1. EXERCISE SETTING If you look at the Durham University presentation, you will see a Scenario

2. EXERCISE SETTING If you look into the Durham University presentation, and imagine what Nepal will look like 30 minutes after an 8.6 earthquake, you will see a Threat

3. SCENARIO? Or THREAT?

4. THREAT If 8.6 = Casualties and damage as presented can be calculated, Then 8.5 = reduced figures And 8.4 = further reduced figures And so on down to 6.0 (?)

5. THREAT Therefore “assessments” can be calculated beforehand with enough accuracy for planning purposes and updated as information and technology changes. That information will allow more accurate planning than ever before

6. THREAT Go back to 8.6 scenario Need common PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS to be agreed between GoN and Humanitarian community If not, then no common Contingency Plan Plans and scenario in danger of being adjusted to suit wishful thinking (Nepalgung example yesterday)

7. THREAT Worst Case assumptions are prudent Can then respond to a lesser event relatively easily. Cannot plan for a lesser event and hope to respond to a greater event Plan high – implement low is OK Plan low-implement high is foolhardy

8. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS based on the THREAT “Violent” shaking damages or collapses most bridges, creates many landslides Liquefaction makes many roads (especially in Terai) unusable.

10. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS based on the THREAT TIA and Nepalgung airports are unusable for several weeks; others for longer (runway damage, radar disruption, air traffic control communications, unreliable electrical supply, etc)

11. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS – KTM is isolated. Most people, vehicles and supplies will not go far beyond where they were when the quake struck. That includes the Army, Police and emergency services – By day, arterial roads jammed with traffic that cannot escape. Thousands of people trapped on the roads, but have some shelter (inside cars, busses). Isolation may cause even greater stress than elsewhere. Not so serious at night but no traveling the next day.

12. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS THEREFORE – No road movement beyond first bridge for several weeks. – Earthmoving equipment cannot get access to slips, bridges – No fixed wing activity. No aviation fuel after a few days – Very poor communications (Cell phone towers, electricity supply)

13. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS THEREFORE (continued) – Mains electricity generation unreliable –but restoration crews cannot deploy because roads are blocked. – Increasing dependence on generators with dwindling fuel supply. Solar is only source but limited in monsoon. – TV and public radio broadcasts intermittent. Not received by normal audience because the latter have no power either.

14. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS – Public confusion, anger, desperation. – Those who do not normally have electricity are the least affected because they are accustomed to that situation – about 30% of the population, mainly rural areas

15. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS Most of the population will not get assistance for 20 – 30 days probably much longer The only help and supplies available for 20 – 30 days will be whatever is in country at the time. Pre-stocking on a serious scale is critical, particularly in major population centers. Fuel exhaustion is life threatening Pre-stocking is only possible if the storage facilities exist.

16. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS. International Coordination has to start out of the country. Deployable international Control and Coordination Centers will be slow to get into Nepal because. International flights only into Delhi, Kolkata or Lhasa. Flights forward from there in STOL aircraft and helos mainly from India

17. Response to the THREAT Contingency Plans should be based on short, medium and long term preparation Better preparedness leading to readiness Preparedness in a process, readiness is a condition

18. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS There are many more Assumptions on which can all agree A more complete “Planning Assumptions” paper devised by WFP as a basis for discussion is available on request