1. OPERATION SAVE SUMATRA
Now we’ll take a look at a key responsibility of the JTF J2 – Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. The primary purpose of the JIPOE is to support the CJTF’s and component commanders’ planning and decision-making needs by identifying, assessing and estimating the adversary’s centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, capabilities, limitations, and enemy courses of action or ECOAs. JIPOE supports several critical facets of JTF command decision-making, to include mission analysis, COA development, and the analysis and comparison of friendly COAs. Although JIPOE support to decision making is both dynamic and continuous, it must be “front loaded” in the sense that the bulk of JIPOE analysis must be factored into the CJTF’s decision-making effort.

2. This Media is UNCLASSIFIED
EXERCISE, EXERCISE, EXERCISE

3. KEY EVENTS SUMATRAN CRISIS
OVERTHROW OF GOV’T ON SUMATRA
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
3-PART STRATEGY BY REBELS
DESTABILIZATION CAMPAIGN
ANNEXATION OF ACEH PROVINCE
STRAIT OF MALACCA “TONNAGE TAX COLLECTION”
NSPD SIGNED AUTHORIZING FORCE DEPLOYMENT
NSPD 20-14, signed16 Apr & 20-15, signed 16 May
U.S. FORCES CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN UNMTF OPS
I will not spend an extraordinary amount of time discussing the history of the Sumatran Crisis.
It is important however, for you to understand certain key events that led to the crisis.
Most importantly, the September 5th, military overthrow of the Government of Indonesia elements on Sumatra and the Declaration by those responsible of the “Independent Republic of Sumatra”.
Also important are a few events that have occurred subsequently, like intelligence obtained describing a 3-track strategy adopted by the rebels that includes a destabilization campaign throughout the Indonesian Archipelago, the Annexation of Aceh Province on the northern tip of Sumatra and a Tonnage Tax Collection Plan that will likely disrupt shipping through the Strait of Malacca. Finally, after a National Security Presidential Directive was signed authorizing U.S. force deployment to the region on September 16th, U.S. forces are currently involved in United Nations Maritime Task Forces operations in the Strait of Malacca.

4. Background
GOI DEVELOPS AND IMPLEMENTS NATIONAL CAMPAIGN PLAN (NCP)
MORE POWER AND CONTROL TO THE PROVINCES
ECONOMIC RELIEF
U.S. GRANTS AID PACKAGES TO GOI
TSUNAMI DEVASTATES ACEH AND NORTHERN SUMATRA
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PROPELS ACEH REBUILDING PROCESS. REST OF SUMATRA LAGS BEHIND
LIMITED SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA FORCES (TNI)
GOI discussing NCP
After East Timor won its independence in 1999, the Indonesian Government tried to discourage further separatism by initiating a National Campaign Plan (NCP) (one modeled after the National Campaign Plan in El Salvador in the 1980s) and by drafting new laws that devolved more power and provided economic relief to the provinces. The United States, pleased by the positive steps taken by Jakarta, began granting aid packages focused on improving Indonesian infrastructure, education and agricultural productivity.
In late 2004, a tsunami completely devastated ACEH province and much of the rest of Sumatra. During the rebuilding process, International businesses invested heavily in ACEH replacing most of the infrastructure and restoring oil production. The rest of Sumatra did not receive the same level of investment and the rebuilding process has lagged behind. Moreover, in response to Indonesia’s support of the Global War on Terror, the United States began providing limited security assistance to the Indonesian military in 2004.
Security Assistance

5. 2005-2009 NATIONAL CAMPAIGN PLAN PROGRESS
REDUCED SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS
PERIOD OF RELATIVE PEACE
PERIPHERAL ISLANDS PROSPER
Bustling Sumatran Marketplace
Revenue-Generating POL
Jakarta’s progress in achieving the National Campaign Plan goals and the resulting economic benefits to the peripheral islands gradually began to reduce support for independence movements and was a period of relative peace throughout the Indonesian archipelago. One of the most popular aspects of the National Campaign Plan was that it allowed the peripheral islands to collect and spend some of the revenue generated by their own oil, gas, mining, forestry, and fisheries industries. This revenue allowed the areas that were hit hardest by the Dec 2004 Tsunami to cope with the widespread devastation and helped expedite the rebuilding and recuperation process although there still remain areas, decimated by the natural disaster that have yet to fully recover.

6.
INFORMAL ALLIANCE BETWEEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT INDONESIANS AND RADICAL ISLAMISTS
BEGIN AGGRESSIVE CAMPAIGN TO UNDERMINE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA
In early 2007, despite the successes of the National Campaign Plan, an informal alliance between independence-seeking, anti-government Indonesians and radical Islamists formed and began an aggressive campaign to undermine the central government of Indonesia in Jakarta and the National Campaign Plan.

7. 2011-2013 TERRORIST-TYPE ATTACKS BECAME MORE COMMON
CREATED SERIOUS DRAIN
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY RESPONSE
TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE
NCP FALTERS
TAXES RAISED
TNI OVERBURDENED
CONDITIONS RIPE FOR INDEPENDENCE BID
By 2008, terrorist-type attacks against government infrastructure had become common-place and began to create a serious psychological and financial drain. The International Community responded by providing assistance to Jakarta (including limited military support from the United States) but did not fully understand the magnitude of the problem and in retrospect provided too little too late. The population became increasingly more upset over the success of the terrorists, and protests against Jakarta’s inability to control the situation became more common.
During late 2008 and into 2009, Jakarta found it increasingly difficult to stay on track with the National Campaign Plan. In order to fund programs and combat the reinvigorated independence movement, the government increased taxes throughout the entire Indonesian archipelago. Sumatra, the most resource-rich region, was particularly hard-hit. The Indonesian Army has become heavily overburdened combating terrorism and sabotage while attempting to maintain overall internal security. The central government’s tenuous control of the outer islands gradually diminished and efforts to quell the protests and rioting in Sumatra were essentially ineffective. By late 2009, conditions were ripe for an independence bid by Sumatra or any one of the other larger peripheral islands.
TNI Stretched Thin

