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Brinkmanship: Cold war on the edge to become a hot war,

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1 Brinkmanship: Cold war on the edge to become a hot war,
Since the early 1950s through mid-1960s 1

2 German Question: a discourse about the division

3 What agreements were reached about German question at Potsdam Conference? (Document 2)
….supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Con­trol Council. …Soviet demands for reparations….. Possible comments about demilitarization of Germany, for which the USSR will struggle later: (i) The complete disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production (...) 3

4 1947, July – Paris conference on the Marshall plan:
(Document 1) 1947, July – Paris conference on the Marshall plan: Can you describe the position of Molotov and aims of the Soviet Union? What was the aims of the USA in Europe? How did the French president understand the results of the Yalta conference? Question about UN and German question? Did French president Vincent Auriol see the East-West Division as an inevitable consequence of the Marshall Plan? Answers: The new element is that Molotov put the German ques­tion forward and this is a quite insidious propaganda theme. It argues that with the use of pooled resources, Germany would avoid paying the reparations it owes to the nations it has ruined. At this time the USSR needed all the Allies. In turn, they needed the USSR. Russians walked out of the conference and a number of European countries quickly followed suit. 2) Had the United States wanted to impose their presence and run Europe, they would have resorted to bilateral negotiations with every State 3) The mistake got worse at Yalta where, by fear of a separate peace treaty between Germany and Russia, Roosevelt and Churchill gave in to Soviet demands concerning their Eastern borders up to the Oder; at the Potsdam Conference the situation worsened again. The partition of Germany into four zones, with the Big Two getting more than their fair share; the USSR reserved for itself the richest and neighbouring part, which is now being sovietized and inte­grated in its empire. 4) 1951: Выступление А. Я. Вышинского на пленарном заседании шестой сессии Генеральной ассамблеи ООН: «Генеральный комитет принял решение рекомендовать Генеральной ассамблеи включить в повестку дня пункт по Германии, предложенный Англией, США и Францией. Этот пункт говорит об учреждении международной комиссии под руководством ООН для производства обследования в Западной Германии, в берлине и в ГДР с целью выяснить, позволяет ли существующее в этих районах положение провести в них выборы в условиях полной свободы…СССР возражал против включения этого пункта в повестку дня, <т.к.германский вопрос является компетенцией соглашения в П. и статья 107 устава ООН не допускает участия ООН в вопросы, связанные с действиями, санкционированными в результате второй мировой войны правительствами, несущими ответственность за такие действия>. «П. соглашением установлен определенный порядок рассмотрения всех вопросов, касающихся Германии и <попытки передачи германского вопроса в ООН являются обходом П. соглашений> «Что касается проверки наличия условия для проведения свободных выборов во всей Германии, то это лучше всего могут провести сами немцы через комиссии из представителей З. И В. Германии по контролем 4х держав…»Делегация СССР будет голосовать против такого предложения[1]. [1] Советский Союз и вопрос о единстве Германии и мирном договоре с Германией. М.: МИД, 1952, стр 4

