EU-Japan workshop 26/ , Tokyo 1 I. 1. Trade Union Density <10 ~25 ~80<30 Trade union members among private and public employees (%)

EU-Japan workshop 26/ , Tokyo 2 I. 2. Collective Bargaining Coverage Trade union members among private and public employees (%) Employees bound by collective bargaining <30 36

EU-Japan workshop 26/ , Tokyo 3 I. 3. Collective Bargaining Coverage Trade union members among private and public employees (%) Employees bound by collective bargaining <30 36

EU-Japan workshop 26/ , Tokyo 4 II. 1. Normative Basis of Collective Bargaining General right to bargain collectively Common senseLegal rightConstitutional right France Germany Netherlands(Netherlands) Sweden(Sweden) UK(UK)

EU-Japan workshop 26/ , Tokyo 5 II. 2. Normative Basis of Collective Bargaining The autonomy of collective bargaining Little notion of autonomy Legal autonomy with exceptions Constitutio-nal autonomy with restrictions Autonomy as common sense France Germany Netherlands Sweden UK

EU-Japan workshop 26/ , Tokyo 6 II. 3. Scope and Extensions of the Binding Effect Scope Bound are only union members Bound are union members, but duty to apply to non-union workers Bound are all employees of a bound employer France Germany(Germany) Netherlands(Netherlands) Sweden(Sweden) UK(UK)

EU-Japan workshop 26/ , Tokyo 7 II. 4. Duration of the Binding-Effect Duration of the full binding-effect of collective agreements Duration until expiry (company level) Duration until expiry or the end of membership in a contracting association Duration until expiry even if the association was left before Extended duration for one year or the con- clusion of a new coll. agreement France Germany Netherlands Sweden UK

EU-Japan workshop 26/ , Tokyo 8 II. 5. Duration of the Binding-Effect No post-effectivenessPost-effectiveness on the individual level until a new agreement is made (even to the worse) Strict post-effectiveness incorporated in the individual contract France Germany Netherlands Sweden UK Post-effectiveness as part of the individual contract

EU-Japan workshop 26/ , Tokyo 9 II.6. Binding Effect and Deviations Deviations to the disadvantage of employees through individual contract through individual contract No contracting outContracting out France Germany Netherlands Sweden UK

EU-Japan workshop 26/ , Tokyo 10 II. 7. Binding Effect and Deviations Deviations to the disadvantage of employees through agreements with work councils No works councilVery restrictedPossible if allowed by contracting associations France Germany Netherlands Sweden UK

EU-Japan workshop 26/ , Tokyo 11 III. Five Different Types France:State-organised bargaining system guided by lawin many details Germany:Dual structure with two powerful channels created by law Netherlands:Cooperative bargaining system institutionalised in bi- and triparty pacts Sweden:Effective single channel bargaining system highly accepted and perfectly flexible UK:Voluntarism suffering from weak collectivity stabilised by legal minimum standards.

EU-Japan workshop 26/ , Tokyo 12 IV. Thesis Despite similar economic and societal challenges, national systems of collective wage formation in Europe show almost no tendency to converge. Instead, each nation is trying to develop the specific strengths of its own collective bargaining system.