Progress in Using Entity-Based Monte Carlo Simulation With Explicit Treatment of C4ISR to Measure IS Metrics Corporate Headquarters: Freedom Drive Suite 800 Reston, VA (703) (703) (FAX) Simulation Sciences Division: 512 Via de la Valle Suite 301 Solana Beach, CA (858) (Voice) (858) (FAX) Simulation Sciences Division (SSD) Prepared by Dr. Bill Stevens, Metron for IS Metrics Workshop March 2000

2 OASD (C3I) Information Superiority Metrics Workshop March 2000 OUTLINE  Approach  Key Metrics Related Details –Basic Monte Carlo Metrics and Statistics –Cause-and-Effect Analysis –Sensitivity Analysis –Hypothesis Testing  Examples –CINCPACFLT IT-21 Assessment –FBE-D  Lessons-Learned and Challenges

3 OASD (C3I) Information Superiority Metrics Workshop March 2000 Entity-Based Monte Carlo Simulation with Explicit C4ISR  Provides one means to directly measure relevant IS metrics in mission-to-campaign level scenarios. Assess impact of IT and WPR improvements on warfighting outcome.  Explicit C4ISR includes representation of: –Platforms, systems, and commanders, –Command organization (group, mission, platform), –Commander’s plans and doctrine, –Information collection, –Information dissemination, –Tactical picture processing, and –Warfighting interactions.  Provides means to capture, simulate/view, and quantify the performance of alternate C4ISR architectures and warfighting plans.

4 OASD (C3I) Information Superiority Metrics Workshop March 2000 Key Metrics Related Details Basic Metrics and Statistics  Typical Monte Carlo metrics are random variables X which are computed for each replication (X n = value in replication n). Examples: –Percent of threat subs tracked/trailed/killed on D+10, –Average threat sub AOU on D+0, etc.  Three key quantities should be computed for each X:

5 OASD (C3I) Information Superiority Metrics Workshop March 2000 Key Metrics Related Details Cause-and-Effect Analysis Relate Data Recorded Above to Force Effectiveness Metrics - Force Attrition and Damage, Resources Expended, and Commander’s Objectives Attained. Example C4ISR Operational Sequence Cause-and-Effect Metrics (For Each Threat Presentation) Cause-and-Effect Metrics (Force Level) Threat emission Wide-area sensor detection Engagement sensor cue Weapon allocation Engagement BDA collection Re-engagement Record time(s) of key threat emissions. Record time, accuracy, completeness of each WAS detection. Record cue receipt times. Time from cue receipt to acquisition. Record weapon system allocation times. Record weapon launch and intercept times and engage results. Record BDA collection times, associated engage events, BDA data. WAS tasking loads vs. capacity vs. time. Percent miss- allocations vs. time. Engage sensor cueing loads vs. capacity vs. time. Percent miss- allocations vs. time. Weapon system tasking loads vs. capacity vs. time. Percent miss-allocations vs. time. BDA collection system tasking loads vs. capacity vs. time. Percent miss-allocations vs. time.

6 OASD (C3I) Information Superiority Metrics Workshop March 2000 Key Metrics Related Details Excursion Analysis  Monte Carlo runs can be organized in the form of a scenario baseline + scenario excursion sets + selected metrics and metric breakdowns. Example excursion sets: –SA-10 P k ’s:[0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6] –CV-68 VA Squadron:[squadron-x, squadron-y, squadron-z]  Resulting excursion set sensitivity graphs can be generated: Number of BLUE Fighters Killed Pk Squadron X Squadron Y Squadron Z

7 OASD (C3I) Information Superiority Metrics Workshop March 2000 Key Metrics Related Details Hypothesis Testing  Many typical study objectives can be addressed through the use of statistical hypothesis testing.  As an example, one could employ hypothesis testing to test H 0 vs. H 1 : H 0 :  X    Y H 1 :  X    Y and to thus determine whether or not squadron X is statistically more or less survivable that squadron Y for given SAM configuration.  Standard tests can be applied as a function of (  ) where  = probability of falsely rejecting(accepting) H 0. Number of BLUE Fighters Killed SAM P k Pk’Pk’ Squadron X Squadron Y XX YY

8 OASD (C3I) Information Superiority Metrics Workshop March 2000 Examples CINCPACFLT IT-21 Assessment IT-21 tactical picture is significantly improved. IT-21 tactical picture is significantly improved. More tracks and more tracks with ID info. More tracks and more tracks with ID info. Simulation revealed that IT-21 ground picture would have much improved ID rate …