5 1) What did Stalin propose? (3)
Soviet Draft for a German Peace Treaty, 10 March decision-making in the USA Document 3/4 1) What did Stalin propose? (3) 2) How did the DOS evaluate the “..abstract unification…” of Germany? (4) 3) How did the DOS propose to resolve the German problem? (4) 4) What was important – the integration and European Defense system or unification of Germany? (4) Why a German Peace Treaty: In 1947 На Московской сессии Совета министров иностранных дел СССР выступал за немедленное создание единой Германии посредством создание центральные германские административные департаменты, а также продвигал идею написания мирного договора с Германией как средство объединения Германии, поскольку договор должен был бы заключаться с правительством Германии[1]. [1] За антифашистскую Германию, стр , документ № , 188, 195о Germany is re-established as a unified state All armed forces of occupying powers must be withdrawn from Germany …. Germany guarantees that it will not enter into any kind of coalition or military alliance 2) A conviction that a unified Germany was a desirable goal ; feels that a unified Germany in a Europe which is still divided presents certain very grave dangers of German domination of the Continent; or rapprochement with the Soviet Union; 3) We are going ahead on integration. If the Soviet Union is genuinely prepared to permit free elections and the consequent establishment of a unified Germany, we are prepared to let the ultimate all-German government decide whether it wishes to continue its adherence to the integration program. 4) U.S. solution of the German situation would be a unified Germany within the EDC [European Defence Community]. foresees a choice between unification in the near future and a present integration which would not preclude subsequent unification. 1952, 10 марта СССР стоял на позициях призыва западных держав вернуться к принципам Потсдамского соглашения на различных совещаниях, как Париж, март 1951, а также разработал основы мирного договора с Германией, который был направлен трем западным державам 10 марта 1952 г. Эта была «Нота правительства СССР правительству США с приложением проекта Основ мирного договора с Германией», поскольку, как указывается в тексте, «прошло уже около семи лет со времени окончания войны в Европе, мирный договор с Германией все еще не заключен…». В проекте довора содержались фразы о том, что «германия восстанавливается как единое государство. Тем самым кладется конец расколу Германии…Все вооруженные силы оккупирующих держав должны быть выведены из Германии не позднее чем через год со дня вступления договора в силу. Одновременно будут ликвидированы все иностранные военные базы на территории Германии… и Германия обязуется не вступать в какие-либо коалиции или военные союзы, направленные против любой державы. Принимавшей участие своими вооруженными силами в войне против Германии..»[1] [1] Отношения СССР с ГДР, стр Документ 114. Также см. статью The origins of Stalin’s Note… 5

6 Stalin and the SED Leadership, 7 April 1952 (Document 5)
1) How did Stalin represent the American policy towards Germany? 2) How did he emphasize the Soviet concerns as to the Western problem towards Germany? 3) What did Stalin recommend the German communists to do? The Americans need their army in West Germany to hold Western Europe in their hands. They say that they have there their army [to defend] against us. But the real goal of this army is to control Europe. The Americans will draw West Germany into the Atlantic Pact. They will create West German troops. Comrade Stalin considers that irrespective of any proposals that we can make on the German question the Western powers will not agree with them and will not withdraw from Germany in any case. And you must organize your own state. The line of demarcation between East and West Germany must be seen as a fron­tier and not as a simple border but a dangerous one. One must strengthen the protection of this frontie 6

7 Final assessment of the Cold War Origins
3 major interpretations regarding the origins of the Cold War: 1) the orthodox interpretation - a responsibility for the breakdown of the wartime Grand Alliance to the Soviet Union: Stalin expanded communism in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, and The U.S. had no choice but to check Soviet expansionism. So, ideological clash Soviet historians - the United States exaggerated any threat the Soviet Union may have posed to the United States at the end of World War 7

8 Americans failed to appreciate the nature of Stalin's ambitions,
1 famous alternative view in orthodox: Hans Morgenthau and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. traditional goals of Russian expansionism, rather than communist ideology, was premises for the Cold War; Americans failed to appreciate the nature of Stalin's ambitions, and the Soviets could not understand the cause of American sensitivity. >> the Cold Wary was the product of mutual misunderstanding. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Hans J. Morgenthau, The Origins of the Cold War (1970) 8

9 Final assessment of the Cold War Origins
2) Revisionist (Gabriel Kolko): Economic factor - the Truman administration supported for a interventionist strategy designed to make the world safe for American capitalism: global open door policy of equal trade, investment opportunity, private enterprise, multilateral cooperation in foreign commerce freedom of the seas 9

10 Final assessment of the Cold War Origins: revisionists
The Soviet Union: did not want to subordinate its economic system Losing control in countries with strong communist parties resulted in American support of conservative establishments. Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, (1972) 10