8. Rebels take control of Sumatra and establish HQ in Medan
OVERTHROW IN SUMATRA
Colonel Hasan
APRIL 5 OVERTHROW
COLONEL HASAN GRABS POWER IN MEDAN
DISMISSES CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS AND MOST CIVIL SERVANTS
ESTABLISHES “INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC OF SUMATRA”(IROS)
LOCAL AL QAEDA CELLS ESPOUSE SUPPORT FOR HASAN
BEGIN CONSTRUCTING TWO TRAINING BASES
On September 5, 2010, (Recall that it is now late October 2010 so this was a little over 7 weeks ago) a military contingent led by Indonesian Army Colonel Teunku Hasan staged a successful overthrow of Indonesian central government elements in Sumatra. Hasan took control of the regional administrative building in Medan, Sumatra and proclaimed himself the leader of the newly established “Independent Republic of Sumatra” (IROS). One of his first actions was to dismiss most of the government civil servants (because of their suspected loyalties to Jakarta), causing many essential government functions to abruptly cease functioning. The radical Islamist movement (including members of Al Qaeda) quickly espoused support for Colonel Hasan and he openly embraced them, noting, “. . . any and all groups who want to help the proud people of Sumatra throw off the yoke of oppression are welcome to join our ranks.” Following the tsunami of 2004, Al Qaeda took advantage of the destruction in Sumatra and began the construction of two new training bases in the vicinity of Medan.
The Aceh Province on the northern tip of Sumatra remains under the control of Indonesian forces still loyal to the central government in Jakarta. These troops are considered extremely professional and loyal and were originally assigned to quash the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) insurgents’ long-standing separatist movement in Aceh and to ensure central government control over the region's significant oil and natural gas resources. The presence of American energy companies and international investment after the 2004 devastation in ACEH, was a strong contributing factor for the government’s efforts to maintain control of Aceh. To date, Hasan’s rebel forces have not mounted any operations to defeat the loyalist forces, but most believe it is only a matter of time before the rebels mass sufficient forces to oust the loyalists
FYI: Sumatra is comprised of a number of administrative regions called Provinces each led by a GOI appointed Governor. The administrative regions of Sumatra (or the smaller islands nearby) are: Aceh, Bangka-Belitung, Bengkulu, Jambi, Lampung, Riau- capital: Pekanbaru, Sumatera Barat (West Sumatra) - capital: Padang, Sumatera Selatan (South Sumatra) - capital: Palembang, Sumatera Utara (North Sumatra) - capital: Medan
Rebels take control of Sumatra and establish HQ in Medan

9. Armed Forces of the self-proclaimed “IROS”
SUMATRAN RESPONSE
SUMATRAN CIVILIAN POPULACE
MAJORITY WERE TIRED OF GOI AND SUPPORT CHANGE
FEAR OF WAR, LACK OF SERVICES CAUSING SOME TO LEAVE
MILITARY
LITTLE RESISTANCE, MAJORITY COMPLICIT. THOSE OPPOSED MELTED AWAY OR LEFT
BECAUSE OF DIVIDED LOYALTIES, ETHNICALLY DIVERSE LEADERSHIP AND CORRUPT PAY SYSTEM
Hasan and his rebel military leaders were quickly able to consolidate power and gain the support of the majority of the population of Sumatra, although small pockets of pro-Jakarta elements (among those who had benefited directly from the NCP) reportedly still exist. A growing percentage of the population have decided however that the lack of government and social services combined with a fear of civil war are reason enough to leave and have begun to head to neighboring countries to escape from the crisis situation.
Divided loyalties, a corrupt military pay system, and disarray among the ethnically diverse military leadership resulted in minimal Indonesian armed forces resistance to Hasan in Sumatra and it appears that the vast majority (as evidenced by their inaction) were complicit in the overthrow. Those opposed simply left if they could or melted into the population. Bottom Line: The remnants of the Indonesian military stationed on Sumatra are loyal to Col Hasan and consider themselves the armed forces of the Independent Republic of Sumatra. (Details, including their numbers, platforms and capabilities, are available in the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace materials your JTF J2 Staff and PACOM J2 will have access to on the game Web-Site.
Armed Forces of the self-proclaimed “IROS”

10. GOI RESPONSE JAKARTA CONDEMNED THE INSURRECTION
HEATED VERBAL EXCHANGES BETWEEN GOI AND REBEL LEADERSHIP *
GOI Parliament condemns Rebels Actions
GOI forces on the brink of civil war
In Jakarta, the national and military leadership condemned the insurrection in Sumatra fearing their secession would embolden other dissatisfied peripheral islands as well as devastate the national economy. Since the overthrow, there has been a series of heated verbal exchanges between the GOI and Rebels that have brought the two sides to the brink of civil war.

11. United Nations and Regional Actors
UNSC Emergency Session April 16th passed UNSC RESOLUTION 704 (2010):
Rebels must desist from further military action
Rebels must respect Int’l law of the sea
UNMTF formed to ensure freedom of navigation
“convince” rebels to cooperate w/ UNMTF and Security General for a mutually acceptable agreement
UNMTF Operations began April 22nd
ASEAN calls on ASEAN countries to cooperate w/ UNMTF to secure unhindered transit (Political Statement, 16 Apr)

12. UNMTF Concept of Operations
Thailand &
United Kingdom
4 X Ships, 5 X MPA
Malaysia &
Australia
6 X Ships, 3 X MPA
Singapore &
United States
6 X Ships, 5 X MPA
Of note, the northern oil fields and platforms have a large concentration of AMCITS and other foreign nationals as employees.

13. Average commercial ship transit/day ~ 100
Situation Update
Average commercial ship transit/day ~ 100
Average tanker ~ 20 ships/day
Average container ~ 30 ships/day
Pirate/Rebel harassments reported
Increased to 35 per week
UNMTF intercepted Pirate/Rebel vessels
Increased to 15 per week
Maritime refugees rescued
Increased to over 1,000 per week

14. Situation Update
Several un-seaworthy vessels have been encountered with refugees attempting to cross the SOM
Refugees are rescued and transported to Malaysia and Singapore
Commercial shipping volume slowly decreasing (140/day down to 100/day over 5 weeks)
Harassment encounters increasing, but rebels still avoid confrontation when UNMTF ships in view
Rebel tactic: False distress calls diverting UNMTF ships
Intercepted rebel craft are turned over to Indonesian Navy

