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Academic working papers: EIOP (European Integration Online Paper) http://www.eiop.or.at/erpa European Research Papers Archive (ERPA): +1,000 working papers of high quality EUI, Florence; MPIfG, Cologne; NYU Law School; ECSA, Vienna; ARENA, Oslo; MZES, Mannheim; ESCR; Queen’s University (Belfast); McGill University (Montréal, PQ).
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Lecture II Area Studies, February 12, 2007 Review of some major research traditions in the field of Area Studies
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How to look at the world?
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Introduction ‘Reality’ and ‘Description’ Different accounts possible: none as such more ‘valuable’ than the others
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Research Not a straight line from problem to solution, from question to answer (ES 1A2, etc.) Data are not easy to be found Data as such do not tell us anything Once found, data are part of a ‘story’ told by someone else: in a book, an article, a paper, a website, a presentation In addition, you present them in yet a different ‘story’ of your own
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Research and assumptions Every ‘story’ is based upon some – either implicit or explicit – assumptions, which themselves shape the topic of research, the questions asked, the data selected, the analysis of those data, the cause-and-effect strands, and the final story told There are no ‘facts’ and causal relations without ‘theory’; however, there is no ‘theory’ without ‘facts’ either
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Starting point Each account - starts from different assumptions - uses different methods - raises distinct research questions - collects different ‘facts’ - offers different explanations (causal strands, etc) Question: how to account for these differences?
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Stories are shaped by... Assumptions and perspectives (plus other factors) Oft-implicit argument Example: US in Iraq, Bush Jr. - to do what Bush Sr. could not do - Bush Jr & Cheney: oil interests - safeguard access to major oil supplies Simplistic mode of analysis - individual actor: Bush Jr - has Intentions upon which he Acts leading to Outcome - I → A = O, which (often) equals I, however...
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Some complicating features NOTE: rational choice analysis, e.g. How can we tell he had those intentions? Did he act ‘rationally’, that is ‘goal-oriented’? PLUS: a contextual analysis, e.g. He does not live on ‘an island unto itself’: other actors who have different intentions, etc. etc. He was part of ‘group-think’ which itself was part of a larger network of rules, regulations, etc: to what extent do individual intentions shape group activities? To what extent do group intentions and preferences shape individual ones?
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Several major ideal-type research perspectives Social Sciences Rational choice analysis (since 1950s – 1960s) Ideas and Ideology Cultural analysis Structural analysis (focus on: Historical Institutionalism) Comparative analysis (lecture)
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Some distinguishing features Assumptions: actors, motivation, results Does the context matter, if so, how and why? How do we define the problem? What constitutes solid and proper ‘facts’? Refer to either individual or collective body? Individual’s perception and objectives versus collective body’s institutions (rules, regulations, customs, formal institutions, etc) How to account for change? What about historical contingency?
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At first, some ontological remarks The classical contrast: ‘A’ versus ‘B’ ‘A’: Methodological individualism ‘B’: Methodological holism (or, methodological collectivism) ‘A’ aimed to debunk a common 19 th -c fallacy, typical of Durkheimian and Marxian analyses: → NOTION: look at group (e.g. class) activity, and know what individual members thereof want → YET: you cannot infer individual interests & motivations from group interests & motivations
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Some basic things to know first Methodological individualism -tradition: Weber -everything can & should be reduced to motivations and characteristics of individuals who make up society -social phenomena are result of individuals acting upon their intentions -always start from individual’s perspective and preference structure -influence upon Economics: Man = rational profit-seeker, maximizing profits and limiting costs Methodological holism (or, collectivism) -tradition: Durkheim & Marx -idea: whole > than sum of its parts -thus analyze topic under investigation in its totality -social facts (‘society’) have existence of their own -Individuals do matter, yet only as players acting in a context -Actors: tend to be institutions, rules, regulations, etc which define inter-human relations
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Rational choice theory (1) Influenced by economists and some of their assumptions Start from simple assumptions and units & reduce a political situation to its essence: actors’ preferences and intentions are key Actors always seek to maximise benefits and to limit costs Actors = usually individuals, yet also groups, parties or states Key question: Under which conditions will chain ‘I – A – O’ lead to ‘O = I’?
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Rational choice analysis (2) Preferences: assumed wants and desires of actors Strategies: actions available to actors Rationality: best possible strategy (goal-oriented, Weber) & consistency of preferences YET: actors can only choose actions not outcomes [uncertainty factor] YET: there are many constraints: individual cannot freely choose his/her actions
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Rational choice analysis (3) Application: prisoners’ dilemma [two to confess, or not to confess?]: best result ‘not to confess’ = not most logical one; thus both end up in prison for 5 years Question: how to account for collective action (e.g. parties, unions, etc)? - to expect: no cooperation OR free rider: lower costs, raise benefits (if: no reason to expect low level of participation will cost much) - yet, this is not what always happens -by delegation: e.g voter and representative [= agent]; raises problem of trust, how to control the agent?