11 Final assessment of the Cold War Origins
3) post-revisionism (John Gaddis): both internal and external influences important in explaining the breakdown of the Grand Alliance: domestic politics, bureaucracy, personality, specific perceptions of Soviet intentions 11

12 Final conclusion of N. Tsvetkova
ideological differences are insufficient to explain the Cold War after World War II Soviet and American interests now collided as both nations attempted to fill the power vacuum created by the collapse of Germany and Japan: Europe, Asia Misunderstanding: Russian political expansionism cannot understand American global economic policy 12

13 Since the early 1950s through mid-1960s
Global Cold War and the road to détente or Global Cold War and the road to a hot atom war??? Since the early 1950s through mid-1960s 13

14 Aftermath: the end of Truman presidency, 1953
Aftermath: the end of Truman presidency, 1953., death of Stalin,1953, the end of Korean War, 1953 >> New leaders: D. Eisenhower, N. Khrushchev, New strategies: American “New Look” , 1950s and Soviet “nation-building”, 1960s Approach: blocks, alliances building. 14

15 Strategies: the United States
Project Solarium, : 4 approaches to USSR Military alliances Line and nuclear weapons Throwing out the pro-soviet governments Negotiations and compromises New look strategy was a combination of three ideas and meant: “…react massively, with nuclear weapons, in the event of communist aggression at any level, strategic or tactical.” John Foster Dulles, a domino theory: the loss of a country will follow the loss of others 15

16 Solarium Room in the White House, 1953
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17 Solarium Room in the White House, 2008-2012
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18 John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, 1953-1959
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19 Strategies: the Soviet Union
Khrushchev: “ this is atomic blackmail” >> 1) to build atom in the USSR: new army branch - Nuclear-Missile Combat + outer-space 2) Nationbuilding 1950s – was to support national movements in developing countries and to turn the Third World into socialism. >> Cold War became a global war, not only European one: Middle East (Egypt + Iran) + Latin America (Cuba) + sub-Saharan Africa (Congo, now Zaire). 19

20 The Nature of the period of the Cold War, the mid-1950s through mid-1960s
The growing Soviet-American rivalry in the Third World, because the Soviet Union wanted to challenge U.S. around the world >> The spread of the Cold War in the Middle East, East Asia, Latin America, and Africa. New idea in the literature: The Soviet expansion was determined by the fear of possible Chinese communist expansion and rising China as nuclear power. Khrushchev's aggressiveness was motivated not only by a desire to take advantage of an opportunity to expand Soviet influence but also by the perceived Soviet need to fend off a growing challenge by China for leadership of the communist movement. 20

21 Realization of strategies: 1) alliances-building – Asia +Middle East
ANZUS (Australia, Zealand, United States) 1951 SEANTO - Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 1954: combat the expansion of communism Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos Warsaw Pact, 1955 – mutual military alliance between USSR and Eastern Europe>> To find more allies in developing world: bilateral alliances with Egypt, Syria, China 21

22 I) Realization of strategies: 2) nation-building in former colonies:
Middle East: Egypt (Gamal Nasser, who made a problem with Suez Canal, 1956) and idea of pan-Arabism – to establish an alliance of all Arab nations to rid the region of outside political influences (it is denied) Iran, 1953 – Shah Pahlavi after the killing of Mossadeq 22

23 Eisenhower Doctrine for ME/ USSR
USA: To use force in the Middle East against an armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism, 1956. USSR: To be oriented on Arabs (their parties like BAATH in Syria and Iraq) declared a socialism 23