15. Items of National Interests
The GOI has formally asked the U.S. for assistance in regaining control of Sumatra.
NSPD reiterates the importance of freedom of navigation, protecting American citizens, eliminating terrorist organizations with international reach, and enhancing the stability of countries in this region.
Over 63,000 ships transit the Strait of Malacca annually
Over 1/3 of world trade, 3 x more ships than transits Panama Canal and over 2 x the number transiting the Suez Canal
50% of world’s oil travels through the Strait of Malacca

16. 1. DEFINE THE BATTLESPACE ENVIRONMENT
JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (JIPOE)- Initial
1. DEFINE THE BATTLESPACE ENVIRONMENT
2. DESCRIBE THE BATTLESPACE’S EFFECTS ON ADVERSARY & FRIENDLY CAPABILITIES
3. EVALUATE THE ADVERSARY/ENEMY
4. DETERMINE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION (ECOAS)
This JIPOE briefing roughly follows the JIPOE methodology described in Joint Pub (JTTP for JIPOE) while also incorporating elements & terminology from Operational Art.
There are 4 principal steps to the JIPOE methodology:
1. Define the battlespace environment
2. Describe the battlespace’s effects on adversary & friendly capabilities
3. Evaluate the adversary/enemy
4. Determine enemy courses of action (ECOAs)
In JMO operational art terms, one must identify the objective(s); consider Factors Space, Time, & Force; identify adversary (& friendly) critical strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and center(s) of gravity; and develop possible adversary courses of action.

17. JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
JIPOE STEPS 1 & 2
(FACTORS SPACE & TIME):
1. DEFINE THE ENVIRONMENT
2. DESCRIBE THE ENVIRONMENT’S EFFECTS ON ENEMY & FRIENDLY CAPABILITIES

18. INDONESIA
The Republic of Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelago with 13, 667 islands.
Of the 6,000 inhabited islands, Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Irian Jaya account for 90% of the land area
The Islands are divided into 4 major groups
Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Sulawesi Compose the “Greater Sunda Complex”
Group Lying east of Java from Bali to Timor are the “Lesser Sunda Islands”
Group Containing the Maluku Islands between Sulawesi and the Lesser Sunda Islans
Fourth Group is Irian Jaya
In total land area, Indonesia is about three times the size of Texas.
Most islands consist of rugged volcanic mountains covered by dense tropical forests, Some with triple canopy jungles
With more that 100 active volcanoes, Islands from Sumatra through lesser Sundaes are the world’s most volcanically active region, subject to numerous earthquakes.
Indonesia is a multicultural society with 225 million citizens split into over 100 distinct ethnic groups and 300 mutually unintelligible languages, These ethnic groups have their own customs, system of values, and religious beliefs.
A little less than half of the Indonesian population is ethnically Javanese. Javanese dominance, particularly in government administration, has created resentments and conflict with other ethnic groups.
Rebel insurgency on Sumatra must be looked at with Indonesia’s diversity in mind. The central Government in Jakarta is deeply concerned that the secession of Sumatra, if allowed to proceed, may lead to additional regional secessions, and the eventual disintegration of Indonesia.

19. INDONESIA MARITIME CLAIMS
Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claims are based on its longstanding claim to archipelagic status.
Indonesia established archipelagic strait baselines around the outermost points of its outer islands in February 1960.
These baselines extend for over 8,000 nautical miles and enclose an area of approximately 666,100 square nautical miles

20. SUMATRA GEOGRAPHY
Now let’s turn our focus to the actual hotspot, the island of Sumatra. We’ll start with the geography and its potential impact on military operations.
Sumatra is just over 1,000 miles long and about 250 miles at its widest point.
Forest areas account for approximately 60 to 70 % of Sumatra’s total land area.
Sumatra accounts for 25% of the country's total land area.
Bukit Barisan, an unbroken mountain wall varying in height, extends down the entire western side of the island. The range includes 93 volcano peaks, 15 of them still active.
Lake Toba was formed by a massive prehistoric volcanic explosion. At 50 miles long, 16 miles wide, and 1,400 feet deep it is the largest inland body of water in Southeast Asia

21. SUMATRA GEOGRAPHY 1065 miles Strait of Malacca
ACEH
Strait of Malacca
1065 miles
Now let’s turn our focus to the actual hotspot, the island of Sumatra. We’ll start with the geography and its potential impact on military operations.
Sumatra is just over 1,000 miles long and about 250 miles at its widest point.
Forest areas account for approximately 60 to 70 % of Sumatra’s total land area.
Sumatra accounts for 25% of the country's total land area.
Bukit Barisan, an unbroken mountain wall varying in height, extends down the entire western side of the island. The range includes 93 volcano peaks, 15 of them still active.
Lake Toba was formed by a massive prehistoric volcanic explosion. At 50 miles long, 16 miles wide, and 1,400 feet deep it is the largest inland body of water in Southeast Asia

22. SOUTHERN SUMATRA Mobility Slightly Restricted
Mobility Moderately Restricted
Mobility Severely Restricted
Major Road/Highway
Sumatra has 3 major Land forms.
The Southern one-third is dominated by dense mangrove swamp and lowland forest. It also has hills that gradually rise to the steep Barisan Mountains.
Mobility is restricted due to Marshes, poor secondary roads and primary roads subject to being washed out in the rainy season

23. CENTRAL SUMATRA MCOO Mobility Slightly Restricted
Mobility Moderately Restricted
Mobility Severely Restricted
Major Road/Highway
River/Stream
Central Sumatra has hills that gradually rise to the steep Barisan Mountains
While the coastal plain is larger in central Sumatra, there are numerous natural and manmade obstacles such as marshes, swaps and rice paddies that restrict wheeled and tracked vehicles

24. N. SUMATRA & ACEH MCOO Mobility Slightly Restricted
Mobility Moderately Restricted
Mobility Severely Restricted
Major Road/Highway
The Northwest is dominated by a rugged mountain chain and a very narrow coastal plain.
Steep Mountainous terrain severely restricts in the central part of the island
Mobility is restricted due to Marshes, poor secondary roads and primary roads subject to being washed out in the rainy season