9 OASD (C3I) Information Superiority Metrics Workshop March 2000 Examples CINCPACFLT IT-21 Assessment IT-21 with on-the-fly ATO: - More kills for same number of sorties - Fewer BLUE losses IT-21 with on-the-fly ATO: - More kills for same number of sorties - Fewer BLUE losses Degree of improvement: 36% more kills 46% fewer losses Degree of improvement: 36% more kills 46% fewer losses On-the-fly ATO concept was proposed to leverage the improved ID rates …

10 OASD (C3I) Information Superiority Metrics Workshop March 2000 Examples CINCPACFLT IT-21 Assessment Time Within Sensor Range Pre-positioned surveillance and engagement asset holding points. Initial Indication of Target Time Overhead/all- source detection of specific targets. Actionable Time Distributed fusion efficiencies decrease correlation times. Rapid prioritization of targets. Dynamic allocation of assets to identified targets. Better weapon to target pairings. Engagement Time Better positioned engagement assets In-flight target updates lead to shorter localization times. Assessment Time All-source BDA data married with common tactical picture. Quicker relay of BDA. Anticipatory scheduling of pre- and post- strike imagery assets shortens engagement cycle. IPB Time Faster processing and communication of annotated imagery data. Faster and surer assertion of target types. Strike OODA Loop: IT-21 Strike OODA Loop for High-Priority Targets Reduced from 13.5 to 5.5 Hours. Artillery Attrition Goal Achieved in 34 vs. 64 Hours. 50% Increase in Critical Mobile Target Kills. Combined IT and process improvements yield speed-of-command and commander’s attrition goal timeline improvements …

11 OASD (C3I) Information Superiority Metrics Workshop March 2000 Examples Fleet Battle Experiment Delta (FBE-D) The MBC/C7F hypothesized that distributed surface picture management and distributed localization/prosecution asset allocation, leveraging planned IT-21 improvements, would result in significant improvements in CSOF mission effectiveness … USN Surface Warfare Commander Picture Manager 1 Picture Manager N Battle Manager 1 Battle Manager N Distributed Surface Picture Management Nodes Distributed Battle Management Nodes Traditional Centralized C2 FBE-D Distributed C2

12 OASD (C3I) Information Superiority Metrics Workshop March 2000 Examples Fleet Battle Experiment Delta (FBE-D) M&S was employed to model the CSOF threat and US/ROK surveillance, localization, and prosecution assets. Live operators interacted with the simulation by making surveillance, localization, and prosecution asset allocations. These asset allocations were fed into the simulation in order to provide operator feedback and for the purpose of assessing the effectiveness of the experimental distributed C2 architecture. LIVE C2 Maritime CSOF Commander C2 System (LAWS) Prosecution Tasking NSS SIMULATION Attack Assets USAF AC-130 a/c, AH-64 Apaches, USAF/ROK ACC strike a/c, and USN CV strike a/c. Threat Assets nK SOF force transport boats Fusion USN C2 Ships Sensors P-3C and SH-60 Targets Sensor Reports BDA Reports Weapons

13 OASD (C3I) Information Superiority Metrics Workshop March 2000 Examples Fleet Battle Experiment Delta (FBE-D) A novel live operator-to-simulation voice and GUI based approach was employed to effect the desired virtual experimentation environment. Pictured here is the air asset interface...

14 OASD (C3I) Information Superiority Metrics Workshop March 2000 Examples Fleet Battle Experiment Delta (FBE-D) The FBE-D distributed C2 architecture plus new in-theater attack asset capabilities yielded the surprise result that the assessed CSOF threat could be countered in Day 01 of the Korean War Plan. Post-analysis, pictured below, was employed to assess the sensitivity of this result to different force laydowns.

15 OASD (C3I) Information Superiority Metrics Workshop March 2000 Lessons-Learned and Challenges Lessons-Learned C4ISR architectures and C2 decision processes can be explicitly represented at the commander, platform, and system levels. Detailed alternatives can be explicitly represented and assessed. Simulation supports detailed observation of C4ISR architecture in n-sided campaign and mission level scenarios. Facilitates/forces community to think through proposed C4ISR architectures. ID of key performance drivers and assessment of warfighting impact of technology initiatives using Monte Carlo simulation is feasible. Challenges Detailed C4ISR assessments require consideration of nearly all details associated with planning and executing a C4ISR exercise or experiment. Collection of valid platform, system, and (in particular) C2 data and assumptions for friendly and threat forces is an issue. Campaign-level decisions (e.g. determine commander’s objectives) not easily handled. Scenarios in which major re-planning (e.g. modify commander’s objectives) is warranted are not easily handled. Execution times limit the analyses which can be reasonably performed.