24 Southeast Asia: China, Vietnam and domino theory
24

25 China-Soviet Union-United States until the end of 1960s
Soviet assistance + aspirations of China to get a nuclear weapon (They built in 1964) 1959 split for nuclear program +ideological split: Mao blamed the USSR for falsifications of the Marxism China-United States: Taiwan problem (Chinese bombardments of small islands near it + American military support of Taiwan) Soviet Union –U.S. – they both did not want the empower China with weapons but cannot combine their ideological blindness. Khrushchev was not willing to risk a nuclear war with the United States for the benefit of his Chinese allies. Indeed, the Soviets were increasingly worried about the flippant attitude that the Chinese were displaying toward a nuclear war. When Mao Zedong visited Moscow in November 1957, he shocked the Soviets by saying that a nuclear war would not be the end of communism. China would still have some hundreds of millions of people who would probably survive, while the populations of the capitalist countries -- he did not mention the Soviet Union -- would be wiped out. Still, the Soviets, after the Hungarian Revolution, were eager to keep China in the Soviet camp. For that reason primarily, they agreed to provide the Chinese with nuclear assistance, and even, according to some sources, a sample nuclear weapon. While the Soviets did help China put into operation its first nuclear reactor, they never made good on their promise to deliver a nuclear weapon. In 1959, as Soviet fears of Chinese nuclear recklessness revived, the Soviet Union terminated all nuclear assistance to China. 25

26 South-East Asia: Vietnam, 1954
Ho Chi Minh led the “communist” Vietminh, the army again France (North) South was pro-American: former emperor Bao Dai French government asked for the American help after defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Eisenhower rejected the idea to help France (due to a special decision-making process +public opinion and opposition of the Congress)^ 1954 So, new president, John Kennedy must resolve it. 26

27 II) The war for outerspace, Soviet Sputnik, American Vanguard
October 1957 (USSR) and February 1958 (USA) – it was an intercontinental ballistic missile 1) a psychological strike for American society: high vulnerability + Soviet technological prowess. 2) first unbelief in U.S. Government among American public 3) the phenomenon of a Cold War university and science However, Khrushchev's prestige, and that of his country, received a major boost after the Soviet Union launched the first earth-orbiting satellite, Sputnik I, on October 4, U.S. Navy to launch Vanguard on December 6 and the meager weight of America's first successful satellite, the Army's thirty-pound Explorer, which was placed into orbit on February 1, 1958, shocked the American people. To Americans, it was unbelievable that a people supposedly as backward as the Soviets could demonstrate such technological prowess. 27

28 Positive Effect of Sputnik-Vanguard
Khrushchev proposed a 2-3 years suspension of nuclear weapon tests and announced an indefinite suspension of their nuclear test program. Under public pressure – the USA and Great Britain also did the 1-year suspension of the tests. The Limited Test-Ban Treaty, idea of control of dissemination of nuclear weapon 28

29 Positive Effect of Sputnik-Vanguard
idea of co-existence: Since 1958 first contacts – people-to-people Exchanges in information (America, USSR) Visit of Khrushchev to America, 1959 American Exhibition Moscow and Leningrad, 1958 29

30 Effect of Sputnik-Vanguard: Khrushchev’ domestic policy was aimed at surpassing the U.S.
To seed corn in Russia like in Iowa and To breed rabbits to produce more meet than in the USA >> New Russian names of this politics was invented by NK: Dognat (Rundown) Peregnat (Surpass) 30

31 III) Kennedy and Khrushchev: new strategies, Cuba, Berlin
At the beginning of John F. Kennedy's presidency, the Soviets indicated that they were prepared to improve relations with the United States. Khrushchev warmly congratulated the new president on his inauguration day . While Kennedy was inclined to improve Soviet-American relations, his ability to do so was restricted by his determination to appear tough toward communism. 31

32 The early of 1960s: Kennedy and Khrushchev
Developing countries: AID and Peace Corps, 1961 not to let Russia to win Third world Caribbean crisis, 1962 Castro since 1959 and asked the USA to help Eisenhower did not support him Castro asked the Soviet Union CIA: to kill Castro or to invade Cuba by trained émigré; The mistake of Kennedy – not to support the émigré invasion by military forces, April 1961>> In result: Kennedy has drawn Havana and Moscow closer together. Castro declared himself a socialist, to ensure a Soviet commitment to defend Cuba Kennedy –we need to defend other parts – South Vietnam Soviets – we need to defend Cuba Why did not Eisenhower support Castro: Although Eisenhower promptly recognized Castro's government, he was shocked by its execution of hundreds of Batista supporters. Mainly for this reason, the president refused to meet with the Cuban leader when he toured the United States in April He also declined to give Cuba economic aid, which Castro hoped to use to finance his revolutionary program. 32

