The Myth of the Computer April 11. Reductio ad Absurdum Is a common means of reasoning consisting of the following steps: 1.Make an assumption (X) 2.Determine.

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Presentation transcript:

The Myth of the Computer April 11

Reductio ad Absurdum Is a common means of reasoning consisting of the following steps: 1.Make an assumption (X) 2.Determine the implications of that assumption (Y) 3.If the implications are absurd, then the assumption must be false.

Evaluating RAA Are the implications (Y) really absurd? If not, the RAA is unsuccessful. Does the assumption (X) really imply Y? If not, the RAA is unsuccessful. Can the assumption (X) be modified in some minor way so that it no longer implies Y? If so, the RAA is unsuccessful.

A “Special Property” Consciousness, Awareness, Sentience, Understanding, are all words used to vaguely describe various phenomena of mental life. Searle is the most prominent among many who advance arguments to show that (ro)bots do not and cannot have some or all of the above properties.

Searle’s Purposes: 1.Searle’s argument is supposed to be a response directly to the Turing Test’s acceptability for its stated purpose. 2.Searle means to argue that two specific commitments of “strong AI” are false: 1.Mind as program 2.The Irrelevance of the neurophysiology of the brain (that is, functionalism is false)

GOFAI GOFAI, pronounced ‘Goofy’, is an acronym for Good Old-Fashioned AI used by its detractors. Searle, though a detractor, uses the term ‘Strong AI’. GOFAI is characterized by its adherence to functionalism and reliance on “writing the right program”. So, for the sake of Searle’s RAA, assume that GOFAI is true. If it is, Searle says we will have to say that the Chinese Room understands Chinese.

The Chinese Room

If it is absurd that the Chinese room understands Chinese, then the assumptions (below) are false (by RAA). –The mind is an abstract thing that is not necessarily identical with the human brain. Something could have a mind without having a human brain. –The Turing Test is an adequate criterion for determining what has a mind.

The Chinese Room The assumption behind the upshot: Searle means to claim that understanding, thinking, etc. requires a system with a semantics, not only a syntax. He argues that since digital computers have only a syntax, they are ipso facto non-thinking, non-understanding, etc. no matter how they behave.

Other Thought Experiments Consider that since you could make a digital computer out of a sack of marbles and a roll of toilet paper, you could make a functional “brain” out of the following: –Beer cans and beer –Macaroni pieces and water –The population of the Americas (Ned Block’s example) Reply (due to Bill Lycan): Shrink yourself down to the size of a largish organic molecule and wander around John Searle’s brain. You might see things that look like basketballs whizzing around and banging into each other. Would anything you see lead you to believe you were looking at the operation of a conscious mind?

Replies to the Chinese Room 1.The Systems Reply: Searle illegitimately focuses on the person in the box as lacking understanding of Chinese, while the system as a whole obviously understands Chinese. 2.The Brain Simulator Reply: Searle illegitimately claims that a simulation of mental activity isn’t mental activity. Certainly a simulated hurricane does no real damage, but on the other hand, a computer that controls an auto factory really makes cars. 3.The Other Minds Reply: Searle is in no position to say that Chinese speakers that he meets really understand their language. 4.The Intuition Reply: Ned Block says: “Searle's argument depends for its force on intuitions that certain entities do not think. But, (1) intuitions sometimes can and should be trumped and (2) perhaps we need to bring our concept of understanding in line with a reality in which certain computer robots belong to the same natural kind as humans.”