25. CLIMATE AND WEATHER PREDOMINANTLY TROPICAL; HIGH TEMPS AND HUMIDITY
FREQUENT SHOWERS/THUNDERSTORMS
HEAVIEST RAINS (20-27 INCHES/MONTH) MAR-APR AND OCT- DEC
RAINS HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON ROADS/RAIL IN SOUTH
ROAD TRAFFIC EXTREMELY RESTRICTED DURING RAINY SEASON
IN DRY SEASON, CAN TRAVERSE THE TRANS-SUMATRAN HIGHWAY IN 4 DAYS
Sumatran weather is tropical with oppressively high temperatures and humidity.
Temperatures near sea level range from 70 degrees Fahrenheit at night to highs in the 80’s in the afternoon year round.
Cloud cover is very slight during the night and early morning, and is most intense in the early afternoon.
Currently, we have entered the dry season, however if conflict is protracted, weather can severely affect operations
The heaviest rain (20 to 27 inches per month) falls in March through April and October through December.
Thunderstorms occur 15 to 20 times per month during these peak rain periods.
Rains have the most dramatic impact on rail and road traffic in southern Sumatra.
In the south, repair work on lines of communication is constant because of landslides and washouts destroying whole stretches of road.
Accordingly, road traffic is confined to a few major highways and these are badly degraded during the rainy season.
Best time to travel on Sumatran highways is from Now to September. Under ideal dry season conditions, the entire Trans-Sumatran Highway can be driven in four days.
However, with many government workers gone, infrastructure repair has been reduced

26. WATER QUALITY/HEALTH RISKS
PRIMARY SOURCES: RIVERS, CANALS, WELLS, RAIN WATER
QUALITY: FAIR TO POOR
MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLIED TO 40 PERCENT OF POPULATION
ALL AFFECTED BY WATERBORNE DISEASE
CONTAMINATED WATER AND ASSOCIATED DISEASES DEBILITATE THE MILITARY AND GENERAL POPULACE
POLLUTION AND POOR SEWAGE PRACTICES ALSO PLAGUE PUBLIC HEALTH
Potable water quality is fair to poor.
Many residents use bottled water.
Primary sources are rivers, canals, wells, and rain water from roof catchments.
Overall, municipal water is supplied to approximately 40 percent of urban and rural populations.
Throughout Sumatra, water distribution systems are antiquated, poorly maintained and unable to keep up with demand, contributing to contaminated tap water.
Treatment plants periodically shut down because of clogged intake pipes and filters.
Rebel forces, like the general population, suffer from waterborne disease.
Most rural and slum dwellers obtain water directly from heavily silted rivers, drainage canals, raw rainwater catchments or public standpipes.
Within Sumatra, decades of oil industry pollution and untreated rural and urban raw sewage have also taken their toll upon public health.

27. TOPOGRAPHY EFFECT ON ADVERSARY CAPABILITIES
REBEL MILITARY DOCTRINE: FIGHT IN PLACE
REBEL REINFORCEMENT/RESUPPLY OF PRIMARY FORCES/FACILITIES LIMITED
REBEL ACEH PROVINCE OFFENSIVE IMPACTED BY LIMITED LOC’S AND VULNERABILITY OF ROAD/RAIL BRIDGES TO INTERDICTION OPERATIONS
Sumatran topography and the lack of a robust transportation infrastructure have lead to the creation of a Rebel military doctrine of fighting a protracted war in place.
Rebel reinforcement, redeployment and re-supply of primary forces is limited due to relatively few suitable primary road and rail networks.
In the contested Aceh Province, any Rebel offensive will be hampered by restricted lines of communication and the vulnerability of road and rail bridges to Coalition interdiction.

28. TOPOGRAPHY EFFECT ON FRIENDLY CAPABILITIES
75 PERCENT OF SUMATRA IS UNFAVORABLE FOR CROSS-COUNTRY MOVEMENT
TWO HEAVY RAIN PERIODS: MAR – APR AND OCT – DEC
SOUTHERN SUMATRA ROADS PRONE TO FLOODING/MUD
FRIENDLY TROOPS MUST BRING: WATER SUPPLIES, TROPICAL MEDICINE, TRANSPORTATION
Sumatra’s terrain makes military maneuver warfare operations difficult.
At least 75 percent of Sumatra is unfavorable for cross-country movement by either tracked or wheeled vehicles because of swamps, forests, or mountainous terrain.
Man-made features such as rice paddies, canals, and drainage ditches also hinder cross-country movement, especially during the rainy seasons.
Southern Sumatran roads are especially prone to flooding and mud.
Friendly forces on Sumatra will need to be supported heavily with adequate water supplies, significant quantities of tropical medicine, and must remain cognizant that flooding, swamps and other topographical features will hinder and may significantly degrade ground mobility.

29. REBEL ECONOMY SUMATRA WAS MAINSTAY OF INDONESIAN ECONOMY
LNG IS A MAXIMUM REVENUE-PRODUCING EXPORT
REBEL ECONOMY WILL BE DEPENDENT ON POL EXPORT FOR LONG-TERM VIABILITY
Most of Indonesia’s oil activity took place on Sumatra.
Prior to the declaration of independence by the Rebels, exploitable resources from Sumatra supplied a full 50% of Indonesia’s gross export earnings and between 50% and 75% of its oil and many refined petroleum products – kerosene, gasoline, urea, and plastics.
Despite the importance of oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG) is where Sumatra’s and Indonesia’s futures lie because LNG is a maximum revenue-producing export.
One of the leading factors behind the Sumatran rebellion was the long-held belief that Sumatran natural resources and potential wealth were being exploited by unfair tax laws and revenue-sharing requirements with Java.
For long-term viability, the Rebel economy will be dependent on the exportation of POL products as their major source of hard currency although they do maintain lesser interests in the forestry, fishing, and agricultural sectors.

30. SUMATRAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
Major Oil Field
Major Oil Refinery
Major Gas Field
Major LNG Plant
Major Gas Pipeline
ALUEITAM ARUN
NORTH SUMATRA OFFSHORE
KUALALANGSA
DUMAI
DURI
RANTAU
MINAS
JAMBI
ALUEITAM PASE
PANGKALANBRANDAN
ALUEITAM OFFSHORE
S. LHOKSUKON
BETUNG
SUNGAI PAKNING
TALANG AKAR
MUSI
PERABUMULIH
ARUN
The locations of the major oil and gas fields, oil refineries and LNG plant on Sumatra can be found on the game web site
Of note, the northern oil fields and platforms have a large concentration of AMCITS and other foreign nationals as employees.

31. ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON REBEL MILITARY CAPABILITIES
ROBUST EXPORT MARKET WILL BE CRITICAL FACTOR FOR SUCCESS OF REBEL ECONOMY
PRODUCTION/EXPORT OF POL IS A KEY VULNERABILITY AND POTENTIAL LEVERAGE POINT
ALL REBEL TRADE IS SEABORNE; FREE TRANSPORT ON THE HIGH SEAS IS CRUCIAL
The export sector is the backbone of the Rebel economy and is the major source of hard currency. It will be critical for long-term economic viability to maintain a robust export market.
As all of Rebel international trade is carried by sea, the Rebels are critically dependent upon free transport on the high seas.
The production and export of POL remains vital to the Rebel economy and can be considered a key vulnerability and potential leverage point.

32. TRADE MOST IMPORTANT EXPORTS PRINCIPAL EXPORT COUNTRIES-PETROLEUM/LNG
CRUDE OIL, PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, LNG
PRINCIPAL EXPORT COUNTRIES-PETROLEUM/LNG
JAPAN – 45%
KOREA – 30%
TAIWAN – 15%
ALL OTHERS-10%
REBEL MERCHANT MARINE
SEIZED OVER 50 SHIPS
40 CARGO
4 CONTAINER
3 LNG TANKERS
12 OIL TANKERS
2 RO/RO
2PASSENGER/CARGO LINERS
While Sumatra exports chemicals, natural rubber, lumber, and clothing, Petroleum, petroleum based products and LNG are by far the largest sources of revenue
At the time the self proclaimed Independent Republic of Sumatra broke away, this was the rough break out of countries importing Petroleum and LNG products from Sumatra. We see no indications that this will change in the near term.
As stated previously, oil has historically been the most lucrative export but as Indonesian internal consumption requirements grow, it has become evident that Sumatra's future economic viability will rely heavily on LNG exports.
65% or 25 of 38 MT of LNG produced per year is exported
25% or 37 million of approx 146 million barrels of oil produced per year are exported.
Key to their economy and trade, a sizeable merchant marine fleet was seized. These ships are vital to the rebel economy.

33. KEY TRADE PORTS There are 5 major commercial ports used by the rebels
ACEH
BELAWAN
DUMAI
There are 5 major commercial ports used by the rebels
The 3 Oil ports are all located in the east facing the strait of Malacca, with oil exports fueling the rebels, the Strait of Malacca is critical to their survival
The largest and busiest, oil port is Dumai
Belwan, is the port for Medan
Palmebang, Sumatra’s 2nd largest city, is the principal port in the south and is surrounded by some of the largest petroleum refineries in the world.
The two remaining ports are Teluk Retai a Key naval base and main port on the south coast and Teluk Bayur the main port on the west coast
TELUK BAYUR
PALEMBANG
TELUK RETAI

34. JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
JIPOE STEP 3 (FACTOR FORCE):
EVALUATE THE ADVERSARY
or ENEMY

35. REBEL LEADERSHIP COLONEL HASAN IS SELF-PROCLAIMED REBEL LEADER
A MODERATE MUSLIM – TEMPORARY ALLIANCE WITH ISLAMIC MILITANTS
MONETARY / TECHNICAL SUPPORT
WILL PROBABLY BREAK TIES WITH MILITANTS WHEN INDEPENDENCE RECOGNIZED
SUMATRAN INDEPENDENCE IS HIS DRIVING IDEOLOGY
Colonel Teunku Hasan, formerly of the Indonesian Army, is the self-proclaimed leader of what he has declared to be the Independent Republic of Sumatra.
Colonel Hasan and his immediate cadre had been positioning themselves for some time to be in a position to effect the liberation of Sumatra. The deteriorating funding from the central government combined with the 2009 reallocation of revenues from the “outlying islands” caused enough civil unrest and turmoil in Sumatra for Colonel Hasan and his cronies to take action.
While Hasan has accepted the assistance of Islamic militants, it is likely that this is only a tactical alliance to gain the monetary and technical support until he has established the Independent Republic of Sumatra as a recognized and legitimate country.
Hasan has maintained tight control and surveillance of his new “allies” and while he is more than happy to make use of their asymmetric warfare capabilities, it is believed that he does not intend to continue support to these “outsiders” once IROS is well established and has gained formal recognition.
Colonel Hasan and his close associates are committed Sumatran nationalists There does not appear to be any other driving ideology behind the Rebel movement It is an umbrella organization, encompassing militant Islamists, leftists and those committed to Western liberal democracy.
The dream of Sumatran independence and the force of Hasan’s powerful personality hold the organization together. Factional strains, however, will undoubtedly emerge as “Rebel” power is consolidated.

36. REBEL LEADERSHIP COLONEL HASAN IS CHARISMATIC AND PRAGMATIC
HE PREFERS CONCESSION TO CONFRONTATION BUT WILL NOT COMPROMISE ON SUMATRAN INDEPENDENCE
VERY LOYAL TO HIS FAMILY
RAZIL HASAN, DEFENSE MINISTER, IS LOUD, PUSHY, VIOLENT AND CORRUPT HIS REPUTATION WITH THE TROOPS IS POOR
AHMED HASAN, KODAM 1 CDR, IS QUIET, COMPETENT, AND WELL-LIKED WITHIN THE MILITARY
Colonel Hasan is a charismatic but pragmatic leader. He is a capable and calculating military leader who is driven by a desire to achieve the establishment of a unified and independent nation state of Sumatra.
He is a good listener, prefers concession to confrontation and is known to be a compromiser on virtually any issue other than Sumatran independence.
He is loyal to his family. Colonel Hasan is particularly close to his two younger brothers, Razil and Ahmad, both of whom were also Indonesian Army officers. Razil has assumed the position of Defense Minister for the Rebels, while Ahmad is Commander of the Northern Sumatran Military Area (KODAM 1).
Razil Hasan is loud, pushy and violent. He has grown up in the shadow of his impressive and charismatic brother and believes he is underrated. However, his reputation within the military is poor. Rumors are rampant that he has already begun to line his pockets with kickbacks and other forms of corruption. On the other hand, Ahmed Hasan is quiet and competent, well liked by his troops, and shuns the spotlight.
Notes: KODAM = Military Area Command
KODAM2 – LTC Syarwan Nasir –know to be a committed Sumatran Nationalist

37. REBEL ORDER OF BATTLE OVERVIEW
Now we’ll look at the Rebel military and its capabilities.
As a result of ethnic and cultural bonds, anti-Javanese sentiment, and Colonel Hasan’s charisma, approximately 95% of those Indonesian forces stationed in Sumatra have shifted loyalty and are now considered rebel forces loyal to Hasan. The remaining 5% were allowed to leave Sumatra and have rejoined Indonesian regular forces in Java.
All of the Indonesian military equipment located in Sumatra prior to the insurgency is now under the control of the Rebel forces.

38. REBEL GROUND FORCES GOB: MAJOR EQUIPMENT: 30,000 TOTAL (18K/12K)
15 COMBINED ARMS BRIGADES
MAJOR EQUIPMENT:
40 LIGHT TANKS
175 APC
125 HOWITZERS / SPG
5 SAM SYSTEMS
+ MANPADS
70 ADA SYSTEMS
35 HELOS
The Rebel Army consists of approximately 30,000 personnel, the majority of whom are local militia or territorial troops.
This force is designed for unconventional warfare in a static environment, and mobility is very limited.
On Sumatra, Rebel forces will be deployed for a defensive guerrilla war if Sumatra is threatened with invasion. Rebel ground forces may also be used in an effort to wrest control from Loyalist forces in the Aceh province.

39. Ground Force Disposition
ACEH X
KODAM 1
KODAM 1 HQ, MEDAN
1st BRIGADE, MEDAN
2ND BRIGADE, BELAWAN
7TH BRIGADE, TANJUNGBALI
6TH BRIGADE, SIBOLGA
10TH BRIGADE, PADANG
4TH BRIGADE, PEKANBARU
9TH BRIGADE, BENGKALIS
12TH BRIGADE, TANJUNG PINANG
KODAM 2
17TH BRIGADE, PANJANG
23RD BRIGADE, TELUK RETAI NAVAL BASE
20TH BRIGADE, BENGKULU
14TH BRIGADE, JAMBI
15TH BRIGADE, PANGKALPENANG
KODAM 2 HQ, PALEMBANG
13th BRIGADE, PALEMBANG
21ST BRIGADE, SUNGAIPENUH
Rebel forces are organized into two distinct Military Area Commands or KODAMs.
While COL Hasan has overall control, the commanders of KODAM 1 and KODAM 2 oversee forces in their respective regions.
The KODAM is the key organization for all strategic, tactical, and territorial military operations for all services. The Navy and Air Forces are represented on the KODAM staff by senior liaison officers.
KODAM 1 covers the northern half of Sumatra and is headquartered at Medan. There are approximately 18,000 ground forces assigned to KODAM 1. The Rebel Ground Order of Battle is organized into brigades (2000 personnel divided into 2 regiments; each regiment divided into 3 battalions). Each brigade is a combined arms unit consisting of infantry, a small amount of light armor and artillery.
All Rebel ground forces are composed of a small regular cadre with the majority of the troops consisting of local territorial reservists.
This organizational structure reflects the traditional Indonesian strategy of Total People’s Defense. This doctrine holds that Indonesia (and, by extension, the rebels) cannot afford a large military apparatus; instead, a small cadre of regular troops is augmented by reservists who are activated in time of national emergency. These forces would defend Sumatra with a strategy of territorial guerrilla warfare.
Military Area Command 2 or KODAM 2 comprises the southern half of the island and is headquartered at Palembang. There are approximately 12,000 rebel Army troops in KODAM 2.
           

40. REBEL AIR FORCE FIGHTERS ATTACK TRANSPORT MPA HELOS 5 x F-16A
13 x F-5E
ATTACK
14 x BAE HAWK
5 x OV-10
TRANSPORT
9 x C-130/L-100
2 x F-27
11 x CN-235
MPA
2 x 737
HELOS
20 VARIOUS
REBEL AIR FORCE F-16A
REBEL AIR FORCE C-130
The Rebel Air Force has some aircraft in the area of the Strait of Malacca that provide a detection and warning capability. However, in general, the Rebel Air Force is a small force composed of older aircraft with limited capabilities.
All of these assets were seized from the Indonesian Air Force at the outbreak of the civil war.
Training observed to date is very basic, maintenance is considered poor and interoperability with the other Rebel services is marginal at best. While all Rebel Air Force aircraft possess the capability of IFR for night or bad weather flight, they are seldom observed training in this environment. Therefore, night attack or reconnaissance missions are assessed to be unlikely or minimally effective if attempted.
Notes: F-16A – Multi-role 1480NM Range (Combat Radius 676nm) 20mm Cannon AIM-9 AAM (Short Range IR guided 8Km)
F-5E – Light Multi-role 1340NM Range (Combat Radius nm) 20mm Cannons AIM-9 AAM (Short Range IR guided 8Km)
BAE Hawk –Light Multi-role 1360NM Range (Combat Radius 125nm) 30mm Cannon AIM-9 AAM (Short Range IR guided 8Km)
C-130 Transport 4250NM Range Max Load 124 Troops 19325kg
L-100 Transport 2390nm Range Max Load 22860kg
F-27 Transport 2370nm Range Max Load 60 Troops/46 Paratroops/6438kg
CN-235 Maritime Patrol/Transport 1549NM 57 Troops/46 Paratroops Exocet ASM (Inertial with Active Radar 70Km) Mk46 Torpedoes
Boeing 737 Maritime Patrol 2255NM (Side-looking, multimission surveillance Radar)

41. REBEL AIR FORCE MAJOR OOB
MEDAN
(7) Bae HAWK Mk 53
REBEL Bae Hawk
PEKANBARU
(6) F-5E
(5) F-16A
ALL MPA/TRANSPORT ACFT
ALL ROTARY WING ACFT
The Rebel Air Force has three operational bases as depicted on this slide. Annex A of the intelligence estimate provides estimated operational ready rates for each type of aircraft and provides the complete inventory of the transport and rotary wing aircraft at Pekanbaru.
PALEMBANG
- (7) F-5E
(7) Bae HAWK Mk 53
(5) OV-10F