33 P.S.: Caribbean crisis, 1962 Other pressing factors:
Berlin crisis, august 1961 South Vietnam –pressure from the North Chinese pressure on Taiwan Soviet missiles were deployed on Cuban territory in early 1962 >> 6 days crisis in October: world on the edge of the nuclear war: Kennedy felt humiliation after failed invasion of Cuba + he was strongly criticized for his soft reaction to the building of the Berlin Wall >> He wanted to go to the end Khrushchev felt the force and backed Solution: mutual removal of missiles (American missiles in Turkey) and new concepts and strategies were elaborated 33

34 New approaches in Cold War politics
Kennedy: “flexible response” To use not only nuclear attack against the Soviet Union but also: covert action, antiguerrilla operations, conventional forces Military build up Diplomacy Today: it was the direct road to Vietnam tragedy 34

35 Vietnam in the Cold War Kennedy increased the number of military advisers from 700 to 16,700 He believed in domino theory Lyndon Johnson: South Vietnam would collapse if the United States did not expand its participation in the war. >> air war+ ground combat forces ( in 1968) + bombing campaigns Problem: the factor of China: Mao sent to help Ho Shi Minh Today: Johnson did not use the possibilities to convince China and a wrong estimation of Chinese foreign policy as having expansionist character in Asia. But: Chinese policy was more defensive (?) USA till 1969 did not use zero relations of China- Soviet Union >> Talks since 1969. 35

36 The road to relaxation Both Soviets and Americans wanted to improve relations since Sputnik, Vietnam, Chinese test of bomb in 1964 Both were eager to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear-weapon states. 36

37 Cold War Culture Home fronts Selling image 37

38 Social-cultural dimension of the Cold War:
Frames of the theme Social-cultural dimension of the Cold War: It means as an umbrella term to embrace the mass experience within cold-war political events. social history in its broad sense of ‘ordinary’ and ‘everyday’, but in extraordinary circumstances. Problems: Did the Cold War high politics influence arts, movies, pop culture, everyday life, etc. of people who lived during the period of the Cold War, 1940s -1990? Were the cultural artifacts to use as a tool in propaganda or they were made by autonomous artists who lived in the cold war and reflect its the reality? 1) Introductory words Since the fall of the USSR the expression ‘new cold war’ became a new discourse for cold war studies. The young scientists began arguing that the international history of the cold war, its diplomatic story or simple Soviet – American relations should be balanced with questions addressing social cultural dimensions of the CW ( Kuznick P. J., Gilbert J. Rethinking cold war culture, 2001; Osgord K. A. Hearts and Minds. The unconventional cold war // journal of cold war studies, 4/2, 2002; Shaw T. The politics of cold war culture // ibid, 3/3, 2001) 38

39 2 dimensions of Cold War Cultures (American-West and Soviet-socialist)
1) Home fronts: how did the Cold War influence a domestic life? 2) Selling a brand (image) aboard: How did both superpowers sell their images, ideologies to foreign public and to each other? 39

40 at home: inside the U.S/West and USSR: social dimension
Purge: both in the United States and Soviet Union: pursue of dissidents Campaign against those who appraised West culture in the Soviet Union (in Russian: “against cosmopolitism) – “Kosmopolit”, since 1950s until the end of 1980s = traditional Russian xenophobia VS. America-and-West- admirers 2) Camping against communists (Senator McCarthy), since the end 1940 until the mid-1950s >> American variant of xenophobia during the Cold War – a scare to be infected with leftist and communist ideas witch-hunts 40