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Rational choice analysis (4) Collective action = result of factors proposed: -Patterns of cooperation result from interaction over time (but why interaction in the first place?) -One relatively powerful member within organization puts pressure on others (USA in NATO) -Actors obtain incentives elsewhere (e.g. support over other issues). EU: MS accept less optimal results since they hope to gain more on other issues [e.g. emergence of Euro] or why join or stay in NATO after 1989-1992? -Non-rational motiviations (norms, values, ideologies); however, if these are important, they would falsify basic rational choice arguments
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Ideas and Ideologies (1) New addition to field of comparative politics / AS: aims to study role of ideas PRIOR TO (independent of) interests and institutions Most studies so far tended to focus on effects of ideas on outcomes Roles to be played by ideas: shape preferences, interests and strategic options as well as institutions and organisations Quality of argument: too early to tell, yet interesting results Main problem: to show that basic tenet is correct: are ideas indeed prior to interests and institutions?
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Ideas and Ideologies (2) Examples of application approach -French Republicanism emphasizes individual rights (rather than group rights) versus state. Thus: no multiculturalist minority policies in France. Analysis of the veil issue in the public domain -European Monetary Union: formation of an ideational consensus among MS in late-1980s on the use of anti- inflationary politics; national interests were redefined in terms of this consensus on monetary policy -Social policy reform: the weight of neo-liberal, anti-state ideology, the belief that the individual is largely responsible for his or her own welfare, since the late 1980s
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Cultural analysis (1) A long tradition in social sciences and study of politics (AS) Classics: De Toqueville, Democracy in America [cultural explanation for democratic nature of US society] & Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism [cultural analysis of economic systems and development] ‘Politics [...] occurs in a cultural context that links individual and collective identities’ (Ross, 1997, 73).
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Cultural analysis (2) Thus, actor = groups, collectivities For ‘culture’ is by definition shared or inter- personal Culture = hard to define and to identify (more than just ideas; includes symbols, beliefs, norms, values, customs etc too) Most applications focus on ‘political culture’
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Cultural analysis (3) Basic claim: culture shapes preferences, interests and identities of groups and individuals. Thus cultural analysis can account for group and individual actions and behaviour Problems: - how to measure ‘culture’? [surveys] - how to show that culture causes an outcome? [danger: argument is a ‘re-description’] - some studies: primordial argument: the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis by Huntington (1993)
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Cultural analysis (4): applications -Almond & Verba (1963), Civic Culture a study of political cultures in 5 countries [Italy, USA, Germany, UK, and Mexico]: use of surveys to examine democratic (in-)stability. Many problems -Putnam (1993), Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy differences in performance of Italian regions are result of differences in social capital, social trust; civil society matters to create efficient and good government. Many problems: fascism strong in North; cause-and-effect: what comes first: vibrant civil society or democracy and efficient government? -Studies of nationalism and nation-building concepts like ‘invention of tradition’, ‘imagined communities’, ‘sites of memory’, etc: cultural artifacts that people share and upon which they act, it is claimed
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Historical institutionalism (1) Important variety of political analysis New institutionalism: emerged in 1960s and 1970s Actors: institutions = set of rules and procedures which are predictable over time and have effects on patterns of behaviour of groups and individuals Institutions: both formal and informal Institutions: define ‘rules of the game’ and act as constraints upon behaviour: they determine the ‘access’ and ‘veto’ opportunities of individuals, groups, and other collective bodies [states, etc]
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Historical institutionalism (2) Distinct features: -Institutional context shapes strategies and goals which actors (can) pursue -History matters: once on a path, one will most likely stay on it (‘path dependence’ by Pierson) because of ‘increasing returns’ [high set-up costs of rules and organisations, learning effects, preferences and expectations will adapt to context; to change is costly] -Only under specific circumstances, as ‘returns’ decrease, is change possible (‘path breaking’) -Often a comparative analysis
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Historical institutionalism: applications -Barrington Moore Jr, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy outcome struggle vested interests vs. modernizing forces will define whether country will be democratic or not -Health care reform (Immergut, 1992) CH, F & Sweden: doctors and other interested parties opposed to reform; yet ‘institutional veto’ points differed (CH, referendum: no; F: opposition parliament overcome after 1958; S: no veto points, govt could pursue reform) -Citizenship regimes policies and conventions/concepts about citizenship shape immigration and integration policies: see difference UK (multiculturalist) versus F (integrationist) (Weil & Hansen) or F (political Nation) versus G (cultural nation) (Brubaker, etc)
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Historical institutionalism: applications -Tax policy US, Sweden, UK (Steinmo, 1989) interests and values do not matter; constitutional and electoral institutions do (US: change only incremental because of dispersion of power; UK: party govt induces short-term policies; S: corporatism allows compromises and long-term focus) -Welfare state regimes and their reform (Ebbing- Andersen etc & Pierson) Models: Scandinavian, Conservative, Liberal, and – sometimes – Mediterranean: created under specific circumstances by different actors in divergent political cultures. How to adapt them to changing circumstances (ageing, globalizing economies, EU, neo-liberal notions, etc)? Can they be changed?
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Historical institutionalism: recap Argument: institutions shape interests and preferences of relevant political actors, leading to actions that confirm existent patterns (path dependency) Accounts for stability of policies, institutions, and preferences over time and for variation across countries YET, problematic to explain changes that do occur!
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