42. REBEL AIR DEFENSE Rebel Airfield ROLAND SAM Site RAPIER SAM Site
MEDAN
(7) Bae HAWK Mk 53
PEKANBARU
(6) F-5E
(5) F-16A
ALL MPA/TRANSPORT ACFT
ALL ROTARY WING ACFT
PALEMBANG
- (7) F-5E
(7) Bae HAWK Mk 53
(5) OV-10F
Rebel Airfield
ROLAND SAM Site
RAPIER SAM Site
Fighter CAP Station (typical)
MPA Patrol Area (typical)
Air Surveillance Radar Coverage
With the exception of its limited inventory of fighter aircraft, the Rebel air defense posture is limited to air defense artillery and older SAM systems. The air defense artillery inventory is detailed in Annex B. SAMs include 30 Swedish-built, man-portable/shoulder-fired RBS-70s and the three tracked Rapier systems deployed to the three main Rebel Air Force bases as depicted on the slide. Also shown are the three mobile Roland SAM systems that are currently deployed to the Rebel’s three main naval bases.
MCOO = Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay
Rapier Towed low-level surface-to-air missile system/semi-automatic optical command line-of-sight guidance
Roland 2 Self Propelled low-altitude surface-to-air missile optical or command radar guided

43. REBEL NAVY PERSONNEL NAVAL AIR 3 NAVAL BASES C-802 CDCM NOB MINES
12,000
3,000 MARINES IN TWO BRIGADES
800 NAVAL AIR
3 NAVAL BASES
NOB
2 x TYPE 209 SS
5 x FFG
9 x FF
2 x PTG
6 x LST
18 x LCM
NAVAL AIR
2 x E-2C
2 x 737 MPA
3 x CN-235 MPA
(Exocet Capable)
C-802 CDCM
30 MISSILES (65 NM)
5 LAUNCHERS
MINES
1500 BOTTOM INFLUENCE & MOORED CONTACT MINES
The Rebel Navy consists of 12,000 personnel. This includes 3,000 members of the Marine Commando Corps and 800 members of the Naval Air Arm. The Navy also controls all coastal missiles.
The primary threat posed by the Rebel Navy is its capability to disrupt the flow of merchant traffic in the Strait of Malacca. The Rebel Navy has proven they are capable of closing the less heavily traveled Sunda Strait between Sumatra and Java. A combination of mines, artillery, ship and shore-based anti-ship missiles, in addition to the air threat, constitute a credible threat in the confined Malacca and Sunda Straits.
The naval order of battle is relatively modest but capable, and includes two diesel submarines.
All naval aviation assets are co-located with the Air Force at Pekanbaru AFB and consist of a handful of surveillance and maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). It is worth noting that the two Boeing 737 MPA could cause problems with positive identification relative to commercial aircraft.
There are 30 C-802 CDCMs and five launchers. Missiles and mobile launchers can deploy on short notice and the missiles can be fired from any location. The KODAM Commander probably has release authority for the CDCMs in his region. HF and landline comms are probably used to transmit weapons-free orders to the launch batteries themselves. The current deployed locations of the CDCM launchers are provided in Annex C of the intelligence estimate.
Finally, the Rebel Navy has approximately 1500 older Soviet-design bottom influence and moored contact mines. All surface units, aircraft, submarines, and coastal merchant and fishing vessels are potential minelayers.

44. REBEL NAVY MAJOR OOB TANJUNG PINANG BELAWAN TELUK RATAI
(1) Ki Hajar Dewantara FFG
(1) Tribal FF
(2) Kapitan Patimura FF
BELAWAN
(1) Van Speijk FFG
(1) Fatahillah FFG
(1) Claud Jones FF
(3) Kapitan Patimura FF
(1) Dagger PTG
This slide shows the Rebel OOB at the three main navy bases. The primary base is Teluk Ratai which is home to the submarines and naval headquarters. Also located at Teluk Ratai are all of the Rebel Amphibs.
TELUK RATAI
(2) Type 209 SS
(1) Van Speijk FFG
(1) Fatahillah FFG
(1) Claud Jones FF
(2) Kapitan Patimura FF
(1) Dagger PTG
Plus all AMPHIB’s
REBEL NAVY KAPITAN PATIMURA FF

45. MARITIME MCOO ñ ñ Rebel Navy Base ROLAND SAM Site
BELAWAN
(1) Van Speijk FFG
(1) Fatahillah FFG
(1) Claud Jones FF
(3) Kapitan Patimura FF
(1) Dagger PTG
TANJUNG PINANG
(1) Ki Hajar Dewantara FFG
(1) Tribal FF
(2) Kapitan Patimura FF ñ
Rebel Navy Base
ROLAND SAM Site
C-802 CDCM Site and Range Arc
Suspected Mining
Rebel Naval Air Station
This Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay slide shows the CDCM threat with particular emphasis on the ranges of the C802’s. As mentioned earlier the Sumatran Rebel have closed the Sunda Strait with mines along with other navy assets.
TELUK RATAI
(2) Type 209 SS
(1) Van Speijk FFG
(1) Fatahillah FFG
(1) Claud Jones FF
(2) Kapitan Patimura FF
(1) Dagger PTG ñ

46. Rebel CDCM and RADAR Coverage
This slide shows the (max theoretical) Rebel air surveillance and coastal surveillance radar coverage and depicts the general geographic location of the 5 C-802 deployment sites.
CDCM’s:
Inventory/Specifications. The Rebel Navy has 30 C-802 CDCMs and five launchers. C-802 Specifications: Range – 120 km; Speed - Mach 0.9; Flight altitude meters flight phase, 5-7 meters attack phase; Guidance - inertial and terminal (jam-resistant) active radar; Warhead – 165 kg time delayed, semi-armor piercing high explosive.
Operational Tactics. Missiles and launchers can deploy on short notice and the missiles can be fired from any location. Pre-surveyed launch sites are not required. Any source of targeting can be used including coastal surveillance radars, visual observers, and MPA locator reports. Range and bearing (or lead angle, if known) are the only inputs required for launch.
RADAR:
5 FURUNO Series Coastal Surveillance radars are located in the vicinity of the deployed C-802 launchers at:
DUMAI (0140N/10127E)
TANJUNG PINANG (0054N/10426E)
BELAWAN (0347N/09841E)
TELUK RATAI (0535S/10511E)
PAJAK (0206N/10138E)
A mixture of THOMPSON TRS 2215 and TRS 2230 Air Defense Radars are located on the three airbases at:
PALEMBANG (0255S/10442E)
PEKANBARU (0032N/10442E)
MEDAN (0334N/09841E)
Specifications: Detection Range: 510 km, Ceiling: 30K m.
The TRS 2230 is the FIXED or RELOCATABLE version and the 2215 is the MOBILE Version that can be transported by road/rail/air and can be deployed in less than 1 hour.
Air Surveillance Radar
Coastal Surveillance Radar
Current C-802 CDCM Sites