41 at home: inside the U.S/West and USSR: social dimension
2) dissidents in all the countries whose words were differentiated from an official discourse: In Soviet Union: The Thaw since 1956: phenomenon of physicist-lyric poet – a dissent voice among technocrats (scholars, and engineers) like A. Sakharov = R. Havemann in the GDR. The defection to the West of a number of leading Soviet artists However, a support of the communist regime in s became more wide: a standard of life became higher and the absent of repression *Aulich J, Sylvestrova M. Political posters in central and eastern Europe: …, 1999; Robin R. The making of the cold war enemy…., 2001 **) Weart S. R. Nuclear fear: a history of images, 1988; Wenger A., Suri J. At the crossroads of diplomatic and social history….// journal of cold war studies, 1/3, 2001; Oakes G. The imaginary war: civic defense and American cold war culture, 1994 41

42 Czechoslovakia, 1968 >>
at home: inside the U.S/West and USSR: social dimension Eastern Europe: from open riots to silent opposition Germany, 1953 Riots in Poland, 1956 Hungary, 1958 Czechoslovakia, 1968 >> Silent nonviolent dissidents were strong in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland Church (Catholic and Lutheran) was shelter for dissidents in GDR, and Poland End of 1970s – Jimmy Carter idea to promote human rights became the main idea of dissidents 42

43 at home: inside the U.S/West and USSR: social dimension
In United States: -1960s-1970s generation of baby-boomers – 20% of population of 24 years. -Hippy and counterculture movement (rock groups) against War (pacifism) -strong revisionism in arts and social studies (critical theory to interpret history and politics) In Western Europe: -radical students in the FU, leftists, post-modernism, the battles between left- and right-wing intellectuals: Picasso and Congress of for Cultural Freedom: Main ideas – rejection of dominant values of American society, idea of American imperialism 43

44 at home: inside the U.S/West and USSR: cultural dimensions
3) Making divergent official cultural discourses in historical memory: different story of the Second world war (two victors) in both the U.S. and the USSR; 4) Official games with public fear of future nuclear war: through anti-war demonstrations, documentary films and movies like ‘The third war’ 5) “We [USSR] turned out to be in position of defender in the face of American cultural offensive:” inserting some American ideas in society, movies, culture (globalization, Americanization or copying to smooth people) *) the topic about personal experiences of exiles: Solzhenitsyn. One day on the life of Ivan Denisovich: the life in Siberian camp Wiener j. Gimme some truth: the John Lennon FBI files, 1999 **) Troitsky A. Back in the USSR: the true story of rock in Russia, 1987 Nixson W. Parting the curtain: propaganda, culture and the cold war…, 1997 Lindey Ch. Art in the cold war: from Vladivostok to Kalamazoo.., 1990 Berghahn V. America and the intellectual cold wars in Europe., 2002 44

45 Байкал (Baikal)/ Pepsi
45

46 Пугачева (Pugacheva)/Monro
46

47

48 What is meant by the American dream
What is meant by the American dream? That all men shall be free to seek a better life, with free worship, thought, assembly, expression of belief and universal suffrage and education.

49 “Soviet dream” as an answer to Hollywood films:
Idea of “American dream” in Hollywood and of a birth of a “Soviet dream” in Mosfilm “Soviet dream” as an answer to Hollywood films: - provincial girls win big cities by following methods: A successful career but a tragedy of personal life A successful marriage (love, family) Moscow does not believe in tears, Oscar, 1979 49

50 at home: inside the U.S/West and USSR: cultural dimensions
6) Patriotism as a theme in arts was the main tool for counter-offensive. Flight 222 (movie, 1985) -we love USSR -we do not leave it The friendship of people *) Shaw T. British cinema and the cold war, 2000 **) Henriksen M. Dr. Strangelove’s America: society and culture in the atomic age, 1997 (It concern the film by Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove, 1963???) Sayre N. Running time: films of the cold war, 1982 ***) Admiral Nakhimov by the great Soviet director Pudovkin: Sarah Davies. Soviet cinema in the early cold war // cold war history. Across the borders… Молодая супружеская чета - солистка балета на льду и профессиональный спортсмен - одновременно оказываются в Нью-Йорке. Он просит политического убежища - и ставит её перед выбором: вернуться на родину или остаться с мужем.. 1986 ВКФ - Приз "За яркое воплощение на экране темы советского патриотизма". 50

