction (RAF) > were > > tried in Germany, the prosecution had to detail all of the evidence, > > including how they linked the terrorists to specific attacks. Forensic > > experts from the German BKA (comparable to the FBI) described in the open > > courtroom how they extracted fingerprints from items left at the attack > > sites. At the time, there were RAF sympathizers and supporters in the > > courtroom who took notes. It did not take long for the RAF terrorists > still > > at large to change their methods -- wearing gloves and spraying their > hands > > with latex so that they would not leave any fingerprints. > > > > The U.S. media are providing a similar service for al Qaeda. I am sure > that > > al Qaeda will fix its mistakes and mannerisms before its next attack in > the > > United States. I say the following with a heavy heart, but if there were > an > > "Osama bin Laden" award given out by al Qaeda, I believe that it would be > > awarded to the U.S news media for their investigative reporting. This type > of > > reporting -- carrying specifics about U.S. vulnerabilities -- must be > stopped > > or censored. > > > > I propose that the Department of Homeland Security establish a program > where > > academicians, reporters, think tankers or any citizen could contact the > > department and inform them of security vulnerabilities. If the department > > determined that these vulnerabilities indeed existed, then it could award > > "Homeland Security Protective Security" certificates to individuals or > > "Homeland Security Gold Stars" to newspaper or Internet sites that put the > > country first during a time of war. If displayed on its banner, this star > > might increase circulation. > > > > During World War II, there was a security slogan that went: "Loose lips > sinks > > ships." Maybe the current security slogan should be: "Prolific pens > propagate > > terrorist plots." The president and Congress should pass laws temporarily > > restricting the media from publishing any security information that can be > > used by our enemies. This was necessary during World War II, it is > necessary > > now. These restrictions were backed by the American public during World > War > > II, and I believe the public would support them now. > > > > As for "treason," well, maybe that accusation against the media is not > > justified. Webster's dictionary defines treason as violation of allegiance > > toward one's country and lists one of its characteristics as "consciously > and > > purposely acting to aid its enemies." I know the media have not > consciously > > and purposely aided al Qaeda. Therefore, J'accuse the media of lacking > common > > sense. As a concerned terrorism analyst, I say the following to the media: > > You are making the jobs of terrorism analysts, intelligence officers and > law > > enforcement officials very difficult. Help us, don't hinder us from > defeating > > our enemies. > > > > Dennis Pluchinsky is a senior intelligence analyst with the Diplomatic > > Security Service in the U.S. Department of State. His opinions are > personal > > ones and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the State > > Department or any other branch of the U.S. government. > > > > > > > > © 2002 The Washington Post Company
INTRODUCTION TO AW 4GW MW

38. Differences
Many of the methods used in 4GW aren't new and have robust historical precedent. However, there are important differences in how it is applied today. These include:
Global -- modern technologies and economic integration enable global operations.
Pervasive -- the decline of nation-state warfare has forced all open conflict into the 4GW mold.
Granularity -- extremely small viable groups and variety of reasons for conflict.
Vulerability -- open societies and economies.
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39. Differences II.
Technology -- new technologies have dramatically increased the productivity of small groups of 4GW warriors.
Media -- global media saturation makes possible an incredible level of manipulation.
Networked -- new organizational types made possible by improvements in technology are much better at learning, surviving, and acting.
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40. 4th Generation Warfare (4GW)
Formless and most deadly kind of war
4GW ops are intelligence driven.
Requires constant preparation and resourcefulness
Distinguishing a combatant from a non-combatant (civil) can be extremely difficult
Can hit anytime, anywhere, anything and anyone

41. Winning a 4GW conflict
Victory in 4GW warfare is won in the moral sphere. The aim of 4GW is to destroy the moral bonds that allows the organic whole to exist -- cohesion. This is done by reinforcing the following (according to Boyd):
Menace. Attacks that undermine or threaten basic human survival instincts.
Mistrust. Increases divisions between groups (ie. conservatives and liberals in the US).
Uncertainty. Undermine economic activity by decreasing confidence in the future.
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42. Center of Gravity Is The People
Leverage unconventional capabilities against insurgents. Become cellular like “them”. Defeat a networked threat with a network.
Develop small independent action forces (SIAF).
Establish disciplined, well trained and highly mobile, counter guerrilla forces.
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43. Power of Perception & Influence As “Ammo”
Money is ammunition
Food is ammunition
Medicine is ammunition
Education is ammunition
Fuel is ammunition
Employment is ammunition
Recognition is ammunition
Respect is ammunition
Information and knowledge is ammunition
22 countries of Arab League 300 – 330 millions 5 % of the world population has the youngest 40% under 14. From this population 60 million people is illiterate.
Number of translated books from foreign language to Arab in the Arab world is 4.4 / 1 million people this figure in western world is around 900.
Poor access to the knowledge!!!

44. Summary
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45. Questions?
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