Focus Groups Experiences with Prêt à Voter Steve Schneider, University of Surrey 3 September 2010 TexPoint fonts used in EMF. Read the TexPoint manual before you delete this box.: A A A A A A

Context General observations Experience with Prêt à Voter Contents

A `usability study’ of the existing Pret a Voter prototype. “Conducting this trial will enable us to discover what inadequacies there are with the prototype system: for example, are the participants able to understand the feedback that the system provides after they have voted? The trial will also give us insight into participants' trust in the system, and whether they believe that the system really does keep their vote secret, and really does protect against modification of the cast votes. We will also be looking to gauge participants' trust in cryptographically secured voting in general. Results of this initial study will be useful for identifying and defining the requirements of a trustworthy voting system in WP1.1, and will also inform the analysis of threat models in WP2.1. Ultimately, it will inform development of the full system in WP3.2.” Trustworthy Voting Systems Project Proposal

Background discussion on voting, including security issues Introduce Prêt à Voter system. Voting Tasks Vote for a particular candidate Check a receipt (visually) Audit a ballot form Check the vote on the bulletin board Groups took place in February and March 2010, in Crawley and Birmingham in the UK Focus Group Discussion Guide

Two `younger’ (<35), two `older’ groups; average 8 per group Run by a facilitator in each case. The academics (us) did not interact directly with the groups. We watched from behind a one-way mirror. Transcripts, DVDs, and `headline notes’ provided subsequently Intention to flush out and identify views and opinions. Not systematic user trials. Caveats: Not statistically significant: sample size too small to draw general conclusions. Maybe not all have voted recently? People provide inconsistent views (this should be no surprise) Groups can be swayed or influenced by a few individuals The groups

Perception that current UK system is “old fashioned”. The current UK system is trusted. The groups did not have security concerns about their voting (“this is England”). Trust in the system is therefore taken for granted Recognition that other parts of the world might have issues with the integrity of the voting process Recognition that secrecy of the ballot was important …though most participants said they personally were not worried about disclosing their vote, or having it known. (Some contradictions here) Some seemed to see how they vote as `consumer information’ Some General Observations

Understanding of vote casting process – people able to cast votes Understanding of random order for names Less understanding of need to shred list of names Less understanding of receipt Expectation it should say who you voted for `I don’t need a receipt, I know I’ve voted’ Less understanding of audit, and hence less motivation. Therefore auditing may be unreliable Checking the receipt on the web was easy, but varying expectations and understanding of what is being checked Experience with Prêt à Voter

Concerns that the process takes longer, that there are more steps in the voting process Possibly a concern if queues could form Introducing a new technology can raise expectations that are not currently present. Receipts seemed to introduce an expectation of what should be on them, people suddenly want a receipt of how they voted. The phrase `New voting system’ also seemed to raise expectations. Green issues – comments about the amount of paper involved People wanted/suggested an electronic interface (DRE) – ATM / Tesco analogy A mix of positive and negative group reactions to the system, across age ranges: one older group, one younger group more positive, and the other two were more negative Some reactions

voters carrying out the task correctly voters understanding why the system is this way [NB lack of understanding may impact on correct operation] voters’ attitudes to security in voting systems How much understanding do we need to impart to the voting public? Why, or just how? How much `market research’ – ask vs tell? What threat models are appropriate? Insider corruption; external coercer; external hacker; eavesdropper Impact on design: Best way of handling receipts – who, how? Best way of handling audit – who, how? Issues raised

Who are the customers: The election authorities, and experts? The general public? How much fanfare? People trust the existing voting system, and are uncomfortable hearing about flaws Security (but they appear take that for granted) Verifiability (but do they want that?) Countering fraud Usability Also saving money Convenience Sales pitch?