51 II) Selling its image to foreign public How both the U. S
II) Selling its image to foreign public How both the U.S. and the Soviet Union tried to sell their ideologies Main motive: to win an allegiance of people around the world (the war for hearts and minds) Means: Propaganda (radio) Training of definite social and professional groups Cultural presentations 51

52 How both the U.S. and the Soviet Union tried to sell their ideologies
Central Committee of Communist Party (Propaganda Division) State Committee of Foreign Relations at MFA SU Committees of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (SSOD) Radio of Moscow United States Information Agency Agency of Intentional Development Voice of America DOS+NSC More people were mobilized through private initiative than in the USSR 52

53 Radio propaganda Radio Moscow:
The U.S. was first targeted since early 1950s, from Moscow Since 1970s – from Cuba and Vladivostok 70 languages News and answer on American propaganda Russian Classics Radio Moscow World Service >> Voice of Russia Voice of America The Soviet Union was targeted since 1947, from Austria Soviet jamming 80 languages News and Music Strong and free critics of American government and life Encourage people for internal change through programs about “democratic legacy” or national history of a country. Forbidden literature NEW: the VOA turned out to be more respected that the Radio Moscow 53

54 Influence through printed mass media: two journals
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55 Another journals: Sputnik/Диалог
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56 The printed media USSR Primary topics: Science, Space
Russian literature Belated Counter-attacks on American pop-culture in the early 1980s USA Primary topics: Government People Consumerism (retail goods) Consumerism undermined Soviet life and communism regime – AMERICAN EXIBITION 56

57 Nixon-Khrushchev kitchen debates, 1958
57

58 Training of foreign citizen Two divergent approaches to reproduce allegiance:
USA: an existed professional elite was the main target 600, ,000 were trained 900 former grantees became members of ruling elite (presidents, leaders of parties) Main success: Alexander Yakovlev, an adviser of M. Gorbachev USSR: lower social groups were trained to reproduce new elite loyal to the SU 250, ,000 were trained 100 former grantees became members of ruling elite 58

59 When and Why the Soviets failed
Since 1956, NSC-5506 “Eat- West Exchanges” – 1) To stimulate consumerist desires of captive and Soviet people 2) To return people in Easter Europe to their national history, history of independence and prosperity. (the seeds of nationalism) 3) The increase of funds since the early 1980s Soviet Union: Movement for Peace defeat in political campaigning to reach short-term political aims 2) Artistic and sporting exchanges to advertise a prestige and success of Russian culture and Soviet sport; 3) A lack of funds for support of “socialist” movements in 28 countries (Africa, Arabs, 2 countries in Latin America) since the early 1980s 59

60 Conclusion Dissidents and consumption society of the West have undermined the political regime of the Soviets. 60

61 Methodological problems in studies of cultural cold war and proposed theoretical frames
Problems in methods: what kinds of methods are more appropriate to estimate the audience response to domestic and foreign influence? How to evaluate an efficiency of both American and Soviet cultural influence? Multiple meanings of cultural phenomena. 61

62 Proposed theoretical frames for cultural cold war
American and Soviet cultural imperialism (pressure and deep implantation of values in all the clusters of life) Americanization and Sovietization (partial influence –politics, technologies, language) Cultural Transfer (mutual exchange and globalization without borders and Walls) Response theory (resistance of local culture to coming values) – toasts VS.grenki 62

63 Soviet Grenki/American Toast
63

64 Гренки (the brad in oil on the pan)/toasts
64


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