47. LOYALIST AND GAM DISPOSITIONS
BANDA ACEH
GAM
LHOKSEUMAWE
GAM
ACEH
LANGSA
MEULABOH
As mentioned in the Scenario Brief, Aceh Province, on the northern tip of Sumatra is still under the control of the GOI with approximately 5,000 GOI loyal ground forces dispersed throughout the province as depicted on the slide.
Prior to the Sumatran independence movement, the GOI forces focused primarily on containing the threat from the Free Aceh Movement, or GAM and protecting the oil and Gas infrastructure. They now find themselves not only containing the GAM threat but also burdened with the heavy responsibility of defending Aceh from attack by the Sumatran Rebels.
GAM strongholds are depicted on the graphic and although lightly armed and poorly organized, GAM is known for its ruthlessness and terrorist-type tactics.
If coalition forces become engaged in ground operations in Aceh, they will find GAM fighters difficult to differentiate from Indonesian Loyalist or Sumatran Rebel forces because all primarily wear camouflage utility-type uniforms although GAM members have been known to don local civilian garb when conducting terrorist attacks or surveillance operations.
The Intelligence community does not have a good understanding of the relationship between Col Hasan’s IROS movement and the Free Aceh Movement. Our best assessment based on the most current intelligence indicates that the majority of GAM supports Colonel Hasan and will support his effort to annex Aceh and defeat the GOI loyalists forces, because they believe they will be rewarded for their loyalty possibly with their own independence at some later date.
GAM believes U.S. and coalition forces present a direct threat and are likely to respond with force if they feel threatened. It is unclear if they will oppose a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) in Aceh by U.S./Coalition forces.
GOI LOYALIST Battalions (5000 troops total)
GAM (Free Aceh) FIGHTERS (800 est)
3000 GAM SUPPORTERS (Throughout Aceh)
GAM

48. LOYALISTS IN SOUTHERN SUMATRA
On the southwest end of Sumatra in the mountains north of Bengkulu and IVO mountains 80 miles north of Padang, and 80 miles west of Pekanbaru there are approximately 1,000 GOI loyal ground forces holding out waiting for support from the GOI.
Approximately 500 man force in both areas with established chain of command
Well trained and equipped for company sized Light Infantry operations
Both forces in contact with Aceh Command
GOI LOYALISTS

49. AL QAEDA TRAINING CAMPSAQ
KABANJAHE
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
ACEH AQ
TARUTUNG
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Another force that may influence the Sumatran crisis is Al Qaeda and other militant Islamic groups such as the Jemaih Islamiah and Laskar Jihad. Al Qaeda operations are believed to be concentrated at the two recently constructed terrorist training camps, Kabanjahe and Tarutung, both located in the mountainous region of northern Sumatra. Detailed descriptions of these camps are available on the Intel Portion of the Game Web Site. The precise number of Al Qaeda, Jemaih Islamiah and Laskar Jihad operatives based out of Sumatra is unknown however, most U.S. intelligence agencies assess the total number to be less than 1,000 throughout the Indonesian Archipelago with one-quarter on Sumatra conducting actively planning, training, sabotage, and terrorist type attacks.
The militant Islamic organizations in Sumatra are assessed to have MANPADS, Small Arms, IED’s and other similar weapons.
IED (Improvised Explosive Device)

50. JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
JIPOE STEP 4 (CRITICAL FACTORS):
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, CENTER OF GRAVITY, ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION (ECOAs)
TO BE DETERMINED BY THE JPG
The fourth and last step determining Adversary Courses of Action is one we will ask you the players to grapple with

51. Additional Planning Information

52. AMCIT Disposition Overview
Vietnam
Thailand
Brunei
Malaysia
Finally, there are a significant number of American citizens throughout Indonesia. This slide offers an overview nationwide while the following two slides breakdown AMCIT locations on Sumatra and Java and Bali.
359
Sulawesi
Irian Jaya
331
Sumatra 99
Kalimantan
432
Maluku
Jakarta 1
Java
4498
Timor
3527
Total 12
250

53. Time and Place for Major Units
CJCS Warning Order DTG Z MAY 2014
Today is 24 May 2014
Major Unit Locations (see Dispositions slide)
U.S. Embassy Jakarta

54. U.S. Forces Disposition 1SFG HQ + ODA 160 SOAR 353 SOG 1 SEAL PLT
1 RIB DET
NSWTU, 1 SEAL PLT
1RIB DET, 1MK5 DET
ODB
2 x ODA
COWPENS/STRIKE SAG
MV PFC DEWAYNE T WILLIAMS
Today there are several U.S. units currently operating in the Southeast Asian region as part of PACOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan. The USS COWPENS Strike Surface Action Group (SAG) had a routine port visit in Singapore curtailed and is now conducting show-of-force operations in the Strait of Malacca. Two additional ships from the COWPENS SAG were detached and directed to operate with the newly-formed UNMTF. There are also various SOF units in the AOR conducting FID and JCET’s. The purpose of these U.S. forces is to assist the Government of Indonesia in the Aceh province and support Operation SECURE PASSAGE to ensure access to international waters to include passage of shipping through the Strait of Malacca and associated sea-lanes.

55. Questions ?

56. ID Team Leaders and Team Breakdown ________

57. JPG Tasks
1. WHO: You are the SOCPAC Staff and serving on the JPG. WHEN: It is now 24 May WHERE: You are on the island of Hawaii. WHAT: Prepare a Mission Analysis briefing (IAW Joint Publication 5-0) 2. Identify Enemy and Friendly Strategic Centers of Gravity, but DO NOT conduct factor analysis on the Strategic Centers of Gravity. 3. Identify a Friendly and Enemy Operational Centers of Gravity and DO conduct CC-CR-CV factor analysis of these Operational COGs. 4. LOO/LOEs. Even though the identification of Lines of Operation/Effort (LOO/LOEs) would follow in subsequent stages of the Joint Operational Planning Process, develop your proposed LOO/LOEs and Decisive Points oriented on your selected Enemy Operational COG, and present this diagram to the commander at the Mission Analysis briefing. 5. Dry erase boards or PPT are acceptable.