© Michael Lacewing Conceptual schemes Michael Lacewing

An anthropological idea Different cultures and languages have different sets of concepts - different conceptual schemes One suggestion: the senses let in information, which is then interpreted, using the conceptual scheme –We don’t form ideas directly from sense experience Whorf: –We are inclined to think of language simply as a technique of expression, and not to realize that language first of all is a classification and arrangement of the stream of sensory experience which results in a certain world-order

Conceptual relativism The claim that we cannot translate from one conceptual scheme to another, so that different schemes embed different representations of reality –Whorf: all observers are not led by the same physical evidence [i.e. stream of sensory experience] to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be calibrated. However, if we can translate between schemes, there is no conceptual relativism.

Relativism and reality Some people wrongly say that people with different conceptual schemes inhabit different realities. –This supposes that language creates reality - but the world would exist even if no one spoke language. –Relativism is defended by presupposing that something is the ‘same’, but interpreted differently. Relativism rephrased: A proposition may be true in one conceptual scheme without being able to be expressed in another scheme. Therefore, no scheme can express all true propositions.

Discussion Parts of another conceptual scheme may be untranslatable - but we can use the parts we can translate to understand these, and thereby expand our conceptual scheme One conceptual scheme can express all truths, as long as it is expanded Objection: can we always combine different conceptual schemes? –E.g. blue v. green v. blue-green

Discussion If we can’t combine conceptual schemes, then different schemes can express different truths. However, we cannot argue that what is true in one conceptual scheme is false in another. Conclusion: in order to be able to state a truth, you must be able to state it!

Objection Empirical: how far can we translate between conceptual schemes? Philosophical: the relation between language and conceptual schemes that relativism presupposes is incoherent –If the conceptual scheme ‘organizes’ our experience, then ‘experience’ must be made up of ‘experiences’ –We can only identify our experiences the familiar way, using language (e.g. seeing a rose) –Any conceptual scheme that starts from these experiences will be similar to ours