the argument from reason

leibniz’s law arguments 1)All Fs are G. 2)o is not G. 3)o is not an F.

the argument from doubt 1)All material bodies are such that I can doubt their existence. 2)I am not such that I can doubt my existence. 3)I am not a material body.

the argument from reason 1)All material bodies are incapable of thinking. 2)I am not incapable of thinking 3)I am not a material body.

[I]f there had been such machines, possessing the organs and outward form of a monkey or some other animal without reason, we should not have had any means of ascertaining that they were not of the same nature as those animals. On the other hand, if there were machines which bore a resemblance to our body and imitated our actions as far as it was morally possible to do so, we should always have two very certain tests by which to recognize that, for all that, they were not real men…

The first is, that they could never use speech or other signs as we do when placing our thoughts on record for the benefit of others. For… [a machine] never arranges its speech in various ways, in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as [every] man can do…

the argument from reason 1)All material bodies are incapable of thinking. 2)I am not incapable of thinking 3)I am not a material body.

…we can easily understand a machine's being constituted so that it can utter words, and even emit some responses to action on it of a corporeal kind, which brings about a change in its organs; for instance, if it is touched in a particular part it may ask what we wish to say to it; if in another part it may exclaim that it is being hurt, and so on. But it never happens that it arranges its speech in various ways, in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as [every] man can do…

The new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game which we call the 'imitation game." It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart front the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. He knows them by labels X and Y, and at the end of the game he says either "X is A and Y is B" or "X is B and Y is A." … It is A's object in the game to try and cause C to make the wrong identification... The object of the game for the third player (B) is to help the interrogator.

We now ask the question, "What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this game?" Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions replace our original, "Can machines think?"

I believe that in about fifty years' time it will be possible, to programme computers, with a storage capacity of about 109, to make them play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator will not have more than 70 per cent chance of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning… [So] at the end of the century the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted.